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ABSTARCT 
 
The central thesis developed here is that recognition is imperative for the constitution of 
subjects under international law. The thesis addresses the failure of the prevalent theories of 
recognition of states to account for the relational element of coming-into-being of 
international subjects. I identify the notion of absolute sovereignty, the idea that states can 
entirely be independent from their external relations, as the underlying cause of this failure. 
The outcome is that, the constitutive theorists limit their perception of recognition to an act 
of sovereign consent and the declarative theorists assume that states can individually acquire 
international personality on an ipso facto basis.  
 
I employ Hegel’s theory of recognition to demonstrate that free and independent subjects 
come into being through mutual recognition, that the unity of independent self-
consciousnesses “in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is 
‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.”  States cannot be purely absolute entities which are independent 
of any relations to the external world. By applying Hegel’s notion of self-consciousness to 
the concept of statehood, we can begin to understand that the source of states’ freedom and 
independence is the unity of states in their opposition, that the sovereignty of each state can 
essentially be maintained within an international community which comprises the 
aforementioned ‘We’.  
 
The thesis, therefore, seeks to depart from the prevalent theories’ restrictive economy of 
recognition wherein statehood is constantly reproduced as a subject which, in its 
absoluteness, is complete and closed, is without any relation to its externality. I argue that, 
through a rereading of Hegel’s theory, one can gain an accurate perception of the 
international subject — contra the atomistic idea of absolutely sovereign state — as always 
in flux, constantly determined by one’s relation to its others.  Such a perception does not 
only bring to the fore the constitutively imperative role of recognition but also accounts for 
the determinative force of dynamic relations under international law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Theories of recognition of states under international law are grouped into two camps 
— the constitutive and the declarative theories. The proponents of these theories 
contemplate the relevance of the act of recognition vis-à-vis the attainment of statehood and 
international personality. The advocates of the constitutive theory perceive recognition as 
legally constitutive of new states’ international personality. An emerging entity may meet 
the criteria of statehood, however, based on the constitutive approach, the new state can only 
become a subject of international law if recognition is accorded to it by the established states. 
The rationale behind this approach is that, through recognition, established states 
demonstrate their consent to be bound by rights and obligations in relation to the new state. 
Two major problems are attributed to this approach. Firstly, the constitutive theory gained 
prominence in an age in which international law was thought to govern the relations within 
a Eurocentric family of nations. Non-member states gained membership through recognition 
which was granted on the basis that these states achieved a certain level of European 
civilisation. Even if one strips such an approach from its racist elements, the constitutive 
theory produces another problem: subjective criteria of international personality.  
 Viewed from the perspective of the constitutive theorists, attainment of international 
personality becomes contingent upon the volition of established states. In addition to failing 
to provide an objective standard by which such volition may be practiced, the proponents of 
this theory leave essential questions which determine veritable issues related to the practice 
of recognition unanswered. How many states are required to recognise a new entity for it to 
become a subject of international? What would be the effects upon an entity’s international 
personality of the fact that some states may recognise, and others may not? Can one state 
create new international subjects by merely recognising any aspiring entity? International 
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community lacks a centralised authority powered with adjudicating issues vis-à-vis the 
attainment of international personality by emerging entities. The constitutive theory may be 
understood as passing this role on to individual states, however, aforementioned practical 
concerns obscure any constitutive role that may be attached to recognition within this 
context.  
 Declarative theory’s response to these practical issues is to opt for an objective test 
for international personality. Proponents of this theory argue that a state becomes a subject 
of international law the moment an emerging entity meets the international criteria of 
statehood. Regarding the attainment of international personality as concurrent with the 
attainment of statehood, in turn, leaves no room for according any constitutive role to 
recognition. In other words, the gap, which the constitutive theorists claimed existed 
between statehood and international personality, is absent in the declarative theorists’ 
formula and this absence eliminates the need to utilise the act of recognition for constitutive 
purposes. Thus, in the declarative theorists’ perspective, this act comprises a mere political 
declaration whereby an established state acknowledges the existence of a new state. The 
statehood and the international personality of this new entity is, therefore, legally established 
irrespective of recognition from established states.  
 Among these two theories, the declarative approach is more prevalent in 
international practice. While Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention provides the often 
quoted criteria of statehood, Article 3 declares that ‘[t]he political existence of the state is 
independent of recognition by the other states.’1 Another example of the embracement of 
the declarative theory in international practice appeared in the first opinion of the Arbitration 
Commission of the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia: ‘the existence or disappearance of the 
State is a question of fact; that the effects of recognition by other States are purely 
                                               
1 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933.    
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declaratory.’2    Furthermore, Stefan Talmon informs the reader of Germany’s declared 
position vis-à-vis the question of recognition: ‘We and our partners in the EU have not 
recognised the [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. […] This is of no relevance for the 
question of the international legal personality of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as 
recognition does not have constitutive effect.’ 3 
 Pervasiveness of the declarative theory in practice ensures that recognition does not 
carry any constitutive significance. When subjected to close scrutiny, it becomes apparent 
that even the proponents of the constitutive theory do not advocate a formula wherein mutual 
relations of recognition among states are constitutive of international personality. While, in 
the declarative camp such constitutive effect is entirely denied. Constitutive theorists 
conceive recognition as a key that gains access into a family of nations but one that is used 
only at the sovereign volition of established states. Such conception lacks an intersubjective 
element of coming-into-being that mutual recognition suggests. Responding to this lack, the 
central thesis I develop here is that recognition is imperative for the constitution of subjects 
under international law. I demonstrate this imperative by adopting Hegel’s theory of 
recognition wherein free and independent subjects come into being through mutual 
recognition; such recognition comprises a dialectical unity as a result of which opposing 
self-consciousnesses can attain freedom and independence.4 
 The failure to adopt a dialectic formula for the coming-into-being of states as 
international subjects can be explained by reference to the notion of absolute sovereignty of 
states and this notion’s influence upon the constitutive and the declarative theories. Vattel’s 
prominent concept of absolute sovereignty rendered the state ‘absolutely free and 
                                               
2 Opinion No. 1, (1992) 31 ILM 1488, p. 1494.  
3 A letter of the German Foreign Office, dated 10 February 1994, (ZaöRV, 56 (1996), pp. 1007-8, 
cited in Talmon S., ‘The Constitutive Versus the Declarative Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non 
Datur?’, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 75, Issue 1, 1 January 2005, pp. 101-108, p. 
106.  
4 Hegel G.W.F., Phenomenology of Spirit, (trans. A.V. Miller) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977) p. 110.  
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independent with respect to […] all other nations, as long as it has not voluntarily submitted 
to them.’5 Therefore, the state is conceptualised as an ostensibly self-relating, self-sufficient 
atomistic substance which can actually be free from external relations. The influence of 
Vattel’s formulation of sovereignty of states upon the theories of recognition can be glanced 
in the following way. For the constitutive theorists, the act of recognition amounts to an act 
of sovereign consent without which established states cannot be bound by rights and 
obligations towards a newly emerging entity. For the declarative theorists, coming-into-
being as a state is a self-sufficient act which does not involve relating to any external entity. 
Once the criteria are fulfilled, the entity becomes a state and a subject of international law.  
 To the extent that the notion of absolute sovereignty intricately underlies these 
theories, the issue of relation as a determinative element of the very being of international 
subjects is evaded. However, as Nancy would have it, ‘[…] one cannot make a world with 
simple atoms. There has to be a clinamen. There has to be an inclination or an inclining from 
one toward the other, of one by the other, or from one to the other.’6 Therefore, rethinking 
recognition as a constitutive imperative requires reconciling the sovereign quality of 
statehood with the perception that states exist within an international community. 
Accordingly, in this thesis I achieve this reconciliation first by questioning the tenability of 
Vattel’s formula of absolute sovereignty and the type of international subject which this 
formula generates in conjunction with the prevalent theories of recognition. In its 
absoluteness, this subject is complete and closed, it is without any relation to its externality.  
 Second, I depart from the idea of the subject as complete-in-itself and reconceive the 
international subject as always in flux, in relation with an other, and is determined by this 
relation. To achieve this reconception, I apply Hegel’s theory of recognition to the issue of 
international personality. I show that the dialectical understanding of the constitution of the 
                                               
5 Vattel E., The Law of Nations, (Indianapolis: Library Funds Inc., 2008) p.83.  
6 Nancy JL., The Inoperative Community, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) p.3.  
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international subject entails gaining independence and freedom through continuous and 
mutual relations of recognition. Inasmuch as this dialectical understanding can be adopted 
to account for sovereign singularities of states, it does also incorporate the dynamic relations 
among states as a determinant force, as a constitutive imperative which constantly shapes 
each state’s personality.   
 
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter One 
 In the first two chapters, I provide a case study of the Turkish Cypriot community. 
The purpose of this study is twofold. Firstly, I demonstrate the way in which recognition is 
determinative, in practice, of the very being of an entity. The second purpose of the case 
study is to expose the rigid practice behind international community’s act of according 
personality to entities under international law. To achieve these purposes, in the first chapter, 
I introduce the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and delineate the share of 
sovereign power Turkish Cypriots enjoyed under this constitution. These powers form the 
departure point of the study wherein I portray Turkish Cypriots’ struggles to regain any form 
of sovereign assertion after the community lost its share in the interethnic conflict of 1963. 
While I consider the community's struggles in more detail in the second chapter, I use the 
first chapter to establish the parties with whom Turkish Cypriots had relations that 
determined the being of this community. In this regard, I refer to Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots’ anti-colonial struggles against the British and how, during this period, the 
islanders’ connections with mainland Turkey and Greece affected their post-colonial future.  
 I demonstrate a web of relations that resulted in the establishment of the Republic of 
Cyprus wherein Turkish Cypriots had to cooperate with their Greek counterparts to maintain 
their communal well-being in a bi-communal state structure. I also show how the 
antagonistic relations among the communities resulted in the collapse of this state structure 
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and dragged the Turkish Cypriot community into a political impasse. Therefore, in the first 
chapter, I emphasise the relational element of coming-into-being by demonstrating that the 
1960 constitution, which defined the Turkish Cypriot community, was the product of an 
attempt to appease the requirements of a couple of external powers, namely, Turkey and 
Greece, and, as such, blatantly disregarded the political ambitions of the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot communities. I begin the second chapter by tracing the effects of such disregard on 
the short lifespan of the constitutional setup of the new Republic.  
 
Chapter Two  
 In this chapter, I present a range of historical events that led to Turkish Cypriots’ 
unilateral declaration of independence in the northern region of the island. The starting point 
is the collapse of the constitutional structure of the island in 1963 due to interethnic conflict 
that erupted as a result of the communities’ antagonistic ambitions for the future of the new 
Republic. I explain how this collapse ousted Turkish Cypriots from the governmental 
positions and commenced a long and futile process of negotiations to restore the 
constitutional order on a bi-communal basis. I, then, consider two military interferences on 
the island in the year of 1974 which geographically separated the communities and rendered 
reconciliation among them much more difficult. Following a series of yet another round of 
futile negotiations, Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared independence in 1983 that was 
instantly rejected by the international community with a resolution of the Security Council 
of the United Nations which called all of its members not to recognise the Turkish Cypriot 
state. 
 Therefore, in this chapter, my focus is upon a chain of events that comprises Turkish 
Cypriots’ efforts to regain the level of sovereignty provided by the 1960 constitution in order 
to ensure the survival of the community and the eventual manifestation of these efforts as a 
struggle for recognition. I argue that international non-recognition determines the very being 
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of the Turkish Cypriot community by majorly contributing to the political impasse that 
surrounds the community and to the existential crisis that this impasse generates. In addition 
to emphasising the central role of recognition vis-à-vis the being of an entity, the second 
overall purpose of the case study is to expose the rigid practice behind international 
community’s act of according personality to entities under international law. The futility of 
Turkish Cypriots’ long struggle to regain any form of sovereign assertion — either by trying 
to solve the Cyprus problem or striving for international recognition of an independent 
Turkish Cypriot state — provides an opportunity to assess international community’s 
response to dire consequences that this futility entails. To the extent that the Turkish Cypriot 
community cannot benefit from the 1960 constitutional setup and cannot protect itself 
against political vulnerabilities of economic dependence, the existence of the community is 
threatened. Non-recognition of a Turkish Cypriot state, however, renders this community’s 
international personality conditional upon the resolution of the Cyprus problem — a problem 
which have been proving, for more than half a century, to be irresolvable. Therefore, through 
the case study, I establish that, despite the evident existential cul-de-sac, international law 
fails to provide Turkish Cypriots with any meaningful safeguards to maintain their 
communal being.   
 In the next chapter, I build upon the first argument of this case study that recognition 
is necessary in practice to maintain one’s personality under international law. In view of this 
necessity, I offer an analysis of the prevalent theories of recognition of states under 
international law to demonstrate whether such necessity is met by these theories. I return to 
the second argument of the study regarding the inflexibility of international community’s 
approach vis-à-vis international personality later on in the thesis to distinguish between a 
restrictive and a general economy of recognition. 
 
 
   15
Chapter Three   
 After establishing recognition as a necessary element in achieving international 
personality in the previous chapters, in Chapter Three, I question whether the prevalent 
theories of recognition of states accommodate such necessity. I introduce the constitutive 
theory of recognition by referring to the respective works of Oppenheim, Lauterpacht, and 
Kelsen.7 Despite certain disparities between their views, the works of these eminent scholars 
help us grasp the elemental aspects of the constitutional theory: that the act of recognition is 
legally constitutive of a newly emerging state’s international personality; that this act 
operates as a form of consent by which established states agree to be bound by rights or 
obligations towards this new entity; that without recognition, statehood can be separated 
from international personality; that the lack of a central authority under international law to 
determine personality necessitates such a state-centric approach to recognition.  
 I refer primarily to the works of Hall, Williams, and Chen to draw a general 
framework of the declarative approach to the issue of recognition.8 The fundamental features 
of the declarative theory that I discern from the works of the aforementioned scholars are 
the following: the declarative theory rejects the subjective and ostensibly arbitrary approach 
to the determination of international personality; this rejection extends to the separation of 
statehood from international personality; as a result of the latter rejection, states are deemed 
ipso facto subjects of international law basing the criteria of personality, in turn, upon the 
objective test of statehood; the ipso facto basis of international personality does also 
circumvent the lack of a central authority under international law which can determine 
statehood or personality.    
                                               
7 Oppenheim L., International Law, vol. I., Peace, (1st Ed.), (London: Longman, 1905); Lauterpacht H., 
Recognition in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947); Kelsen H., ‘Recognition 
in International Law Theoretical Observations’, 35 American Journal of International Law, 1941.  
8 Hall W.E., Treatise on International Law, (4th Ed), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895); Williams J.F., 
‘Recognition’, Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol. 15, Problems of Peace and War, 53, 1929 Chen T-
C., The International Law of Recognition, (Edited by L.C. Green) (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1951).   
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 The overall outcome of my assessment of the prominent theories of recognition is 
that, for declarative theorists, the moment an entity meets the criteria of statehood it 
becomes, ipso facto, a subject of international law; therefore, recognition is perceived as a 
declarative act of merely political significance. For the constitutive theorists, recognition is 
deemed a sovereign act of consent which can be arbitrarily and subjectively granted to new 
entities turning these entities into new states. Although the adherents of the latter theory 
argue for a legally constitutive role for recognition, they fail to ground this argument upon 
a practical and objective basis. I draw two conclusions from the overall assessment.  
 The first conclusion is that, underlying the prevalent theories of recognition is the 
notion of statehood as absolutely sovereign. I introduce the notion of absolute sovereignty 
by tracing its historical development via the works of Bodin, Hobbes, Grotius, and Vattel. I 
demonstrate that Bodin and Hobbes respectively thought of sovereignty as absolute but did 
so at the level of internality.9 This level concerned a sovereign’s relations with its subjects. 
Whereas, with Grotius’ and Vattel’s separate works, the absoluteness of state sovereignty 
found an external domain of applicability.10 States were deemed absolutely independent of 
each other, suggesting that statehood can be complete-in-itself and entirely free of external 
dependencies.  The first conclusion which I draw above refers to the absoluteness of state 
sovereignty at this external level.  
 I argue that, with regard to the constitutive theory, the underlying notion of absolute 
sovereignty is manifest in the perception of recognition as a sovereign act of consent. This 
perception suggests that states’ absolute freedom of external dependencies cannot be 
contravened unless states consent to be bound by rights and obligations towards new entities. 
For the declarative theory, it is manifest in the attainment of international personality on an 
                                               
9 Bodin J., On Sovereignty – Four chapters from the Six Books of The Commonwealth, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992); Hobbes T., Leviathan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).  
10 Grotius H., The Rights of War and Peace, Book I (Indiana: Liberty Fund Inc., 2005); Vattel E., The Law of 
Nations, (Indianapolis: Library Fund Inc., 2008). 
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ipso facto basis which suggests that there is no need for the states to interact with each other 
when coming-into-being as international subjects.  
 In light of these manifestations, my second conclusion is that neither of the theories 
asks the conceptual question of the other’s role in establishing the international personality 
of each subject. This conclusion sets the purpose of my next chapter. Therefore, in what 
follows, I employ a theory of coming-into-being of the subject which incorporates 
recognition as a constitutive modus operandi. Departing from the prominent theories of 
recognition, this theory has to account for the role an entity’s relation to another entity plays 
in determining each other’s being. 
 
Chapter Four 
 In this chapter, I introduce Hegel’s theory of recognition to account for the 
ontologically imperative role one’s relation to an other has in constituting both entities as 
subjects. Hegel developed his theory of recognition by explaining how self’s transformation 
into a self-conscious, free and independent subject is contingent upon mutual recognition 
between self and its other; that this transformation takes place through a dialectical 
movement wherein self moves out of itself into the encountered self, and then moves back 
into itself as the encountered self reciprocates the same constitutive movements.11  
 By turning to Hegel’s theory of recognition to explain the constitution of the 
international subject, I follow the works of three authors who used Hegel’s theory to account 
for different forms of subjects. The first author is Axel Honneth who built his notion of the 
moral subject upon the intersubjective element of Hegel’s theory of recognition.12 The 
second author is Charles Taylor who based his notion of the cultural subject upon an 
                                               
11 Hegel, op. cit, at pp. 109, 110. 
12 Honneth A., Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1995).  
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Hegelian understanding of historical progress through claims of recognition.13 The third 
author is Costas Douzinas who argued that the legal subject (or subject of rights) is 
determined by one’s relation to its other(s).14 While these authors provided key examples of 
ways in which Hegel’s theory of recognition can be utilised to explain the coming-into-being 
of various forms of subjects, a certain challenge remains vis-à-vis the incorporation of the 
dialectic of master and slave within the context of international law.  
 Inasmuch as his theory can account for the constitutive element of mutual 
recognition among two parties, the fact remains that Hegel’s account of recognition 
culminates in the relation between a master and a slave. Both Taylor and Douzinas 
interpreted this relation as a moment which has to be overcome on the way to achieving 
one’s identity. For Taylor, master and slave marked a historic epoch in which personal 
identity was based upon grant of honours. For Douzinas, it constituted a narcissist phase of 
consciousness which desired the subjugation of its other but is later overtaken by mutual 
recognition. The utilisation of Hegel’s theory for the purposes of this thesis, therefore, 
necessitates the grasping of challenges posed by the dialectic of master and slave within the 
context of international law. In the next chapter, I turn to Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel’s 
work to understand certain repercussions of the dialectic which may be relevant to the 
aforementioned context.  
 
Chapter Five 
 In this chapter, I begin to scrutinise the difficulties one may face in attempting to 
abstract Hegel’s theory of recognition from its overall context. As I pointed out in the 
previous chapter, the dialectic of lordship and bondsman forms the major part of Hegel’s 
                                               
13 Taylor C. ‘Politics of Recognition’ in Taylor C., et.al., Multiculturalism, (Amy Gutmann (Ed.)), (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
14 Douzinas C., ‘Identity, Recognition, Rights or What Hegel Teach Us About Human Rights?’, Journal of 
Law and Society, vol. 29, No3, September, 2002. 
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theory and previously mentioned authors who employed this theory had to overcome, in 
various ways, the challenges the dialectic posed. In this chapter, I turn to Kojève’s 
interpretation of Hegel’s work wherein the former placed lordship and bondsman at the 
centre of his reading.15 I demonstrate that Kojève understood the struggle between master 
and slave as the driving force of historical progress. According to Kojève, this progress 
reaches its teleological end by the reconciliation of the struggle. Kojève’s historicism and 
his teleological approach provide insights into certain challenges which may be relevant in 
the international law context.   
 According to Kojève, effects of the dialectic of master and slave are twofold. Firstly, 
the dialectic sets the historical context within which recognition takes place. This context 
consists of the anthropogenetic generation of human society which is brought about via a 
desire for recognition. Secondly, the dialectic serves a teleological purpose which is 
completed by bringing an end to history with the attainment of the universal and the 
homogenous state. Therein lies the challenge to utilising Hegel’s theory of recognition 
within the context of international law. I argue that Kojève’s historical contextualisation of 
the theory of recognition hinders my overall attempt to use Hegel’s theory to reconceive the 
constitution of the international subject, that the teleological progress towards a universal 
and homogenous state misplaces my attempt to deviate from the state-centric orientation of 
the prevalent theories of recognition under international law.  
 My attempt to circumvent the challenge posed by the dialectic of master and slave 
through Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel’s work consists of two steps. First, I contest the 
Kojèvean understanding that in Hegel’s work, human society is oriented towards a 
teleological end. I rely upon Frederic Jameson’s counterargument that the dialectical 
perception of the notion of society plunges this notion into a perpetual flux.16 This reliance 
                                               
15 Kojève A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1969) 
16 Jameson F., The Hegelian Variations: On the Phenomenology of Spirit, (London: Verso, 2010). 
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entails a detour into Hegel’s thoughts on Sophocles’ tragic play Antigone as Jameson derived 
his argument from Hegel’s understanding of the opposition of ethical substances that the 
primary characters of the play — Creon and Antigone — represented. This is an opposition 
which, as Jameson interpreted, led to the destruction of the ethical order and, in turn, 
enhanced the mortality of social forms in Hegel’s thought.  
 Second, I refer to Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading of the notion of negativity to 
demonstrate that the perpetual flux pertains not only to Hegel’s thoughts on the notion of 
society but also to his theory of recognition.17 Nancy understood the concept of negativity 
— that is to say, the core element of Hegel’s theory of recognition — to be restless. This 
restlessness informs a form of subject which is always in a transformative relation with its 
other. Therefore, the subject is re-conceived as becoming which can never have a beginning 
nor a teleological end. According to Nancy, the restless subject is always in flux, in relation 
and is continuously determined by this relation. Relying upon Nancy’s reinterpretation of 
Hegel’s thought, I argue that a fresh understanding of the theory of recognition can 
incorporate the determinant force of dynamic relation and, as such, counter the perception 
of international personality as rigidly closed and complete-in-itself.  
 In the next chapter, I distinguish between the restrictive economy of the prevalent 
theories of recognition of states under international law and the general economy of the 
recognition of a restless subject. In order to draw this distinction, I benefit from a paradox 
inherent to Hegel’s theory of recognition. This is a paradox which can help us understand 
the reasons for the constitutive and the declarative theorists’ failure to account for the 
constitutive role of one’s relation to its other. Furthermore, a close scrutiny of the paradox 
also shows that my departure from the position of the prevalent theories to a renewed 
perception of recognition does not amount to an implausible leap.   
                                               
17 Nancy JL., Hegel: Restlessness of the Negative, (trans. J. Smith, S. Miller), (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002). 
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Chapter Six 
 In this chapter, I turn to another set of Kojève’s lectures on Hegel’s thought to bring 
to the fore the aforementioned paradox.18 These lectures consist of Kojève’s interpretation 
of Hegel’s work as a philosophy of death. The interpretation centres upon discovering a 
conceptual link between the notions of negativity and death within Hegel’s account of the 
life and death struggle. As this struggle precedes, and, therefore, sets up the scene for the 
dialectic of lordship and bondsman, Kojève argued that man’s freedom is contingent upon 
an encounter with death wherein one has to risk his animal life to attain recognition of his 
humanness. The paradox pertains to the impossibility of encountering death and remaining 
alive at the same time.  
 I rely upon Bataille’s critique of Kojève’s interpretation to elaborate upon this 
impossibility.19 Bataille argued that absolute negativity, indeed, corresponded to death or 
nothingness in Hegel’s work, and, as such, it established the vast scope of Hegel’s 
philosophy. The rejection of fear of death, according to Bataille, marked the moment of an 
authentic sovereignty wherein limits set by this fear is transgressed. However, Bataille also 
demonstrated that within the dialectic of lordship and bondsman, absolute negativity (and 
its very philosophical potential) was held in check with abstract negativity whereby neither 
of the participants die in the life and death struggle nor the fear of death is overcome. 
Inasmuch as holding absolute negativity or actual death in check is necessary for attaining 
the meaning of the master’s discourse (for if one of the parties to the life and death struggle 
were to die, such meaning would be lost) it does also entail the subjugation of what Bataille 
called authentic sovereignty to the servile operation of the Hegelian dialectic.  
                                               
18 Kojève A., ‘The Idea of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel’, in Keenan D.K. (editor), Hegel and 
Contemporary Continental Philosophy, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004).  
19 Bataille G., ‘Hegel, Death and Sacrifice’ in Botting F., Wilson S. (editors), The Bataille Reader, (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1997) 
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 Derrida interpreted this subjugation as a restricted economy of lordship which 
limited the outcome of recognition to the production, reproduction and circulation of servile 
subjects.20 Derrida also pointed out that the subterfuge with which Hegel achieved this 
economy hides the true potential of the latter’s philosophy, a blind spot which is capable of 
subsuming the Hegelian discourse and of transgressing its limits.  
 I draw upon Derrida’s notion of restricted economy to argue that the constitutive and 
the declarative theorists’ aforementioned failure is the product of a similar restricted 
economy of recognition. My contention is that the overarching effect of the underlying 
notion of absolute sovereignty, which I demonstrate in the third chapter, can be explained 
as engendering such a restrictive economy. By upholding the elements of absolute 
sovereignty of states, the prevalent theories of recognition are at the service of producing, 
reproducing and circulating statehood as the sole subject of international law. In other words, 
recognition serves the production of the aforementioned subject which is ostensibly 
complete-in-itself and free of all external dependencies. 
 Viewing the failure of the prevalent theories within the framework of such a 
restrictive economy, in turn, illuminates the international community’s reluctance to 
recognise personalities which may transgress the discourse of statehood. The outcome of 
such an economy is that the fluidity of the problems faced by the Turkish Cypriot community 
is met by a steadfast once-and-for-all decision of the Security Council of the United Nations 
which does not accommodate the flux of the continuous struggle to maintain one’s very 
being. However, respective thoughts of Bataille, Derrida and (as I demonstrate in the fifth 
chapter) Nancy converge on the idea that the restricted economy of recognition can be 
overcome by grasping the full potential of Hegel’s notion of negativity. 
 I maintain that the restrictive economy of the theory of recognition of states under 
international law can also be overcome, that the aforementioned failure of the prevalent 
                                               
20 Derrida J., Writing and Difference, (London: Routledge Classics, 2001).  
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theories also carries the potential to transgress the limits set upon these theories by the 
underlying element of the notion of absolute sovereignty.  Albeit, such transgression will 
have to subsume or sacrifice the very problematic and limiting discourse of the so-called 
absoluteness of the sovereignty of states and to discover that even in its true nature, absolute 
is not without a relation, that self-relation would render absolute self-same and static, and 
finally, that absolute’s inevitable relation to non-absolute establishes recognition as a 
constitutive imperative. In the conclusion of the thesis I revisit the problems presented by 
the case study of the Turkish Cypriot community and reflect upon the ways in which a 
general economy of recognition can assist us in resolving the major problems this study 
highlights. 
 
Conclusion   
 I begin the conclusion of the thesis by recapitulating my argument on the failure of 
the prevalent theories of recognition under international law. I repeat my assertion that the 
constitutive and the declarative theories fail to account for the constitutive role of one’s 
relation to its other. The constitutive theorists render recognition a sovereign act of consent 
with the corresponding impractical and arbitrary power to create states out of entities. The 
declarative theorists’ reaction to this arbitrariness is to deem recognition a political act of 
declaration and grasp international personality as concomitant with achieving statehood on 
an individualistic basis.  In light of the Hegelian approach utilised throughout the thesis, I 
argue that one’s relation to its other has an imperatively constitutive role in both establishing 
and continuously determining the very beings of entities involved.  
 Reflecting back upon the case study of the Turkish Cypriot community, I 
demonstrate the manner in which taking into account the imperative force of relation 
necessitates rethinking the constitution of international subject. The case study is of a 
community which finds itself in the political impasse of the Cyprus problem. On the one 
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hand, this problem prevents Turkish Cypriots from having access to a recognised state. On 
the other hand, international non-recognition of the unilaterally declared independence of a 
Turkish Cypriot state (based on the illegality of this declaration) plunges the community into 
an existential crisis. However, with forty-plus years of struggle (and relative success) to 
organise itself, Turkish Cypriots create de facto governments which govern a set population 
over a defined territory seemingly fitting the criteria of statehood but for the aforementioned 
illegality. I argue that, it is at this juncture of continuously attributing illegality to a Turkish 
Cypriot state (and, therefore, to Turkish Cypriot international personality) where imperative 
force of relation can help us attain a better understanding of the constitution of international 
subjects. Both the aforementioned failure of prevalent theories of recognition and 
international community’s reluctance to recognise a Turkish Cypriot state point towards a 
once-and-for-all act of recognising statehood as a subject which is closed and complete in-
itself. Such an act of recognition, in turn, ensures that any later problems which may arise 
within the closed subjects will have to remain trapped in these complete closed-ness.  
 This once-and-for-all act of recognition (or non-recognition) disregards the 
imperative force of relation in continuously determining subjects (which, therefore, come to 
be always in flux, always subject to change). Vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriot case study, the 
effect of this disregard is manifest in continuing to attribute illegality to the idea of a Turkish 
Cypriot state in the north of the island despite the fact that the current political juncture of 
the Cyprus problem threatens the very being of the Turkish Cypriot community. As the 
community struggles to overcome what is proving to be the insurmountable political 
impasse of the Cyprus problem, the ever-increasing economic dependence upon and ensuing 
political interference by Turkey, and international non-recognition result in an existential 
crisis.  
 I conclude by arguing that, in its current restrictive form, international recognition 
remains the major contributor to the aforementioned existential crisis, that, by only taking 
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into account the imperative force of relation — in this case study, Turkish Cypriots’ 
continuous act of relating to Greek Cypriots and other parties involved in the Cyprus 
problem, namely Greece, Turkey, Britain, the European Union and the United Nations — 
can one remedy the ongoing injustice of once-and-for-all determination of the Turkish 
Cypriot international personality. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Case Study Part One: The Constitutional Setup of the Republic of Cyprus 
 
Introduction  
 In the overall scheme of the thesis, I argue that recognition is imperative for the 
constitution of subjects under international law. I build this argument upon two premises. 
The first premise is that relations of recognition shape the very being of communities. In 
other words, the coming-into-being of entities are relational. The second premise is that the 
prevalent theories of recognition of states under international law fail to account for this 
necessity. The purpose of the current and the next chapters is to demonstrate the first premise 
with a case study on the Turkish Cypriot community. I engage with the second premise in 
the third chapter.  
 Two major events in the recent history of the Turkish Cypriot community are 
relevant to achieving the purpose of the first two chapters. The first event is Turkish 
Cypriots’ unilateral declaration of independence and the ensuing refusal, of the international 
community, to recognise this independence. Through an analysis of the declaration and its 
rejection, I substantiate the role recognition plays in determining the very being of a 
community. In the Turkish Cypriot example, the effects of withholding recognition include 
exclusion from the international community, ever increasing economic dependence upon 
another country, and the resultant existential vulnerability against political manipulation.   
 The second event is the unsuccessful referendum held on the proposed plan to 
resolve the constitutional crises and reunite the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities of 
the island. The historical progress toward and the outcome of the referendum set the context 
of Turkish Cypriots’ communal struggles. This context consists of a political impasse the 
disentanglement of which depends not only upon the actions of the Turkish Cypriot 
community but also upon the deeds of others who relate to this community. For instance, 
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Greek Cypriots’ reluctance to solve the Cyprus problem and the ensuing ‘no’ vote (despite 
Turkish Cypriots’ ‘yes’ vote) in the referendum prevent   Turkish Cypriots from using their 
share of sovereign power of the Republic of Cyprus. In addition, Turkey’s economic 
engulfment of the Turkish Cypriot community and the resultant political repercussions 
instigate the demographic disintegration of the community. As the community lacks the 
necessary means to solve these issues, it is its external relations which continue to shape the 
community’s existence.   
 An additional purpose of the case study is to expose the rigid practice behind the 
international community’s act of conferring legal personality to entities under international 
law. I achieve this purpose by showing that international community is obstinately 
disinclined to take into account the relational element of coming-into-being. I argue that, in 
relation to the Turkish Cypriot community, this disinclination is manifest in the international 
community’s refusal to review the decision to withhold recognition. This decision appears 
to be made on a once-and-for-all basis and its review is ostensibly out of the question even 
in light of the fact that the failed referendum and the increasing economic dependence is 
dragging Turkish Cypriots into oblivion as a community.  
 The recent history of the Turkish Cypriot community’s struggles constitutes an 
appropriate topic for the case study in two ways. Firstly, the community is defined and its 
existence is safeguarded by the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. The 
establishment of this Republic and the ensuing collapse of its constitutional setup involves 
several actors. This involvement, in turn, provides an opportunity to examine the Turkish 
Cypriot community’s relations with these actors and understand the determinative effects 
these relations have upon the very being of the community. Due to the infamous Cyprus 
problem which led to the aforementioned collapse, the community cannot benefit from the 
relevant provisions of the constitution and, as such, remains outside of the state structure 
and the constitutional set-up of the Republic of Cyprus. Secondly, therefore, the exterior 
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position of the community accentuates the effects of international non-recognition of 
Turkish Cypriots’ unilateral declaration of independence allowing one to draw clear 
conclusions vis-à-vis the necessity of recognition and international law’s rigid approach 
against the relational element of coming-into-being.21    
 In this chapter, I begin the case study with a focus upon the manner in which the 
1960 constitution defined the Turkish Cypriot community and secured its existence. 
Thus, in the first part of the study, I present the constitutional division of the sovereign 
power among Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. This division entailed a bi-
communal state structure wherein Turkish Cypriots enjoyed a share of legislative, 
executive and judicial powers that were meticulously balanced against any overwhelming 
use of these powers by the Greek majority. Insofar as the constitutional provisions 
ensured that Turkish Cypriots participated in the running of the state on a politically equal 
                                               
21 The Turkish Cypriot case study displays certain similarities to cases that emerged in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These cases also feature non-recognised entities that 
are situated within the boundaries of parent states and struggle to gain independence with the economic and 
military support of a third state. The gist of each study is that a frozen conflict or a political impasse constitute 
the status quo trapping each entity within a condition of continuous dependence and political vulnerability. 
Factors that determine the fate of the self-proclaimed republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, for instance, are that the 
entity is located within Azerbaijan, the majority of its population is ethnically composed of Armenians, and it 
has unilaterally declared independence that is recognised solely by Armenia. Thus, the entity, despite de facto 
compliance with the criteria of statehood, is heavily dependent upon economic and military support of Armenia 
and cannot escape this state of dependence due to the futility of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
The Republic of Abkhazia is another example in which the entity’s struggle against the parent state of Georgia 
is supported by another state, namely Russia, with the resultant unilateral declaration of independence. This 
declaration is recognised by a small number of states. Similar to the previous case, however, the political 
impasse between Russia and Georgia continues to affect the very being of Abkhazia. In another case, 
assimilation of the South Ossetians into Russia through extensive grants of Russian passports demonstrates the 
type of threat against the existence of the small communities of non-recognised states. The reasons for 
presenting a singular case study herein, instead of a comparative one that includes above-mentioned cases of 
the post-USSR era, are twofold. Firstly, a concentrated focus is necessary for the analysis of a complex set of 
events that resulted in a loss of both internal and external forms of autonomy or sovereignty. Sovereignty (or 
sovereign assertion of rights) is necessary to maintain an independent political will which is, in turn, crucial 
for the existence of a community, especially for one that is isolated from the constitutional structure of the 
parent state. A singular focus permits a more complete demonstration of such loss of sovereignty, constitutional 
isolation, and ensuing threats to one’s existence. Secondly, in the case of the Turkish Cypriot community, the 
loss of sovereign share of state power took place in 1963 providing a longer period of political impasse in 
which the repercussions of lack of international personality can be clearly assessed compared to the emergence 
of post-USSR entities in the early 1990s. An additional benefit of this longer period of impasse is that it reveals 
the economic dependence of the non-recognised entity upon the sponsor state as unsustainable and as a major 
contributor to the political manipulation of the entity. References to the aforementioned post-USSR republics 
are from separate case studies presented in Walter C., Von Ungern-Sternberg A., Abushov K. (editors), Self-
Determination and Secession in International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).              
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footing with Greek Cypriots, these provisions also accorded exclusive powers to each 
community for their respective communal internal affairs.     
 In the second part of the study, I consider a time period in which decolonisation 
of Cyprus from the British rule took place. The relations that occurred throughout this 
period were not limited to a single-dimensional conflict between the coloniser and the 
colonised; that is say, between the British and the Cypriots. The Greek and the Turkish 
Cypriot communities had an antagonistic relationship based on mutual mistrust of each 
other’s ideological stances. Both communities respectively turned to their so-called 
mother-countries, that is to say, Greece and Turkey, for inspiration and liberation. 
However, it was a confrontational relationship among these mother-countries which 
ultimately led to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. In other words, the 
decolonisation of Cyprus manifestly demonstrated a set of relations that have been 
defining the very beings of the two Cypriot communities ever since the inception of the 
Republic.   
 Throughout the second part of the chapter, therefore, I introduce the parties to the 
Cyprus problem and outline the hostility inherent to relations among them. First, I present 
the Greek Cypriot community by focusing upon this community’s anti-colonial struggles 
which was epitomised by the idea of unification with Greece. Second, I introduce the 
Turkish Cypriot community by referring to their reaction to the idea of unification. This 
reaction found its expression in the idea of separation of the island into Greek and 
Turkish-ruled regions. Third, I refer to the manner in which the agreement between 
mainland Greece and Turkey was instrumental in establishing a new republic in which 
neither the Greek nor the Turkish Communities of Cyprus achieved their ultimate aims 
of above-mentioned unification or separation.  
 In the final part of the current chapter, I evaluate the communities’ reactions to 
the establishment of the new republic. The outcome is that neither of the communities 
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accepted the settlement and carried on working for their pre-1960 ambitions. A network 
of relations resulted in the drafting of the 1960 constitution the provisions of which 
safeguarded the very being of the Turkish Cypriot community. The rejection of these 
provisions as an ultimate solution ensured that this network later occasioned the collapse 
of the constitutional structure paving the way for the geographical separation of the 
Cypriot communities. Therefore, in this chapter, I bring to the fore the relational element 
of coming-into-being by focusing upon the role of the parties within the web of the 
Cyprus conflict. In the next chapter, I show how, in the aftermath of the separation, this 
relational element clearly manifested itself as a question of recognition. 
 
Part One 
1.1. Introduction  
 Until the year of 1960, Cyprus remained a Crown Colony under the British rule. 
With the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus on 16th August, Britain formally 
relinquished its sovereignty over the island. The first article of the 1960 constitution asserted 
the sovereignty of a new state:  
The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with 
a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-
President being Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish 
Communities of Cyprus respectively as hereinafter in this 
Constitution provided.22    
The purpose of this part of the chapter is to determine Turkish Cypriots’ share of sovereign 
power within the new republic. To achieve this purpose, in what follows, first, I present the 
bi-communal state structure and then delineate the constitutional positions occupied by 
                                               
22 Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
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Turkish Cypriots within the structure. Finally, I briefly outline the extent of constitutional 
power Turkish Cypriots enjoyed in these positions.  
 
1.2. The State Structure  
 As observed above, Article 1 of the 1960 constitution provided for a presidential 
regime. The executive power of the regime is entrusted to the president and the vice-
president of the Republic.23 For the exercise of this power, the presidency of the Republic is 
supported by a Council of Ministers members of which are nominated by the president and 
the vice-president.24 The legislative power of the new state is divided among the House of 
Representatives25 and two Communal Chambers — one Greek and the other one Turkish 
Chambers.26 The Supreme Constitutional Court,27  the High Court of Justice, and the 
subordinate courts28 form the judiciary of the new republic.   
 Many authors are in agreement that the 1960 constitution created a bi-communal 
state structure. In this regard, Kyriakides wrote about the ‘strong bi-communal character’ of 
the 1960 constitution.29 In an attempt to emphasise the bi-communality of the state, Özersay 
drew readers’ attention to the fact that nowhere in the constitution reference to a uniform 
Cypriot Nation could be found and in its stead, all the provisions of the constitution are 
directed towards two separate communities of the island.30 In addition, Necatigil referred to 
the constitutional arrangements as ‘a functional federative system’ which provided for ‘the 
                                               
23 Article 46. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Article 61. 
26 Articles 86 and 87. 
27 Article 133 (1). 
28 Article 152 (1). 
29 Kyriakides S., Cyprus – Constitutionalism and Crisis Government, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1968) pp. 55,56. 
30 Özersay K., Kıbrıs Sorunu: Hukuksal İnceleme (Cyprus Problem: Legal Investigation), (Ankara: Ankara 
Üniversitesi Basım Evi, 2009) p.39. 
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partnership and co-founder status of the communities, the bi-communality of the state, and 
the dichotomy of functions and powers between the state and the communities.’31  
 In contrast to Necatigil, Dodd found the notion of ‘functional federation’ illogical: 
‘There is little point in referring to it as a “functional” federation, as is often the case, since 
all federations are organised on the basis of functions.’32 Instead, Dodd preferred to call the 
constitutional arrangements of the new Republic a ‘communal federation’ based on the fact 
that the arrangements did not create a ‘geographical federation.’33 Although these authors 
brought the issue of federalism into the debate concerning the nature of the 1960 
constitution, it must be noted that the constitution does not involve terms such as 
‘federalism’ or ‘federal state(s)’. Accordingly, any discussion of federalism or probable 
federal systems of Cyprus is avoided in this case study.   
 Instead of the issue of federalism, the focus of this part of the chapter remains upon 
what Kızılyürek emphasised as the basic principle of the 1960 constitution – the sharing of 
sovereignty among the Greek and the Turkish communities.34 In their analysis of the 
constitutional provisions of the Republic, Kızılyürek and Erhürman pointed out that the state 
structure of Cyprus was designed for two ethnically different communities to co-exist and 
conjointly rule the state while maintaining their communal differences.35 Articles 2(1) and 
2(2) of the 1960 Constitution could be regarded as the starting point of this design. These 
articles provided respective definitions for the two communities of the island. The first 
article identified the Greek community as ‘all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek 
origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who 
are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church.’ The latter identified the Turkish community 
                                               
31 Necatigil Z. M., The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, 2nd Ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993) p.18.  
32 Dodd C., The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2010) p.42. 
33 Ibid, p.42. 
34 Kızılyürek N., Daha Önceleri Neredeydiniz? (Where were you before?), (İstanbul: Birikim/Güncel, 2009) 
p.16. 
35 Kızılyürek N., Erhürman T., Kıbrıs’ta Federalizm (Federalism in Cyprus), (Lefkoşa: Işık Kitabevi, 2009) 
p.70. 
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as ‘all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish 
or who share the Turkish Cultural traditions or who are Moslems.’ A complex division of 
constitutional positions and powers was ostensibly necessary for these communities to 
conjointly rule the new Republic. In the next section, I outline the constitutional positions 
Turkish Cypriots occupied within the state structure.   
 
1.3. The Constitutional Positions  
 In 1960, the Turkish Cypriot community comprised eighteen percent of the total 
population of Cyprus.36 Seventy-seven percent of this total population were Greek 
Cypriots.37 The significant   numerical difference between these communities required 
application of specific ratios for the executive, the legislative and the judicial positions.  For 
the first branch of the executive power, the division is between two positions. Article 1 of 
the 1960 constitution declared that the president of the Republic is to be elected from the 
Greek community, and the vice-president from the Turkish community. The composition in 
the second branch of the executive is based on a 30 to 70 percent ratio. Therefore, in the 
Council of Ministers three seats are granted to the members of the Turkish community and 
the remaining seven seats to the members of the Greek community.38  
 The legislative power of the Republic is exercised at two different levels. In the 
House of Representatives, where the majority of this power is exercised, the Turkish 
community is granted thirty percent of the seats.39 In the fifty-seat House, this percentage 
corresponds to fifteen seats; the remaining seats are occupied by the Greek community. The 
                                               
36 Markides K.C., The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) p.3; 
Polyviou P.G., Cyprus Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980, (London: Duckworth, 1980) p.1. 
37 Hatay M., ‘Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking?’PRIO Report 2/2007, (Oslo: International Peace 
Research Institute, 2007) p.4.  
38 Article 46. 
39 Article 62(2). 
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second level of the legislature consists of the Communal Chambers. Each community has 
its separate Communal Chamber where limited legislative powers are exercised.40  
 With regard to the judiciary, a Turkish judge is among the three judges that form the 
Supreme Constitutional Court of the Republic; one of the remaining two judges is Greek 
and the other one a neutral judge who also assumes the role of the President of the Court.41 
The High Court of Justice is comprised of two Greek judges, one Turkish judge and a neutral 
judge – again the neutral judge assuming the role of the President of the Court.42 Finally, the 
1960 constitution determines the composition of the public service at a ratio of seventy 
percent Greek and thirty percent Turkish,43 of the army at a ratio of sixty percent Greek and 
forty percent Turkish,44 and of the security forces (the police and gendarmerie) at a ratio of 
seventy percent Greek and thirty percent Turkish.45  
 
1.4. The Constitutional Powers 
 The bi-communal mosaic of the state structure is further complicated by the complex 
division of powers within each constitutional position. In order to achieve the conjoint rule 
of the island among the Greek majority and the Turkish minority, a matrix of powers which 
check and balance each other in varied ways are introduced. In this regard, the most 
important position to be occupied by a Turkish Cypriot in the Republic is that of vice-
presidency. Dissimilar to the traditional role of a deputy whose main task is to act on a 
temporary basis as the chief executive in the president’s absence, the vice-president of 
Cyprus is granted powers that almost equal that of the president. The most significant of 
                                               
40 Article 86. 
41 Article 133 (1)(1). 
42 Article 153 (1)(1). 
43 Article 123 (1). 
44 Article 129(1). 
45 Article 130 sub-sections (1) and (2).  
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these powers are the entitlement to the ‘final veto’ of the decisions of the Council of 
Ministers,46 and of the laws of the House of Representatives.47 Article 57 of the constitution 
stipulates that the right of final veto in relation to the decisions of the Council of Ministers 
may be used by the vice-president either conjointly with the president or on his/her own 
accord.  
 Article 50 determines the vice-president’s right of final veto on any laws or decisions 
of the House of Representatives. According to this article, the right of final veto can be 
exercised on laws or decisions concerning the foreign affairs, questions of defence, and 
questions of security. Issues concerning the foreign affairs upon which the vice-president 
can exercise his/her right of final veto include the recognition of states, declaration of war, 
conclusion of peace and international treaties,  and the protection of the citizens of the 
Republic abroad.48 The laws and decisions concerning the question of defence upon which 
the vice-president can exercise the right include ‘the composition and the size of the armed 
forces,’ ‘importation of war materials and explosives,’ and ‘cession of bases and other 
facilities to allied countries.’49 Finally, the issues of security involve the ‘distribution and 
stationing of forces,’ ‘emergency measures and martial law,’ and ‘police laws.’50  
 In addition to the right of final veto, vice-president also has the ‘right of return’ of 
the decisions of Council of Ministers51 and of laws and decisions of the House of 
Representatives.52 This right consists of the prerogative to send back to the Council any 
decisions53 or to the House any decisions or laws54 for reconsideration. Furthermore, vice-
                                               
46 Article 49(d).  
47 Article 49(f).  
48 Article 50(1)(a). 
49 Article 50(1)(b). 
50 Article 50(1)(c). 
51 Article 49(e). 
52 Article 49(g). 
53 Article 57(2). 
54 Article 51(1). 
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president has the right of recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court55 and the prerogative 
of mercy in capital cases.56 Finally, vice-president designates and terminates the 
appointment of Turkish ministers to the Council of Ministers.57 Turkish Cypriots occupied 
three ministerial positions and their share of executive power required one of these positions 
to be chosen among the following ministries: the Ministry of Finance, or the Ministry of 
Defence, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.58 
 In terms of the legislature, Article 61 of the constitution provides that the House of 
Representatives has legislative power in all matters that do not fall within the legislative 
authority of the Chambers. The laws are passed in the House with a simple majority vote.59 
There are exceptions to this rule if the House tries to amendment the Electoral Law or pass 
any laws concerning the municipalities, the imposition of duties, or taxes. In these cases, the 
constitution requires ‘a separate simple majority of the Representatives elected by the Greek 
and the Turkish Communities respectively taking part in the vote.’60   
 Therefore, in most of the matters that fall within the legislative authority of the 
House, the total of the Turkish votes can only be effective in conjunction with the Greek 
votes. In other words, if Bill X61 comes before the House, fifteen Turkish votes, without any 
support from Greek members of the House, will not be sufficient to enact or prevent the 
enactment of this Bill. However, in matters that fall within the exceptions mentioned above, 
the Turkish vote acquires a determinative power. For instance, the Electoral Law cannot be 
amended unless out of the fifteen Turkish representatives, eight of them concur — i.e. a 
separate simple majority emerges from the Turkish vote.  
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 In addition to the membership of the House of Representatives, the Turkish 
community enjoys legislative power through the Communal Chambers. Distinct from the 
House which accommodates elected members from both communities and requires 
collaboration among them, the Communal Chambers provide the Greek and the Turkish 
community with their respective legislative bodies. Article 87 of the constitution determines 
the legislative scope of each Chamber. Accordingly, the Chambers have the right to exercise 
legislative power over an extensive list of issues which solely concern their communities. 
These issues include the following: religion, education, and culture; personal status; the 
composition and instances of courts dealing with certain civil disputes; the imposition of 
personal taxes and fees on the respective members of the communities; the charities and 
foundations; subsidiary legislation or bylaws for the functioning of the municipalities; the 
producers' and consumers' cooperatives; and the credit establishments.62  
 The intricate division of state power among the two communities continues within 
the judiciary of the Republic. It was previously observed that the Supreme Constitutional 
Court is composed of a Greek, a Turkish, and a neutral judge — the neutral judge being the 
president.63 The President and the Vice-president of the Republic jointly appoint the judges 
of the Court.64 However, if a disagreement arises among the President and the Vice-president 
vis-à-vis the appointment of the Greek and the Turkish judges, the President’s nominee 
succeeds to the position of the Greek judge, and the Vice-President’s nominee succeeds to 
the position of the Turkish judge.65 Regarding the appointment of the neutral judge the 
constitution provides that ‘[t]he neutral judge shall not be a subject or a citizen of the 
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Republic [of Cyprus] or of the Kingdom of Greece or of the Republic of Turkey or of the 
United Kingdom and the Colonies.’66  
 While the composition of the High Court of Justice slightly differs from that of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court, the presidency of the High Court is also entrusted to a neutral 
judge. Within the set-up of the High Court there are two Greek judges, a Turkish judge and 
a neutral judge.67 Despite the fact that the numerical equilibrium of Greek and Turkish 
judges of the Supreme Court is not maintained within the High Court structure, the neutral 
judge is granted two votes.68 This allows the neutral judge to cast a determinative vote in 
cases where a single vote from the neutral judge could result in a numerical tie. For instance, 
in a case heard before the High Court, the Greek judges could vote to allow an appeal from 
one of the parties. In turn, the Turkish judge could vote to dismiss the appeal. If the neutral 
judge had only one vote and s/he were to side with the Turkish judge in his/her decision, the 
case would remain unsolved. Thus, the neutral judge’s second vote is a potential tie-breaker. 
Furthermore, it also has the capability to ensure that any probable intra-communal bias of 
the numerically superior Greek judges can be held in check.  
 
1.5. Conclusion  
 The purpose of this part of the chapter was to determine Turkish Cypriots’ share of 
sovereign power within the state structure of the Republic of Cyprus. In order to achieve this 
purpose, I presented a brief outline of the constitutional provisions which determined the 
composition and the functions of the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches of 
the new Republic. I showed that the 1960 constitution did not only define the Turkish 
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Cypriot community, it also granted considerable share of power to this community within 
all of the branches.  
 At the beginning of this part, I referred to authors who argued that the constitutional 
set-up of the Republic formed a bi-communal state. Despite the numerical gap between the 
populations of each community, the constitutional provisions, which I considered above, 
demonstrated that Turkish Cypriots could hold in check any probable desires of Greek 
Cypriots to exclusively rule the state. My concluding argument is that, insofar as the 
constitution weaved a web of checks and balances among the communities, it safeguarded 
the very being of the Turkish community. Particularly, the legislative powers of the 
Communal Chamber ensured that Turkish Cypriots could singularly be in charge of matters 
which most affected their communal existence. Generally, the extensive powers of the 
Turkish Cypriot vice-president guaranteed the exercise of political power on an equal basis 
with the Greek Cypriot head of state. However, the constitutional arrangements of the 
Republic could only be maintained for the first three years of its establishment. The outbreak 
of an inter-ethnic armed struggle resulted in the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriot community 
from the constitutional structures of the state. In the following part, I demonstrate the factors 
which contributed to the collapse of these arrangements and to the resultant exclusion. 
 
Part Two  
2.1. Introduction 
 In the year of 1963, armed conflict between the two communities of the island forced 
Turkish Cypriots to continue their existence within guarded enclaves. In addition to the 
humanitarian crises of life in the enclaves, this conflict resulted in the obstruction of the 
community’s enjoyment of the share of sovereign powers. This obstruction marked the 
beginning of a period which ultimately resulted in the geographical separation of the 
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communities and, later on, the unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot 
community. In this part of the chapter, I present a close study of the events that led to the 
conflict in 1963. The purpose of this study is to introduce the parties to the conflict and 
outline the causes of hostility inherent to their relations with one another.   
 I begin this study with a section on the decolonisation of the island from the British 
rule. Under this section, beside the British as the colonisers, I identify four parties. First, I 
present a brief outline of Greek Cypriots’ anti-colonial movement. The term enosis (Greek 
word for ‘union’) symbolised Greek Cypriots’ struggles against the British by epitomising 
unification with Greece as the desired outcome of decolonisation. Second, I show that this 
expression determined Turkish Cypriots’ reaction to the enosis movement; this reaction 
comprised the idea of taksim which meant ‘partition’ in Turkish and represented the division 
of the island into Greek and Turkish parts. Finally, I complete the identification of the parties 
by considering the respective mother-lands Greece and Turkey and their role in the 
settlement of the issue of independence of Cyprus. The antagonistic relationship among 
these four parties, which was forged during the decolonisation period and was overshadowed 
by their then political stances, has played a continuous role in shaping the future of the island 
ever since.  
 I conclude this part by reflecting upon the initial effects of these antagonistic 
relations on the post-colonial constitutional structure. I present the manner in which Cypriot 
communities acted upon their respective desires for enosis and taksim to the detriment of 
the established order. I show that two elements were instrumental in the behaviour of the 
communities: the appointment of the paramilitary leaders of the anti-colonial movements 
into constitutional positions, and the continuation of the arming of clandestine groups. I 
follow upon the incipient consequences of these elements in the next chapter to trace the 
development of the relational conflicts into a struggle for recognition with existential 
repercussions.  
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2.2. The Last Years of the British Rule on the Island  
 To present an outline of the conflicting desires of the two communities of the island, 
in this section, I focus upon three central elements of the decolonisation process of Cyprus. 
For the first of these elements, I demonstrate the manner in which the idea of enosis shaped 
the anti-colonial struggle Greek Cypriots staged against the British rule. To achieve this 
demonstration, I focus upon the respective roles the influential leadership of Archbishop 
Makarios III and the fanatical militarism of General Grivas played in the struggles. The 
second element consists of Turkish Cypriots’ reactions to Greek Cypriots’ movements. I 
show that these reactions were determined by Turkey’s involvement in the question of 
Cyprus and the establishment of a clandestine Turkish defence unit on the island. The final 
element constitutes the manner in which the decolonisation process started with an initial 
agreement struck between mainland Greek and Turkish authorities to the exclusion of the 
communities of the island.   
  
2.2.1. Greek Cypriots’ Anti-Colonial Movement  
 Emerging as a state-doctrine in the aftermath of Greek independence in 1830, Megali 
Idea (Big Idea) consisted of the project to unite all of the Greek-Orthodox people who lived 
outside the territory of Greece under the same state.69 The Greek word ΕΝΩΣΙΣ (enosis, 
union) connotes the project of Megali Idea and played an important role in shaping the Greek 
Cypriots’ struggles against the British rule in Cyprus. In this regard, Thomas Ehrlich 
observed the following:  
As early as 1830, substantial sentiment was voiced on the Island for 
enosis. Pressures built up steadily and unremittently [sic] in the next 
century. The roots of the desire for union cannot be found among the 
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ruins of ancient Greece; Aphrodite’s island [i.e. Cyprus] was never a 
part of Hellenic Greece. Though Greeks colonised the Island, they 
regarded the Cypriots as an alien people. The Hellenic ties of Greek 
Cypriots are rooted in the Byzantine period rather than in classical 
times. Religion and language were the major pressures unifying 
Greece and Cyprus – and their centripetal force was substantial. 
Many Greek Cypriots considered themselves Greeks living on 
Cyprus, even though their ancestors had lived there for centuries.70  
In terms of the anti-colonial struggle staged against the British, Greek Cypriots’ desire for 
enosis had been demonstrated most ardently in three important events: the riots of 1931, the 
plebiscite of 1949 and the organisation of Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA, 
National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) in 1953.  
 In the aftermath of the dissemination of the news on 21st October 1931 that, the Greek 
members resigned from the Colony’s Legislative Council due to the ongoing disagreement 
in relation to the budget talks, a reactive Greek crowd, which exceeded the number of three 
thousand, gathered in and around the Commercial Club.71 Amid the stirring of passions with 
speeches that glorified enosis and cries that proclaimed the revolution against the British 
rule, the crowd, waving mainland Greek flags, proceeded to the Government House.72 The 
angry masses dispersed only after a round of shots was fired by the police forces. However, 
seven were injured by the shots, one among the injured would later die, and the destruction 
of the Government House by fire could not be prevented.73  
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 O’Malley and Craig reported that, in the aftermath of the riot, ‘[t]he colonial power 
sent in troops and warships from Egypt, and tried to crush the nationalist movement by 
deporting its leaders, outlawing any mention of enosis, and abolishing the legislative council 
in favour of rule by decree.’74 However, the force of enosis should not be thought as a 
temporary catalyst which led to the 1931 riot and then faded away with the enactment of the 
repressive colonial policies by the British. Holland suggested that behind the British 
Empire’s uncharacteristic suspension of the constitutional government for the entire 
duration of the decolonisation of Cyprus, continuous influence of enosis could be found.75  
 The year of 1945 saw the Labour Party come to power in Britain with a landslide 
success in the elections over the Conservatives.76 With the intention to mitigate the effects 
of repressive policies over Cyprus, the new Labour government established a Consultative 
Assembly in 1947.77 The purpose of this Assembly was to offer ‘a large measure of self-
government’ to Cypriots with the enactment of a new liberal constitution.78 Greek Cypriots 
rejected this offer.79 According to Kızılyürek, the Greek-Orthodox Church pronounced an 
outright rejection of the British attempt to establish self-government in Cyprus, damned this 
enterprise and called the Greek Cypriots to join the struggle for ‘Enosis, and only enosis’ 
under the auspices of the Church.80 With regard to the British offers of self-government from 
1947 to 1956, Reddaway wrote the following:  
On each occasion suggestions were made in London that, if only the 
British would adopt a more liberal position on this or that aspect of 
the proposed constitution, agreement might be possible. But such 
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comments missed the essential point that acceptance or rejection by 
the two Cypriot communities depended not on the constitutional 
merits of the proposals, but on a political judgment whether they 
could be made to serve the cause of Enosis [...] The Ethnarchy [i.e. 
Greek Cypriot leadership] consistently rejected offers because they 
did not include an assurance that constitutional government would, 
in a short space of time, lead to the ending of British rule and to the 
realisation of the national aspiration of the Greek Cypriots to be 
united with Greece.81  
The incessant force of enosis was later to be publicly revealed with a plebiscite which was 
held by the Greek-Orthodox Church among the Greek Cypriots on 15 January 1950.  
 The plebiscite returned a 95.7 percent ‘yes’ vote for enosis.82 There are, however, 
several aspects of this vote which must be noted. Firstly, O’Malley and Craig drew readers’ 
attention to the fact that the vote could not account for Turkish Cypriots’ view on the issue 
of enosis since the voting took place in Greek Orthodox churches and being Muslims, 
Turkish Cypriots would not attend to these churches.83 Secondly, as the plebiscite was 
organised by the Greek-Orthodox Church — an institution which assumed the leadership of 
the Greek Cypriot community and was the foremost advocate of enosis — the voters could 
be unduly influenced by the likely repercussions of voting ‘no’ for enosis.84 As Stavrinides 
noted,  
[...] the voting took the form of signing one’s name under a petition 
in public. If a Greek was to ‘vote’ on this issue at all, it was as 
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embarrassing and risky for him to ‘vote’ against enosis as to declare 
in public that he was not ‘a true Greek.’85  
Accordingly, the final result of the plebiscite may not be reliable. However, the result was 
instrumental in establishing a young Bishop as one of the most important men in the history 
of Cyprus.  
 With the encouragement of his priest uncle, Michail Mouskos entered the Kykkos 
Monastery at the age of 13.86 After finishing high-school in Nicosia and assuming the name 
Makarios at his ordination,87 Mouskos attended the University of Athens to study in the 
Theology Department.88 It was at the time when he was pursing further studies in theology 
at the Boston University in the year of 1948 that he received a telegraph informing him of 
his election as the Bishop of Kition.  In the aftermath of his return to Cyprus, the young 
Bishop proved his worth for the enosis cause. In this regard O’Malley and Craig reported 
the following:  
In 1948 the Ethnarchy council was revamped and its leader, the 
young Bishop Makarios, was given responsibility for re-uniting 
Greek Cypriots under the church banner. At a popular rally in 
October 1949 in Nicosia, he roused the Greek Cypriots by calling 
for freedom for his ‘enslaved people’ from the ‘British yoke’, and 
entreating them to join the ‘noble struggle for union with the 
Motherland.’89   
In another occasion Makarios was quoted making this statement: ‘We do not believe, as 
some traitors and friends of England do, that Enosis will be realised within the framework 
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of Anglo-Hellenic friendship. Enosis is not granted; it can only be won by continuous 
struggle.’90  
 In relation to the plebiscite mentioned above, O’Malley and Craig wrote that 
Makarios was in charge of its organisation and the resounding message its result sent to the 
public assisted Makarios in the election for Archbishop which was to be held nine months 
after the plebiscite.91 Makarios won the election with 97 percent of the votes.92 It was 
unmistakeable that he was elected Archbishop ‘on the Enosis ticket.’93 Becoming the 
Archbishop at the age of 37, Makarios assumed the name Makarios III and was regarded by 
Greek Cypriots as the dynamic leader who could achieve enosis.94 The oath he swore on the 
occasion of his enthronement dismissed any doubts as to the role of enosis in shaping the 
fate of the new Archbishop and the Greek struggle against the British rule: ‘I take the holy 
oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom and shall never waiver from our 
policy of uniting Cyprus with Mother Greece.’95   
 According to Kızılyürek, Makarios’ main political strategy was to internationalise 
the Cyprus problem via the United Nations with the hope to gain the right to self-
determination and use this right to achieve enosis.96 Thus, Makarios tried to benefit from a 
period in which many former colonies were decolonized and he used the Church’s resources 
for this cause; nonetheless, he also needed to acquire mainland Greece’s support before 
attempting any international enterprise.97 In this regard, Kızılyürek reported that Makarios 
was disappointed with the result of his meeting with the Greek Prime Minister Plastiras in 
1951 as Plastiras disapproved of Makarios’ political strategy and refused to support it.98 
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However, Makarios’ attempts to procure support from Greece were not entirely futile. In his 
travels to mainland, Makarios enquired about a Cyprus-born army officer who started a 
brand-new chapter in the Greek struggle against the British rule on the island.   
 George Grivas was the leader of Organisation X, a paramilitary organisation whose 
members, in Kızılyürek’s opinion, embraced excessive nationalist views.99 Born and raised 
in Cyprus, Grivas reached the rank of colonel in the mainland Greek army and gained 
experience as a guerrilla fighter.100 O’Malley and Craig described him as ‘a rigidly self-
disciplined soldier, fanatically fit, daring and brutally single-minded.’101 Makarios met 
Grivas in Greece in June 1951 for the purpose of establishing an organisation for armed 
struggle in Cyprus.102  This meeting was followed by Grivas’ visit to island in July 1951; 
Kızılyürek is of the opinion that the purpose behind Grivas’ visit was the investigation of 
the conditions on the island for guerrilla warfare.103 While Makarios remained sceptical 
about carrying out a guerrilla war in Cyprus, he met again with Grivas and the members of 
the ‘Fighting Committee’ in Athens to take the following oath for enosis: “I swear in the 
name of Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity to keep secret, sacrificing even my 
life, suffering even the harshest tortures, all that I know or will hear regarding the question 
of the Union of Cyprus. And I shall obey blindly the relevant orders given to me from time 
to time.”104 This incident marked the birth of EOKA and the organisation began its 
‘campaign of bomb attacks and sabotage’ in Cyprus in April 1955.105  
 The instigation of EOKA’s campaign followed the first Greek attempt to bring the 
Cyprus issue before the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1954. While the question 
                                               
99 Ibid, pp. 97, 98. 
100 O’Malley and Craig, op. cit. at p.10. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Kızılyürek (2005) op. cit. at p.98. 
103 Kızılyürek (2002) op. cit. at p.101. 
104 Reddaway, op. cit. at p73 – Oath of the Members of the Fighting Committee in Athens for the Union of 
Cyprus (the twelve members included Makarios and Grivas). 7 March 1953.    
105 O’Malley and Craig, op. cit. at p.15.; Kızılyürek (2005) op. cit. at p.99, Stefanidis I.D., Stirring the Greek 
Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945-1967, (Hampshire: 
Ashgate, 2007) p.78. 
   48
of Cypriots’ right to self-determination was successfully put on the agenda, it was deemed 
by the Assembly that ‘for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution 
on the question of Cyprus.’106 Ehrlich reported that this result was regarded by the Greek 
representatives as an ‘important tactical victory’ for ‘Cyprus was no longer an internal 
matter of British policy; it was an international question.’107 However, the Greek ‘tactical 
victory’ combined with the terror of EOKA would soon backfire as the British drew Turkey 
into the question of Cyprus to fend off Greek ambitions.  
 
2.2.2. Turkish Cypriots’ Reaction to the Greek Cypriot Movement  
 The increase in the number of violent acts EOKA committed against the British 
necessitated the declaration of a state of emergency in the island. This declaration provided 
Greece with the pretext to renew her attempts regarding the Cyprus question at the United 
Nations.108 In order to avert these attempts, British called ‘a conference in London on the 
political and defence questions affecting the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus’ and 
invited the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey.109 According to O’Malley and Craig, 
underlying the then British Prime Minister Eden’s decision to call the conference was the 
idea that ‘the conference would provide a chance to change the international perception of 
the Cyprus problem as a purely anti-colonial struggle and put the spotlight on the antagonism 
between Greece and Turkey instead’ with a purpose to ‘put pressure on Athens to accept a 
compromise plan that suited Britain.’110  
 While Turkey had ‘remained quiet about Cyprus after being on the losing side in the 
First World War,’ Dr. Kuchuk — the communal leader of the Turkish Cypriots who was to 
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be elected the first Vice-president of the Republic in 1960 — suggested the reasons for the 
Turkish government’s quietness in the following terms:  
This has been the attitude of the Turkish government. They have 
never taken the Greek campaign for enosis seriously because they 
believed that Great Britain’s decision not to quit the island was an 
unassailable answer to the whole question; but they have made it 
emphatically clear that if Great Britain ever considers leaving Cyprus 
then the Turkish government has a great interest in the ownership of 
the island [...] Turkey cannot tolerate seeing one of her former 
islands, lying as it does only forty miles from her shores, handed over 
to a weak neighbour thousands of miles away, which is politically as 
well as financially on the verge of bankruptcy.111  
Turkey followed a very similar line in the London conference as the Turkish Foreign 
Minister Fatin Zorlu vociferated Turkey’s opposition to Greece’s demand for a plebiscite in 
Cyprus on the issue of self-determination and insisted that if British were to relinquish 
sovereignty over the island, Cyprus should revert back to Turkey due to the island’s 
geographically strategic position.112  
 Realising that this argument may not be sufficiently convincing, Zorlu sent a coded 
telegraph to the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes informing him that the British and 
the Greek authorities would not be persuaded by mere persistence of the Turkish line of 
argument, and that, orders from Menderes to relevant positions would be very valuable to 
the Turkish cause.113 Following this telegraph, on 6th and 7th September 1955, anti-Greek 
protests took place in Turkish cities of Istanbul and Izmir destroying many Greek properties 
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— 73 churches, 8 cemeteries, 26 schools, 1004 houses, 4,212 shops, 21 factories, 17 hotels, 
97 restaurants and 23 warehouses —  and killing 16 Greeks.114  
 Initially, the protests were portrayed as a reaction to the bombing of the Turkish 
consulate in the Greek city of Salonika — the location of the consulate was near the 
birthplace of Mustafa Kemal115 — and this would seem a good-enough provocation to stir 
up the emotions of Turkish nationalists; however, it was later to be revealed that the bomb 
in Salonika was planted by a young Turkish man.116 In addition to this, it was also revealed 
that, Menderes met the president of Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti (Cyprus is Turkish Society), 
informing him of Zorlu’s request for ‘an uncontrollable Turkish public reaction;’ the 
president of the society later disseminated this information to the local branches of the 
society and the very next day, on 6th September, the events in Istanbul and Izmir took 
place.117 The British plan to shift the spotlight in the Cyprus problem had succeeded. On the 
pretext of the crises in Istanbul and Izmir, Zorlu left the London conference,118 the Greek 
bid for self-determination in Cyprus failed at the UN, 119 and a new chapter in the question 
of Cyprus began.  
 In this new chapter, Turkey played a central role in shaping Turkish Cypriots’ 
reaction to Greek Cypriots’ struggle for enosis. In this regard, Zorlu persuaded Menderes 
for the formation of a Turkish organisation in Cyprus against the activities of Greek 
EOKA.120 Consequently, the Special Warfare Department under the General Staff of the 
Turkish Army established Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (Turkish Defence Organisation, TMT) 
in Cyprus; a lieutenant colonel from the Warfare Department was appointed as its leader; 
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and the department was responsible for supplying arms to the new organisation.121 However, 
TMT’s role was not limited to fighting against EOKA and its ambition to achieve enosis.  
 TMT also adopted Taksim (partition) as its official principle and, according to 
Kızılyürek, with a fanatical and chauvinist approach, the organisation ‘convinced’ any 
Turkish Cypriot who would not support Taksim.122 TMT adopted the ‘partition’ thesis when 
it was first put forward by the then UK Secretary of State for the Colonies Lennox-Boyd. In 
this regard, Hitchens reported that,  
[i]n 1956 Alan Lennox-Boyd told the House of Commons that a 
Greek Cypriot demand for union with Greece would be met by a 
British-sponsored plebiscite for Turks only. If the Turkish Cypriots 
voted to join Turkey, the island would be partitioned.123  
Taking steps towards achieving partition, TMT incited violence to divide mixed 
communities of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.124 Among the people who suffered most from 
the terror of TMT were the Turkish members of PEO (Pancyprian Federation of Labour).  
 A federation for trade unions in Cyprus, PEO had Turkish Cypriot (as well as Greek 
Cypriot) members and a Turkish branch with its Turkish president. TMT targeted these 
members facilitating their switch from PEO to Kıbrıs Türk İşçi Birlikleri Kurumu (Cyprus 
Turkish Labour Union Association, KTIBK) and threatened anyone who refused to switch 
membership with violence.125 Consequently, an attempt was made to assassinate the 
president of the Turkish branch of PEO, Mr. Ahmet Sadi Erkurt, who survived the attempt 
despite suffering serious injuries.126 To bolster the separation of the communities, the 
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leadership of Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu (The Federation of Cyprus Turkish 
Institutions, KTKF) worked in tandem with TMT and implemented separatist policies such 
as giving Turkish names to villages, urging Turkish citizens to speak Turkish avoiding 
communication in English or Greek, and finally, and most importantly, forcing Turkish 
persons to do business only with other Turkish persons.127    
 In addition to Greek Cypriots’ campaign for enosis, Turkish Cypriots’ counter-
campaign for taksim formed the contours of the anti-colonial struggles against the British. 
However, the British had a different idea regarding the probable solution to the Cyprus 
problem. This idea was to engage Turkey’s interest against Greece’s attempts to 
internationalise the problem. To the extent that this idea was successfully implemented, the 
problem remained regional and the solution merely dependent upon satisfying the concerns 
of mainland Greece and Turkey. Such a solution would, in turn, not only ignore the demands 
of Cypriot communities but also safeguard the British interests on the island.  
  
2.2.3 An Agreement between Greece and Turkey  
 The economic reliance of the British on Middle Eastern oil rendered Cyprus a crucial 
place for overseas defence of the oil trade.128 In addition to this defensive role, the 
geographical position of the island allowed the western world to monitor the Soviet 
expansion into the Middle East.129  Accordingly, while in economic terms, the British could 
no longer afford to retain sovereign control over the entire island,130 they, nonetheless, had 
an interest in retaining at least some control in the region. In other words, a complete 
relinquishment of the sovereignty over the island would mean losing a base from which 
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military security to the oil trade can be supplied. In addition, an independent and non-aligned 
Cyprus might soon come under a threat from the Soviet Russia or might even decide to side 
with her threatening the southern border of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
In light of these threats, Turkey’s involvement in the Cyprus question opened the way for 
the British to settle the problem without compromising much of her interests in the oil trade 
and the security of the borders of NATO.   
 While the practice of self-determination in Cyprus was not viable for the British 
interests in the Middle East, retaining sovereignty by granting self-government to Cypriots 
was not accepted by the Greek Cypriot leadership who aspired to enosis and did not accept 
any other solution that would not enable union with Greece. The stalemate between the 
British and Greek Cypriots was disturbed by the entry of the Turkish demand for partition. 
Turkey’s involvement in the question of Cyprus engendered a stern rejection of enosis. 
Turkey strongly opposed enosis on two grounds. Firstly, it was perceived that union with 
Greece would threaten the well-being of the Turkish community on the island; and secondly, 
Cyprus as a Greek island would pose a risk to Turkey’s southern borders blocking naval 
access to and from the Mediterranean Sea. Another aspect of the Turkish involvement in the 
Cyprus problem was that, a solution which did not take into account the Turkish position 
might drag Turkey into war with Greece. In other words, two NATO countries might declare 
war against each other thoroughly jeopardising the southern flank of the organisation. 
 The intertwining of several interests over the island ensured that the Cyprus question 
could only be settled by finding the middle ground between the Greek demand for enosis, 
the Turkish demand for taksim and the British demand to remain on the island. This ground 
was to emerge from the negotiations between the Greek and the Turkish Prime Ministers 
who met in Zurich and London in the year of 1959. The sides were to set aside their 
respective demands for enosis and taksim by agreeing upon a form of sovereign 
independence which was to be externally guaranteed by Greece, Turkey, and Britain, and 
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internally shared among Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The British interests were safeguarded 
by retaining two sovereign bases on the island. The sharing of power within the state 
structure of the Republic of Cyprus can only be understood against this background wherein 
conflicting interests from several parties had to be balanced.  
 We observed in the first part of this chapter that the 1960 constitution provided for a 
bi-communal state structure in which the sovereign powers were divided between the Greek 
and the Turkish communities. Consequently, neither the Greek Cypriot ambition to unite the 
island with Greece nor the Turkish Cypriot desire to partition the island was achieved. The 
communities attempted to achieve their anti-colonial aspirations through the activities of 
their respective illegal paramilitary organisations EOKA and TMT. Although historically 
the two communities did not engage in violent inter-communal conflict, in the year of 1955 
EOKA’s attacks hit British auxiliary forces which were manned by Turkish Cypriots.131 The 
establishment of TMT in 1957 exacerbated inter-ethnic violence as the targets were chosen 
specifically on ethnical grounds. O’Malley and Craig reported that on 7 June 1958, the 
bombing of the Turkish information centre in Nicosia generated ‘two months of 
massacre.’132  
 While it was suspected that the bomb was placed by a Turkish agent provocateur, 
with regard to the ensuing rage of the Turkish Cypriots, O’Malley and Craig noted the 
following:  
After the bombing, hundreds of Turkish Cypriots took to the streets 
armed with sticks, cudgels and other weapons, and began to attack 
police cars, burn Greek buildings and loot shops in the old quarter of 
Nicosia. The tactics bore all the hallmarks of pre-planned concerted 
action. The violence quickly spread to other towns. The first night’s 
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clashes left four dead and scores injured, and factories and offices 
ablaze.133  
As a consequence of this attack, Grivas ordered ‘a retaliatory onslaught on Turkish Cypriots, 
particularly those in the police force.’134 Two years later, the Zurich and London agreements 
required these communities to share the sovereignty of the same state. In what follows, I 
shift my attention to the aftermath of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and 
analyse the role conflicting desires and military friction played in the collapse of the 
constitutional arrangements.  
 
2.3. Instigators of the Constitutional Collapse: Enosis and Taksim  
 Contemplating the fate of the newly established state, O’Malley and Craig referred 
to the ‘[c]ritics [who] predicted gloomily that in the new Cyprus, Greek would turn against 
Turk, right against left, and the island would go down in a sea of blood and hate.’135 These 
predictions were regrettably fulfilled in the third year of the Republic. In this section, I 
analyse the reasons behind the collapse of the constitutional arrangements. This analysis 
focuses upon the ideas of enosis and taksim, and the manner in which these ideas affected 
the communities’ perceptions of the 1960 constitutional set-up. The outcome is that, neither 
of the communities regarded the 1960 constitution as the ultimate solution to the Cyprus 
problem. I show that both the Greek and the Turkish communities continued to strive for the 
respective goals of union with Greece and partitioning of the island; that these actions, in 
turn, inevitably led to the breakdown of the constitutional order.  
 While Greek Cypriots demanded self-determination for the purposes of achieving 
union with Greece, Turkish Cypriots — being suspicious of Greek Cypriots’ negligent 
demand for enosis — campaigned for partition. With the establishment of the Republic of 
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Cyprus, neither of the demands was met. Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee provided that 
‘Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom [...] undertake to prohibit [...] any activity aimed 
at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition 
of the Island.’ Accordingly, relinquishment of the ambitions for enosis and taksim could be 
regarded as the most elemental condition for the proper functioning of the new state.  
 The relevant question, therefore, is whether the communities were ready to renounce 
these ambitions in the post-1960 era. Markides argued that they were not:  
From the very inception of independence, the Greek Cypriots never 
concealed their unhappiness with the constitutional setup or their 
readiness to proceed with its amendment in due time. Some of them, 
both within and outside the government, considered independence 
not as a terminal stage but as another step toward the ultimate 
realisation of Enosis. Much of the legitimacy accorded to Makarios 
[with his election as the president] was based on the assumption that 
in reality he had never given up the struggle for union with Greece 
and that the acceptance of independence was nothing more than a 
tactical move that would eventually lead toward the incorporation of 
Cyprus within the Greek nation.  
The Turks, fully aware of this state of affairs, remained intransigent, 
suspicious, unaccommodating, and predisposed to adopt, in regard to 
constitutional and governmental issues, a rigid posture which tended 
to divide them even further from their Greek compatriots.136  
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The first sign of the continuity of the struggle for enosis even after the attainment of 
independence could be discerned from Makarios’ appointment of Greek Cypriots, who had 
strong EOKA backgrounds, to the Council of Ministers.  
 Nicos Kranidiotis (who remained under house arrest during the British rule due to 
his close connection with Grivas) was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Andreas 
Papadopulos (former EOKA gang leader) was appointed as the Minster of Communications 
and Works; Tassos Papadopulos (former EOKA propaganda chief) was appointed as the 
Minister of Labour; and most significantly, Polykarpos Georghadis (former EOKA 
commander) was appointed as the Minister for the Interior.137 The latter and Nicos Sampson 
(former EOKA gunman and, later on, newspaper publisher) became the foremost advocates 
of the idea that despite the Zurich and London Agreements enosis could still be achieved.138 
According to Hitchens, both men ‘were unscrupulous and conspiratorial, strongly marked 
by mythic ideas about violence and gunplay. For them, and for a number of others, the 
EOKA struggle was unfinished and the EOKA ranks were not disbanded.’139 According to 
Foley and Scobie a faction of EOKA retained a considerable number of weapons even after 
the establishment of the Republic.140 
 In the above-quoted passage, Markides stated that Turkish Cypriots’ reaction to the 
state of affairs apropos enosis was to remain intransigent and suspicious; Foley and Scobie 
added that, in light of the perceived threat of enosis, Turkish Cypriots smuggled in arms 
from abroad.141 Kızılyürek, too, wrote that TMT continued its activities of arming and 
training Turkish Cypriots in the aftermath of the Zurich and London agreements.142 
Similarly, Drousiotis maintained that, instead of dissolving, TMT was reinforced by 
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weapons and ammunition transferred from Turkey.143 TMT’s post-1960 existence was 
confirmed by Kılıç whose study revealed that the Special Warfare Department continued to 
assign a leader to the organisation until 1974.144 More importantly, Kızılyürek argued that 
in its post-1960 existence, TMT continued to strive for partition.145 Two incidents 
substantiate Kızılyürek’s argument.  
 The first incident was a ‘Top Secret’ document found in the drawer of a Turkish 
Cypriot communal leader during the events of 1963; this document identified the reasons 
for refusing the establishment of the Republic as the ultimate solution to the Cyprus 
problem.146 Central to such rejection was the perception that mistrust among the 
communities necessitated a bi-communal state structure and that such bi-communality could 
only be maintained by constantly manifesting this mistrust with occasional outbreaks of 
violence between the communities.147 It was commonly suspected that the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership was implicated in the activities of TMT,148 and that this leadership did not deny 
the existence of such a document.149 The second incident was a statement made by a former 
officer of the Special Warfare Department. Major Tansu150 confirmed that despite the 
establishment of the bi-communal Republic, TMT continued its clandestine work for the 
partitioning of the island and the establishment of a Turkish Cypriot independent state.151   
 During the post-1960 era in which TMT continued its covert existence, Greek 
Cypriot leadership established its own underground organisation. Named The National 
Cyprus Organisation,152 another top secret document — the Akritas Plan — defined the 
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purpose of this organisation. Drafted in 1963, the Plan came to light in 1966 after a Greek 
local paper published it ‘with the professed intention of exposing the mishandling of the 
Greek Cypriot ‘national cause’ by Archbishop Makarios.’153 In terms of its content, the plan 
devises a method for ‘the final and unalterable national objective which is the full and 
unconditional application of the right of self-determination.’154  
 As the first step towards achieving this objective, the plan required the persuasion of 
the international opinion that the Zurich and London agreements have not settled the Cyprus 
problem in a satisfactory and just manner, and that, it was necessary ‘to remove the 
unreasonable and unjust provisions of the administrative mechanisms.155 The next step of 
the Plan comprised ‘the amendment of the negative elements of the agreements and the 
consequent de facto nullification of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance.’156 The 
relevance of the Treaty of Guarantee was that it legitimised external intervention either 
individually or jointly from Greece, Turkey and/or the United Kingdom to prevent any 
attempt to unite Cyprus with any other state or partition the island.157 The relevance of the 
Treaty of Alliance was that, it legitimised the presence of mainland Greek and Turkish 
contingents on the island.158 In the Plan, the abrogation of these treaties was regarded as 
essential for the people of Cyprus to ‘be able, freely, to express and apply its will.’159  
 The third step of the Plan consisted of the manner in which the probable reactions of 
Turkish Cypriots to the initial two steps would be dealt with. For the purposes of the Plan, 
the drafters considered it crucial that any Turkish resistance was immediately met with a 
Greek counter-attack.160 In this regard, the need to strengthen the organisation was 
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emphasised.161 In addition, the Plan stated that ‘[t]he forceful and decisive suppressing of 
any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further constitutional 
amendments, and it should then be possible to apply these without the Turks being able to 
show any reaction without serious consequences for their community.’162   
 For the purposes of this section, the Akritas Plan is important for demonstrating that 
the Greek ambitions for enosis did not subside with the establishment of the Republic of 
Cyprus. While at the outset, the Plan set the objective as the exercise of unrestricted self-
determination, two provisions of the Plan reveal that such an exercise was sought for the 
proclamation of enosis. The first of these provisions was a line of precaution that 
international opinion may be persuaded more efficiently if the struggle was based on self-
determination rather than enosis.163 Although this provision distinguished between enosis 
and self-determination, it did not rule out the former as an option that the people of Cyprus 
could choose when exercising unconditional self-determination. The second provision 
related to the occasion in which the Turkish resistance may not be instantly contained and it 
provided the confirmation that enosis was the ultimate aim. Accordingly, the Plan read that 
‘[i]n case of the clashes [between Turkish and Greek Cypriots] becoming widespread, we 
must be ready to proceed immediately through [the second step], including the immediate 
declaration of ENOSIS […]’164       
 In an interview with Kızılyürek, Glafkos Clerides165 verified that Ministers 
Georghadis and Tassos Papadopulos were involved in the drafting of the Plan, and that the 
development of the Plan was within Makarios’ knowledge who, in turn, endorsed it.166 For 
the purposes of this section, the Plan is significant for demonstrating the Greek Cypriot 
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leadership’s reaction to the establishment of the Republic. This reaction was one of 
discontent and it was a shared reaction among the Greek and the Turkish leaderships but for 
separate reasons. For the former, the cause of discontent was the constitution of the Republic 
which forbade enosis. For the latter, it was the forbidding of taksim.  
 However, as observed above, neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriot leaderships, 
in the post-1960 era, abandoned their ambitions to achieve enosis and taksim respectively. 
These ambitions set the atmosphere in Cyprus for a major crisis in the last months of 1963. 
The emergence of the internal strife after Makarios’ thirteen-point proposal to amend the 
constitution resulted in the de facto demise of the bi-communal constitutional arrangements. 
In other words, in 1963, the Turkish Cypriot community found itself trapped in enclaves 
with no access to the state structure as provided by the constitution.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter comprised the first part of the case study on the Turkish Cypriot 
community. The overall purposes of the study are to establish the premise that relations of 
recognition shape the very being of communities and to expose international community’s 
inflexible approach in conferring legal personality under international law.  As the first step 
of achieving these purposes, in this chapter, I provided a brief account of the constitutional 
positions and powers granted to the Turkish Cypriot community within the state structure of 
the Republic of Cyprus. These provisions defined the communities of the island and 
safeguarded their being through a division of political power.  
 The constitutional structure presented in this chapter forms the background of the 
Cyprus conflict and the resultant political impasse that I consider in the next chapter. Turkish 
Cypriots’ struggle for recognition and the consequent existential crisis emanate from losing 
the share of political power enshrined in the 1960 constitution. My argument is that, this loss 
and the following struggle for recognition are the outcome of a web of relations which 
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determines the very being of the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus, in the second part of the 
chapter, I introduced the parties to the conflict and explored the reasons for the antagonistic 
relations among them. I identified two incompatible anti-colonial movements as the root 
causes — the enosis movement of the Greek Cypriot community and the taksim movement 
of the Turkish Cypriot community.  
 Inasmuch as the issue of the decolonisation of the island was settled primarily among 
the governments of mainland Greece and Turkey — a solution which ostensibly safeguarded 
against the ambitions of the island communities — the political desires generated by the 
above-mentioned anti-colonial movements survived and, thus, continued to undermine this 
settlement. I presented the means of this subversion in the last section of the second part of 
the chapter by focusing upon the continued armament of the clandestine groups in the new 
republic, and the placement of ex-chiefs of the enosis movement into the ministerial 
positions in the government. To the extent that these events represented the persistence of 
communities in their attempt to realise their respective ambitions for ensosis and taksim, this 
persistence would result in an inter-ethnic armed conflict in the year of 1963.    
 Through the second part of this chapter, therefore, I presented a web of hostile 
relations that did not only culminate in the establishment of a state whose constitutional 
structure was doomed to fail within three years, but also a set of relations which continued 
to affect the fate of the Turkish Cypriot community for years to come. My concluding 
argument is that, this network of parties brings to the fore the relational element of coming-
into-being for the Turkish Cypriot community, first, as the 1960 constitution defined and 
safeguarded the existence of the community; second, as these relations continued, in the 
aftermath of the events of 1963, to determine the fate of Turkish Cypriots by trapping this 
community in a political impasse. I present these events and the ensuing battle for 
recognition in the following chapter.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
Case Study Part Two: The Cyprus Problem 
 
Introduction  
 In the previous chapter, I examined the anti-colonial movements of the Greek and 
the Turkish communities of Cyprus to map a network of relations that culminated in the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. I also referred to the constitutional provisions of 
this republic to show that the 1960 constitution both defined the communities and shared 
political power among them to ensure their existence in a balanced but interdependent setup. 
However, with the events of 1963, this setup ceased to exist occasioning the infamous 
Cyprus conflict that remains unresolved until today.   
 In this chapter, I follow up the case study of the Turkish Cypriot community by 
considering three sets of major events in the history of the Cyprus conflict. The first set of 
these events is the thirteen-point proposals presented in 1963 by the first president of Cyprus 
to amend the 1960 constitution and the inter-ethnic conflict these proposals generated. The 
second set consists of the events of 1974 which included a coup d’état sponsored by 
mainland Greek junta against the president of the island and the consequent mainland 
Turkish military intervention on the island. Third set of events are Turkish Cypriot’s 
unilateral declaration of independence in the year of 1983 and international community’s 
non-recognition of this declaration. I show that the outcome of the first set of events was 
that, Turkish Cypriots were ousted from the positions they occupied within the state structure 
and were forced to live in enclaves. Consequent to this expulsion, the double military 
intervention of 1974 brought about the geographical separation of the communities and this 
separation formed the basis of the unilateral declaration in 1983.  
 The purpose of recounting these major events is to substantiate the role one’s 
relations to others play in determining one’s being and the fact that this determination 
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ultimately manifests itself as a question of recognition.  As I pointed out in the outset of the 
previous chapter, the case study on the Turkish Cypriot community achieves this purpose in 
two ways. Firstly, the ongoing Cyprus conflict traps this community in a political impasse. 
Secondly, this impasse, in turn, poses an existential threat to the very being of the 
community. To the extent that the international non-recognition of a Turkish Cypriot state 
comprises the essential aspect of this threat, the case study carries an additional purpose of 
exposing international law’s inability to account for the relational element of coming-into-
being. I explain this inability by focusing upon international community’s reluctance to 
respond to the facts that a solution to the Cyprus problem does not solely depend upon the 
acts of the Turkish Cypriot community, and, in the absence of international provisions to 
enhance its personality, the community is devoid of any means to reduce its economic 
dependence to and fend off subsequent political vulnerabilities against Turkey.    
 The chapter is, thus, divided into four parts. The first part traces the immediate 
effects of the continued ambitions for enosis and taksim within the first three years of the 
Republic. The central focus of this part is on the manner in which these ambitions were 
manifest in the Greek Cypriot president’s thirteen-point proposals and Turkish Cypriots’ 
vehement reactions. Insofar as the Greek Cypriot community perceived these proposals as a 
viable solution for the functional failures of the bi-communal constitution, Turkish Cypriots 
understood the proposals as an attempt to get rid of the provisions of the 1960 constitution 
that particularly ensured the political balance between two communities and, in doing so, 
safeguarded the existence of Turkish Cypriots. I present the major consequence of the 
thirteen-point proposals as the almost inevitable descend of the communities into inter-
ethnic fighting.  
 In the second part of the chapter, I follow the ramifications of this armed conflict by 
considering the exclusion of Turkish Cypriots from state structures and the subsequent round 
of futile negotiations between the two communities of Cyprus. I present that, due this futility, 
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the growing tensions between the Greek Cypriot president and mainland Greek junta 
culminated in the junta-sponsored coup d’état against the president. This coup was trailed 
by mainland Turkish army’s intervention on the island with the pretext of preserving the 
constitutional order. I show that this intervention effected the geographical division of the 
communities as Greek Cypriots fled to the south and Turkish Cypriots moved to the northern 
region of the island which was secured by the Turkish military. Since then, this division and 
the presence of the intervening army comprise the backdrop of negotiations to solve the 
Cyprus problem.  
 In the third part of the chapter, I take into account Turkish Cypriots’ unilateral 
declaration of independence and international non-recognition of this declaration effected 
by a resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations. I display the background of 
this declaration as Turkish Cypriots’ escape from years of economic isolation and fear of 
violence in enclaves to the considerable safety of the northern region of the island. The 
declaration proceeded from another round of unsuccessful negotiations to solve the ever-
complicated Cyprus problem and were defended by some scholars as Turkish Cypriots’ right 
to self-determination stemming from their share of sovereignty access to which had been 
barred since 1963.  
 In the fourth part of the chapter, I concentrate on the repercussions of the Security 
Council’s resolution under two sub-headings. Under the first of these headings, I consider 
the effects of non-recognition on trade, travel, and property rights in the unilaterally declared 
state. Referring to relevant caselaw, I present international courts’ focus upon lack of 
recognition in determining these rights. Under the second heading, I consider economic 
consequences of non-recognition by taking into account the community’s increasing 
dependence upon Turkey for financial support which, in turn, aggravates Turkish Cypriots’ 
political vulnerability. In the overall scheme of the chapter, therefore, I engage with a 
number of relations among parties that are involved with the Cyprus problem and assess 
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these relations’ contribution towards the existential crisis faced by the Turkish Cypriot 
community today. The outcome of the study is that, in practice, recognition becomes a 
necessary component of establishing oneself as a person of international law, that lacking 
this constituent element damages one’s claim to legal personality. This may even be so, 
despite the fact that a chain of events can prove that an entity’s emergence from a life 
threatening political impasse may not entirely be in its own hands.  
   
Part One 
1.1. The Thirteen-Point Proposals  
 In the first chapter, I introduced the provisions of the 1960 constitution of the 
Republic of Cyprus and demonstrated that within the bi-communal state structure, the 
Turkish Cypriot community were granted a politically equal share of sovereign power. 
Therein, I also analysed Greek Cypriots’ anti-colonial movement against the British and 
showed that the idea of unification with Greece comprised the motivation for this movement. 
I presented Turkish Cypriots’ reaction to this idea by focusing upon their movement for 
partition. I took into view that the agreements between Greece and Turkey upon which the 
new Republic was founded denied both communities the realisation of their anti-colonial 
ambitions. 
 The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 marked the island’s 
independence from British colonial rule. However, in the previous chapter, I demonstrated 
that neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriot leaderships considered this as the desired 
form of independence. I displayed the manner in which the ideas of enosis and taksim 
continued to respectively shape the leaders’ actions even in the aftermath of 1960. In the 
short-lived history of the bi-communal state structure of the Republic, the influence of these 
ideas were manifest in two events. First, there was the constitutional crises. Second, these 
crises instigated an inter-ethnic armed struggle. For the purposes of this part, the outcome 
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of the crises and the ensuing struggle are significant for demonstrating the ways in which 
Turkish Cypriots were deprived of their share of sovereign power. Thus, in what follows, I 
present the escalation of constitutional crises into an inter-ethnic strife. The trajectory of the 
crises follows a thirteen-point proposal by the Greek Cypriot president to amend the 
constitution and Turkish Cypriots’ rejection of these proposals. While the former thought 
that the constitution in its current format was unworkable, the latter perceived the proposals 
as an attempt to cancel constitutional provisions which were essential for the Turkish 
community’s existence.  
 The crises started off with a prolonged struggle over the implementation of several 
provisions of the 1960 constitution. Main problematic constitutional issues related to public 
services, taxes, the army, and separate municipalities.167 With regard to public services, the 
dispute arose in relation to the appointment of civil servants. The 1960 constitution set the 
ratio of Greek and Turkish civil servants at seventy to thirty percent. According to 
Kyriakides, Turkish Cypriots regarded the implementation of the ratio as necessary for 
sufficient representation of the Turkish community within the state structure, whereas, in 
light of the demography of Cyprus (eighteen percent Turkish, seventy-seven percent Greek) 
Greek Cypriots considered the public service ratio unjust and discriminatory.168  
 The second problem concerned tax legislation. The new Republic did not have a tax 
law and the constitution allowed for the application of the colonial tax law to be applied 
until a set deadline.169 The first aspect of the problem was that the communities could not 
agree upon the new tax legislation before the deadline.170 This necessitated an extension of 
the application of the colonial law; and the second aspect of the problem was that, the 
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communities could not agree upon the duration of this extension.171 Central to this problem 
was the constitutional provision that in passing laws about issues of taxation separate 
majority vote was required in the House of Representatives.172 Accordingly, the majority 
vote among the Turkish members of the House would frustrate Greek propositions and vice 
versa. In light of this deadlock, the President ordered for the collection of taxes under the 
pre-1960 income-tax law; however, the Constitutional Court rejected the validity of this law 
rendering the Republic without any means of taxation.173   
 The third constitutional problem was a dispute over the formation of the army.  While 
Greek Cypriots favoured an approach to form the army on ethnically mixed basis, Turkish 
Cypriots favoured an ethnically separated formation. However, the Turkish opinion did not 
suggest the formation of two separate armies; instead, in an army of five battalions in which 
each battalion would consist of three companies, ‘[t]he Turkish Cypriot position was that 
the battalions could be mixed. However, on the company level, separation on a bi-communal 
basis was necessary.’174 The Turkish argument was that the necessity arose from the 
difficulty of jointly stationing religiously and linguistically different communities.175 
Following the Turkish line of argument, the Vice-president initially returned the decision of 
the Council to form armies on a completely mixed basis for reconsideration; and after the 
Council’s insistence on the mixed army, the Vice-President vetoed the decision.176  
 The final constitutional problem arose in relation to the issue of municipalities. 
While Turkish Cypriots were eager to implement the constitutional provisions for separate 
municipalities in five largest towns in the Republic,177 ‘Greek Cypriots, fearing separation 
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as a step toward partition, objected to the Turkish demands.’178 Similar to the tax problem, 
communities’ failure to reach an agreement on the issue of municipalities prevented the 
House of Representatives from passing new legislation. Consequently, Greek Cypriots 
reverted to the Council of Ministers – an institution they numerically dominated – for an 
order that would enable the establishment of unified Municipal Councils. Turkish Cypriots, 
in turn, attempted to validate separate Turkish Municipalities by legislating through their 
communal chamber.179 The issues were contested in the Supreme Constitutional Court and 
the Court found that both actions were unconstitutional. Kyriakides emphasised that the 
tension arising from the bi-communality of the constitution inhered within the Supreme 
Constitutional Court.180 The reason for Kyriakides’ remark was that the Court reached its 
decisions by majority vote – the Greek judge dissenting in the case concerning the Council’s 
order and the Turkish judge dissenting in the case concerning the Turkish Chamber’s 
legislation.    
 By the year of 1963, four major constitutional issues remained unresolved. With 
regard to the public services, the Turkish community contested the decisions of the Public 
Service Commission — the body which was in charge of the appointment of public 
servants.181 Out of twenty-seven cases, the Supreme Constitutional Court could only hear 
five before the resignation of the President of the Court in May 1963 prevented any solution 
to the public services dispute.182 In relation to the taxation problem, it was observed above 
that the Court considered it unconstitutional to collect taxes under the pre-1960 legislation. 
Nonetheless, Greek Cypriots, via the Greek Communal Chamber and ignoring the Supreme 
Constitutional Court’s decision, proceeded to collect taxes under the pre-1960 legislation.183 
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The manner in which the decision of the Court was circumvented itself contributed to 
another constitutional crisis; the neutral judge resigned from his position as the President of 
the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus.184 As a result of the Vice-president’s veto, the 
issue of forming an army remained in a deadlock. Finally, following the bi-communal voting 
in the Supreme Court, the question of municipalities was also trapped in a stalemate. 
 Amid these constitutional crises and the resultant communal tensions, on 30th 
November, 1963, President Makarios made thirteen proposals to amend the 1960 
constitution.185 Ostensibly, this was an attempt by the President to solve the crises vis-à-vis 
the implementation of the constitutional provisions. Makarios was proposing to abandon 
both the President’s and the Vice-president’s right to veto, to abolish the requirement for 
separate majorities in the House of Representatives, to establish unified municipalities, to 
determine by law the number of the Security and Defence forces, and to reset the ratio of 
employment in the Public Service in accordance with the ratio of the population of Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots.186  
 There were several opinions on the practicability of the 1960 constitution. According 
to Polyvios Polyviou the 1960 constitution provided for institutions with rigid and 
unworkable structures, and created a false inter-communal balance which was ‘out of tune 
both with the real strength of the two communities and with their genuine needs, and [can] 
only be maintained at the original position by obstructionist and obstinate use of power on 
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the part of the minority.’187 In Kyriakides’ perspective, the basic Articles188 of the 
Constitution were the root causes of the rigidity of the constitution:  
In essence, the basic Articles reflected the compromising spirit of 
the Zurich and London agreements and are intended to ensure 
bicommunal balance. However, the unalterable nature of the basic 
Articles, made the constitutional life of the Republic extremely 
rigid.189  
Finally, O’Malley and Craig opined that, ‘[t]he complex structure of power-sharing, 
principally through political vetoes, solidified the division between the [Greek and the 
Turkish] communities, and failed to overcome the antagonism caused by the fears and 
aspirations of the two peoples.’190  
 There were, also, opposite views which stressed that a way for the constitution to 
work could be found. In this regard, Ehrlich wrote the following: 
It is tempting to say that the scheme never had any chance of lasting 
success — that a constitution requiring the ethnic origin of the 
coroner in a coroner’s inquest to be that of the deceased could only 
fail [...] Despite substantial weaknesses, the settlement did represent 
an imaginative resolution of many difficult problems. Given 
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patience and a spirit of compromise on each side, it might have 
worked.191 
In addition to Ehrlich, Ernst Forsthoff — the neutral West German judge who presided as 
the first President of the Supreme Constitutional Court — made the following statement in 
an interview in the aftermath of his resignation: 
[F]rom the moment I commenced my duties I noticed that there were 
allegations to the effect that the Constitution was not capable of 
being implemented, that revision was necessary and the like. I faced 
these allegations with the following thought: Every constitution can 
have its peculiar problems. There is no constitution in the world 
which has not got its particular difficulties and problems. This is 
primarily a question of goodwill. If there is goodwill a constitution 
can be implemented and this Constitution is capable of being 
implemented.192   
Was there goodwill to implement the constitution? In the previous section, we observed that 
in the aftermath of the proclamation of the Republic, the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot 
clandestine organisations, which continued to aspire respectively for enosis and taksim, 
continued to function. In light of such information, it is difficult to claim that there was any 
goodwill to implement the constitution.  
 Instead of such goodwill, however, there was invariable distrust among the 
community leaders. Therefore, while Greek Cypriots suspected that the Turkish 
community’s demand to implement separate municipalities was a plot to achieve partition, 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership did not accept that there might be genuine difficulties in 
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implementing the seventy percent to thirty percent ratio of employment in the Public 
Services. Makarios’ thirteen-point proposals were made in a period when persistent crises 
vis-à-vis the constitution heightened inter-communal tensions and deepened suspicions.  
 Among the critics who denounced Makarios’ timing for the proposals were authors 
who regarded the 1960 constitution as unworkable. In this regard Polyviou noted the 
following:  
Wholesale amendment of the 1960 constitution, it is believed, would 
at some point have been essential, but should only have been 
attempted at a much later stage, only when existing mutual suspicion 
had been reduced and the confidence of the Turkish Cypriots 
secured, and additionally only if iron-clad guarantees had at the 
same time been given that enosis would not be sought and the status 
of independence would not be endangered.193   
Under the circumstances surrounding the constitutional crises, it was almost definite that the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership would be suspicious of and hence reject any proposals which 
purported to abandon the Vice-president’s veto, abolish the requirement for separate 
majorities and unify municipalities. Accordingly, the Turkish rejection of Makarios’ 
proposals came on 16 December 1963.194 Vice-President Kuchuk regarded the proposals as 
part of ‘a predetermined policy to abrogate the agreements which had brought about the 
republic of Cyprus and to create an independent Greek State in which the Turks would be 
left at the complete mercy of the Greeks.’195  Five days later, on 21 December, inter-
communal conflict broke out.  
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 According to Foley’s account, the stimulus for the conflict was provided by an 
incident in which Greek Cypriot policemen’s demands to see identification were refused by 
some Turkish Cypriots.196 With the gathering of a crowd that surrounded the policemen, the 
ensuing argument escalated into firing of shots from both sides, killing two Turkish Cypriots 
and seriously injuring one policeman.197 In his account of the same incident, Oberling 
maintained that the incident was sparked off by the Greek Cypriot special constables’ 
attempt to search a woman in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia.198 After the formation 
of an irritated crowd, ‘[t]he constables thereupon fired their automatic weapons, nearly 
cutting the woman and her male escort in half.’199 The significance of this account lies in 
Oberling’s claim that the special constables were ‘illegally armed Greek Cypriot civilians 
[...] hired by [the Minister of the Interior,] Georghadis.200  
 Another allegation directed at Georghadis was that a day before the attacks on 21st 
December, the Minister of Interior deceived the Turkish Cypriot police force into 
disarming.201 In the ensuing events, Greek Cypriots would ‘launch a major attack’ against 
Turkish Cypriots.202 According to Reddaway,  
Turks were murdered in their homes, hundreds of Turkish hostages 
were seized, the fighting quickly spread to other areas in the Island. 
In the end 103 Turkish villages were partially or completely 
destroyed, over a thousand houses and shops were destroyed or 
damaged and many more were looted. Some 25,000 Turkish 
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Cypriots (about a quarter of the total Turkish population) were 
uprooted from their homes and became refugees.203 
In his analysis of the 1963-1964 conflict, Reddaway was of the conviction that the Greek 
Cypriot leadership attempted to put the Akritas plan into effect.204 As observed previously, 
the Akritas plan was a blueprint of achieving enosis in the aftermath of the proclamation of 
the Republic. Considered in light of the Plan, Makarios’ thirteen-point proposal to change 
the constitution, the probable formation of Georghadis’ special constables and the following 
attacks against the Turkish Cypriots ostensibly conform to the provisions of the plan. In the 
aftermath of the internal strife, enosis, as devised by the Akritas plan, was not achieved. 
However, in Makarios’ words, the 1960 Constitution was ‘dead and buried.’205  
 Despite the fact that TMT continued its clandestine activities consequent to the 
proclamation of the Republic, and according to Cockburn, the organisation had five 
thousand trained men at its disposal, the Turkish Cypriot community was considerably 
outnumbered by the Greek Cypriot forces.206 Facing the threat posed by these forces, 
Turkish Cypriots abandoned twenty-four Turkish and seventy-two mixed villages to take 
refuge in Turkish Cypriot controlled enclaves.207 In addition, due to concerns for their 
security, Turkish Cypriot officials, representatives and civil servants had to withdraw from 
their positions within the state structure.208 Consequent to this withdrawal, Greek Cypriots 
gained total control of the government and the House of Representatives, and proceeded to 
implement Makarios’ thirteen-point proposal.209 In this regard, Kyriakides wrote that ‘[t]he 
structural and functional changes of the 1960 Constitution by the Greek Cypriot leadership 
                                               
203 Reddaway, op. cit. at p.146. 
204 Ibid, p.147.  
205 President Makarios quoted in Oberling P., Negotiating for Survival: The Turkish Cypriot Quest for a 
Solution to the Cyprus Problem, (New Jersey: The Aldington Press, 1991) p.10.  
206 Cockburn C., The Line: Women, Partition and the Gender Order in Cyprus, (London: Zed Books, 2004) 
p.54. 
207 Kyle, op. cit. at p.12. 
208 Crawshaw N., ‘Cyprus: The Political Background,’ in Koumoulides J.T.A. (ed), Cyprus in Transition 1960-
1985, (London: Trigraph,1986) p.5. Herein referred to as Crawshaw (1986).  
209 Kyriakides, op. cit. at pp. 112, 113. 
   76
have been directed toward establishing a unified state with “unfettered” independence.’210 
To the extent that the 1960 constitution provided for a bi-communal state structure, it was 
now de facto dead and buried.  
 Central to Greek Cypriots’ appropriation of state power was the perception that 
Turkish Cypriots vacated their positions within the government to stage an insurgence 
against the state.211 Certainly, the suspicion that TMT continued its covert existence training 
men and smuggling arms, and the role played by the Turkish paramilitaries in forming 
enclaves that seemingly prepared ‘[t]he necessary territorial basis for partition’ provided 
Greek Cypriots with sufficient pretext.212 However, Oberling’s report offers a different 
insight into the acts of the Greek Cypriot leadership:  
[...] the Greek Cypriot controlled radio station in Nicosia was 
unceasingly broadcasting inflammatory propaganda to the effect 
that the Turkish Cypriots (all of whom were huddling together in 
their various ghettos) were revolting against the government and had 
embarked upon a wholesale slaughter of the Greek Cypriot 
population. These accusations served not only to further encourage 
Greek Cypriot militancy but also to misinform the outside world as 
to the true nature of the massacre which was then underway on the 
island.213 
Under such pretext, the Greek Cypriot leadership regarded its appropriation of power as 
legitimate and stipulated that collaboration with Turkish Cypriots was conditional upon their 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the constitutional amendments.214 
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 In turn, the Turkish Cypriot leadership argued that their absence from the 
government and the legislature was due to security reasons,215 therefore, they were being 
expelled from the state apparatuses and that, the Greek appropriation of the political power 
was unconstitutional.216 To the Turkish Cypriots’ considerable dismay, however, 
international recognition of Makarios’ government had not been withdrawn.217 In fact, on 
4th March 1964, Resolution 186 of the Security Council of the United Nations asked of ‘the 
Government of Cyprus [...] to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and 
bloodshed in Cyprus’ as if no question of the legitimacy of the Government of Cyprus had 
arisen due to the atrocities and the resultant Greek Cypriot appropriation of the power.218  
 In addition to amending the constitution, the Greek Cypriot government attempted 
to enhance its hold on power by bringing oppressive measures against the Turkish Cypriot 
community. During the period between the years of 1964 and 1967, the Greek government 
imposed economic sanctions upon the Turkish enclaves.219  These sanctions were 
maintained by encircling the enclaves with fortifications, subjecting the imported supplies 
to rigorous scrutiny, and permitting solely the entry of items which were ‘needed for barest 
survival.’220 In addition to the economic sanctions, Turkish Cypriots were subjected to 
restriction of movement (between different enclaves) as a result of the ‘harassment and 
humiliating searches by the Cyprus Police’  — the police forces now being entirely formed 
by Greek Cypriots.221  
 Another significant event vis-à-vis the oppression of the Turkish Cypriot community 
was the return of Grivas to the island on 14 June 1964 as the commander of the mainland 
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Greek military contingent on the island.222 Among the constitutional amendments put into 
effect by the Greek Cypriot government was the creation of an army called the National 
Guard.223 While Grivas was not officially appointed to any position within the new army, 
Oberling maintained that ‘the old rightist fanatic from Trikomo’ rapidly seized the 
leadership of the National Guard.224    
 Two of the Grivas-led attacks upon the Turkish enclaves carried much significance 
in shaping the future of the Cyprus question. The first of these attacks was in August 1964 
against the Turkish enclave in the Kokkina region.225 The significance of this region was 
that it was the only coastal region under Turkish Cypriots’ control in the northern shore of 
the island; and hence, it was the only point to which supplies coming from Turkey by the 
sea route could reach.226 The National Guard’s offensive against Turkish Cypriots in this 
region was met by the air raids from Turkey’s air force.227 With this raid, the mainland 
Turkish administration was proving its ability to stage a military intervention on the island.  
 The second of the Grivas-led attacks took place in November 1967. Crawshaw 
reported that ‘[o]n 15 November, a large force of Greek and National Guard troops, led by 
Grivas, attacked the Aghios Theodoros/Kophinou enclave.’228 In light of the events in 1964, 
the Turkish threat to intervene was taken more seriously. In accordance with the Turkish 
ultimatum, Grivas was called back to Athens and the excessive mainland Greek troops were 
withdrawn from the island.229 In addition, the economic restrictions imposed upon the 
Turkish enclaves were lifted.230  Marking a turning point for the four-year long internal 
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strife, these events would open the way for the commencement of inter-communal 
negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus question.   
 
1.2. Conclusion 
 In this part of the chapter, the focus of the case study was upon the manner in which 
the bi-communal structure of the 1960 constitution collapsed. In the last section of the 
previous chapter, I demonstrated that with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the 
communities did not  abandon their respective ambitions for enosis and taksim. I showed 
that these ambitions played a central role in the communities’ rejection of the the bi-
communal state structure as the ultimate solution to the Cyprus problem. I presented the 
outcome of this rejection in the current part by taking into account the constitutional crises 
that started off as a struggle to implement the given provisions and later transformed into 
the conflict of the thirteen-point proposals.  
 The brief account of the constitutional crises presented herein sets the background 
for Turkish Cypriots’ struggles to maintain their communal being. Inasmuch as the 1960 
constitution provided for means to safeguard this being, the workings of ideological 
ambitions and mistrust among the communities resulted in the loss of these safeguards. The 
significance of this loss for the forthcoming parts of the chapter is that it accentuates the 
negative effects of international non-recognition of Turkish Cypriots’ unilateral declaration 
of independence. To delineate these effects, in the remaining parts of the case study, I trace 
Turkish Cypriots’ progress from negotiating a solution to the constitutional crises to 
unilaterally declaring independence. I start this investigation in the next part by focusing 
upon the inter-communal negotiations that commenced in the aftermath of Greek Cypriots’ 
appropriation of constitutional power.  
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Part Two  
Inter-communal Negotiations and Military Interventions  
 In the history of the Cyprus conflict, the commencement of negotiations between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots can be viewed as forming a chronological bridge between two 
armed struggles — the first being the inter-ethnic fighting of 1963 and the second, back-to-
back events of the coup d’état and the military intervention of 1974. The first struggle was 
the end result of the manifestation of antagonistic political ambitions. The second set of 
struggles generated from the persistent effects of these ambitions. Therefore, in what 
follows, I consider the negotiations between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot leaderships 
with a particular focus upon the prolonged effects of the idea of enosis on these negotiations. 
The relevance of this focus is threefold. First, Turkish Cypriots’ mistrust of the idea played 
a central role in the futility of negotiations. Second, such futility, in turn, frustrated the junta 
in charge of government in Greece and occasioned the coup d’état in Cyprus. Third, Turkey 
staged a military intervention on the island as a reaction to the coup. The events of 1974 
resulted in the separation of the populations of the island into Greek southern and Turkish 
northern regions. This regional division, later, provided the territorial basis for the latter’s 
unilateral declaration of independence.   
 With the instigation of the Secretary General of the United Nations, representatives 
of the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot communities met for ‘an exploratory first meeting’ on 
11 June 1968.231 The first meeting was followed by a period of negotiations that extended 
from the year of 1968 to 1971. In this period, the sides presented their positions vis-à-vis the 
Cyprus problem and exchanged proposals for its settlement. However, by the end of 1971 
the negotiations reached a deadlock. Writing in this regard, Polyviou stated that ‘[e]ven 
when agreement seemed near, one gets the distinct impression that a great gulf of 
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irreconcilable objectives and opposing philosophies divided the parties’.232 Accordingly, 
while the Turkish representative ‘believed in the fundamentality and continued essential 
validity of the 1960 constitution’ and was prepared to reformulate certain aspects of the 
constitution on the basis that local autonomy is granted to the Turkish Cypriots.233 The Greek 
representative regarded the 1963 constitution as ‘functionally broken down’ and considered 
the objective of the negotiations as finding ‘a solution to the constitutional aspect of the 
Cyprus problem in the context of an independent and unitary state.’234 As a result of their 
respective positions, the Turkish representative argued for maintaining a bi-communal state 
structure with ‘strict separation of functions between state and communities,’235 whereas, 
the Greek representative insisted on a unitary state structure in which ‘[u]nity had to be taken 
both in the sense of a basically unified administrative and governmental machine, and in the 
sense of avoiding arrangements that would force the communities to draw further apart.’236  
 To a considerable extent, the inter-communal conflict had justified the Turkish 
community’s fear of enosis. Hence, the Turkish community was suspicious of any solution 
that did not prohibit enosis forever. This was so, despite the fact that the Kophinou event 
and the resultant threat of intervention from Turkey forced Makarios to reconsider the 
struggle for enosis. In the aftermath of this event, Makarios reached an understanding that 
‘[a] solution by necessity must be sought within the limits of what is feasible, which does 
not always coincide with the limits of what is desirable.’237 Defining enosis as what is 
desirable and ‘an independent Cyprus’ as what is feasible, Makarios was ostensibly 
abandoning the struggle for uniting the island with Greece.238 
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 However, according to Kızılyürek’s interpretation, the idea of an independent 
Cyprus did not consist of settling the Cyprus problem by reaching an agreement with the 
Turkish Cypriot community; instead, an independent Cyprus for Makarios meant a Greek 
controlled sovereign state in Cyprus.239 In light of this interpretation, the Turkish 
representative’s opposition to a unitary state can be read as resisting the appropriation of 
power by Greek Cypriots and the eventual opportunity such appropriation would provide 
for enosis. In terms of the Greek representative’s perspective, however, the Turkish 
emphasis on strict separation of functions between the state and the communities disguised 
the Turkish ambitions for partition.240 
 The reactivation of talks between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriot representatives 
took place with the intervention of the Secretary General of the United Nations. The 
negotiations were resumed on 8 June 1972 with constitutional experts from Greece and 
Turkey accompanying the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot representatives.241 The talks 
between the parties continued for two years until they were interrupted by a coup d’état 
staged by the National Guard on 15 July1974, and the ensuing military intervention of 
Turkey on 20 July 1974.  Makarios’ above-mentioned change of political direction played a 
central part in the events of 1974.  
 Despite Makarios’ distinction between what was desirable and what was feasible, 
the Turkish community remained suspicious of Greek Cypriots’ aspiration for union with 
Greece. However, Markides wrote that ‘[a]s early as 1965 a public opinion poll showed that 
most [Greek] Cypriots opted for continued independence’ and added that ‘[t]he apparent 
reason for this change of mood [from supporting enosis to favouring independence] was the 
constant fear of Turkish invasion.’242 In addition to the fear of a Turkish invasion, Markides’ 
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analysis revealed several other factors that contributed to the shift in Greek Cypriots’ 
political ambitions. Firstly, he pointed out that ‘[i]ndependence permitted the development 
of political organisations that could channel the variety of political interests which formerly 
were suppressed because of the nationalist struggle.’243 Secondly, ‘greater contact with 
Greece after independence erased the illusory views entertained by many former ardent 
enosists vis-à-vis the motherland.’244 In this regard, Markides drew the reader’s attention to 
the contrasts between mainland Greek and Greek Cypriot political and economic 
institutions. Accordingly,  
[t]he absence of reactionary military movements (with the exception 
of EOKA) and dictatorships, a recurrent feature of Greek politics, 
allowed the Cypriots to develop their trade unions, their 
cooperatives, and a viable merchant class, which after independence 
contributed significantly to the high standard of living. Furthermore, 
in Cyprus a dynamic leftist party was allowed to grow unchecked, 
whereas in Greece the Left was severely suppressed and the party 
was forced underground. Fears arose that the union of the two 
countries would have adverse consequences for the Greek Cypriots 
and might reduce Cyprus to the status of another remote and 
neglected province of Greece.245  
Finally, Markides considered the rapid economic growth and the emergence of mass media 
in the aftermath of the independence as ‘secularising agents,’ and he commented that ‘[these 
agents] break down the insulation of the society from the outside world and accelerate the 
decline and debunking of cherished traditional values and ideologies.’246  
                                               
243 Ibid, p.77. 
244 Ibid, p.78. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid, pp. 78, 79. 
   84
 Two relevant results emerged from the combined effects of the above considered 
factors. The first was that, as a traditional nationalist ideology, enosis did not survive the 
transformation of the Greek Cypriot society.247 The second was that, Makarios cooperated 
with the Communist party AKEL — which was the strongest party in Cyprus — by 
removing the ban imposed upon the party by the British and by offering the party five seats 
in the House of Representatives.248 In turn, AKEL had reasons of its own to support 
Makarios in the Archbishop’s politics of independence since union with Greece would have 
meant the proscription of the communist party, and would have involved Cyprus within the 
membership of NATO.249   
 Fading support for enosis and the emergence of successful cooperation between 
Makarios and the communists250 were not considered favourably by the military regime in 
mainland Greece. Despite the declining support for enosis, there were several means by 
which the junta could manipulate the internal affairs of Greek Cypriots. First of these means 
was the presence of officers from mainland Greece in Cyprus which was sanctioned by the 
Treaty of Alliance.251 In this regard, Crawshaw wrote that, ‘[t]he Greek officers were 
politically an unknown quantity, but in view of the army’s irredentist tradition there was the 
inherent risk that individual officers far from home would use their position to propagate the 
doctrine of Enosis.’252 More important than the Greek officers’ presence was the secret 
return of Grivas to the island in 1971.  
 It was mentioned above that Grivas was called back to Greece in the aftermath of the 
Kophinou crisis in 1967. Hitchens wrote that in defiance of the agreement reached between 
Turkey and Greece after the crisis, the Greek junta facilitated Grivas’ clandestine return to 
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the island as a part of ‘a broader campaign of subversion’ against Makarios.253 According to 
Markides, ‘Grivas remained to his death a fanatical zealot of Enosis and was prepared to 
torpedo any effort on the part of Makarios to reach an accommodation with the Turks that 
excluded Enosis.’254 Finally, the political climate within the Greek Cypriot community was 
in itself ripe for dissident activities. In this regard Crawshaw stated that,  
[t]he toleration of a police force split into political factions since the 
time of EOKA, the appointment of militant ex-guerrillas to positions 
of power, the massive importation of arms and their indiscriminate 
distribution created conditions in which subversion flourished.255  
By the year of 1969, Markides noted that there were at least five known terrorist 
organisations which asserted leadership over the struggle for enosis; on his arrival, Grivas 
established a sixth by the name of EOKA B.256   
 In a letter addressed to the President of Greece, Makarios complained that the Greek 
officers who were attached to the National Guard — it will be remembered that the Guard 
was under Grivas’ leadership during the Kophinou crisis — were involved in manning and 
providing materials for EOKA B.257 In addition, Makarios accused the National Guard of 
plotting against the state, requested the replacement of Greek officers with ‘military 
instructors’ for the restructuring of the Cyprus army, and declared his intention to put 
Cypriot officers in charge of the National Guard.258  Crawshaw is of the opinion that while 
the junta entertained the idea of using force to remove Makarios from power as a last option, 
it was the Archbishop’s ‘determination to purge the National Guard’ that hastened the junta 
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to resort to this option.259 Thus, on 15 July 1974, the National Guard staged a coup d’état 
against the Presidency of Makarios in Cyprus.   
 Despite coming under heavy tank fire in the Presidential Palace, Makarios managed 
to escape, and via a British base on the island the Archbishop fled the country.260 Wrongly 
announcing Makarios’ death over the radio, the perpetrators of the coup declared Nicos 
Sampson as the new president.261  According to Hitchens, ‘[t]he junta men banked on their 
ability to kill Makarios and to offer his cadaver as a symbol of goodwill to Turkey and to 
the United States. A relatively orderly division of the spoils would then follow, with 
something for everybody.’262 Presumably, the junta relied on the notion that in the aftermath 
of getting rid of Makarios, an agreement on the basis of double enosis — which the United 
States and the NATO officials would appreciate — might be reached with the government 
of mainland Turkey.263 However, the National Guard failed at its attempt to capture 
Makarios. In addition to this failure, the leadership of the coup made a crucial mistake in 
installing Sampson as the new president of Cyprus.  
 As was mentioned earlier, Nicos Sampson was a former EOKA gunman and the 
publisher of a newspaper. Hitchens described him as ‘a well-known thug and a killer; a man 
devoid of education or culture, and […] a relentless hater of Turks.’264 Hitchens’ description 
seems well-founded since, during the armed conflict in 1963-1964, Sampson was reported 
to lead vicious offensives on Turkish Cypriots.265 In addition, O’Malley and Craig wrote 
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that ‘[Sampson] was a convicted EOKA assassin who boasted that he had killed someone 
for every year of his life.’266 Furthermore, Oberling noted that, in 1969, Sampson was elected 
to the House of Representatives at the end of a campaign which called for ‘Death to the 
Turks.’267 Finally, quoting Hitchens once again,   
[Sampson’s] name alone was enough to send a frisson through the 
Turkish Cypriot quarter, which remembered him from 1963 and 
which had been frightened by the lurid and violent tone of his 
newspapers.268  
Sampson’s propensity for violence manifested itself in the first days of his instalment as the 
president. In this regard, Cockburn reported that ‘[t]he armed offensive [which was initiated 
with the coup] continued for some days to purge the island of leftists and democrats, 
targeting Makarios supporters, members of the Communist Party (AKEL) and […] Socialist 
Party (EDEK).’269 According to Oberling, ‘[m]ore than a thousand Greek Cypriots were 
killed in less than a week.’270 While in the first few days of the coup the new regime 
committed violence solely against Greek Cypriots, Hitchens pointedly remarked that ‘the 
Turkish Cypriots could not be expected to believe that Sampson was their friend.’271 Sharing 
the same disbelief, Turkey staged a military intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974.     
 Justification for the Turkish intervention may be found in the provisions of the Treaty 
of Guarantee. Article II of the Treaty provided that Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom 
‘recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic 
of Cyprus.’ In addition, Article IV of the Treaty asserted that ‘[i]n so far as common or 
concerned action may not be possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the 
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right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the 
present Treaty.’ The go-ahead for the military intervention was given by the Turkish Prime 
Minister after he visited London and was convinced that the British government would not 
take common action in Cyprus.272  
 With the aim of creating a bridgehead in the northern coastal town of Kyrenia and 
from there to reach the Turkish enclave in capital Nicosia, the Turkish troops commenced 
‘a sea- and air-borne operation’ on 20 July.273 The immediate effect of the operation was 
that the Greek junta announced a cease-fire on 22 July. The cease-fire revealed the junta’s 
incapacity to act against the Turkish intervention. They had misjudged the Turkish threat to 
invade, were not able to send immediate support to Cyprus, and were not prepared to declare 
war against Turkey. This total failure marked the end of the junta regime in Greece. On 23 
July, the political power in Greece was handed to a civilian government.274 On 25 July, 
Foreign Ministers of Britain, Greece and Turkey met in Geneva to agree upon the conditions 
of a cease-fire.  
 It was agreed that ‘the areas controlled by the armed forces should not be extended, 
that all Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek and Greek Cypriot forces should immediately 
be evacuated and that military and civilian detainees should be exchanged as soon as 
possible.’275 On 9 August, a second conference gathered in Geneva which involved the 
Greek and the Turkish Cypriot representatives. The conference took place in a tense 
atmosphere due to the fact that neither side to the conflict obeyed the first Geneva agreement; 
the Turkish army continued to establish new military positions with continuous flow of 
troops and supplies, and the National Guard still occupied the Turkish enclaves.276  
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 Central to the second conference was the question of future constitutional 
arrangements for Cyprus. The views presented by the sides resembled the positions they had 
taken during the pre-1974 negotiations. While the Greek Cypriot representative spoke of a 
‘geographical cohesion that held out the spectre of partition,’ the Turkish side demanded ‘a 
fully fledged system of geographical federation.’277 The conference reached a deadlock with 
the Turkish authorities’ rejection of the Greek Cypriot representative’s demand to adjourn 
for thirty-six hours to consider the proposals.278 In the aftermath of this deadlock, the Turkish 
army resumed its southward advance and a cease-fire was ordered on 16 August after almost 
forty percent of the island came under the Turkish army’s control.279   
 Fearing the oncoming advance of the Turkish army, 180,000 Greek Cypriots fled 
from their homes in the north to take refuge in the south.280 In accordance with an agreement, 
which was reached between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot representatives, Turkish 
Cypriots were allowed to cross from south to the Turkish occupied north.281 The migration 
of a large number of Turkish Cypriots established the geographical basis for a divided 
Cyprus. Since 1975, the year in which the sides resumed inter-communal discussions, Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots continue to negotiate the terms for reuniting the island. In the next part 
of this chapter, I briefly consider the processes which led to Turkish Cypriots’ unilateral 
declaration of independence. This declaration was made in the aftermath of yet another 
round of negotiations. I present the gap between parties’ respective approaches to the Cyprus 
problem which now included an added complexity of the uprooted populations and occupied 
territories.  
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Part Three 
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence and International Non-recognition  
 The Turkish occupied region of Northern Cyprus provided a safe haven for the 
Turkish Cypriots, who, for a decade, lived in the enclaves under economic isolation and fear 
of violence. The geographical separation of the communities, however, was not a final 
solution to the Cyprus problem. The sides resumed inter-communal negotiations in 1975. 
By demanding the return of the refugees to their homes, the Greek Cypriot proposals were 
asking for a federal solution which did not involve a geographic separation; as opposed to 
this, the Turkish Cypriot proposals were calling for ‘a Federal Republic composed of two 
Federated States, one in the north for the Turkish national community, and one in the south 
for the Greek national community.’282  
 In Kıbrıs’ta Federalizm (Federalism in Cyprus), Kızılyürek and Erhürman wrote that 
the Greek representative was authorised by President Makarios to negotiate for a federal 
solution which was based upon several Greek and Turkish cantons.283 In addition, Kızılyürek 
and Erhürman reported that the essential aspects of the Greek proposals were the demand 
for a powerful central government, freedom of movement and acquisition of property 
throughout the island.284 These demands contrasted with the Turkish proposal for a bi-zonal 
federation with a less powerful central government that allowed greater autonomy for the 
federated states.285 These divergent positions presented by the sides in 1975 formed the basis 
of inconclusive negotiations for the next four decades.  
 In relation to the differences in parties’ approach to the problem, Erhürman argued 
that since the 1970s to present, Greek Cypriots continued to suspect every set of new Turkish 
Cypriot proposals as promoting two separate states; and similarly, Turkish Cypriots 
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considered every set of new Greek Cypriot proposals as envisioning a solution not on the 
basis of a federal but a unitary state.286 On the one side of the negotiating table, there was 
the Turkish Cypriot community that, after a decade of atrocities and economic hardship, was 
experiencing the relative safety of northern Cyprus. Therefore, one could not expect this 
community to concede a plan that was not based upon the geographical separation of the 
Greek and the Turkish communities. On the other side of the negotiating table, there was the 
Greek Cypriot community that continuously distrusted Turkish Cypriots’ ambition for 
partition. Consequently, it could not be expected from the Greek Cypriot leadership to accept 
a solution that was based upon the geographical separation of the communities — especially 
if such a solution meant that the Greek Cypriot refugees of 1974 could not return to their 
homes.   
 The credibility of the Greek Cypriots’ suspicions considerably increased with the 
Turkish community’s unilateral declaration of independence in the northern part of the 
island. Between the deadlock of disparate arguments and continued mistrust, Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was proclaimed on 15 November 1983. In the 
following passage, Tamkoç explained the connection between the inter-communal 
negotiations and the declaration of independence:  
Toward the end of 1983, when in the course of intercommunal talks, 
it became quite apparent that the Greek Cypriot leadership, 
encouraged and proded [sic] by Greece, was not going to budge from 
its position in denying the Turkish Cypriot community its right of 
self-determination the Turkish leaders finally concluded that the time 
had come for the proclamation of the independence of their State.287 
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The underlying assumption of Tamkoç was that the Turkish Cypriot community had a right 
of self-determination and the futility of the talks resulted in the denial of this right.  
 The idea of Turkish Cypriots’ right to self-determination stemmed from the 
perception that ‘[this right] was exercised in 1960 jointly by the two communities which 
were recognised as co-founders of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus,’ that regardless of 
the numerical gap between the Greek and the Turkish populations, both the communities 
were signatories to the treaties which established the Republic.288 Therefore, authors who 
argued for the legitimacy of the TRNC stressed that with the events of 1963, the 
constitutional arrangements of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus were destroyed. Hence, 
post-1963 Greek administration could not be accepted as the legitimate government of the 
bi-communal Republic.289 While the proclamation of the TRNC was the outcome of 
exercising the right recognised by the Zurich and London agreements, the perceived demise 
of the bi-communal state of the Republic and the inconclusive negotiations were portrayed 
as the reasons that necessitated such an outcome. 
 International opinion, however, projected a different perspective. Joseph argued that 
the United Nations accorded ‘an indirect recognition of the legality and the constitutionality 
of Makarios’ “Turkish free” government’ by rejecting a claim by the then Vice-President 
Kutchuk against the legality of the Greek Cypriot delegate at the Security Council in 1964.290 
Kutchuk’s argument was that in the absence of the Vice-president and the Turkish ministers 
from their offices, appropriate constitutional sanctions were not given to the Greek Cypriot 
delegate.291 In addition to this, it was presented earlier in the chapter that Resolution 186 (4 
March 1964) of the Security Council called upon the ‘Government of Cyprus,’ which by 
then functioned as a Greek administration without the participation of the Turkish officials, 
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to act against violence and bloodshed in the island. To a considerable extent, the two 
incidents mentioned above support the notion that the international community did not 
regard the Republic of Cyprus as extinct and considered the Greek administration as the 
legitimate government of Cyprus.  
  Almost two decades later, the Security Council repeated its view that the Republic 
of Cyprus was not extinct by calling upon ‘all states to respect the sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus.’292 In 
accordance with this view, the Council resolved that the Turkish Cypriots’ unilateral 
declaration of independence ‘is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee’, and that ‘the 
attempts to create a ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ is invalid, and will contribute to 
a worsening of the situation in Cyprus.’293 The final clause of the resolution called upon ‘all 
states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus.’294  
 Thus far in this chapter, I presented Turkish Cypriots’ struggles to maintain their 
communal being within the context of the constitutional provisions of the Republic of 
Cyprus. With the events of 1974, the ensuing demographic separation, and the unilateral 
declaration of independence in 1983, these struggles enter the context of international law. 
The overall purpose of the case study is to account for recognition as an essential element, 
in practice, for the very being of a community; to show, as Jan Klabbers submitted, that ‘it 
is next to impossible for a state to survive without recognition.’295 Turkish Cypriots’ 
struggles, until the declaration of 1983, can be interpreted as the community’s attempt to 
gain recognition from Greek Cypriots as their politically equal partners in the new Republic. 
Although the initial struggle for recognition took place within the context of domestic law, 
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its refusal locked the Turkish community in a constitutional crisis with existential 
repercussions.  
 In light of these existential repercussions, Turkish Cypriots internationalised their 
struggle for recognition. The unilateral declaration of independence can be interpreted as an 
attempt to safeguard the necessary means to maintain the very being of a community — 
means which have long been denied to Turkish Cypriots by the futility of inter-communal 
negotiations. As such, the combined consequences of the constitutional crises and the 
unresolved negotiations accentuate the impact of international non-recognition upon the 
existence of the Turkish community. It is against this background that I evaluate 
international community’s approach to exclude the relational element of coming-into-being. 
In the next part of this chapter, I present this evaluation through an account of the 
consequences of non-recognition upon the Turkish Cypriot community.  
  
Part Four 
Existential Consequences of Non-recognition  
4.1. Introduction  
 In the final part of the case study, I focus upon the consequences of the Security 
Council’s resolution which called for the non-recognition of the TRNC. I consider these 
consequences within three different contexts: international trade, international travel, and 
property ownership. Insofar as these affairs are vital for a community to maintain its being, 
I highlight the role recognition played in hindering Turkish Cypriots’ operations in all of 
these contexts. I show that such hinderance renders the Turkish community heavily 
dependent upon economic support from Turkey.  
 In the latter section of the part, I consider the political reverberations of this 
economic dependence. I expose international law’s inability to provide Turkish Cypriots 
with necessary means to defend against the ramifications of Turkey’s tutelage. I argue that 
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this inability is rooted in international community’ rigid approach to disregard the relational 
element of existing as an entity under international law. I show that, apropos the Turkish 
Cypriot community, such disregard is manifest in the failure to take into account a set of 
relations that have, more than half a century, been generating the existential cul-de-sac.      
 As noted earlier, the Security Council of the UN reacted to the proclamation of the 
TRNC with Resolution 541 (1983). This resolution regarded the TRNC as invalid and called 
for its non-recognition. In the following year, the Council repeated its stance against the 
TRNC by adopting Resolution 550. Accordingly, the Council ‘[reiterated] the call upon all 
States not to recognise the purported State of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” set 
up by secessionist acts and [called] upon them not to facilitate or in any way assist the 
aforesaid secessionist entity.’296 Brus et al. reported that the Security Council’s call not to 
facilitate or assist the Turkish Cypriot state did not result in an outright ban on trade or other 
forms of cooperation with the Turkish Cypriots.297  Instead, it was argued that, ‘the Greek 
Cypriots who enjoy exclusive access to international forums as the only internationally 
recognised government of Cyprus, were gradually successful in making trade and other 
economic relations with Northern Cyprus an unattractive option for other countries.’298 In 
what follows, I show that, despite the fact that an outright ban on trade or travel was not 
occasioned by the relevant resolutions, behind Greek Cypriots’ success was the very issue 
of recognition. In other words, the international perception that the Turkish Cypriot state 
was not recognised played the central role for denying this community trade, travel, and 
property rights. I rely upon the existential effects of this perception to affirm recognition as 
an essential element in achieving and maintaining communal existence. 
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4.2. Trade, Travel, and Property Rights     
 A major hindrance to the Turkish Cypriot trade took place in 1994 when the 
European Court of Justice ruled that the certificates of origin and phytosanitary certificates 
issued by Turkish authorities in the northern region of Cyprus could not be accepted by the 
European Economic Community.299 The following sentence quoted from the judgment 
illustrates the central aspect of this decision:  
It would be impossible for an importing State to address enquiries to 
the departments or officials of an entity which is not recognised, for 
instance concerning the contaminated products or certificates that are 
incorrect or have been interfered with. Clearly only the authorities of 
the Republic of Cyprus are in a position to take action following 
complaints connected with the contamination of plant products 
exported from Cyprus.300  
While the certificates of origin were necessary for preferential treatment of goods from 
Cyprus within the European Economic Community, goods such as citrus products and 
potatoes required additional phytosanitary certificates according to the Plant Health 
Directive 77/93 of the EEC.301 Without the preferential treatment, the costs of the Turkish 
Cypriot agricultural products increased and the competitiveness within the European market 
was lost.302  
 According to Brus et al., ‘[u]ntil 1994, the EC [European Community] was the main 
trading partner of the Turkish Cypriots, with agricultural products — mainly citrus fruits 
and potatoes — being the major exports’.303 In addition, it was reported that ‘[i]n 1994, 
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agricultural products corresponded to 48.1 per cent of Northern Cyprus’ total export volume 
with 23.4 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot working population employed in the sector.’304 
The loss of competitiveness in the European market meant that the Turkish Cypriot 
community were now devoid of their economic powerhouse.  
 Another issue that causes an additional impediment to the economic well-being of 
the Turkish Cypriot community concerns the sea- and air-ports in northern region of the 
island. At the centre of this issue, too, is the question of recognition. Since the TRNC is not 
recognised as an independent state, the decision of the Republic of Cyprus in 1974 to close 
all the sea- and the air-ports in Northern Cyprus305 is respected by the international 
community. An instance which, in this regard, illustrates the international community’s 
attitude took place in the year of 2006 when a north Cyprus based airline made an application 
to the authorities in the United Kingdom to operate direct flights from London airports to 
Ercan airport in Northern Cyprus.306 The reason for the rejection of this application was that 
‘the Republic of Cyprus had not designated Ercan as a recognised Cypriot airport under the 
terms of the Chicago Convention.’307  
  A final obstacle to achieving a healthy economy in Northern Cyprus is the lack of 
certainty in property rights in the northern region. In a report dated March 2006, 
International Crisis Group recognised this uncertainty as diminishing ‘foreign direct 
investment and private sector development.’308 The root cause of the ambiguity in property 
rights can also be traced back to the issue of recognition. As was mentioned earlier, the 
Turkish intervention of 1974 resulted in the migration of 180,000 Greek Cypriots to the 
south of the island. Emine Çolak reported that with the provisions of Article 159 of the 
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constitution of the TRNC, ‘the ownership of all property in North Cyprus ‘abandoned’ by 
Greek Cypriots since February 1975 was deemed to have passed to the TRNC and the Land 
Registry records were amended accordingly, technically depriving the previous owners of 
their title according to the domestic law of the North.’309   
 However, the international community’s stance on the issue of recognition of the 
TRNC played a central role in determining the rights of the previous owners. In the case of 
Loizidou v Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that,  
[i]t is evident from international practice and the various strongly 
worded resolutions [i.e. Resolution No.541 (1983) and No.550 
(1984) of the UN Security Council] that the international community 
does not regard the “TRNC” as a State under international law and 
that the Republic of Cyprus has remained the sole legitimate 
Government of Cyprus [...] Against this background the Court 
cannot attribute legal validity for purposes of the Convention to such 
provisions as Article 159 of the fundamental law on which the 
Turkish Government rely.310  
The common aspect of the above considered separate instances of economic isolation is the 
international non-recognition of the TRNC. While the TRNC remains unrecognised, the 
limited access to external markets, increased costs of transport and uncertainty of title to 
property continue to repel foreign investment and prevent the development of the private 
sector. Thus, the Turkish Cypriot economy relies heavily upon an increasingly inefficient 
public sector.311 This reliance, in turn, generates existential problems at a different level.  
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4.3. Political Consequences of Turkey’s Tutelage  
 The combined effects of non-recognition and the inefficiency of the public sector 
render Turkish Cypriots financially dependent upon Turkey and the form of this dependence 
engender political ramifications.312 As the financier of the public sector,313 Turkey assumes 
the right to manage this sector more efficiently. Such an assumption, however, permits, what 
may be called, the act of meddling with the internal affairs of the Turkish Cypriot 
community. In this regard, Dodd commented that, ‘[i]nitiatives stemming from Turkey to 
tighten up the conditions of work for civil servants, and the many others on the large public 
payroll, were greatly resented [by Turkish Cypriots].’314  
 Political consequences also follow from Turkey’s military presence in the northern 
region of Cyprus. In describing the role of the Turkish army in Cyprus, Christos Ioannides 
wrote that ‘[s]ince 1974, the TRNC has been totally integrated militarily with Turkey,’315 
and that, ‘[t]he Turkish army is responsible for both the external and internal security of the 
TRNC.’316 The most significant consequence of this responsibility is that, the Turkish 
Cypriot police force is brought under the command of the mainland Turkish army.317 
Another factor that links the Turkish army to political interference in northern Cyprus is the 
claim that the youth movement of the mainland Turkish Nationalist Movement Party, also 
known as the Gray Wolves, are engaging in politically motivated illegal activities in northern 
Cyprus.318  
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 In his book Özel Harp Dairesi (Special Warfare Department), journalist Ecevit Kılıç 
revealed that the Grey Wolves formed the civil component of the Special Warfare 
Department and took part in assassinations and massacres in which the Department was 
implicated during the 1970s and 1980s in Turkey.319 The Cyprus Action Network — a 
human-rights activists group — maintains that since 1974, ‘[t]here has been more than 31 
bombings, 10 arsons, 4 gun firings, and 1 murder with political motivations in the Turkish-
controlled part of Cyprus’ and that no one has ever been charged for these crimes.320 
Considering the facts that the Special Warfare Department were active in Cyprus via the 
operations of the TMT, that the Grey Wolves formed a unit of this Department, that the 
Turkish Cypriot police forces are under the command of the Turkish Army, and that no one 
was charged for the politically motivated crimes, the claim that the Turkish army interferes 
in political affairs in the northern part of Cyprus gains more credibility.  
 In addition to the claims of physical violence, Özkaleli wrote about ‘mental violence’ 
that has been directed against any person who has been critical of Turkey’s policies for 
Cyprus.321 Therefore, in several occasions, political criticism of Turkey resulted in people 
being detained by the police or losing their jobs, and being branded a ‘traitor’ or ‘a spy for 
the Greek Cypriot administration.’322  However, Ioannides considered the presence of the 
Turkish army as one of the two factors that affect the Turkish Cypriots’ political will. The 
second of these factors is the ‘legal and political incorporation of Anatolian settlers into the 
TRNC.323 
 Hatay informed the reader that in the aftermath of the 1974 war and prior to the 
establishment of the TRNC, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot administration ‘facilitated and 
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encouraged an immigration of Turkish nationals from Turkey.’324 While this policy served 
the purposes of reinforcing the Turkish population and meeting the needs for the 
establishment of a feasible economy in northern Cyprus,325 Hatay argued that the ‘influx of 
Turkish nationals changed the character of the demographic problem in Cyprus as it added 
a new element to the population ratios that have historically been important for power-
sharing arrangements and power struggles on the island.’326 Approaching the same problem 
from a different perspective, Ioannides argued that, 
[...] Turkish-Cypriot autonomy, which has been eroding steadily 
since the 1950s, has diminished even further with the legal and 
political incorporation of the settlers into the TRNC. The 
consequence of this process has been to eliminate the vestiges of an 
autonomous Turkish-Cypriot collective will. Indeed, Turkish 
Cypriots have ceased to have an identifiable political will of their 
own.327  
While there is a considerable percentage of the population who believe that financial aid 
from Turkey is not a solution to the economic ailment of the Turkish Cypriot community 
and that some accuse Turkey of maintaining such dependency for her own interests in 
Cyprus,328 the most significant sign of discontent against the current political status quo was 
given by the Turkish Cypriot community in 2004.  
 In a referendum for the UN sponsored plan to unite the island, 64.9 percent of the 
participating Turkish Cypriots voted for the implementation of the plan.329 In other words, 
                                               
324 Hatay M., ‘Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking?’ PRIO Report 2/2007, (Oslo: International Peace 
Research Institute, 2007) p.2.  
325 Ibid, Hatay quoted from İnanç G., Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor: Türk Demokrasisinde Kıbrıs (1970-1991), 
(İstanbul: Türk İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2007) pp. 77-80; Bahçeli T., Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955 
(London: Westview, 1990) p.111. 
326 Hatay, op. cit. at p.3. 
327 Ioannides, op. cit. at p.167 [emphasis in original] 
328 Özkaleli, op. cit, at p.57. 
329 BBC New, ‘Cyprus Spurns Historic Chance,’ 25 April 2004, access: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3656753.stm  (date of access: 25 July 2012).   
   102
the Turkish Cypriot community explicitly displayed their intention to solve the problem 
which has enclosed the community in a political crisis of being since 1963. Once again, 
however, external relations played a crucial role in determining this community’s future. 
The plan was not enacted due to Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the plan in a concurrently held 
referendum. The principal consequence of this rejection is that a major international effort 
to resolve the conflict was thwarted prolonging the political impasse that engulfs the Turkish 
Cypriot community within a crisis of being. Greek Cypriots remain disinclined to solve the 
constitutional conflict as its outcome helped this community’s appropriation of state power. 
Turkish army remains stationed in Northern Cyprus and the Turkish government continues 
its project to restructure the public sector. For lack of recognition, Turkish Cypriots have to 
endure international law’s inability to remedy these relational disadvantages.  
  
Conclusion    
 In the first two chapters of this thesis, I provided a case study of the Turkish Cypriot 
community to achieve two general purposes. The first purpose was to substantiate the role 
recognition played in determining the existence of the community. To achieve this purpose, 
I presented a lengthy account of the events surrounding the establishment of the Republic of 
Cyprus and the collapse of its constitutional arrangements. The central focus of this account 
was upon the manner in which Turkish Cypriots’ relations with the Greek Cypriot 
community had an essential impact upon the very being of the former community. Within 
the domestic context, this manner consisted of the ways in which the Turkish community 
lost its share of sovereign power under the constitutional set-up of the Republic and were 
barred from regaining this power through futile inter-communal negotiations. 
 Within the international context, I focused upon international community’s non-
recognition of Turkish Cypriots’ unilateral declaration of independence. I showed that the 
results of this non-recognition were the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and the 
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exacerbation of the community’s economic dependence upon Turkey. I described the serious 
political repercussions of this dependence by referring to Turkey’s interference with the 
community’s public affairs and the former’s continued military presence on the northern 
region of the island.  
 The second purpose of the case study was to demonstrate international law’s inability 
to take into account the relational element of coming-into-being. To accomplish this 
purpose, I relied upon the combined outcomes of domestic negotiations and international 
non-recognition. I presented that, the loss of sovereign share and economic dependence 
generated an existential crisis which left this community vulnerable to political manipulation 
and demographic assimilation. My concluding argument is that, the aforementioned inability 
stems from international law’s disregard of the existential effects which an entity’s external 
relations have upon its being. In other words, the struggles of the Turkish Cypriot 
community and the resultant threats of oblivion cannot be grasped without the context of 
this community’s relations which include Greek Cypriots, Britain, Greece, and Turkey.   
 These are relations in which certain rights and obligations that safeguard the being 
of an entity are either recognised and granted or not recognised and withheld. In relation to 
the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, we observed that the respective political 
ambitions of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities were not granted. According to 
Britain, Greece, and Turkey, the significance of the Cyprus problem lay in preserving 
regional security and self-interest rather than recognising the wishes of the island’s two 
communities. In relation to the form of independence granted to Cypriots, the Greek 
community did not recognise the Turkish community as a politically equal partner. In 
Turkish community’s aspiration for partition, too, there was the question of recognising 
Greek Cypriots as reliable partners.  
 The relevance of the question of recognition is also manifest in Turkish Cypriots’ 
relations with Greek Cypriots in the aftermath of the ethnic-strife. Regaining constitutional 
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powers or any other means of survival under the rubric of the Republic of Cyprus, for 
Turkish Cypriots, is contingent upon negotiating a solution with Greek Cypriots. To the 
extent, and it has been more than half a century now, that these negotiations constantly prove 
futile, Turkish Cypriots continue to find themselves economically dependent upon Turkey. 
This dependence marks another important relation that shapes the being of the community, 
albeit in an existentially threatening manner. International law’s aforementioned disregard 
of the relational element of coming-into-being relates to turning a blind eye to all of these 
connections the combined effects of which is to trap Turkish Cypriots in a political impasse.  
 International law overlooks these effects in two ways. The first is by insisting on the 
non-recognition of the unilaterally declared state on the northern region of the island. While 
this insistence may be justified on the basis that the TRNC is an offshoot of Turkey’s 
unlawful occupation of the northern region of the island.330 It does still ignore the fact that 
the military occupation is also threatening the very being of the Turkish community. The 
second way is that, international law fails to provide any alternative means to safeguard the 
well-being of this community against the repercussions of futile negotiations and Turkey’s 
repressive tutelage. The need for such alternative means could only arise if the relational 
element of coming-into-being were taken into account, in other words, if the international 
law took notice of the existential significance of Turkish Cypriots’ relations.   
 Over the course of two chapters, I demonstrated the practical role external relations 
and recognition played in determining the being of the Turkish Cypriot community. In the 
next chapter, I question whether the prevalent theories of recognition of states under 
international law account for this role. Here, I also argued that international community’s 
reaction to the struggles of Turkish Cypriots reflected an oversight of the relational element 
of existing as an entity. I return to this argument later on in the thesis to criticise international 
law’s approach as a restrictive economy of recognition. The following assessment of the 
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prevalent theories and the eventual criticism of the international approach, in turn, shape the 
contours of my overall argument that recognition is imperative for the constitution of 
subjects under international law.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORIES OF RECOGNITION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Introduction 
 The case study presented in the previous chapter enunciated the central role one’s 
relation to its others plays in determining the very being of a community. The need for 
recognition emerges as an essential manifestation of this role. However, under international 
law, such constitutive force is denied to the act of recognition. This denial is rooted in the 
prominent theoretical perception that recognition amounts to a declarative act by which the 
recognising party merely makes her political intentions known. My overall argument in this 
thesis, that recognition is imperative for the constitution of international subjects, has to 
contend with this prominent perception. To achieve this purpose, in this chapter, I argue that 
the prevalent theories of recognition of states under international law fail to account for the 
relational aspect of coming-into-being. I demonstrate that this failure is manifest in the 
constitutive theorists’ perception of recognition as an act of sovereign consent, and in the 
declarative theorists’ conception of international personality on an ipso facto basis.  
 The starting point of my argument is that, the prevalent theories of recognition of 
states cannot resist the atomistic conception of state sovereignty. Therefore, I commence 
this chapter with an analysis of the notion of absolute sovereignty. By focusing upon a short 
historical development of this notion, I demonstrate that the perception of states as absolute 
entities without any dependencies upon external beings comprises the modern understanding 
of sovereignty. I argue that this modern understanding is problematic to the extent that it 
assumes states to exist in a vacuum. In other words, the notion of absolute sovereignty lacks 
the relational element of coming-into-being; it does not deal with the possibility that relating 
to another being may be continuously determinative of one’s existence. Instead, the modern 
understanding of sovereignty curbs the existential effects of mutual relation by introducing 
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the notion of sovereign consent; a sovereign state does not come into existence in an 
international community which may affect her very being, but as a self-relating entity who 
has the freedom to give or withhold consent in each of her individual relations and to 
determine the extent of her external obligations.   
 In the second part of the chapter, I demonstrate that the aforementioned problematic 
atomism taints the constitutive theorists’ approach to describe the role of recognition. This 
approach embraces the notion of absolute sovereignty by considering recognition as an act 
of sovereign consent. An established state cannot be bound by new obligations towards an 
emerging state unless the former consents by recognising the latter. The outcome is that, the 
concepts of statehood and international personality are separated; the attainment of the latter 
is based on the arbitrary and subjective will of the established states; and, in the absence of 
a central authority to decide upon the question of recognition, international personality is 
rendered relative to the recognising state. I argue that the constitutive theory does not only 
produce these practical difficulties, by embracing the notion of absolute sovereignty, it 
misses the opportunity to account for recognition as a mutually constitutive imperative 
within the relational element of coming-into-being. 
 In the third part of this chapter, I argue that the scholars, whose ideas were central to 
the development of the declarative theory, placed the practical difficulties of the constitutive 
theory at the centre of their attention. In other words, the ontological question of whether an 
entity can be without a relation to another, or to what extent such a relation would come to 
constitute the being of both entities, did not occupy the thoughts of the declarative thinkers. 
Instead, these theorists concentrated upon the subjective arbitrariness of constitutive 
recognition perceived as a sovereign gesture of consent. I argue that this concentration 
extends the restrictive effects of the notion of absolute sovereignty into the domain of the 
declarative theory. Constitutive theorists’ perspectives are curtailed by the intention to hold 
on to the underlying notion of absolute sovereignty of states. In turn, by assuming the 
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question of recognition to be whether such a curtailed perspective would work in practice, 
the declarative theorists expand the limiting effects of this underlying notion. A double 
failure is committed. Neither of the prevalent theories of recognition engages with the 
relational element of recognition — an element which is imperative for the personality of 
each entity.  This is a double failure which, in turn, warrants a new search for a viable 
theoretical framework to understand this imperative effect. I present my departure from the 
prevalent theories of recognition in this chapter and set on a search for a new theoretical 
framework in the next.     
 
Part One 
1.1. Absolute Sovereignty of States 
 Under international law, states are regarded as sovereign entities. In this regard, 
Antony Anghie remarked that ‘sovereignty is the foundation of international law.’331 
Richard Joyce added that ‘[c]onventionally, modern sovereignty is considered an exclusive 
feature of nation-states.’332  An attribute of this sovereignty is that it is absolute. In this part 
of the chapter, I focus upon two perspectives on what the notion of absolute may entail for 
state sovereignty. The first perspective is that states are absolute but only to a certain extent. 
In this view, the absoluteness of sovereignty is delimited by God or the laws of nature. The 
second perspective dismisses this limit and renders states absolute in the etymological sense 
of the word. However, both approaches present veritable problems. The former produces an 
oxymoron in that absolute state is nevertheless subjected to a source of law ostensibly higher 
than itself. The latter is implausible to the extent that an absolutely sovereign state comes 
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into being among other absolutely sovereign states and their mutual relations continue to 
define the very being of each state. 
 In spite of the inherent problems, the two perspectives mark the progress towards a 
modern understanding of international law. Throughout this chapter, I argue that this 
understanding underlies the prevalent theories of recognition with restrictive effects. 
Grasping the nature of these problems and the manner in which they determine the modern 
perception of international law is, therefore, essential for illuminating, later in the chapter, 
the restrictive effects upon and the resultant shortcomings of the prevalent theories. I begin 
the first section of this part with a focus upon the work of whom Peter Fitzpatrick referred 
to as ‘the standard source of the modern idea of sovereignty’, namely, Jean Bodin.333 I, then, 
move on to consider Thomas Hobbes’ definition of absolute sovereignty. I highlight two 
factors as relevant in the respective works of Bodin and Hobbes. Firstly, these authors 
provided an internal account of sovereignty which focused upon the sovereign’s relation 
with his people.334 An internal account essentially falls within the domain of constitutional 
law and lacks a detailed study of sovereign’s relations with other sovereigns. Secondly, even 
though in their respective works Bodin and Hobbes were less concerned with a sovereign’s 
external relations, both authors imposed outer limits upon the absolute power of the 
sovereign by referring to the laws of God and nature. These references, in turn, create a 
paradox vis-à-vis the absoluteness of sovereignty.  
 In the second section of this part, I consider the respective works of Hugo Grotius 
and Emmer de Vattel. These works offer an external view on the notion of absolute 
sovereignty by applying the notion within the context of law of nations. Grotius’ work marks 
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the gradual secularisation of the notion of sovereignty as the paradoxical necessity to rely 
upon an external force diminishes. Vattel’s thoughts on the given subject completes this 
secularisation and, thus, removes the paradox of the overarching power of God. The central 
tenet of Vattel’s thought is sovereignty defined as a state’s absolute freedom and 
independence from all externalities. The purpose of my reference to Vattel’s work is to show 
that insofar as the first paradox is removed, a second is generated. I will use this second 
paradox, later in the chapter, as the basis of my critical assessment of the prevalent theories 
of recognition of states.    
  
1.2.  Absolute (Internal) Sovereignty: Bodin and Hobbes 
 Bodin defined sovereignty as ‘the absolute and perpetual power of a 
commonwealth.’335 Elaborating upon the notion of absoluteness, Bodin remarked that ‘[…] 
sovereignty given to a prince subjected to obligations and conditions is properly not 
sovereignty or absolute power.’336 One may perceive such sovereignty as an ‘unbound 
entity,’ ‘an absolute law-making entity that does as it pleases, without restraint.’337 The 
difficulty of this perception is, however, manifest when viewed in light of ‘the fact that 
sovereigns do not exist in isolation, that they inhabit a universe which includes other 
sovereigns.’338 Amidst a group of sovereigns ‘acting as one pleases’ presents a rather limited 
opportunity; based on the absoluteness of its sovereignty a state cannot, for instance, act 
upon its own volition to invade another state’s territory. Such an act would, clearly, impinge 
upon the other state’s absolute sovereignty.   
 An important point is to be discerned from the above-mentioned difficulty. Within 
the context of relations among states, absolute sovereignty has to be qualified. Contrary to 
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his initial emphasis on the unconditionality of the absolute power of the sovereign, Bodin 
also accepted that certain stipulations are, in fact, attached to the exercise of this power. 
However, these stipulations were not derived from a comparison of several sovereign states. 
Instead, Bodin referred to the law of God or nature as the source of obligations which bound 
the absolute power of sovereign entities.339 Reference to Bodin’s argument on these 
obligations is relevant to demonstrate that even ‘the standard source of the modern idea of 
sovereignty’ accepted that ‘absolute’ power of the sovereign cannot entirely be absolute.   
 Bodin narrated a dialogue which took place in the aftermath of the death of the Great 
King of Tartary. The purpose of this dialogue is to illustrate the role of the conditions 
attached to the absolute powers of the sovereign. The dialogue takes place between the 
people – who chose the new king among the deceased’s sons or nephews – and the new 
king. After seating the newly elected king on to the throne, the people would say: 
“We beg you, and also wish and bid you, to reign over us.” The king 
then says, “If that is what you want of me, you must be ready to do 
as I command, and whom I order killed must be killed forthwith and 
without delay, and the whole kingdom must be entrusted to me and 
put into my hands.” The people answers, “So be it.” Then the king, 
continuing, says, “The word that I speak shall be my sword,” and all 
the people applaud him.340   
The absolute aspect of the sovereign power is demonstrated with reference to the most brutal 
of acts — the killing of someone. The king’s power is unlimited to the extent that he can 
demand that someone be killed, and this vicious act must be carried out instantly. The rest 
of the inauguration ritual, however, goes on to show that the king takes ‘absolute’ power 
subject to the law of God. The procession continues with getting hold of the king from the 
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height of the throne and seating him on a lowly bench on the ground. This is followed by 
the king’s acknowledgement of God with which the people remind him that good 
governance will have his every wish granted, whereas the opposite would result in being 
stripped of all his power so that ‘even this bench on which you sit will not be left to you.’341 
Finally, the elected person will be raised back on to the throne and acclaimed as the new 
king. This exchange between the people and the new king, according to Bodin, marked a 
power that is absolute and sovereign, ‘for it has no other condition than what is commanded 
by the law of God and of nature.’342  
 Despite the absence of the word ‘absolute’, Hobbes’s account of sovereignty is 
similar to Bodin’s conception of the term as it also suggests the accumulation of unqualified 
power to the person of the sovereign. In Hobbes’s formulation, sovereign is the one who 
carries the person of the commonwealth.343 Sovereignty is, thus, established by the 
unification of the multitude under the authority of one man to whom the multitude would 
‘confer all their power and strength.’344 Hobbes further elaborated this conferral by referring 
to the submission of the will and judgment of everyone to the will and judgment of the 
sovereign.345 Since, according to Hobbes, the sovereign bears each person of the multitude 
and forms a single will out of a plurality of voices, this formulation is represented with the 
figure of the great Leviathan; defined also as the mortal god, Leviathan would ostensibly 
have the unrestrained sovereign power to maintain and defend the peace of the 
commonwealth.346  
 As Fitzpatrick informs us, ‘in Leviathan Hobbes sets the domain of this mortal god 
distinctly and self-sufficiently apart from the religious’, that is to say, from the Immortal 
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God.347 However, this self-sufficiency does not necessarily warrant an unchecked power. 
Subjects’ obedience to the sovereign ceases with the failure of the latter in upholding the 
laws of nature, particularly, that of every man’s right to protect himself.348  In Hobbes’s 
words, 'subjects owe to sovereigns, simple obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience 
is not repugnant to the laws of God.’349 Hobbes thought of the laws of nature as one of three 
different ways God asserted his laws and one which could be discerned by ‘the natural 
dictates of right reason.’350 Hobbes described the first law of nature as ‘a general rule, found 
out by reason, by which man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or 
taketh away the means of preserving the same.’351 Following this first rule, people’s 
establishment of the commonwealth and the sovereign’s use of absolute power therein 
becomes conditional upon the need to maintain peace and defend against other people.352  
 An alternative interpretation of absoluteness, in Hobbes’s account, focuses upon 
sovereign’s independence from persons from within the commonwealth; thus, ‘the sovereign 
is not subject to the command of any other person.’353 Such an interpretation ostensibly 
opens up the possibility of a particular type of unlimited absoluteness:  
It could be argued that since the sovereign is only answerable to God 
and is also in a position (vis-à-vis its subjects) to decide what God’s 
demands are, this subjection has no real effect on its absolute 
temporal authority.354   
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Granted this absolute temporal authority, nothing would seem to stand in the way of the 
mortal God exercising its extensive supremacy.355 Despite this supremacy, however, 
Richard Joyce argued that in Bodin’s and Hobbes’s accounts what we witness ‘is not 
absoluteness in and of itself.’356 Joyce explained that in these accounts, sovereignty ‘relies 
on something other to it, in this case God, to justify its power.’357 This reliance renders it 
impossible, in theory, to conceive a form of sovereignty which can genuinely be absolute. 
Joyce added that, in practice too, the commonwealth’s claim to absolute temporal 
sovereignty would even be open to contest as a result of states’ collisions with the Church 
in deciding what God’s demands are.358  
 With these inherent doubts as to the attainability of authentic absoluteness in Bodin’s 
and Hobbes’ respective works two factors are relevant. The first factor is that, the focus of 
these accounts remains upon the establishment of sovereignty from an internal perspective. 
As Kinji Akashi remarked, ‘Hobbes’ discussions on the state of nature, and ‘law’ and ‘right’ 
therein, deal mainly with the establishment of a state by individual natural persons and not 
with the state of nature among states.’359 That is to say, Hobbes (and we can also add Bodin 
here too) offers ‘no resolved way in which the being-in-this-world of this mortal god could 
be constitutively comprehended.’360 The second factor is that, even if one tries to 
comprehend the sovereignty of the commonwealth from an external perspective by taking 
into account commonwealth’s relations with other states, one encounters an obstinate 
persistence upon the very same problematic notion of absoluteness. In what follows, I shift 
my attention to the works of Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel to demonstrate the manner 
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in which, at the level of conceiving the law of nations, the notion of absolute sovereignty 
continues to play a central role. 
 
1.3. Absolute (External) Sovereignty: Grotius and Vattel       
 Hugo Grotius is commonly regarded as the progenitor of modern and secular 
perception of international law.361 For the purposes of this chapter, the significance of this 
perception is twofold. Firstly, an assessment of state sovereignty from the external 
perspective, which takes into account sovereign states’ relations to each other, can be 
conducted through Grotius’ account of international law. In other words, the account 
provides an insight into what being in this world with other sovereigns may entail for the 
very notion of absolute sovereignty of a state. Secondly, Grotius’ secularist approach 
provides an opportunity to understand how this notion survives within the modern 
understanding of international law and does so by circumventing the limits of laws of God 
and nature. In what follows, therefore, I introduce Grotius’ concept of international law with 
an emphasis upon the latter’s notion of state sovereignty and this notion’s effect upon the 
development of the concept of the law of nations.      
 Grotius divided the subject of sovereignty into common and particular, and 
elucidated this division by referring to the structure of the body.362 Body of an animal is 
capable of seeing and this makes the body the common subject of seeing. As the body sees 
through the eyes, which constitute particular parts of the body, the particular subject of 
seeing is, therefore, the eyes. Following this logic of the body, Grotius maintained that the 
common subject of sovereignty was the state and the particular subject of sovereignty was 
                                               
361 Covell C., The Law of Nations in Political Thought: A Critical Survey from Vitoria to Hegel, (Basingstoke: 
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Malay Mirror’ in  Koskenniemi M., Rech W., Fonseca M.J. (eds.), International Law and Empire: Historical 
Explorations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) p.21.  
362 Grotius H., The Rights of War and Peace, Book I (Indiana: Liberty Fund Inc., 2005) p.259. 
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the person or persons which exercised the sovereign power within the state.363 This is a 
power which is supreme and hence, the acts of the one who exercises these powers ‘are not 
subject to another’s power, so that [these acts] cannot be made void by any other human 
will.’364 Thus far, the notion of supremely sovereign state resembles the internal accounts of 
Bodin’s and Hobbes’s absolute sovereignty. The question remains as to what happens to this 
supreme power once we start to consider its relations with other supreme powers. Grotius’ 
perception of the law of nations hints at a certain answer.  
 Grotius classified the law or rights of nations as a form of voluntary right which drew 
its authority from human will as opposed to divine determination.365 Therefore, at the very 
outset, the law of nations did not, in Grotius’ ostensibly secular perspective, amount to some 
form of hierarchically superior right as an ordainment of God, a dictate of reason, or a rule 
of nature with a capacity to delimit the supreme power of the sovereign states. Instead of 
comprising a restrictive burden upon the absolute sovereignty of states, international law 
derived its authority from the will of these states.366 The posited volition of the states 
becomes the instrumental power in establishing the law of nations; and custom, understood 
as ‘continual use’ throughout time, comprises the manner in which this volition is 
manifested.367 Inasmuch as the international law may set the context of being-in-this-world 
for the sovereign states, this context is thus composed of the voluntary behaviour of the 
states. 
 In addition to providing an opportunity to assess the repercussions of being-in-this-
world upon the notion of absolute sovereignty of states, Grotius’ account of international 
law also aids us in understanding how this notion survives within the modern perception of 
international law and does so by circumventing the limits of laws of god and nature. Moving 
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from Bodin’s and Hobbes’ internal perspective on sovereignty to Grotius’ external (or what 
could also be called the international) approach, the necessity of relying upon an outside 
power ostensibly disappears. I referred, above, to Joyce’s comments that state sovereignty 
does not amount to ‘absoluteness in and of itself’ and that reliance upon God was necessary 
for this sovereignty to establish its power.368 Grotius’ perspective on the particular subject 
of sovereignty resembles the respective internal accounts of Hobbes and Bodin. The king, 
as this particular subject, according to Grotius, is obliged to observe the laws of nature, god, 
and nations.369 Whereas, any form of reliance upon god is missing from the external level 
of sovereign relations. At this level we are concerned with the law of nations which derives 
its authority from the common subjects of sovereignty, that is to say, from the states. The 
significant feature of this derivation is that it lacks any reference to the limiting power of 
god. The secularism of Grotius’ approach to international law is relevant here; rights of 
nations are voluntary rights of human will and not of any form of divine will.  
 Given Grotius’ distinction between particular and common subjects of sovereignty, 
it may be assumed that different rules apply within the internal and the external domains of 
sovereignty. This assumption would readily lead one to the conclusion that the absolute 
power of the sovereign can be retained at the external level, since the context of this level is 
set by the secular law of nations which derived its authority from the voluntary behaviour 
of the sovereign states. However, through a closer inspection of Grotius’ statements, doubts 
may be raised in relation to the above-mentioned assumption and the ensuing conclusion. 
Firstly, the metaphor Grotius used to elucidate the distinction between particular and 
common subjects of sovereignty does not invoke a definite separation between these two 
subjects. The eyes are a part of the body; hence both the body and the eyes do the seeing. 
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Secondly, the possibility of such a separation is further diluted by Grotius’ reference to the 
commonality of the law of nations.  
 Law of nations, Grotius noted, derived its authority ‘from the will of all, or at least 
many, nations.’370 Grotius offered the following explanation for this reservation: ‘I say of 
many, because there is scarce any Right found, except that of Nature, which is also called 
the Right of Nations, common to all Nations.’371 The emphasis is placed upon the perceived 
fact that law of nature is also common — and even more common than that of law of nations 
— to all nations. This emphasis, in turn, renders it difficult to reach an unequivocal variation 
between an internal form of sovereignty subject to laws of god and nature, and an external 
form of sovereignty subject only to laws of nations. Despite this difficulty, Grotius’ account 
of the law of nations demonstrated that the modern understanding of international law would 
centre upon the volition of sovereign states with much diminished role for the laws of god, 
if not for the laws of nature. For a clearer departure from the bounds of the law of nature, 
one would have to wait for Emer de Vattel’s description of international law.   
 Writing in the eighteenth century, Vattel witnessed the manner in which international 
relations developed in the aftermath of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1649. According to 
Martti Koskenniemi 'the Peace of Westphalia in 1649 laid the basis for an agnostic, 
procedural international law whose merit consisted in its refraining from imposing any 
external normative ideal on the international society. The objectives of that society would 
now arise from itself and not from any religious, moral or political notions of the good given 
externally to it.’372 Vattel’s formulation of Law of Nations provides a preeminent account 
of the post-Westphalian modern international law. For the purposes of this chapter, the focus 
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is upon the way in which Vattel devises the notion of ‘absolute’ sovereignty of states without 
the overarching dominion of the law of nature or God. 
 Inasmuch as Vattel’s conception of sovereignty can be distinguished from those of 
Bodin, Hobbes or Grotius, the starting point of the former’s thought also features the familiar 
notions of the state of nature and laws derived from this state:  
Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and 
who, before establishment of civil societies, lived together in the 
state of nature, – nations or sovereign states are to be considered as 
so many free persons living together in the state of nature. 373 
Therefore, to the extent that the sovereign states exist within the state of nature, the laws of 
that nature ostensibly bind these states. Vattel expressed this thought in the following way. 
 As men are subject to the laws of nature […] the entire nation, 
whose common will is but the result of the united wills of the 
citizens, remains subject to the laws of nature, and is bound to 
respect them in all her proceedings.374 
However, Koskenniemi informs the reader that, Vattel stands out from his pre-modern 
predecessors such as Hobbes and Grotius by regarding natural law as ‘originally intended to 
be applicable between individuals’ and thus, devising a new form of law that is applicable 
to the relations between states.375  
 Vattel achieved the distinction between laws applicable to individuals and to states 
by recognising that individuals and the states form different types of subjects and that, the 
application of the law of nature to different subjects should yield different results. 
                                               
373 Vattel E., The Law of Nations, (Indianapolis: Library Fund Inc., 2008) p.68. 
374 Ibid. 
375 Koskenniemi M., From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.113; Vattel, op. cit. at pp. 68, 69. 
   120
A state or civil society is a subject very different from an individual 
of the human race: from which circumstance, pursuant to the law of 
nature itself, there result, in many cases, very different obligations 
and rights; since the same general rule, applied to two subjects, 
cannot produce exactly the same decisions, when the subjects are 
different; and a particular rule which is perfectly just with respect to 
one subject, is not applicable to another subject of quite different 
nature. There are many cases, therefore, in which the law of nature 
does not decide between state and state in the same manner as it 
would between man and man.376  
In Vattel’s view, the law of nations, ‘as a distinct science’, consists of the ‘the art of thus 
applying [the law of nature] with a precision founded on right reason’ to the states as a 
different form of subject.377 In spite of the fact that the starting point in Vattel’s thought is 
the law of nature, it is the application of this law as a separate law of nations which detached 
Vattel’s thought from the works of previously examined authors.  In what follows, I briefly 
present Vattel’s formulation of the law of nations and show how this formulation rejected 
any external normative restrictions upon the sovereignty of states.  
 Vattel’s account of the law of nations consists of two concepts — the ‘necessary’ 
and the ‘voluntary’ laws of nations.378 Necessary law of nations conceptualises the manner 
in which the law of nature is applied to the states.379 This consists of the application of two 
general laws of the society of nations. The first law is that ‘each nation is bound to contribute 
everything in her power to the happiness and perfection of all the other.’380 The second 
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general law is that ‘each nation should be left in the peaceable enjoyment of that liberty 
which she inherits from nature.’381  
 Although Vattel initially acknowledged the necessary law of nations as immutable 
and absolutely binding upon nations,382 the combination of the first and the second laws of 
the society suggests otherwise, leading Vattel to remark that,  
[a]s a consequence of that liberty and independence, it exclusively 
belongs to each nation to form her own judgment of what her 
conscience prescribes to her, – of what she can or cannot do, – of 
what is proper or improper for her to do: and of course it rests solely 
with her to examine and determine whether she can perform any 
office for another nation without neglecting the duty which she owes 
to herself.383   
This statement demonstrates the shift away from the natural law perspectives of Hobbes and 
Bodin wherein the sovereignty of the prince was subjected to the external normative 
restraints of the law of nature or God. In Vattel’s thought, however, the necessary law of 
nations produces a system in which even the general dictates of the law of nature are 
subjected to the judgment of the concerned state. 
 Vattel’s description of the voluntary law of nations follows from the right of 
judgment afforded to the states within the context of necessary law of nations. Accordingly, 
Vattel explained that,  
[e]ach nation formulates that she has justice on her side in every 
dispute that happens to arise: and it does not belong to either of the 
parties interested, or to other nations, to pronounce a judgment on 
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the contested question. The party who is in the wrong is guilty of a 
crime against her own conscience: but as there exists a possibility 
that she may perhaps have justice on her side, we cannot accuse her 
of violating the laws of society.384 
According to Vattel, this is due to the notion that opposing any nation with open force 
violates the very liberty of that particular state, and as a result, threatens the most basic tenet 
of the natural society.385 Therefore, all nations are presumed to consent to ‘suffer certain 
things to be done, though in their own nature unjust and condemnable.’386 Vattel concluded 
that rules which are construed from this consent are the voluntary law of nations.387   
 Central to such an understanding of law of nations is the absolute sovereignty of the 
nation-states which Vattel constructed as follows: ‘[e]very nation that governs itself, under 
what form soever, without dependence on any foreign power, is a sovereign state.’388 Vattel 
further described that, 
[…] all men inherit from nature a perfect liberty and independence, 
of which they cannot be deprived without their own consent. In a 
state, the individual citizens do not enjoy them fully and absolutely, 
because they have made a partial surrender of them to the sovereign. 
But the body of the nation, the state, remains absolutely free and 
independent with respect to all other men, all other nations, as long 
as it has not voluntarily submitted to them.389 
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In the conceptions of Bodin and Hobbes, the ambiguity of absolute sovereignty of 
commonwealth was apparent from the fact that the sovereignty of the prince was subjected 
to external laws. Breaking away from this tradition, Vattel’s modern conception of absolute 
sovereignty of the state did not feature a predominant kingdom of God or obligatory rules 
of nature. This ostensibly renders the sovereignty of the state definitely absolute. For the 
purposes of this chapter, two features of this definitely absolute sovereignty are relevant. 
First, despite his departure from previous views on state sovereignty, Vattel’s conception is 
also riddled with ambiguities. Second, even with these ambiguities, Vattel’s idea of absolute 
sovereignty underpins the prevalent theories of recognition of states under international law. 
I conclude this part of the chapter by pointing out the problematic aspect of Vattel’s account 
of absolute sovereignty and demonstrate the manner in which this account underpins the 
prevalent theories in the next part. 
 The difficulty generated by Vattel’s account of absolute sovereignty pertains to the 
fact that states come into being in an international community. Not only that becoming a 
person of this community entails relating to other persons within the community, it does also 
require that international rules and regulations apply to states as subjects. Peter Fitzpatrick 
asked the relevant question here: 
To begin at the beginning, how do these sovereign states, quite 
‘independent of all the others’ come to be ‘in the first place’? They 
come to be through being recognised in and by international law. 
Which immediately plunges us into circularity and a seeming 
inconsequence with the nation state creating an international law 
which creates it.390    
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If coming-into-being cannot take place quite independent of all the other states, one must 
think that the absoluteness of state sovereignty is, in fact, unattainable. This impossibility 
can be demonstrated by focusing upon either side of the ‘seeming inconsequence’ of states 
creating international law or vice versa. If one focuses upon the first dimension wherein 
entities depend upon meeting the criteria of statehood provided by international law to 
become sovereigns, such dependence, in itself, diminishes the absoluteness of the attained 
sovereignty. Secondly, even if one focuses solely upon the dimension that ‘states create 
international law’, such creation necessitates collaboration among states which, again, tends 
to diminish absoluteness of sovereignty.  
 Vattel’s approach focused primarily on the second dimension. His formulation of the 
‘positive law of nations’ consisted of voluntary, customary and conventional laws.391 
Absolute sovereignty of the state underlay all three forms of law as each set of laws were 
deduced, according to Vattel, from the wills of the nations.392 However, beneath every form 
of international law, one can discover another aspect which contradicts the notion of truly 
absolute sovereignty. Within the context of the voluntary law of nations there is the need to 
presume consent in order to avoid interfering with the liberty of any nation. Vattel defined 
the customary law of nations as ‘[c]ertain maxims and customs consecrated by long use, and 
observed by nations in their mutual intercourse with each other as a kind of law.’393  And 
the conventional law of nations or of treaties was defined as ‘several engagements into which 
nations may enter.’394 The latter forms of international law, therefore, testify to the fact that 
international community is not made up of individual entities of absolute non-relation to 
others. States relate to each other whether by long use or even by deciding to or not to enter 
into a new convention.  
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 The definite ambiguity of Vattel’s notion of absolute sovereignty, thus, pertains to 
the wilful blindness towards the ways in which such relations actually determine the very 
being of states. Vattel seemed to acknowledge the necessity of relations between states 
through his views on the need to presume consent. However, he did not consider these 
relations as constitutive or determinative of statehood. Statehood, in Vattel’s view, remained 
what I would tentatively call atomic, that is to say, capable of singular existence. On the one 
hand, it is difficult to understand how, without such capability, states can be absolutely free 
and independent. On the other, the need to enter into relations contradicts such capability. 
Despite the evident contradiction, I will show in the next part of this chapter that, the 
resultant notion of sovereign consent underlay the constitutive theory of recognition.      
  
1.4. Conclusion 
 So far in this chapter, I traced the historic development of the concept of absolute 
sovereignty of states through the works of Bodin, Hobbes, Grotius and Vattel. I presented 
that in their respective works, Bodin and Hobbes conceived of state sovereignty as absolute. 
I showed that their conceptions provided the person of the sovereign with ostensibly 
unlimited power. However, the scope of this unrestricted power extended only so far as to 
include independence of the sovereign from other persons or obligations within the state. 
Contrasted to this internal lack of restraint, both Bodin and Hobbes subjected their absolute 
sovereigns to external normative powers of God or nature. Next, I demonstrated that 
Grotius’ account of international law did not feature such an external normative restriction 
upon the sovereignty of states. The focus of this demonstration was upon Grotius’ perception 
of the law of nations as voluntary rights which drew their authority from human, and not 
divine, will.  
 Grotius’ views on international law marked a departure from internal considerations 
of sovereignty of states by contemplating this sovereignty within the realm of states’ 
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international relations. He argued that posited volition of states constituted, within this 
external realm, the laws of nations. By deriving the authority of international law from the 
wills of states, Grotius ostensibly circumvented the external normative force of God and/or 
nature upon state sovereignty. However, this circumvention was achieved only to a certain 
extent as Grotius remained somewhat ambivalent in relation to the continuing effects of the 
law of nature upon states and their international relations. This ambivalence prevented 
Grotius from perceiving states as absolutely sovereign. For such a perception, I shifted my 
attention to Vattel’s thoughts on international law.   
 I presented above that Vattel’s perception of the law of nations centred upon the 
independence of the sovereign state from all external relations. Such independence did not 
only ensure that state sovereignty is absolute, it did also form the basis for the conception of 
international law as the product of states’ sovereign consent. Among the four scholars whose 
ideas on state sovereignty I presented in this part of the chapter, only Vattel’s thought 
purportedly achieved what Joyce regarded above as ‘absoluteness in and of itself’ for the 
notion of state sovereignty. However, this achievement is contested by Fitzpatrick who 
argued against the attainability of absolute independence within the context of states’ 
relation to international law. Inasmuch as the will of the states creates international law, 
international law sets the legal definition of statehood and accords rights together with 
obligations to entities who meet these criteria. One certain outcome of this, as Fitzpatrick 
called it, ‘seeming inconsequence’ is that states do find themselves in forms of relations both 
with international law and, under the rubric of this law, with other states.  
 The central argument of my thesis is that, such relations are mutually constitutive 
and continuously determinative of the very being of international subjects. This argument 
necessitates a relevant evaluation of the prevalent theories of recognition of states under 
international law. In what follows, I analyse the underlying effects of Vattel’s notion of 
absolute sovereignty upon these prevalent theories. In light of these effects, I will argue that 
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the constitutive and the declarative theories fail to ask the conceptual question of the role 
one’s relation to its others plays in establishing the international personality of each subject. 
This failure, in turn, forms the basis of my search, later in the thesis, for a theory of 
recognition which will accommodate such a role.   
 
Part Two 
2.1. Introduction  
 The issue of recognition under international law proves to be one of the most 
challenging topics upon which no easy conclusion may be reached. In the preface of his 
book, the International Law of Recognition, Chen stated that ‘the problem of recognition is, 
by general agreement, one of the most perplexing problems of international law.’395 Kelsen 
added to that concern by stating that both in theory and practice, the question remains 
unsolved and that ‘hardly any other question is more controversial, or leads in the practice 
of states to such paradoxical situations.’396 Lauterpacht also seemed to share a similar 
concern: 
There are only very few branches of international law which are of 
greater, or more persistent, interest and significance for the law of 
nations than the question of Recognition of States, of Governments 
and of Belligerency. Yet there is probably no other subject in the 
field of international relations in which law and politics appear to be 
more closely interwoven.397  
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Noting that recognition is ‘assuredly the most politicised’ aspect of statehood, Klabbers 
pointed out the lack of certainty of what is recognised as the source of confusion surrounding 
the topic of recognition.398 One can recognise either a state or a government; recognition of 
a government is further divided into recognition of its legality or its de jure or de facto 
existence.399  
 In the overall thesis, I rethink the role of recognition vis-à-vis the constitution of 
international subjects. As the issue of international personality is intrinsically linked with 
the notion of statehood, my focus is set upon the question of recognition of states rather than 
governments. The parameters of the debate on this type of recognition are established by the 
constitutive and the declarative theories. In this part of the chapter, I critically engage with 
these theories. The purpose of this engagement is to demonstrate that an extension of the 
parameters of the debate is necessary. I base this necessity upon the repercussions of Vattel’s 
notion of absolute sovereignty upon the prevalent theories of recognition.  
 To achieve the set purpose, in what follows, I introduce the thoughts of the 
proponents of theories of recognition and delineate the role Vattel’s aforementioned notion 
played in shaping these theories. In the narrowest sense, the constitutive theory maintains 
that a new community’s recognition as a state is constitutive of that community’s legal 
personality under international law. I present this theory by referring to separate works of 
Lassa Oppenheim, Hersch Lauterpacht, and Hans Kelsen. Inasmuch as there are notable 
divergences in their views, the works of these eminent scholars help us understand the 
principal aspects of the constitutional theory: that the act of recognition is legally 
constitutive of a newly emerging state’s international personality; that this act operates as a 
form of consent by which established states agree to be bound by rights or obligations 
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towards the new entity; that without recognition, statehood can be separated from 
international personality; that the lack of a central authority under international law to 
determine personality necessitates such a state-centric approach to recognition.  
 In contrast to the constitutive theory, the declaratory theory asserts that the 
recognition of a new state is only of declaratory value which conveys no constitutive legal 
effect. Proponents of this theory whose works I consider in this part include William Edward 
Hall, Sir John F. Williams, and Thi-Chiang Chen. The fundamental features of the 
declarative theory which I discern from the works of the aforementioned scholars are the 
following: the declarative theory rejects the subjective and ostensibly arbitrary approach to 
the determination of international personality; this rejection extends to the separation of 
statehood from international personality; as a result of the latter rejection, states are deemed 
ipso facto subjects of international law basing the criteria of personality, in turn, upon the 
objective test of statehood; the ipso facto basis of international personality does also 
circumvent the lack of a central authority needed to determine statehood or personality under 
international law. 
 I conclude this part by arguing that neither of these theories accommodates 
recognition as a constitutive imperative whereby mutual acts of relating to one another 
constructs each entity’s international personality. Firstly, I argue that this failure is manifest 
in the constitutive theory’s perception of recognition as sovereign consent. Under the 
influence of Vattel’s problematic notion of absolute sovereignty, such perception produces 
an arbitrary and impractical test of international personality which is contingent upon the 
subjective will of established states. Secondly, I argue that the declarative theorists prolong 
the effects of the notion of absolute sovereignty by restricting their critical engagement to 
the constitutive theory’s subjective test of international personality. Therefore, both the 
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prevalent theories fail to probe the conceptual question of the role one’s relation to its other 
plays in establishing the international personality of each subject.   
 
2.2. Constitutive Theory 
 To begin with one of the most eminent advocates of the constitutive theory, Lassa 
Oppenheim’s views on the relevance of recognition was based upon the possibility of a 
distinction between statehood and international personality: 
It is generally agreed that a new State before its recognition cannot 
claim any right which a member of the Family of Nations has 
towards other members […] There is no doubt that statehood itself is 
independent of recognition. International law does not say that a 
State is not in existence so long as it is not recognised, but it takes no 
notice of it before its recognition. Through recognition only and 
exclusively a State becomes an International Person and a subject of 
International Law.400 
A newly emerging entity could become a state without recognition; however, the new state 
would not become a subject of international law unless recognition was accorded to her. 
This distinction relied on the notion that the international law was applicable within the 
community of civilised states — in other words, within the Family of Nations.401 Since 
international law was not applicable outside this family, entities could still qualify as states 
but not as subjects of international law. 
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 In order to become subjects of international law, therefore, new states had to enter 
into this family. Oppenheim suggested that entry into the Family of Nations was a matter of 
attaining a certain level of civilisation: 
There are States in existence, although their number decreases 
gradually, which are not, or not fully, members of that family 
because their civilisation, if any, does not enable them and their 
subjects to act in conformity with the principles of International 
Law.402  
The act of recognition marked the approval of a newly emerging states’ entry into the realm 
of international law: ‘Recognition is the act through which it becomes apparent that an old 
State is ready to deal with a new State as an International Person and a member of the Family 
of Nations.’403 A new state whose level of civilisation had improved might be accepted into 
the domain of International Law as a member of the Family. Since the Family lacked a 
central authority, recognition was awarded by each member state. Oppenheim noted that 
‘recognition by one State is not at all binding upon other States, so that they must follow 
suit’ but that, ‘no new State has by International Law a right to demand recognition.’404   
  Writing in 1905, Oppenheim presented a Christian-Eurocentric perspective of 
International Law.  According to this perspective the Christian States of Europe were the 
original members of the Family of Nations and the Christian colonies of these states 
comprised the next group to enter the Family. 405 In Oppenheim’s view, only the Turkish 
Empire and Japan constituted the non-Christian and non-European members of this 
Family.406 In terms of the applicability of international law today, one can maintain that, 
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such a Christian and Eurocentric view is obsolete. This is also evident in the discontinued 
use of the criterion of ‘civilisation’ in achieving international personality.   
 Dismissing the requirement of civilisation as part of the criteria of statehood, 
Brownlie  declared that ‘[this requirement] is usually omitted from enumerations of criteria 
and is redolent of the period when non-European states were not accorded equal treatment 
by the European Concert and the United States.’407 In addition, Crawford informs the reader 
that the criterion of ‘civilisation’ may be subjective and discriminatory and that, any 
consideration of civilisation should be regarded as a ‘certain minimum of order and stability’ 
in relation to the governments of the new entity.408 The subjective aspect of Oppenheim’s 
account of recognition is manifest in his view that ‘recognition by one State is not at all 
binding upon other States.’409 This view suggests that a newly emerging state may be 
recognised by certain members of the Family of Nations as a subject of International Law, 
whereas for other members, who would prefer to withhold recognition, the new entity may 
not become a subject of international law. The subjective aspect of recognition is also 
noticeable in Oppenheim’s suggestion that the old State may accord recognition to the new 
State on condition that a certain set of criteria is met.410 Since an old State’s recognition of 
a new one is not binding upon other members of the Family, there arises the possibility of 
many varying sets of criteria being enforced upon the new state by other members. This 
possibility, in turn, defies any objective test for international personality.  
 The idea that ‘one state’s recognition is not binding upon another state’ also reveals 
the underlying concept of sovereignty of states in Oppenheim’s thought. This idea conforms 
to the assertion that sovereign states are not bound by any obligations unless they voluntarily 
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consent to be so. Vattel, in his conceptualisation of the absolute sovereignty of the states, 
was quoted in the first part of this chapter stating that ‘[…] the body of the nation, the state, 
remains absolutely free and independent with respect to all other men, all other nations, as 
long as it has not voluntarily submitted to them.’411 Oppenheim’s above-quoted statement 
that ‘[r]ecognition is the act through which it becomes apparent that an old State is ready to 
deal with a new State as an International Person and a member of the Family of Nations’ 
can also be viewed in this light.412 Becoming a member of the Family of Nations is 
concomitant with observing relevant rules and regulations in one’s relation to other 
members. In order for the sovereign member states of this Family to be bound by such 
observations, consent must be accorded to the new member. Recognition, in Oppenheim’s 
formulation can, thus, be interpreted as the sovereign gesture which indicates the consent of 
the member states.  
 Another problematic aspect of Oppenheim’s thought is his distinction between 
statehood and personhood under international law. The Christian and the Eurocentric 
perspective on civilisation marked Oppenheim’s measure of personhood under international 
law. A state could not become a subject of international law unless the required level of 
civilisation was first achieved. Today, however, a comparatively more objective 
understanding prevails. In contemporary textbooks of international law, legal personality is 
not defined through the notion of ‘Europe’s civilised Empires’ but with reference to 
statehood in general. In International Law, Shaw stated that ‘[d]espite the increasing range 
of actors and participants in the international legal system, states remain by far the most 
important legal persons […]’413 In addition, in Principles of Public International Law, 
Brownlie suggested that ‘[i]t is the states and organisations […] which represent the normal 
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types of legal person on the international plane.’414 If international law provides rights and 
duties for states, it becomes much difficult to justify Oppenheim’s idea that certain entities, 
which satisfy the criteria of statehood, may not benefit from these rights. The second 
proponent of the constitutive theory, whose thoughts I consider next, enters the debate from 
the angle of this difficulty.  
 In his book, Recognition in International Law, Hersch Lauterpacht sternly rejected 
the distinction between statehood and international personality:  
The distinction [between statehood and international legal 
personality] seems to be of little value. There is, in law, no substance 
in the assertion that a community is a State unless we attach to the 
fact of statehood rights and competencies, within the internal or 
international sphere, which international law is ready to recognise. 
It seems irrelevant to predicate that a community exists as a State 
unless such existence is treated as implying legal consequences.415  
Despite refusing to differentiate between statehood and international personality, 
Lauterpacht was of the view that recognition is constitutive of statehood. Lauterpacht 
explained that ‘[to] recognise a community as a State is to declare that it fulfils the conditions 
of statehood as required by international law.’416 Lauterpacht’s theory of recognition is 
distinguished from Oppenheim’s approach by the former’s perception of the act of 
recognition as ‘the impartial fulfilment of a legal duty.’417  
                                               
414 Brownlie, op. cit. at p.58. [my emphasis] 
415 Lauterpacht, op. cit. at pp. 38, 39. 
416 Lauterpacht H., ‘Recognition of States in International Law’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 53, 1944, 385-
458, p. 385.  
417 Ibid.   
   135
 Furthermore, the notion of fulfilling a legal duty sets Lauterpacht’s thought apart 
from the declarative theory in which recognition is considered as an act of political 
declaration.  Therefore, Lauterpacht noted that, 
[o]nce we have assimilated the idea that recognition is not primarily 
a manifestation of national policy but the fulfilment of an 
international duty, we shall have removed the principal objection to 
the acceptance of the view that recognition marks the rise of the 
international rights and duties of the State.418  
 The initial problem with this assertion is that, when one considers the nature of an 
obligation, one reaches the inevitable conclusion that it must be owed to a person. In terms 
of a duty to recognise under international law, this duty is ostensibly owed to the newly 
emerging state. However, Lauterpacht is quoted above stating that, it is by the act of 
recognition that a new state acquires international rights and duties — that is to say, it is 
with the act of recognition that a state becomes a person of international law. Accordingly, 
simple logic dictates that it is not possible to reconcile the idea that a duty could be owed to 
a person which has not yet attained that personhood. 
 Lauterpacht seemed to be aware of this contradiction as he attempted to justify the 
duty to recognise by reallocating the person to whom this duty was owed. Thus, Lauterpacht 
maintained that this duty may be owed to the international community rather than the newly 
emerging unrecognised state: 
In the first instance, as the established States act in this matter on 
behalf of the international community, they may be deemed to owe 
to that community a duty of recognition notwithstanding the fact that 
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the substantive right is not yet fully vested in the beneficiary directly 
concerned.419  
The problematic aspect of owing an international legal duty to a person who has not attained 
personhood may thus be avoided. However, the idea of owing a duty to the international 
community has its own practical concerns.  
 In a critical analysis of Lauterpacht’s theory of recognition under international law, 
Josef Kunz declared that there are no norms of a right or a duty to recognise under ‘positive’ 
international law.420 Accordingly, Kunz suggested that Lauterpacht’s argument for an 
international legal duty to recognise is ‘a mere postulate de lege ferenda.’421 A recent 
example is the partial recognition of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. A 
decade since the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, one hundred and fifteen 
countries recognised Kosovo as an independent state.422 The countries that withhold 
recognition involve Serbia — the country from which Kosovo unilaterally declared 
independence — Spain, India, Brazil and two permanent members of the United Nations’ 
Security Council, namely, Russia and China. Despite the fact that the International Court of 
Justice, in its advisory opinion, declared that ‘the adoption of the declaration of 
independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law’423 and that 
Kosovo already acquired membership of international organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund424 and the World Bank,425 the lack of ‘organised international 
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machinery to enforce any obligation to recognise’ means that Kosovo is only recognised by 
certain members of the United Nations as an independent state and that, there is no normative 
means by which Russia and China — as permanent members of the Security Council — and 
other non-recognising states can legally be held accountable for their non-recognition.  
 In addition to there being no international norms by which such non-recognising 
states can be held accountable, there is also the lack of an international body for systematic 
enforcement of a so-called duty to recognise.426 Lauterpacht’s attempt, therefore, to 
construct a comparatively more objective test of recognition based on an international 
obligation falls short of meeting the normative and the administrative requirements. 
Furthermore, the concept of duty to recognise contradicts the underlying notion of absolute 
sovereignty of states. We observed above that Oppenheim thought of recognition as an act 
of sovereign consent towards newly emerging states, as a sign of an established state’s 
readiness to be bound by rights and duties towards the new state. At a certain level, 
Lauterpacht’s views on recognition resemble this sovereign-consent oriented approach. 
Quoted above, Lauterpacht remarked that ‘recognition marks the rise of the international 
rights and duties of the State.’427 If rights and duties necessarily follow from the act of 
recognition, one can argue that it is the notion of sovereignty of states, the fact that sovereign 
states are not bound by rights and duties unless they consent, which generates this necessity. 
The idea that states meet a certain obligation when recognition is accorded, however, 
contradicts the very sovereign aspect of such consent.  
 Next, I consider Hans Kelsen’s views on constitutive effects of recognition. For the 
purposes of this section, Kelsen’s approach is relevant in two ways. Firstly, Kelsen’s theory 
of recognition is set against Oppenheim’s notion of sovereign consent and Lauterpacht’s 
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concept of duty to recognise. Thus, Kelsen’s theory presents an alternative approach to 
recognition with its focus falling upon the decentralised aspect of international law. 
Secondly, even though it is set against the notion of sovereign consent, the underlying 
element of absolute sovereignty of states can also be detected in Kelsen’s theory. This 
detection, in turn, allows me to draw the conclusion that absolute sovereignty of statehood 
is the determining factor in the respective approaches of the eminent scholars considered in 
this section of the chapter.   
 Kelsen began his theory on recognition by drawing a distinction between a 
community’s natural and legal existence:  
Before recognition, the unrecognized community does not legally 
exist vis-à-vis the recognizing sate. Only by the act of recognition 
does it come legally into existence in relation to the recognizing 
state. Only its legal existence, its existence as judged by 
international law, not its “natural” existence, is of importance in the 
province of that law […] Its legal existence is identical with its 
existence as a state, i.e. as a subject of international law.428 
Kelsen circumvents Oppenheim’s problematic separation of statehood and international 
personality by distinguishing between two stages of existence for a community, namely, 
natural and legal existences. Statehood and international personality can, therefore, be 
achieved concurrently in the latter stage where recognition is accorded. Despite this 
circumvention, however, Kelsen’s view paralleled Oppenheim’s perception that 
international personality of an emerging entity is relative to the recognising state.  
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 Notwithstanding this parallelism, Kelsen did not follow Oppenheim in justifying the 
legally constitutive effect of recognition as an act of sovereign consent. Former’s 
justification was based upon the decentralised nature of international law:  
General international law is primitive law, and, like every primitive 
law, highly decentralized. Unlike the technically developed national 
law, it does not institute special organs authorized to establish in a 
legal procedure the existence of concrete facts as determined by law 
in order that the consequences also prescribed by the law may be 
attached to these facts. General international law leaves these 
functions to the interested parties.429    
In other words, the act of recognition does not amount to sovereign consent but to the 
establishment of the fact that any given community has satisfied the criteria of statehood and 
has come into existence as a legally existing state.430  
 Comparable to Lauterpacht’s views on this topic, Kelsen disagreed with the 
separation of statehood from international personality and used recognition as a means of 
ascertaining whether an entity met the relevant criteria of statehood. Contrasting with the 
former’s approach, however, the latter opposed the idea of an international obligation to 
recognise:  
Such an obligation, however desirable, is not stipulated by positive 
international law. Existing states are only empowered – they are not 
obliged – to perform the act of recognition. Refusal to recognise the 
existence of a new state is no violation of general international law 
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and thus constitutes no violation of the right of any other 
community.431  
By rejecting the concept of an international duty to recognise, Kelsen evaded the 
aforementioned contradiction inherent in Lauterpacht’s thought. Sovereign states cannot 
come under a duty to create further duties towards a newly emerging state; such an 
obligation conflicts with the very nature of sovereignty. Inasmuch as this rejection 
circumvents the stated contradiction, my contention is that, it also affirms the underlying 
effect of absolute sovereignty in Kelsen’s theory of recognition. This effect can clearly be 
detected in Kelsen’s theory in two ways.   
 Firstly, according to Kelsen, each state retains the power to recognise and is 
absolutely free to decide whether to use this power or not. This freedom can be deduced 
from Kelsen’s emphasis on the point that non-recognition will not amount to any violation 
of international law. Thus, Kelsen’s formulation of the power to recognise complies with 
the very notion of absolute sovereignty of states. Secondly, the states are not only free to 
make the decision whether to recognise, but the individual use of this power will only bind 
the recognising state vis-à-vis the recognised entity. As Kelsen noted, ‘[b]y the legal act of 
recognition the recognised community is brought into legal existence in relation to the 
recognising state, and thereby international law becomes applicable to the relations between 
these states.’432 In Kelsen’s formulation of international legal relations, one can detect the 
influence of Vattel’s discourse on absolute sovereignty. We observed in the previous section 
of this chapter that Vattel regarded every state as ‘absolutely free and independent with 
respect to all other men, all other nations, as long as it has not voluntarily submitted to 
them.’433  Therefore, even if he shunned Oppenheim’s conception of recognition as 
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sovereign consent, the notion of absolute sovereignty of states did come to determine 
Kelsen’s approach to the question of recognition too.  
 In this section of the chapter, I briefly presented the thoughts of three eminent 
proponents of the constitutive theory of recognition. The purpose of this section was to 
analyse these views in light of Vattel’s notion of absolute sovereignty of states. I 
demonstrated that Oppenheim, Lauterpacht, and Kelsen agreed upon the legally constitutive 
effect of recognition, however, diverged on the manner in which such constitution was 
effected. In all considered views, recognition marked the beginning of international legal 
personality and the ensuing flow of rights and obligations. The problematic aspect of this 
common view is that it reflects the subjective criteria of international personality which 
depends upon individual relations of recognition. I referred to Lauterpacht’s attempt to 
resolve this problem by introducing the idea of an international duty to recognise and the 
way in which his attempt contradicted (and, in turn, were undermined by) the notion of 
absolute sovereignty of states. My overall argument in this section was that, the constitutive 
theorists’ subjective and relational take on recognition was the outcome of the underlying 
effect of Vattel’s notion of absolute sovereignty of states. I argued that this effect was 
manifest in the central themes of the constitutive theory: that the states are not bound by any 
obligations towards a new entity unless they consent, that recognition constitutes such 
consent. While Lauterpacht’s endeavour to justify this consent by means of an international 
duty offended the very nature of sovereignty. I demonstrated that Oppenheim’s and Kelsen’s 
respective thoughts on recognition conformed to Vattel’s idea that states are absolutely free 
and independent from each other. In the following section, I shift my attention to the 
declarative theory and probe this theory’s reaction to the limiting influence of the notion of 
absolute sovereignty.  
 
   142
2.3. Declarative Theory 
 Compared to the constitutive theory, the declarative theory is the predominantly 
accepted view among scholars of international law. I begin this section by introducing the 
central elements of the latter through the works of eminent scholars such as William Edward 
Hall, Sir John F. Williams, and Thi-Chiang Chen. These elements include the rejection of 
the divide between international personality and statehood; the idea that attainment of 
statehood, ipso facto, constitutes international personality; and the claim that recognition 
merely has evidentiary (and, therefore, not constitutive) value. My argument is that, in its 
approach, the declarative theory addresses solely the practical difficulties of the constitutive 
theory and, in doing so, fails to deal adequately with the relational element of coming-into-
being in the international community. Even though it solves some of these practical 
problems, the declarative theory’s refusal to accord constitutive value to recognition leaves 
the conceptual question of the role one’s relation to its other plays in establishing the 
international personality of each subject unanswered.  
 To begin at the beginning, in his work entitled Treatise on International Law, 
Edward Hall declared that, 
[s]tates being the persons governed by international law, 
communities are subjected to law […] from the moment, and from 
the moment only, at which they acquire the marks of a state. So soon 
[…] as a society can point to the necessary marks, and indicates its 
intention of conforming to law, it enters of right into the family of 
states, and must be treated in conformity with law.434 
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In this statement, three major tenets of the declarative theory can be highlighted. Firstly, by 
referring to states’ subjection to international law, Hall ostensibly rejected the constitutive 
theorists’ perception that rights and obligations bound states on a relative basis. Secondly, 
the division between statehood and international personality is dismissed as marks of 
statehood simultaneously entitle an entity to international personality. Thirdly, this 
entitlement is ‘of right’ meaning recognition may not play any constitutive role in attaining 
international personality.  
 However, Hall did not dismiss recognition outright as an entirely irrelevant act; he 
acknowledged the relational aspect of coming-into-being, and, rather confusingly, found a 
role for the act of recognition therein: 
Theoretically a politically organised community enters of right, as 
was before remarked, into the family of states and must be treated in 
accordance with law, so soon as it is able to show that it possesses 
the marks of a state. The commencement of a state dates nevertheless 
from its recognition by other powers; that is to say, from the time at 
which they accredit ministers to it, or conclude treaties with it, or in 
some other way enter into such relations with it as exist between 
states alone.435 
In other words, a new state comes to be through her relations with other states, and these are 
relations of recognition. Even though Hall considered statehood to be attained as of right 
when the necessary criteria is met, his emphasis on the role of recognition raises the 
following question. Why would such an act of recognition not be considered as constitutive? 
Hall answered this question by drawing a very thin line between constitutive and evidentiary 
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recognition: ‘[…] although the right to be treated as a state is independent of recognition, 
recognition is the necessary evidence that the right has been acquired.’436  
 In contrast to Hall’s emphasis on the evidentiary value of recognition, Sir John F. 
Williams sternly maintained that recognition is impertinent to the question of statehood and 
international personality. Williams’ views on the topic is built upon an uncompromising 
rejection of the distinction between statehood and international personality; Williams 
thought it an erroneous act of reasoning to claim that older states have the prerogative over 
younger states, which can only be equal to the older ones in terms of statehood and therefore 
as subjects of international rights and duties, to decide whether the latter should attain 
international personality.437 Therefore, according to Williams,  
[…] once the fact that a State is civilised is established to the 
satisfaction of the general sense of mankind, or otherwise apparent, 
that State becomes ipso facto a subject of International Law. The 
positivist definition of International Law, as a whole, does not, as a 
matter of logic, require an express assent by all or the majority of 
existing states as a condition sine qua non of the existence of a new 
international person.438 
One can identify two major problems with Williams’ quote. Firstly, as we observed in the 
section on the constitutive theory, the measure of civilisation is an obsolete test for 
statehood. Secondly, despite the claim that an express assent is not an essential condition for 
international personality, there remains the need for someone or in some way to establish 
that a state is civilised. If one is, therefore, to replace the criterion of civilisation with the 
modern criteria of statehood, the question raised by the second problem would still be 
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relevant: in what manner does an entity satisfy ‘the general sense of mankind’ about meeting 
the criteria of statehood?  
 The same problem is ostensibly unresolved in Ti-chiang Chen’s account of statehood 
and international personality. In this account, too, meeting the criteria of statehood is the 
essential element in concurrently attaining international personality. Thus, Chen wrote that,  
[t]he source of rights and duties of an entity in international law is 
the fact of its actual supremacy within a specified area of territory 
over a specified portion of humanity, which enables it to exert 
physical pressure on all those who may choose to disregard its rights. 
This fact is the basis of international law.439 
However, to the extent that he regarded factual existence of state supremacy as the 
foundation of international law, Chen failed to show how this existence is established. 
Similar to Williams’ approach, Chen’s engagement with the notion of recognition is only to 
dismiss it as an act which separates statehood from international personality. Accordingly, 
Chen stressed that ‘[w]hen [states] exist in fact, their right and duties flow automatically 
through the operation of the law.’440 Insofar as it is perceived to hinder this automatic flow, 
recognition will merely amount to a declaration of the recognising state’s intention to treat 
the new states in accordance with law and establish political relations with these states.441  
 In his contemplations on the question of recognition, Brierly followed a line of 
argument similar to Chen’s. The former claimed that ‘[a] state may exist without being 
recognised, and if it does exist in fact, then, whether or not it has been formally recognised 
by other states, it has a right to be treated by them as a state.’442 With this claim the 
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overbearing intention, again, is to safeguard against recognition’s potential to prevent states 
from instantly acquiring international personality. Brierly’s definition of the function of 
recognition should also be viewed in light of this overbearing intention:  
The primary function of recognition is to acknowledge […] the 
independence of the body claiming to be a state, and to declare the 
recognising state’s readiness to accept the normal consequences of 
that fact, namely the usual courtesies of international intercourse.443   
Such a declarative function would, in turn, thwart the constitutive approach which enabled 
states to exist without international personality until after they were recognised as subjects 
of international law.  
 Compared to Chen’s and Brierly’s respective approaches to the question of 
recognition, Malcom Shaw used a different terminology to reach the same result. According 
to Shaw,  
[r]ecognition is constitutive in a political sense, for it marks the new 
entity out as a state within the international community and is 
evidence of acceptance of its new political status by the society of 
nations. This does not imply that the act of recognition is legally 
constitutive, because rights and duties do not arise as a result of the 
recognition.444 
Antonio Cassese also adopted a similar approach to Shaw by regarding recognition as 
‘politically important in that it testifies to the will of the recognising States to initiate 
international interaction with the new State.’445 In addition to agreeing upon the political, as 
opposed to the legal, effect of recognition, Shaw and Cassese appeared to be of the same 
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opinion on the evidential value of recognition too. On this value, Cassese offered a lucid 
explanation: ‘in a community lacking any central authority responsible for formally passing 
judgment on legally relevant situations, the attitude of single States acquires considerable 
weight as evidence for, or against, the existence of new legal subjects.’446 
 Three major principles can be highlighted from the works of the authors considered 
in this section which shape the declarative approach. Firstly, the division between statehood 
and international personality is rejected; therefore, international rights and duties 
automatically flow from an entity’s attainment of statehood. Secondly, in light of this 
rejection, recognition loses its value as the act which determines a new state’s accession to 
international personality; thus, recognition is deemed to lack any legally constitutive effect. 
Finally, recognition is a declarative act which clarifies the political intent of the recognising 
state. Such an act merely has an evidential value. Stefan Talmon interpreted this evidentiary 
value as ‘the status-confirming effect’ of recognition which ‘only corroborates the objective 
legal situation, i.e. the existence of a State.’447 Crawford offered a similar interpretation: 
‘Recognition is an institution of State practice that can resolve uncertainties as to status and 
allow for new situations to be regularised. That an entity is recognised as a State is evidence 
of its status […]’448 The declarative logic can, therefore, be summed up in the following 
way. There is the fact: Entity A meets the criteria of statehood. Then there is the confirmation 
or the evidence of the fact: State B recognises Entity A as a new state. However, the fact is 
ostensibly sufficient, without any confirmation, for the automatic flow of international 
rights. Hence, the conundrum is that, if the fact is entirely sufficient, why the need for the 
evidentiary value of recognition? Otherwise, if the fact has to be established in some manner, 
why dismiss recognition as declaratory?  
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 Mathew Craven’s analysis of the declarative theory can help us understand the 
causes of this conundrum. The starting point for Craven is the manner in which the prevalent 
theories of recognition treat the status and relation elements of statehood. The declarative 
approach keeps these elements separate; therefore, the status of statehood must be attained 
distinctly prior to being able to take part in legal relations with other states.449 Criteria of 
statehood is the objective measure of status, whereas, recognition is a way of relating to 
another entity. What proves to be problematic is the attempt to establish the status outside 
of the context of relation. Craven explains that, 
[t]he difficulty with the declarative position is that it seeks to 
maintain both the idea that the creation of States is rule-governed, 
and that the conferral or withholding of recognition is an essentially 
political and discretionary act. To postulate the existence of a rule, 
but then deny it any ground for being applied is to rely rather heavily 
upon the self-executory character of formal rule.450 
As Emmanuelle Tourme-Jouannet pointed out, recognition is not only essential for the 
establishment of individual identities but also for collective identities and that ‘these 
identities are determined in part by their relationships with others.’451 The perceived ‘self-
executory character’ of the criteria of statehood is problematic to the extent that it excludes 
this essentially relational construction of status.  
 
Conclusion  
 The declarative theory presents an attempt to overcome the major practical 
difficulties of the constitutive theory. In the first part of this chapter, I outlined Vattel’s 
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notion of absolute sovereignty of states and underlined the problematic aspect of perceiving 
states as absolutely free and independent from all externalities. In the second part of this 
chapter, I argued that the problematic perception of state sovereignty underlay the 
constitutive theorists’ understanding of recognition as an act of sovereign consent. Based on 
this understanding, established states could only be obliged to observe the rights of a new 
state if the former consented to this obligation. The outcome of the understanding was that 
the attainment of international personality depended on the arbitrary and subjective will of 
the established states. This outcome, in turn, necessitated a distinction between statehood 
and international personality. International personality of a newly emerging entity, therefore, 
could relatively exist for the recognising states and not for the ones that did not recognise.  
 The declarative theorists rejected the distinction between international personality 
and statehood by deeming the legal criteria of the latter as the objective test for the former.  
Meeting the requisite criteria for statehood was sufficient for the automatic flow of rights 
and duties associated with international personality. Insofar as the rejection of the distinction 
between statehood and international personality solved some procedural difficulties of the 
constitutive approach, it did not , however, engage with this approach’s failure to grasp the 
relational basis of coming-into-being. For the constitutive theorists, recognition becomes a 
powerful tool in the hands of the established, or, as it were, ‘civilised’ states and is used to 
determine new entries into a distinct family of nations. If, according to the proponents of the 
constitutive theory, recognition is merely an individual act of sovereign consent. For the 
proponents of the declarative theory, it is a status-confirming act or of merely evidentiary 
value. In neither approach, thus, mutual relations of recognition are considered as an 
imperative which continuously determine the identities of involved groups.  
 Responding to the declarative theory’s basic principle that states come into being by 
the very fact that they acquire the qualities of statehood irrespective of recognition, 
Fitzpatrick wrote that, 
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[…] common assurance to contrary, facts do not speak for 
themselves. They come to be through various performative modes 
endowing them with operative existence. This could be an 
observational mode, for instance – a recognition of the existence of 
the facts through the way in which they are observed. It depends 
upon recognising what, as it were, comes to it factually. But this 
ability, as Derrida has it, is of the law itself: the incipient relation to 
‘nonlaw’ is ‘in law’. What is involved here becomes not just the 
‘declaratory’ observation of some factual evidence. What is involved 
is also a ‘constitutive’ legal decision responding to a legal claim, with 
both decision and claim being based on legal criteria relating to 
whether an entity is to be endowed with the requisite legal 
personality to participate in an international legal system.452  
Although the arguments on the status-confirming aspect or the evidentiary value of 
recognition may be understood as performative modes which endow facts with operative 
existence, the declarative theorists sternly rejected the outcome of this mode as legally 
constitutive.  
 Viewed within the context of Vattel’s notion of absolute sovereignty and its 
underlying effect upon the constitutive theory, the declarative theorists’ aforementioned 
rejection merely enhances the problematic atomism of state sovereignty which does not take 
into account the fact that states, as international subjects, exist within a community and this 
existence is constantly shaped by mutual relations. Inasmuch as the case study presented in 
the previous two chapters demonstrates existential effects of an entity’s relations with the 
external world, I showed, in this chapter, that the prevalent theories of recognition failed to 
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account for such relational determination of the very being of international subjects. In order 
to seek a viable theoretical framework in which one can account for the relational element 
of coming-into-being, I turn my attention, in the next chapter, to Hegel’s theory of 
recognition.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HEGEL'S THEORY OF RECOGNITION 
 
Introduction 
 The atomistic conception of absolute sovereignty, that the sovereignty of states can 
be established and maintained independently of their external relations, affects the question 
of recognition in two major ways. Firstly, following this conception, the constitutive 
theorists thought of recognition as a sovereign act of consent without which obligations 
towards new entities would not be binding upon already established states. Secondly, by 
reacting to the constitutive theorists’ arbitrary and subjective test of international 
personality, the declarative theorists perceived recognition as a political act devoid of any 
legally constitutive effect. In their respective approaches, each group, therefore, failed to ask 
the conceptual question of other’s role in establishing the international personality of each 
subject.  
 The focus of this conceptual question is upon the relational element of coming-into-
being; it is upon the mutuality of this relation and how this mutuality may continuously 
determine the very being of each entity. To take such an element into account, in turn, 
requires a departure from the aforementioned atomistic perception of sovereignty. In other 
words, and contrary to Vattel’s view, states cannot be ‘quite free and independent from all 
other nations.’ The problematic aspect of such atomism can be solved by locating state 
sovereignty in a communal existence which safeguards equality of each sovereign as well 
as their distinct freedom and independence. To achieve this solution, the role of recognition 
has to be rethought outside the boundaries set by the prevalent theories which I considered 
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in the third chapter; that is to say, recognition must be reconceived as a constitutive 
imperative but one that rests on elements of mutuality and flux.    
 In this chapter, I achieve this reconception by turning to Hegel’s theory of 
recognition as presented in the latter’s Phenomenology of Spirit.453 My argument is that, 
with his approach to the notion of recognition, Hegel provided the conceptual framework 
for an intersubjective system wherein the constitution of each subject depends upon its 
relations with others and that these relations, in turn, enhance the particular freedom and 
independence of each subject. My intention is to apply Hegel’s theory of recognition to the 
construction of subjects under international law. This application, however, is faced with 
two major difficulties. Firstly, Phenomenology is a treatise on the attainment of absolute 
knowledge and, as such, in this work, Hegel traced the development of natural consciousness 
into the scientific truth of knowledge. Adaption of the notion of recognition as presented in 
the Phenomenology requires abstracting this notion from a disparate context with ensuing 
challenges. Secondly, Hegel directly engaged with the question of recognition of states 
under international law in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right.454  Consequently, bidding 
to apply Hegel’s theory of recognition to the issue of international personality I must, first, 
explain why the Hegelian approach I undertake in this chapter relies upon the 
Phenomenology rather than the more obvious source indicated in the Philosophy of Right.  
 Thus, I begin the first part of this chapter by introducing the views Hegel presented 
on recognition and statehood in his Philosophy of Right. I, then, draw upon Rose Parfitt’s 
work to evaluate the influence of these views upon the constitutive theory of recognition. 
This evaluation locates Hegel’s thoughts within the context of failures I associated with the 
constitutive theory in the previous chapter. In other words, I argue that Hegel’s take on 
recognition and statehood as expounded in his Philosophy of Right is undermined by ideas 
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such as membership of a distinct family of nations and an ambivalent duty to recognise 
entities as new states. It is in light of these flaws that, in the second part of the chapter, I turn 
to the Phenomenology of Spirit and introduce Hegel’s thoughts on the act of recognition 
which marks the coming-into-being of self-conscious subjects.  
 As mentioned earlier, the main challenge of relying upon the Phenomenology is that 
it is a treatise on the nature of absolute knowledge. Inasmuch as the account of recognition 
comprises the mutually constitutive movements of two subjects that have to rely upon this 
mutuality to come into being, in the Phenomenology this is presented as an account of 
consciousness’ transformation into self-consciousness. In the second part of the chapter, 
therefore, I demonstrate this transformation by tracing consciousness’ development through 
several stages. A close scrutiny of these stages is necessary to ascertain the inner dynamics 
of the dialectical movements which culminate in the act of recognition. I, then, follow the 
progress of the Hegelian subject into the famous saga of lordship and bondsman. I show that 
this saga sets the context in which the struggle for recognition materialises. However, the 
outcome of this struggle is not the clear construction of two independent subjects but the 
enslavement of one of the parties by the other. I show that this enslavement produces a 
particular type of truth that pertains to the independence of self-consciousness.  
 Two questions, then, become relevant for my attempt to account for the imperative 
role recognition plays for the constitution of subjects under international law. The first is 
whether the inner dynamics of the dialectical movements can be adapted, on an ad hoc basis, 
to describe such a role. The second question is whether the saga of lordship and bondsman 
sets any contextual repercussions for such an adaptation. In the third part of the chapter, I 
answer the first question in the affirmative by referring to the works of authors who adapted 
the theory of recognition for similar purposes. I consider Axel Honneth’s works on the 
constitution of moral subjects; I refer to Charles Taylor’s ideas on the construction of 
cultural identities; and introduce Costas Douzinas’ notion of the legal subject. I engage with 
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the second question and the probable reverberations of lordship and bondsman in the next 
chapter.   
 
Part One  
International Law and Recognition in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right   
 In this part of the chapter, I briefly introduce Hegel’s ideas on recognition of states 
under international law as presented in the latter’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right. The 
purpose of referring to this particular work is twofold. Firstly, I show that Hegel’s thoughts 
can be interpreted as an early constitutive approach to recognition. To support this 
interpretation, I draw upon the manner in which Hegel’s views influenced later proponents 
of the constitutive theory. Secondly, I argue that these views also anticipated some of the 
difficulties which I related to the constitutive approach in the previous chapter. One 
particular problem, which I bring to the fore in this part, is the ambivalence in Hegel’s 
approach to the possibility of a duty to recognise. Based on this ambivalence, I conclude the 
part by arguing that the shortcomings of the account of presented in the Philosophy of Right 
necessitates a turn to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.  
 According to Hegel, the system of right comprises the domain in which freedom is 
actualised.455 In the Elements of the Philosophy of Right Hegel presented the structuring of 
this domain through three parts: abstract right, morality, and ethical life.456 In the first part, 
free will attains an objective, external existence. This existence is turned inwards, and hence, 
becomes subjective within the domain of morality. Finally, in ethical life, freedom is 
actualised by the unification of universal external freedom of abstract right and particular 
subjective good of morality.457 The realisation of this freedom is effected through three 
different spheres of ethical life; these, according to Hegel, are the spheres of family, civil 
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society, and the state.458 Hegel’s ideas on recognition of states under international law is, 
therefore, located within the last sphere of the final domain of system of right.  
 Hegel defined the state as ‘the actuality of the ethical Idea.’459 The ultimate purpose 
of the state is to attain a substantial unity wherein ‘freedom enters into its highest right.’460 
There are three decisive elements of the state as the ethical Idea. The first is that, in its 
immediate existence, a singular state is a ‘self-related organism.’461 The second element 
relates to state’s relation to other states; this relation marks international law.462 Finally, 
there is a third factor which connects the external relations of states under international law; 
this last factor is defined as ‘the spirit which gives itself actuality in world history.’463 The 
focus of this part of the chapter is upon the second element wherein Hegel clarified the form 
of these external relations and the role of recognition therein.  
 Hegel’s perception of international law resembles Grotius’ and Vattel’s positivist 
approaches which I considered in the previous chapter. Thus, according to the former, 
international law ‘applies to the relations between independent states’ and this law’s 
existence ‘depends on [states’] distinct and sovereign wills.’464 The prevalence of the notion 
of absolute sovereignty is inherent to Hegel’s thoughts, too, as he deemed the nation state 
as ‘the absolute power on earth.’465 Inasmuch as each state is regarded as sovereign and 
independent in relation to other states, the absoluteness of this independence is blurred by 
Hegel’s remark that each state has ‘a primary and absolute entitlement’ to be recognised by 
other states.466 This entitlement hints at the constitutive force of one’s relations with its 
others. However, instead of presenting this relation as an imperative, Hegel regarded the 
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entitlement to recognition as ‘purely formal.’467 The idea of pure formality, in turn, renders 
Hegel’s take on the role of recognition under international law rather ambivalent.  
 Hegel explained that the existence of a state is contingent upon its content, that is to 
say, ‘its constitution and present condition.’468 In other words, ‘the legitimacy of a state, and 
more precisely […] of the power of its sovereign, is a purely internal matter.’469 These 
definitions parallel Bodin’s and Hobbes’ respective conceptions of sovereignty which I 
considered in chapter three. However, contrary to these authors’ singular focus upon the 
internal element of sovereignty, Hegel also paid attention to its external element. Thus, 
Hegel argued that ‘[w]ithout relations with other states, the state can no more be an actual 
individual than an individual can be an actual person without a relationship with other 
persons.’470 The ambivalence in Hegel’s thoughts on recognition and international law is 
manifest in two ways. Firstly, recognition is regarded by Hegel as an absolute entitlement 
which ensures individuality of a state but even as such, it is deemed to be purely formal. 
Secondly, sovereignty and the legitimacy of a state is derived from its constitution, but this 
legitimacy needs to be externally supplemented by recognition from other states.471   
 Ambiguities pertaining to Hegel’s conception of recognition under international law 
can be interpreted as anticipating difficulties which would later occupy the minds of the 
constitutive theorists. One such difficulty relates to the possibility of a duty to recognise; 
even though he wrote of an absolute entitlement to be recognised, Hegel understood that the 
act of recognition cannot be obligatory as this act depended ‘on the perception and will of 
the other state.’472  Such dependence is also an indication of the relative aspect of 
international personality as each state will have to determine whether to recognise a newly 
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emerging entity. Despite these difficulties, however, Parfitt argued that ‘a number of factors 
came together to give Hegel’s theory [of recognition] a special traction, encouraging the 
constitutive theory to become predominant from the 1860s.’473 
 Parfitt listed three factors. The first factor consisted of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century revolutions which occasioned the emergence of new sates.474 The second factor was 
‘the gradual transformation of the ‘international’ from an inter-dynastic into an inter-state 
jurisdictional space.’475 Parfitt explained that these two factors were followed by the 
constitutive theorists’ prominent emphasis on international subjects’ prerogative to 
determine whether they would be bound by rights and duties towards newly emerging 
entities.476 Parfitt listed the advancement of European imperialism as the third factor and 
linked this factor to the advent of the notion of civilisation as the measure of international 
personality.477 In the previous chapter, I considered the consequences of these factors within 
the context of the constitutive theory’s failure to account for recognition as a mutually 
constitutive act. I argued that this failure stemmed from the perception of recognition as a 
sovereign act of consent with which membership of the so-called civilised family of nations 
was granted to newly emerging states.   
 Inasmuch as Hegel’s take on recognition and international law in the Philosophy of 
Right influenced the proponents of the constitutive theory in a much later age, the difficulties 
pertaining to the former’s approach were not resolved in the latter’s theories. These 
difficulties necessitate a turn to the Phenomenology of Spirit. The purpose of this turn is to 
abstract an apt theoretical framework to account for the mutually constitutive aspect of 
recognition — a framework which would circumvent the aforementioned difficulties.  In 
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what follows, I commence the search for such a framework by introducing a brief account 
of the transformation of consciousness to self-consciousness in the first four chapters of the 
Phenomenology.  
 
Part Two   
Recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
2.1. Introduction 
 As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, two major obstacles lay in the way 
of utilising Hegel’s ideas on recognition as presented in the Phenomenology to account for 
the constitution of subjects under international law. The first obstacle was Hegel’s direct 
engagement with the question of recognition within the context of international law in his 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right. However, as I demonstrated above, this engagement 
dragged one back into the unresolved issues of the constitutive theory — the very issues I 
try to overcome in this thesis. Insofar as the reappearance of these issues necessitate a turn 
to the Phenomenology, the content of this work presents the second obstacle. The treatise 
details Hegel’s development of cognitive knowledge into scientific truth of absolute 
knowledge. In other words, the notion of recognition features in a section among 
consciousness’ lengthy progress into self-consciousness and has no ostensible connection 
with statehood or international law. Therefore, the question remains as to whether Hegel’s 
ideas can be abstracted from the context of Phenomenology and adapted for the 
aforementioned ad hoc purposes.   
 The purpose of this part of the chapter is to locate the notion of recognition within 
the initial chapters of the Phenomenology. To achieve this purpose, I trace the numerous 
moments of consciousness’ transformation into self-consciousness. The starting point is the 
primary stages of consciousness, namely, sense-certainty, perception, and understanding. I 
follow these moments with consciousness’ evolution into self-consciousness. This evolution 
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takes place over three further stages: desire, recognition, and the dialectic of lordship and 
bondsman. Each stage sets out the components of the dialectical movement that culminates 
in the act of recognition. I show that this movement occurs essentially over a triad of phases 
in which two contradictory positions are overcome in a third moment, that each overcoming 
encompasses the reconciliation of universal and particular elements, and that this 
reconciliation engenders a unity which, at the level of self-consciousness, safeguards 
freedom and independence of different subjects. 
 Before I endeavour to outline the complex transformation of consciousness into self-
consciousness, reference to the overall objective of the Phenomenology is necessary to 
establish the setting and the method of this transformation. At the outset of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel asked whether consciousness can grasp Absolute through 
cognition. Absolute is defined as the whole; this whole corresponds to the truth which has 
its existence as a scientific system.478 Hegel’s answer was informed by a departure from the 
presupposition that there is a gap between cognition and Absolute.479 In Hegel’s opinion, 
separating cognition from Absolute results in a peculiar distinction between two types of 
truths.480 The initial truth is that of Absolute. This is the truth that Science aims to achieve. 
The second truth emerges from cognition. Hegel argued that while as a result of the above-
mentioned presupposition cognition may not be able to grasp Absolute, it, nevertheless, is 
able to comprehend ‘other kinds of truth.’481 A semblance is, therefore, created when two 
modes of knowledge (that is to say, scientific and cognitive) appear side-by-side; this is a 
semblance from which Science, in its quest to achieve true knowledge, must liberate itself.482 
However, according to Hegel, this liberation could not take the form of a mere rejection of 
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cognitive knowledge as ‘an ordinary way of looking at things’ or the form of an appeal ‘to 
the signs [within cognitive knowledge] which point in the direction of Science.’483 In the 
first form, Science assures its mode of knowledge by taking no account of cognitive 
knowledge. However, this assurance may not mean that the semblance is extinguished since 
cognitive knowledge will also be assuring its mode of knowledge by not taking any account 
of Science.484 In the second form, Science will be appealing to an inferior form of itself since 
the signs (to which Science appeals) exists within the initially rejected (in other words, what 
has been regarded by Science as the untrue) mode of knowledge.485    
 Therefore, in Hegel’s perspective, the quandary which is generated by the semblance 
necessitated ‘an exposition of how knowledge makes its appearance’ — an exposition Hegel 
undertook in the overall scheme of the Phenomenology of Sprit.486 With this exposition, the 
initial question of whether consciousness can grasp the absolute assumes a slightly different 
form: which one of the two modes of knowledge is the true knowledge? In other words, the 
second question is a question about the truth of knowledge. However, since truth 
corresponds to the absolute, what remains at issue is still the knowledge of the absolute: 
which one of the two modes of knowledge is the knowledge of the absolute? Given that the 
separation of phenomenal knowledge from the knowledge of the absolute results in the 
above-mentioned semblance, Hegel’s answer begins with merging the two types of 
knowledge. Hence, instead of presupposing a gap between cognition and the absolute, 
natural consciousness becomes the point from which consciousness elevates itself to the 
position of science.487 
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 In order to trace the progress of consciousness into science Hegel employed an 
intricate method. At the basis of this method is the distinction between the notions of being-
for-another and being-in-itself.  The former notion corresponds to knowledge: 
Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and 
at the same time relates itself to it, or, as it is said, this something exists 
for consciousness; and the determinate aspect of this relating, or of 
being of something for a consciousness, is knowing.488  
In The Science of Logic, Hegel defined the latter notion ‘not [as] being in general but [as] 
being with reference to itself in contrast to its reference to the other […]'489 In Hegel: Texts 
and Commentary, Kaufmann read this definition to mean ‘taken by itself, apart from its 
relations to other matters, or, in effect, considered superficially.’490 In the introduction to the 
Phenomenology, being-in-itself is given several names: essence, truth, or the True.491 
Therefore, the truth of knowledge is tested by measuring whether being-for-another (i.e. 
knowing) corresponds to being-in-itself (i.e. the truth).  
  However, this test is not to be depicted as Science setting a criterion for the 
investigation of the knowledge of natural consciousness for Hegel argued that this criterion 
inheres in knowledge.492 In other words, the distinction between being-for-another and 
being-in-itself is inherent to consciousness: 
[...] the distinction between the in-itself and knowledge is already 
present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. 
Something is for it [i.e. for consciousness] the in-itself; and knowledge, 
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or the being of the object for consciousness, is, for it, another moment. 
Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, the examination rests. 
If the comparison shows that these two moments [that is to say, the 
moments of being-in-itself and being-for-another] do not correspond to 
one another, it would seem that consciousness must alter its knowledge 
to make it conform to the object.493  
The alternation of the knowledge of the object, however, does not conclude the test. On the 
contrary, a change in the knowledge necessitates a change in the object ‘for [the object] 
essentially belonged to this knowledge.’494 This necessity, in turn, reveals that ‘what 
[consciousness] previously took to be the in-itself is not an in-itself, or that it was only an 
in-itself for consciousness.’495  
 The result of this revelation is that a new object emerges which is different from the 
first object. In this regard, Hegel wrote that ‘[i]nasmuch as the new true object issues from 
it, this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both 
its knowledge and its object is precisely what is called experience.’496 Through each 
experience, which occasions the emanation of a new true object, consciousness enters into 
a new pattern; and in this pattern essence (or, the truth of the object) is different from the 
previous pattern of consciousness. According to Hegel, this difference ‘guides the entire 
series of the patterns of consciousness in their necessary sequence.’ 497   
 This sequential progress, in turn, enables the comprehension of the whole system of 
consciousness; therefore, experience of consciousness becomes the method by which natural 
consciousness elevates itself to the scientific truth of knowledge (or, to absolute 
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knowledge).498   In what follows, I present the sequential progress of this elevation within 
the first four chapters of the Phenomenology. Therefore, the presentation starts off with the 
primary phase of sense-certainty but is limited to the phase in which self-consciousness 
attains the truth of its independence. It is in this latter phase where one finds Hegel’s notion 
of recognition.   
 
2.2. Consciousness: Sense-Certainty, Perception, and Understanding 
 The first pattern of consciousness which Hegel considered in the Phenomenology is 
sense-certainty. This pattern corresponds to the immediate knowledge of the object: ‘I, this 
particular I, am certain of this particular thing’ and within this certainty the truth of the object 
‘contains nothing but the sheer being of the thing’ and ‘[c]onsciousness, for its part, is [...] 
only as a pure ‘I’.’499 In other words, Hegel explained that ‘the ‘I’ does not have the 
significance of a manifold imagining or thinking; nor does the ‘thing’ signify something that 
has a host of qualities.’500 However, a close reflection upon the distinction between the I and 
the object will reveal that the certainty of the object is actually mediated: ‘I have this 
certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it, similarly is in sense-certainty through 
something else, viz. through the ‘I’.’501  Furthermore, when the truth of the object is tested 
in language — that is to say, when one utters ‘I am certain of this tree’ or expresses this 
certainty in the form of ‘Now is night’ or ‘Here is a house’ — the initially presumed pure 
being of the object reveals itself to be in fact a universal.502 That is to say, in sense-certainty, 
the truth of the object resides in the immediate expression of what This object, Here and 
Now, is; and Hegel showed that the notions of This, Here and Now are actually universals 
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which are permanent and self-preserving, and are indifferent to what happens in them: now 
is night, but in another moment, now is day, or here is a tree but if one turns around, here is 
a house.503  
 The same analysis applies to consciousness which initially appears as a pure I: “I, 
this ‘I’, see the tree and assert that ‘Here’ is a tree; but another ‘I’ sees the house and 
maintains that ‘Here’ is not a tree but a house instead. Both truths have the same 
authentication [...]; but the one truth vanishes in the other.”504 Therefore, consciousness 
comes to realise that universal is, in fact, the true content of sense-certainty. With this 
realisation consciousness enters into a new pattern. This new pattern, in which consciousness 
takes up the object as it is in truth, that is to say, as a universal, is called perception.505 In 
perceiving its object, consciousness ‘confine[s] itself to a pure apprehension of [its 
object].’506 Since the truth of the object is universality, consciousness, therefore, apprehends 
a self-identical object; ‘for in the universality [...] otherness itself is immediately present for 
[consciousness], though present as what is null and superseded.’507  
 However, through its progression from perception to the next pattern, consciousness 
learns that, contrary to the initial presumption, the truth of the object is actually burdened 
by an opposition.508 In order to demonstrate this affliction, Hegel provided an analysis of 
the object as it expresses itself to perception; this expression takes the form of a thing with 
many properties.509 Following on from the previous pattern, universal should remain as the 
truth of the object. The way in which this universality is expressed in an object with many 
properties is through, what Hegel called, an indifferent Also: 
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This salt is a simple Here, and at the same time manifold; it is white and 
also tart, also cubical in shape, of a specific gravity etc. All these many 
properties are in a single simple ‘Here’, in which, therefore, they 
interpenetrate [...] And, at the same time, without being separated by 
different Heres, they do not affect each other in this interpretation [...] 
[S]ince each [property] is itself a simple relating of self to self it leaves 
the others alone, and is connected with them only by the indifferent 
Also.510 
Similar to the indifferent Now and Here, the indifferent Also is a universal. Nonetheless, if 
one regards each property of the thing merely as self-relating, this would render the 
properties indeterminate since, according to Hegel, properties ‘are only determinate in so far 
as they differentiate themselves from one another, and relate themselves to others as to their 
opposites.’511  
 As a result of this necessary opposition, however, the thinghood of the object will be 
unfeasible for it would mean that the essential element of thinghood — the unity, the simple 
togetherness of its properties — will be absent.512 Therefore, the truth of the object cannot 
merely be an indifferent unity as per Also but it must also be a determinate unity in which 
different properties can relate to each other as opposite without falling out of the abstract 
universal medium of indifferent Also; Hegel called this unity One and explained it as ‘the 
moment of negation; [...] simply a relation of self to self [which] excludes an other.’513  
 However, as self-relating negation, One will counter the initial presumption that 
otherness is null and superseded in the object. In this regard, Hegel wrote that,  
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[t]he Thing is posited as being for itself, or as the absolute negation of 
all otherness, therefore as purely self-related negation; but the negation 
that is self-related is the suspension of itself; in other words, the Thing 
has its essential being in another Thing.514 
Having its essence in the other contradicts the former perception that the object’s essence is 
universality. In discovering this contradiction, consciousness elevates itself into a new 
pattern in which ‘the universality splits into the extremes of singular individuality and 
universality.’515  
 In this new pattern and in accordance with the above-quote, consciousness comes to 
the understanding that what it is encountering as an object is ‘a being-for-self that is 
burdened with a being-for-another.’516 The two modes of being which are contained in a 
single unit form an unconditioned absolute universality.517 This new type of universality is 
a deviation from the earlier self-identical universality the truth of which was assumed in 
perception and later contradicted in understanding.  
 Therefore, consciousness “learns that the truth intended by the thesis of the ‘thing 
with properties’ is not the ‘thing with properties’ but rather force and the play of forces.”518 
Norman explained this pattern as the better grasp of the ‘dynamic inter-relation of 
opposites.’519 Therefore, what Hegel called Force is the movement which sustains this 
dynamic interrelation: independent ‘matters’ of the indifferent Also proceed to the unity of 
the object and this unity, in turn, reveals the diversity within the object — a diversity, which, 
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in a circular fashion, reduces back into the unity.520 Hegel distinguished between Force 
proper and the expression of Force.521 Thus, every segment of the above-mentioned 
interrelation corresponds to an expression of Force; whereas, in their circular movement, 
each of these segments disappears into Force proper. In other words, in itself, Force is 
proper; and reflected out of itself, Force becomes its expression, and in dialectical fashion, 
Force is reflected back into itself from its expression.522 However, in expressing itself, Force 
remains with itself; ‘Force has expressed itself, and what was supposed to be something else 
soliciting it is really Force itself.’523 Furthermore, ‘[w]hat appears as an ‘other’ and solicits 
Force, both to expression and to a return into itself, directly proves to be itself Force.’524  
 In the previous patterns the Truth was grasped in the form of antitheses such as the 
universal and the particular. With the play of Forces, these antitheses are eliminated. This 
elimination leads to what Hegel called an inner truth and  
[w]ithin this inner truth, as the absolute universal which has been 
purged of the antithesis between the universal and the individual and 
has become the object of Understanding, there now opens up above 
the sensuous world, which is the world of appearance, a 
supersensible world which henceforth is the true world.525  
The opening up of a supersensible world marks the split between previous patterns of 
consciousness (i.e. sense-certainty and perception) and Understanding. Within the context 
of these previous patterns consciousness concerned itself with the appearance of the object. 
At the level of sense-certainty, consciousness searched for truth in an object which I grasped 
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through my senses. In the stage corresponding to perception, consciousness directed its 
search on to an object which I perceived as the thing with its properties. In the phase of 
Understanding, however, with the realisation of the play of Forces, attention is paid not to 
the appearance of the object but to something that is beyond this appearance.  
 By doing away with the above-mentioned antitheses, play of Forces amounts to an 
absolute flux.526 According to Hegel, the only thing that inheres within this flux is ‘difference 
as a universal difference, or as a difference into which the many antitheses have been 
resolved.’527 This difference constitutes the law of Force; hence, what Hegel called the 
supersensible world is, in fact, ‘an inert realm of laws.’528 In Gadamer’s reading, the law of 
Force corresponded to ‘the law of nature, the one law fully explaining all phenomena and 
ultimately dominating the realm of mechanics, [which] emerges as the truth of the object 
under investigation.’529 Kainz agreed with this reading to the extent that ‘[l]aw as 
universality should be able to subsume and completely transform the determinate aspects 
found within appearance.’530 However, law contains a defect which precludes this total 
subsumption. In Hegel’s words,  
[w]hat seems to be defective in [law] is that while it does contain 
difference, the difference is universal, indeterminate. However, in so far 
as it is not law in general, but a law, it does contain determinateness; 
consequently, there are indefinitely many laws. But this plurality is itself 
rather a defect; for it contradicts the principle of the Understanding for 
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which, as consciousness of the simple inner world, the True is the 
implicitly universal unity.531   
Since the falling of many laws into one law may result in each law losing its specificity, 
Hegel referred to the notion of universal attraction to achieve the above-mentioned unity of 
laws.532 According to Kainz, ‘[t]he law of universal attraction has great importance, insofar 
as it represents the final step in the effort to unify and universalize and control the unstable 
flux of the world of appearance.’533 Thus, in order to grasp the true meaning of universal 
attraction, Hegel warned that ‘[this attraction] must [...] be grasped in such a way that in it, 
as what is absolutely simple or unitary, the differences present in law as such themselves 
return again into the inner world as a simple unity.’534  This simple unity is supposed to be 
‘the inner necessity of the law’ whereby the law is presented in a dual mode; firstly ‘as law 
in which the differences are expressed as independent moments;’ and secondly as Force 
‘which absorbs the differences themselves of what attracts and what is attracted.’535   
 Nonetheless, upon closer inspection, it is revealed that the necessity to distinguish 
between two modes of law does not fall within the object. In other words, it is consciousness 
who reaches this distinction.536 One of the examples Hegel gave for the elaboration of the 
objective emptiness of this necessity is the law of electricity. While simple electricity is 
Force, the law of electricity is that it is composed of positive and negative charges; ‘[b]ut 
that electricity as such should divide itself in this way is not in itself a necessity. Electricity, 
as simple Force, is indifferent to its law — to be positive and negative.’537  In light of this 
                                               
531 Hegel (1977) op. cit. at p.91. [emphases in original] 
532 To point out the specificity of each law, Hegel gave the example of the law of a stone falling and the law 
of the movement of heavenly bodies. While both of these laws relate to something moving in midair, 
regarding these laws as one based on this common aspect would diminish the unrelated characters each law 
has. Ibid, p.91. 
533 Kainz, op. cit. at p.77. 
534 Hegel (1977) op. cit. at p.92. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Ibid, p.94. 
537 Ibid, p.93. 
   171
indifference, the above-mentioned necessity falls into understanding. In other words, it is 
consciousness that acquires a conceptual understanding of implicit difference (while, in 
itself, the object (i.e. electricity) remains indifferent).538 Hegel called this process 
explanation.539  
 The importance of the process of explanation is that it initially consists of 
tautological developments. Kainz summarised these developments in the following way:  
It is true to say that law is distinct from force, since the 
Understanding is distinguishing law from force. But the statement 
here is a mere tautology [...] It is also true that an electrical force 
creates a unity of opposites just as the law regulating electricity 
creates such a unity of opposites. But here again, we have a tautology 
[...] Thus we see that the vacillation of understanding as to whether 
force and law are identical or distinct leads, one way or the other, to 
tautological process.540   
Within the movement of explanation, however, these tautological processes are cancelled. 
For instance, in view of the indifference inherent in electricity, the difference posited by 
understanding is cancelled. In Hegel’s words, ‘[w]hat is present here is not merely bare unity 
in which no difference would be posited, but rather a movement in which a distinction is 
certainly made but, because it is no distinction, is again cancelled. In the process, then, of 
explaining, the to and fro of change which before was outside of the inner world and present 
only in the appearance, has penetrated into the supersensible world itself.’541 In other words, 
manifested as explanation, consciousness grasps change within Understanding. This change 
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contradicts the earlier law of Force which at the moment of entry into the supersensible 
world consciousness perceived as universal unity. This contradiction reveals a second 
supersensible world that Hegel called the inverted world.542  In this new world, ‘the act of 
thinking about the phenomenal world [i.e. the world of appearance] becomes not just a 
unification of sense data but a constant infusion of ‘movement’ and dynamic opposition into 
that which is understood.’543  
 With regard to the first supersensible world, it was mentioned earlier that it is an 
inner world which goes beyond the appearance.544 With the inversion of this initial 
supersensible world, one either reverts back to the world of appearance or to (what may also 
be called) an outer world. Therefore, an ostensible contradiction or antithesis among the first 
and the second supersensible worlds appear. Nonetheless, Hegel informed the reader that 
‘such antitheses of inner and outer, of appearance and the supersensible, as of two different 
kinds of actuality we no longer find here.’545  If such antitheses are maintained, 
Understanding would regress into Perception whereby it will exit the inner world and will 
try to grasp appearance; and the remaining inner world would exist in the imagination.546 As 
opposed to this regression, Hegel cautioned that ‘we have to think pure change, or think 
antitheses within the antithesis itself, or contradiction.’547 To think pure change or 
contradiction, in turn, requires an opposition in which the other is immediately present.548 
Such opposition is present in the inverted world:  
[...] the [second] supersensible world, which is the inverted world, has 
at the same time overreached the other [i.e. the first supersensible] world 
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and has it within it; it is for itself the inverted world, i.e. the inversion 
of itself; it is itself and its opposite in one unity.549   
As this unity, the inverted world corresponds to what Hegel called infinity or the absolute 
Notion.550 Having this infinity as its object, consciousness enters into a new phase.  
 
2.3. Self-consciousness: Desire, Recognition, and Lordship and Bondsman 
 This new phase is the accurate realm of truth. Remembering from earlier assertions, 
truth was the notion which corresponded to the object. Therefore, consciousness having 
infinity as its object meant that the object of consciousness corresponds to the absolute 
notion. As observed earlier in the inverted world (hence, within the notion of infinity) 
differences are tautological and are, thus, cancelled. Consequently, Hegel wrote that, ‘[s]ince 
this Notion of infinity is an object for consciousness, the latter is consciousness of a 
difference that is no less immediately cancelled; consciousness is for its own self, it is a 
distinguishing of that which contains no difference, or self-consciousness.’551 While as a 
result of this act of distinguishing, self-consciousness becomes an object of consciousness, 
this new object does not yet amount to ‘the cognition of what consciousness knows in 
knowing itself.’552 In order to achieve this cognition, the identity of self-consciousness must 
become unequivocal to itself.  
 A certain antithesis between the notions of being and essence inhibits this ambiguity. 
This antithesis arises from the fact that, at the initial stage of self-consciousness, 
consciousness has a double object; the first of these objects is the immediate object which 
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emerges from sense-certainty and perception; this object has being as otherness.553 The 
second object is the recently acquired self-consciousness which Hegel further described as 
‘the reflection out of being of the world of sense and perception, and essentially the return 
from otherness.’554  However, despite being a unity which supersedes otherness, at this early 
stage the second object appears only as the opposite of the first. In order for its identity to 
become explicit for itself, self-consciousness must go through the removal of this 
opposition.  
 This removal is effected by the notion of Desire. In this regard, Hegel wrote that 
‘self-consciousness is Desire in general.’555 Desire corresponds to the destruction of the 
independent object, that is to say, the destruction of the being that self-consciousness 
encounters in otherness.556 This destruction is the manner in which self-consciousness 
becomes certain of the nothingness of the other and achieves a true certainty of itself.557 
With the satisfaction of Desire, however, self-consciousness becomes aware of the 
independence of the consumed object.558 In Hegel’s words,  
Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its gratification, are 
conditioned by the object, for self-certainty comes from superseding 
this other: in order that this supersession can take place, there must be 
this other. Thus self-consciousness, by its negative relation to the object, 
is unable to supersede it; it is really because of that relation that it 
produces the object again, and the desire as well.559 
                                               
553 Ibid, p.105. 
554 Ibid. [my emphasis] 
555 Ibid.  
556 Ibid, p.109. 
557 Ibid; Hyppolite J., ‘Self-Consciousness and Life: The Independence of Self-Consciousness’ in O’Neil J. 
(ed.) Hegel’s Dialectic of Desire and Recognition, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) p.69. 
558 Hegel (1977) op. cit. at p.109. 
559 Ibid. 
   175
The independence of the consumed object necessitates that the satisfaction of self-
consciousness must come not from the negation of the object through Desire but from the 
object negating itself within itself for self-consciousness.560 However, inasmuch as the 
object is self-negating and independent, it contains the features of consciousness.561 
Defining the other as consciousness, in turn, reveals that self-consciousness is, in fact, not 
Desire — that is to say, the satisfaction of self-consciousness is not achieved by negating 
the other object. Instead, ‘[s]elf-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-
consciousness.’562  
 Hegel further elaborated upon the shift from Desire to another self-consciousness by 
maintaining that ‘[s]elf-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so 
exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.’563 It is only as a result of 
such interdependent existence that the unity of self-consciousness in its otherness becomes 
explicit for the subject.564 Furthermore, with this unity, the previously-mentioned opposition 
between the essential ‘I’ and the being of the ‘object’ is finally removed: ‘A self-
consciousness, in being an object [for another self-consciousness], is just as much ‘I’ as 
‘object’.’565  Subsequent to this removal, self-consciousness attains the experience of Spirit 
which Hegel defined as ‘the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, 
in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that 
is ‘I’.’566 Hegel called the unity of self-consciousness in its otherness  — i.e. the unity which 
leads to the experience of Spirit — the process of Recognition.567  
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 Explained in simpler terms, recognition is the process by which subject attains its 
identity or personality. This attainment, however, does not take place on an isolated basis, 
and is, rather, contingent upon subject’s relations with other subjects. This contingency 
results in the above-mentioned formulation of ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’. Within 
the context of this formula, self-conscious subject does not only come to be, but also enjoys 
freedom and independence. The formula lends itself to certain contemporary theories on the 
constitution of subjects and different identities. Parfitt, whose work I considered above, 
highlighted Hegel’s formulation of self-consciousness as the underlying element of the 
latter’s thoughts on the personality of states.568 Before I introduce contemporary abstractions 
of Hegel’s theory of recognition, however, a reference must be made to the final stage of the 
Hegelian subject’s progress wherein truth of independent self-consciousness is achieved. 
 Inasmuch as Hegel wrote of a unity wherein freedom and independence is secured, 
the road towards this unity begins with self-consciousness acting upon its desire. As we 
observed above, this desire corresponds to self-consciousness’ impulse to attain certainty 
through negating the other. Attempting such negation against another self-consciousness, 
both subjects find themselves in a life and death struggle against each other. The outcome 
of the progress of recognition is, therefore, determined by this struggle. The famous dialectic 
of lordship and bondsman comprises the section in which this struggle occurs and resolves 
in the independence of a particular type of self-consciousness. In what follows, I introduce 
this dialectic by tracing the steps that lead up to the struggle and the manner in which this 
struggle is concluded.  
 The process of Recognition is initiated when self-consciousness encounters another 
self-consciousness. Consequent to this encounter, self-consciousness comes out of itself; in 
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other words, it loses itself.569 However this is not a definite loss since what self-
consciousness encounters as its other is also self-consciousness. Therefore, self-
consciousness ‘finds itself as an other being.’570 In terms of trying to become certain of 
itself, of its truth, self-consciousness had to supersede its otherness; however, in superseding 
its otherness, self-consciousness comes to find itself in this otherness and therefore, what it 
supersedes is in fact its own self.571 Thus, by completing the supersession, self-
consciousness effects a return into itself.572 As Desire, self-consciousness had to consume 
the object to attain self-certainty. In its encounter with another self-consciousness, however, 
self-consciousness faces an object which has an independent existence and thus cannot 
consume this object for its own purposes. The independence of the object necessitates that 
in order to effect the above-mentioned supersession, the object must also act in a similar 
manner. Hence, we have two self-consciousnesses where,  
[e]ach is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates 
itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the 
other, an immediate being on its own account, which at the same time 
is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as 
mutually recognizing one another.573    
In order for there to be a middle term between self-consciousnesses, they must first split into 
extremes as a result of which they come to oppose each other; Hegel noted that initially this 
split manifests itself as the inequality of the two self-consciousnesses in which one becomes 
recognised, and the other merely recognising.574   
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 It has been presented above that, at the level of Desire, self-consciousness maintained 
its self-certainty by negating the object. It is with this negation that self-consciousness 
proves its non-attachment to any other existence or life.575 As a result of this negation, self-
consciousness attains the pure abstraction of being-for-self; in other words, it becomes 
certain of itself. However, this certainty is disturbed when self-consciousness encounters 
another self-consciousness: in this encounter, ‘[e]ach is indeed certain of its own self, but 
not of the other, and therefore its own self-certainty still has no truth.’576 We have observed 
earlier that, in order to attain this truth, self-consciousnesses must go through the process of 
recognition. That is to say, each self-consciousness must become the middle term for its 
other in achieving pure abstraction of being-for-self. Nonetheless, at the level of Desire, as 
also observed above, this pure abstraction is achieved through showing that consciousness 
is not attached to any form of existence or life. Therefore, in the initial encounter between 
two self-consciousnesses, the presentation of pure abstraction does not directly manifest 
itself as the process of recognition. Instead, it manifests itself as a life-and-death struggle in 
which each self-consciousness stakes its own life in seeking the death of the other. 577 
 With the above-mentioned struggle, Hegel introduced the notions of freedom and 
independence. Accordingly, one cannot gain freedom without staking one’s own life and 
‘[t]he individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has 
not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness.’578 
However, if the ‘trial by death’ is to end with the death of either one of the subjects, this 
death will amount to ‘the natural negation of consciousness, negation without independence, 
which thus remains without the required significance of recognition.’579 In the contrary 
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scenario, where both subjects survive, instead of natural negation, abstract negation takes 
place. Hegel described the latter as an act ‘which supersedes in such a way as to preserve 
and maintain what is superseded, and consequently survives its own supersession.’580 
Central to an act of abstract negation is the understanding that life is as essential for self-
consciousness as attaining pure self-certainty or being-for-self.581 The survival of both 
subjects, however, results in a failure to split into opposite extremes where each 
consciousness would want to attain pure being-for-self.582 The ensuing extremes are 
unopposed and this outcome causes the above mentioned middle term to collapse leading to 
a relation in which ‘the two [self-consciousnesses] do not reciprocally give and receive one 
another back from each other consciously, but leave each other free only indifferently, like 
things.’583 
 With the collapse of the middle term and the following relation ‘there is posited a 
pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is not purely for itself but for another, 
i.e. is a merely immediate consciousness, or consciousness in the form of thinghood.’584 
While the former consciousness belongs to lord, the latter belongs to bondsman; the former 
‘is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the [latter] is the 
dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another.’585 
Lord and bondsman depict the inequality by which one self-consciousness becomes the 
recognising and the other becomes the recognised.  
 However, following the development of the relation between lord and bondsman, 
Hegel reached a conclusion that ‘the truth of the independent consciousness is [...] the servile 
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consciousness.’586 Central to this conclusion is the notion that lord’s recognition is one-sided 
and unequal.587 One-sidedness of this recognition emerges from lord’s relation to bondsman. 
Existing for itself requires that one’s existence is mediated through another consciousness 
and for lord this other consciousness is that of bondsman.588 However, as this other 
consciousness, bondman is dependent upon an independent thing; therefore, lord’s relation 
to another consciousness consists of a double relation in which lord relates ‘to a thing as 
such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness for which thinghood is the essential 
characteristic.’589 It is lord’s power over the thing which holds the other consciousness in 
bondage.590 However, as desire, lord cannot absolutely negate an independent thing; in order 
to achieve this, lord must interpose the bondsman between the thing and himself.591 As self-
consciousness, bondsman also relates himself to the independent thing; nevertheless, due to 
the independence of the thing, this relation cannot also manifest itself as absolute 
annihilation of the object. Instead, bondsman’s negative relation to the thing manifests itself 
as work and by working on the thing bondsman takes away its independence.592 For his pure 
enjoyment, it is this dependent aspect of the thing which lord takes.  
 The double relation provides lord with two moments from which he derives 
recognition through another consciousness. In the first relation, lord encounters the 
consciousness which works on his object of desire, and in the second relation, lord 
encounters the consciousness which has a dependent existence. As opposed to lord’s 
essential and independent consciousness, encountered consciousnesses are unessential and 
dependent. Lord’s ‘essential nature is to exist only for himself; he is the sheer negative power 
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for whom the thing is nothing.’593 Contrary to lord’s essentiality, bondsman’s nature is to 
exist for another. For bondsman, the thing is independent and his relation to it is manifested 
as work and not as sheer negative power. Therefore, it is the inequality between lord and 
bondsman that renders the recognition, which lord derives from the above mentioned two 
moments, one-sided and unequal. Consequently, this asymmetrical recognition denies lord 
the truth of himself; in other words, he cannot attain certainty of being-for-self for ‘his truth 
is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action.’594   
 In light of lord’s failure to attain self-certainty, Hegel argued that, ultimately, the 
truth of independent consciousness is the servile consciousness of bondsman.595 It is through 
bondsman’s experience of the fear of death (that is to say, the fear of absolute lord) that this 
truth becomes implicit in servitude. Hegel explained that,  
[i]n that experience [bondsman] has been quite unmanned, has trembled 
in every fibre of its being, and everything solid and stable has been 
shaken to its foundations. But this pure universal movement, the 
absolute melting-away of everything stable, is the simple, essential 
nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure being-for-self, 
which consequently is implicit in this consciousness.596     
In order to attain self-certainty, bondsman must become conscious of this implicit truth. It 
is through his work on the thing that bondsman will acquire this consciousness. By working 
on the object, bondsman gives it form and shape; therefore, his negative relation to the object 
renders it permanent.597 This permanence is lacking in lord’s negative relation to the object. 
This is due to the fact that, lord’s relation to the object is manifest as desire and over this 
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object of desire lord retains the sheer power of negation (i.e. consumption, cancellation, 
annihilation); thus, acting upon this power merely produces a transient satisfaction.598 While 
for lord, the thing is only an object by which he drives ephemeral satisfaction, for bondsman, 
it is ‘desire held in check’ – i.e. it is a formative activity which produces permanence.599 
This formative activity, then, is the negative middle term in the relation between bondsman 
and the object. As such, this activity will not only render the object permanent but the 
implicit pure being-for-self of the bondsman will also become permanent.600 Therefore, ‘in 
fashioning the thing, [bondsman] becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he 
himself exists essentially and actually in his own right.’601 In other words, bondsman realises 
that ‘in his work [...] he acquires a mind of his own.’602 This realisation corresponds to the 
truth of independent self-consciousness and brings the section on lordship and bondsman to 
a close.  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 In the overall scheme of the Phenomenology, Hegel presented the development of 
cognitive knowledge into the truth of absolute knowledge. In this development, Hegel 
assigned major significance to self-consciousness as, according to him, one’s entry to the 
realm of truth is marked by this type of consciousness. In the preceding section, I followed 
the progress of consciousness through its initial sense-certainty of here and now towards its 
transition to self-consciousness. The patterns of consciousness consisted of sense-certainty, 
perception, and understanding. I showed that the transition from consciousness to self-
consciousness marked a shift towards achieving self-certainty. Therefore, subject turns to 
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himself and has his consciousness as his object. For the overall scheme of my thesis, this 
transition has a twofold significance. Firstly, it is at this juncture that Hegel introduced the 
process of recognition. Secondly, the primary setting for self-certainty is an encounter 
between two subjects and it is within subjects’ relation to one another that Hegel constructed 
his notions of freedom and independence.  
 The transition from sense- to self-certainty is initiated by the subject’s encounter 
with another independent being. We observed that in consciousness, subject engages with 
an object which has being as otherness. This is an immediate object which emerges as a 
result of sense-certainty and perception. In self-consciousness, however, subject turns his 
attention from this immediate object and becomes conscious of his own self. With this turn, 
subject supersedes the otherness which was encountered in consciousness. The major 
prerequisite of this supersession is that subject encounters another self-conscious subject. 
The reason for this prerequisite is that the supersession of otherness takes place within a 
process of recognition. Hyppolite explained this in the following: 
I am a self-consciousness only if I gain for myself recognition from 
another self-consciousness and if I grant recognition to other. This 
mutual recognition, in which individuals recognize each other, creates 
the element of spiritual life – the medium in which the subject is an 
object to itself, finding itself completely in the other yet doing so 
without abrogating the otherness that is essential to self-
consciousness.603 
Finding one’s own self in the other is, in effect, to recognise that, similar to one’s own self, 
the other is also a self-consciousness. Through this recognition, what I find in the other is, 
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in fact, the very same of what I am. Therefore, it is not through a process of abrogation that 
otherness is superseded but through recognising one’s own self in the other. Hence, through 
mutual recognition, each subject has as its object the self or the ‘I’. As observed above, 
Hegel called this the unity of self-consciousness in its otherness.   
 As Hyppolite noted, the unity of self-consciousnesses in its otherness forms the 
element of spiritual life. In The Hegel Dictionary, Magee explained that Hegel used the word 
Spirit to refer to ‘a unique form of consciousness possessed by human beings.’604 This 
unique form is self-consciousness and this type of consciousness is manifest in human 
beings’ ability to know themselves.605 This ability separates humans from animals to the 
extent that, in contrast to other animals, human beings can reflect upon, comprehend and 
somewhat restrain their instincts and drives.606 In consciously acting upon instincts and 
desires, human beings shape their own nature and this shaping fundamentally corresponds 
to human freedom.607 The above mentioned unity of self-consciousnesses forms the element 
of spiritual life for the reason that in this unity ‘different independent self-consciousnesses 
[...] enjoy perfect freedom and independence.’608 Therefore, with the transition from 
consciousness to self-consciousness, Hegel’s initial cognitive venture towards absolute 
knowledge takes a societal turn. It is through the process of recognition that subjects attain 
self-consciousness. The significance of this process is that subject’s relation to its other 
becomes an existential necessity. This necessity, in turn, weaves an inter-subjective fabric 
unto which Hegel conferred the notions of freedom and independence. In what follows, I 
consider the ways in which Hegel’s notions of recognition and self-consciousness, as 
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presented above, were utilised by contemporary thinkers to account for different forms of 
subjects.  
 
Part Three 
3.1. Introduction  
 In the previous part of the chapter, I introduced Hegel’s notion of recognition as 
presented in the latter’s Phenomenology of Spirit. The overall purpose of introducing this 
notion was to seek an apt theoretical framework to account for the constitution of subjects 
under international law. The obvious challenge for this search is that the Phenomenology 
exhibits the development of cognitive knowledge into the scientific truth of absolute 
knowledge. A consequence of this orientation is that, recognition marks the coming-into-
being of self-conscious subjects. The relevant issue is the extent to which Hegel’s notion of 
self-consciousness can be adapted for the aforementioned purpose.  
 A second issue relates to the dialectic of lordship and bondsman. Hegel’s theory of 
recognition may be interpreted as an intersubjective unity which ensures freedom and 
independence. However, this interpretation is contingent upon working out the 
repercussions of lordship and bondsman upon the process of recognition. In the previous 
part, I demonstrated that this process develops into a life and death struggle and culminates 
in the enslavement of one of the parties. This enslavement, in turn, results in a particular 
type of self-consciousness accomplishing truth of independence. Above, we observed that 
this particular type is that of servile consciousness. An evaluation of the effects of lordship 
and bondsman on the notion of recognition would, therefore, necessitate an assessment of 
the servility of this consciousness.  
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 In what follows, I present works of three authors who adapted Hegel’s theory of 
recognition to account for three different forms of subjects. The purpose of this presentation 
is twofold. Firstly, it demonstrates successful abstractions of the notion of recognition from 
the specific context of the Phenomenology. Secondly, it shows that each author had to 
engage with the question of lordship and bondsman in the due course of these abstractions. 
I begin with Axel Honneth’s work on the constitution of the moral subject, then, move on 
to Charles Taylor’s idea of the cultural subject, and finalise the part by referring to Costas 
Douzinas’ notion of legal personality.  
  
3.2. Axel Honneth: Recognition and Moral Ordering 
 In Redistribution or Recognition? Axel Honneth engaged in a debate with Nancy 
Frasier on the question of the conceptualisation of justice in contemporary social theory. 
Within the context of this debate Honneth devised a moral ordering of society and argued 
that this order was built on relations of recognition. In this section, I briefly present the 
structure of Honneth’s moral order and demonstrate the role Hegel’s theory of recognition 
played therein. Next, I consider Honneth’s approach to the dialectic of lordship and 
bondsman. Between two of his works, Honneth’s approach changes from dismissing the 
dialectic as devoid of any moral force to regarding the dialectic as an elementary experience 
of morality.  
 According to Honneth, the question of justice centres upon the verification of 
subjects’ experiences of injustice within societies.609 His starting point is the social-
theoretical premise ‘that every society requires justification from the perspective of its 
members to the extent that it has to fulfil a number of normative criteria that arise from deep-
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seated claims in the context of social interaction.’610 A moral order underlies this premise in 
which subjects have moral expectations from the society and, in turn, moral implications of 
institutional procedures shape subjects’ convictions of the legitimacy of the political 
decisions of the society.611  
 At the very heart of Honneth’s argument is the understanding that the moral order 
consists of ‘a fragile structure of graduated relations of recognition.’612 Within the context 
of the bourgeois-capitalist society Honneth identified three distinct spheres of recognition; 
in each sphere, mutual recognition of associated values helps to determine the very being of 
individuals in the society.613 These spheres respectively correspond to three normative 
principles — love, the equality principle, and the achievement principle.614 In turn, each 
normative principle is associated with separate forms of inter-personal relations.  
 Love is the basic principle of intimate relationships where, through acts of mutual 
affection and concern, people begin to consider themselves as ‘individuals with their own 
needs.’615 Equality is the underlying principle of legal relations which consist of mutual 
grant of rights and ascription of duties; in this form of relation, people gradually perceive 
themselves as legal persons who share same amount of individual autonomy with all other 
persons within the society.616 The achievement principle underlies ‘loose-knit social 
relations’ in which contention for jobs and professions help persons perceive themselves as 
‘subjects possessing abilities and talents that are valuable for society.’617  
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 Honneth explained that the element of morality pertains to recognition due to 
‘individuals’ willingness to reciprocally restrict their own spheres of liberty.’618 Therefore, 
‘individuals’ claim to the intersubjective recognition of their identity […] is built into social 
life from the very beginning as a moral tension.’619 This moral tension seeps through each 
sphere of societal setup ensuring ‘a minimal normative consensus.’620 However, in the 
Struggle for Recognition, Honneth argued that the sketches of a theory, wherein 
‘communicative relations between subjects [were] conceived as something that in principle 
[preceded] individuals,’ could only be found in Hegel’s earlier Jena writings.621 According 
to Honneth, Hegel abandoned this pursuit in the Phenomenology by focusing upon the 
‘stages of the self-mediation of individual consciousness.’622 Thus, the dialectic of lordship 
and bondsman connected the struggle for recognition ‘to the experience of the practical 
acknowledgement of one’s labour.’623 Insofar as this connection served ‘the sole function of 
the formation of self-consciousness,’ Honneth was of the view that the idea of a moral 
ordering of the society was lost in Hegel’s later work.624    
 However, Honneth changed some of his views on Hegel’s notion of self-
consciousness as presented in the Phenomenology by arguing, later on, that the attainment 
of self-consciousness marked ‘an experience that is moral in an elementary sense.’625 
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Honneth traced this elementary morality to ‘the encounter between two subjects [wherein] 
a new sphere of action is opened in the sense that both sides are compelled to restrict their 
self-seeking drives as soon as they encounter each other.’626 In other words, Honneth 
interpreted the section on Desire as injecting an element of morality into self-consciousness 
rescuing this notion from Honneth’s aforementioned criticism that self-consciousness 
marked an individualistic self-mediation. Thus, Honneth remarked that ‘the specific 
morality of human intersubjectivity begins at this early stage [of Desire]’ and in the form of 
subject’s ‘reflexive reaction to the perception of the other.’627  
 Despite the fact that Honneth reviewed his ideas on the notion of self-consciousness, 
this review did not involve the dialectic of lordship and bondsman. Above we observed that, 
in the Phenomenology, the section on Desire highlighted the subject’s need to encounter 
another subject. Insofar as the purpose of this encounter is to achieve mutual recognition, 
we also observed that once the subject meets another subject, this meeting transformed into 
a life and death struggle the outcome of which led to lordship and bondsman. Honneth’s 
renewed take on the notion of self-consciousness involves the encounter and the idea of 
mutual recognition but somewhat omits its outcome which ties servile consciousness to 
labour. In what follows, I present Charles Taylor’s approach to the theory of recognition 
which assigns lordship and bondsman a historical significance.  
  
3.3. Charles Taylor: Recognition and Identity 
 In his essay entitled the Politics of Recognition, Charles Taylor probed the link 
between politics of identity and demands for recognition in the contemporary social 
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theory.628 While, at the outset, Taylor acknowledged Hegel’s influence on this link, he traced 
the emergence of the discourse of recognition and identity to a period which precedes 
Hegel’s work, a period wherein a major change in the social perception of the concept of 
identity took place. According to Taylor, this change made ‘the modern preoccupation with 
identity and recognition inevitable.’629 Hegel’s theory of recognition is, in turn, highlighted 
as a significant contribution to the above-mentioned change.    
 Taylor differentiated between two changes which brought about the connection 
between recognition and identity. First change occurred with the collapse of social 
hierarchies whereby the notion of honour was replaced by a modern notion of dignity.630 
Taylor employed the former notion ‘in the ancien régime sense in which it is intrinsically 
linked to inequalities,’ the latter is ‘used in a universalist and egalitarian sense, where we 
talk of the inherent dignity of human beings, or of citizen dignity.’631 In Taylor’s view, 
coupled with the underlying principle that every human being shares it, ‘the concept of 
dignity is the only one compatible with a democratic society.’632 In turn, it is this 
compatibility that renders modes of equal recognition, by means of which the above 
mentioned dignity is manifest, vital for democratic cultures.633  
 The second change corresponded to a new perception of individual identity that is 
developed in the eighteenth century; in this regard Taylor wrote about ‘an individualized 
identity, one that is particular to me, and that I discover in myself.’634 This change is, then, 
joined with the ideal of authenticity which, as Taylor explained, consists of being true to 
                                               
628 Taylor C. ‘Politics of Recognition’ in Taylor C., et.al., Multiculturalism, (Amy Gutmann (Ed.)), (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
629 Ibid, p.26. 
630 Ibid.  
631 Ibid, p.27. 
632 Ibid. 
633 Ibid. 
634 Ibid, p.28. 
   191
one’s own self and one’s own particular way of being.635 Furthermore, Taylor elucidated 
that  
[b]eing true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is 
something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am also 
defining myself. I am realizing a potentiality that is properly my own. 
This is the background understanding to the modern ideal of 
authenticity, and to the goals of self-fulfillment and self-realization in 
which the ideal is usually couched.636 
As he acknowledged that the ideal of authenticity is also an outcome of the dissolution of 
the hierarchical society, Taylor also noted that, in order to understand its significance for 
identity and recognition an essential feature of human existence must be taken into 
account.637  
 This feature is the dialogical character of human life, that ‘we define our identity 
always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want 
to see in us.’638 However, such definition of identity contradicts the above-mentioned self-
definition of one’s own being, which is central to the ideal of authenticity, if the latter 
definition was to be interpreted narrowly. In light of this contradiction, Taylor wrote that 
[...] my discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in 
isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly 
internal, with others. That is why the development of an ideal of 
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inwardly generated identity gives a new importance to recognition. My 
own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.639  
In the overall scheme of Taylor’s argument, therefore, a newly emerging discourse on 
dignity and a novel ideal of authenticity condition subjects’ desires for recognition. 
Connected with the notion of individualised identity and the dialogical nature of human 
beings, these two conditions effectuate the link between demands for recognition and 
identity politics, and forge a politics of equal recognition.640 
 Further probing the meaning of the politics of equal recognition, Taylor suggested 
that each of the above-mentioned socio-theoretical changes ascribed different meanings to 
equal recognition; as the change from honour to dignity resulted in a politics of universalism, 
the modern understanding of the notion of identity gave rise to a politics of difference.641 
Thus, within the politics of universalism, recognition is oriented towards equal dignity of all 
citizens.642  Taylor explained that, underlying the notion of equal dignity is ‘the idea that all 
humans are equally worthy of respect,’ and that ‘what commanded respect in us was our 
status as rational agents, capable of directing our lives through principles.’643 It is this 
‘universal human potential’ that politics of universalism recognised and acted upon through 
the equalisation of rights and entitlements.644  
 To some extent, the concept of universal human potential also forms the foundation 
of the politics of difference.  However, instead of interpreting it as a general capacity for 
rational action, politics of difference defines this human potential as the ability to form and 
determine one’s own individual (and cultural) identity.645 This type of interpretation brings 
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to the fore the criticism that in universal application of rules and regulations, the politics of 
universalism may be ‘blind to the ways in which citizens differ.’646 This criticism is, then, 
followed by the charge that politics of universalism ‘negates identity by forcing people into 
a homogeneous mould that is untrue to them.’647 In an attempt to counter this 
homogenisation, politics of difference lays emphasis on the recognition of distinct identities 
of individuals and groups, and claims that within the politics of universalism ‘it is precisely 
this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority 
identity.’648  The former’s attempt may be interpreted as a call for positive discrimination 
that would compensate for the assimilation of minority groups. For the latter, however, this 
call contravenes the principle of non-discrimination which underlies the universal 
recognition of the dignity of every human being.649  
 In order to gain an improved insight into the charge of homogeneity, in the third part 
of his essay, Taylor traced the emergence of the concept of equal dignity. It is also in this 
part that he located and assessed Hegel’s input into the theory of recognition. As observed 
earlier, the notion of equal dignity marked a departure from the notion of honour which had 
been the conceptual basis for pre-modern social hierarchies. In order to demonstrate this 
departure, Taylor focused upon Rousseau’s various considerations of the notion of esteem. 
The first of these considerations is the conceptual connection Rousseau made between social 
hierarchy and other-dependence.650 This connection relies on interpreting the notion of 
other-dependence as craving for other’s esteem and/or good opinion; understood as such, 
esteem corresponds to ‘intrinsically differential’ treatment which is, in turn, associated with 
the traditional conception of honour.651  
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 However, Taylor drew readers’ attention to Rousseau’s description of potentially 
good societies in which the notion of esteem assumed a different role. Taylor quoted a 
passage from Rousseau’s Considerations on the Government of Poland about Greek games 
to demonstrate this role:  
Successful contestants in Greek games were crowned amidst applause 
from all their fellow-citizens – these are the things that, by constantly 
re-kindling the spirit of emulation and the love of glory, raised Greek 
courage and Greek virtues to a level of strenuousness of which nothing 
existing today can give us a remote idea – which, indeed, strikes modern 
men as beyond belief.652  
As opposed to his earlier views on depending on others’ opinions, in this passage Rousseau 
highlighted the significance of glory and public recognition — i.e. two notions for which 
others’ opinions are central. Taylor argued that the difference between earlier and later forms 
of opinions is contextual, that in the festivals, games, or recitations, there is a ‘total lack of 
differentiation or distinction between different classes of citizens’ and Taylor moved on to 
associate this context with balanced reciprocity:  
A perfectly balanced reciprocity takes the sting out of our dependence 
on opinion, and makes it compatible with liberty. Complete reciprocity, 
along with the unity of purpose that it makes possible, ensures that in 
following opinion I am not in any way pulled outside myself. I am still 
“obeying myself” as a member of this common project or “general 
will.” Caring about esteem in this context is compatible with freedom 
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and social unity, because the society is one in which all the virtuous will 
be esteemed equally and for the same (right) reasons.653  
Consequently, within the framework of equality, reciprocity, and unity of purpose, the 
notion of esteem is rescued from an honour-oriented meaning which underlies hierarchical 
society; this rescuing, in turn, marks the dawn of the age of dignity.654   
 Hegel’s input into this new age, according to Taylor, was his emphasis on the 
essentiality of reciprocal recognition for the full development of human beings.655 In his 
reading of Hegel’s account of the life-and-death struggle which ends in lordship and 
bondage, Taylor rediscovered the crucial flaw in the conception of honour within the context 
of social hierarchies. He argued that, 
[i]t is flawed because it cannot answer the need that sends people after 
recognition in the first place. Those who fail to win out in the honour 
stakes remain unrecognized. But even those who do win are more subtly 
frustrated, because they win recognition from the losers, whose 
acknowledgement is, by hypothesis, not really valuable, since they are 
no longer free, self-supporting subjects on the same level with the 
winners.656    
Taylor contended that the above-mentioned flaw can only be circumvented within ‘a regime 
of reciprocal recognition among equals’ and he noted that, in parallel with Rousseau’s notion 
of unity of purpose, Hegel conceptualised this society with the notion of “the ‘I’ that is ‘We’ 
and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.”657   
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 In the previous section, we observed that Axel Honneth regarded the dialectic of 
lordship and bondsman as limiting the scope of recognition to the notion of labour. To the 
extent that in his later work, Honneth reinterpreted self-consciousness as an elementary form 
of morality, his criticism of the dialectic remained unchanged. In Charles Taylor’s 
perspective, however, lordship and bondsman corresponded to the historical period of 
honour-oriented hierarchical societies. The dialectic was regarded by Taylor as an indication 
of the essential defect in these types of societies. As such an indication, the effect of lordship 
and bondsman upon the theory of recognition is transient. In other words, as Taylor argued, 
these effects were circumvented with the turn of the age which brought in new terms of 
recognition and identity.  
 Taylor applied the theoretical framework of recognition, which is informed both by 
the politics of universalism and of difference, to the issues of different cultures.658 This 
application entailed perception of identity as cultural and understood recognition as essential 
for the survival of such cultural groups especially in multicultural societies.659 Next, I shift 
my attention from Taylor’s notion of cultural subjects to Douzinas’ take on the constitution 
of legal subjects. Douzinas’ work exemplifies an alternative way of abstracting Hegel’s 
theory of recognition and provides a different interpretation of lordship and bondsman’s 
effect upon this theory.   
 
3.4. Costas Douzinas: Recognition and Legal Rights 
 In his essay ‘Identity, Recognition, Rights or What Can Hegel Teach Us About 
Human Rights?’ Costas Douzinas utilised Hegel’s theory of recognition to present a critical 
approach to the notions of legal subjects and human rights. For the purposes of this chapter, 
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the significance of this critical approach is twofold. Firstly, Douzinas derived the notion of 
identity from Hegel’s conception of self-consciousness as presented in the Phenomenology. 
Secondly, Douzinas applied the process of recognition to the constitution of legal subjects. 
In what follows, I present Douzinas’ perception of the subject as one who constructs his/her 
identity as self-plus-other. Then, I move on to consider the manner in which Douzinas 
applied this perception to account for the role of recognition in the constitution of subjects 
of legal rights.  
 Douzinas argued against ‘liberal theory’s impoverished view of the subject as a 
closed and monological entity and, of the social bond as an atomocentric collection of 
individuals whose relations to each other are external, superficial, and interest driven.’ 660 In 
Douzinas’ observation, this impoverished view gave rise to a presumption that,  
rights express, uphold, and guarantee pre-existing characteristics, their 
task typically being to promote free will. The characteristics, elements, 
and traits of human personality exist prior to rights and other public 
institutions, which are treated as tools facilitating the public expression 
of pre-formed and complete selves.661  
In his attempt to rebut this presumption, Douzinas argued for ‘the constitutive role of rights 
in building human identity.’662 The underlying premise of Douzinas’ argument is that, 
contrary to the liberal perception of identity as closed and monological, the concept of 
identity is dialogical and dynamic.  
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 Douzinas employed Hegel’s theory of recognition to demonstrate this premise. The 
starting point is that, in the Phenomenology, the determination of the self occurs within ‘a 
continuous struggle to overcome the foreignness of the other.’663 Douzinas presented this 
struggle in three stages. The first stage consists of the initial encounter between the self and 
the other in which the desiring self attempts to gain immediate satisfaction through the 
negation of the object; this attempt, in Douzinas’ reading, results from the ‘delusion of self-
sufficiency under which the difference from others is absolute and must be negated through 
the arrogation of absolute sovereignty.’664 The second stage corresponds to self’s acceptance 
of its dependence on the other but also its attempt to externalise this dependence: ‘[t]he two 
consciousnesses know they need the other’s desire and recognition but believe that they can 
forgo or force it through exclusion, marginalisation or subjugation of the other.’665  The 
second stage refers to the relation between lord and bondsman in which the manifest desire 
is considered by Douzinas to be narcissistic.666  
 However, first two stages are overtaken by a third wherein mutual recognition takes 
place; Douzinas elaborated that,  
[in the third stage] the other is accepted both in her identity and her 
difference from self and, as a result, self discovers himself as integrally 
related to the other. The other’s recognition and desire allows self to see 
himself reflected in another self and create a nexus of links and 
dependencies that affect all aspects of both selves. Recognition works 
if it is mutual. I must be recognized by someone I recognize as human; 
I must reciprocally know myself in another.667 
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It is in light of this nexus that Douzinas reproached the liberal philosophy for attempting to 
venerate the individual by refuting human beings’ dependence on the world and spuriously 
obliterating indications of otherness.668 The result of this attempt is the false impression of 
self-identity which, in Douzinas’ view, can be evinced in law’s promotion of ‘the idea that 
self stands at the centre of the world, fully in control of himself, clear about his motives and 
in possession of his rights, which allow him to enter into instrumental relations.’669 In stark 
contrast to the liberal philosophy is Hegel’s notion of self-consciousness which is defined 
as ‘the unity of oneself in one’s other-being.’670 In other words, ‘self-consciousness both 
negates the split between self and other and preserves it; and as a result of this sublation, self 
becomes ‘an amalgam of self and otherness, of sameness and difference.’671  Consequently, 
identity becomes a dynamic concept in which self is never equal to self but always to a self-
plus-other.  
 Douzinas’ next move was to probe the link between subjects and legal rights. After 
perceiving the notion of identity as self-plus-other, Douzinas devised a constitutive role for 
recognition vis-à-vis the construction of legal subjects. To devise this role, Douzinas relied 
upon Hegel’s idea of ethical life as presented in the latter’s Philosophy of Right. In what 
follows, first, I briefly introduce the idea of ethical life, and, then, consider Douzinas’ 
argument on recognition and legal subjects. I show that this argument centres upon a critique 
of the abstract personality of legal subjects, and that, in Douzinas’ view, recognition of rights 
contributes to the realisation of this abstract personality.   
 As we observed at the outset of this chapter, in his Philosophy of Right, Hegel 
formulated a system of right which traced the development of will through three separate 
domains. We observed that these domains are abstract right, morality, and ethical life. 
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Therefore, it is in the last domain that the previous two stages of the will are united.   Hegel 
offered a definition and the significance of the notion of will for his theory of right in the 
following:  
The basis of right is the realm of spirit in general and its precise location 
and point of departure is the will; the will is free, so that freedom 
constitutes its substance and destiny and the system of right is the realm 
of actualized freedom, the world of spirit produced from within itself as 
second nature.672  
In the domain of abstract right, will corresponds to the notion of personality which has an 
immediate external existence; in the domain of morality, the external existence is reflected 
into itself to arrive at what Hegel called the subjective will. Freedom is, therefore, actualised 
by the unity of the external existence with the internal reflection. As noted above, this unity 
takes place within ethical life which, in itself, is further divided into three separate spheres: 
family, civil society, and state. 673  
 Douzinas used the spheres of ethical life to demonstrate the constitutive role of rights 
in the construction of identity. Comparable to Honneth’s approach considered above, 
Douzinas understood three spheres of ethical life as constituted by three separate stages of 
recognition. Recognition through relations of love and affection comprises the sphere of 
family, legal recognition is the building block of the civil society, and full recognition is 
achieved in the culmination of ethical life in the state.674  
 With regard to the issue of legal recognition, Douzinas brought Hegel’s notion of 
legal personality under particular focus. Douzinas explained that this type of personality 
                                               
672 Hegel (1991) op. cit. at §4, p.35. 
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‘expresses self’s ability to remove itself from family, social and cultural background, from 
all determinations that make it a concrete human being and to become abstract, 
indeterminate.’675 Furthermore, he added that,   
[t]he legal person negates all the contingencies of existence, race, 
sexuality, colour or religion and acquires an individualistic, negative, 
and private concept of self. The negation of what makes self real opens 
the possibility of negating others and of creating a sphere of privacy, 
where the person is free to act without external impositions and to reject 
the offers and advances of others. The will of the legal person is 
negative; it relates to others through excluding them.676 
While this negative aspect of the will corresponds to personal freedom which Douzinas 
deemed ‘the great achievement of modernity’ he also noted that legal personality remains 
abstract.677 Douzinas argued that in order to understand legal rights’ contribution to the 
process of recognition we need to realise that it is the ascription of these rights which 
‘enables the abstract personality to acquire specific characteristics, to objectify itself.’678  
 One example that can demonstrate this objectification is Hegel’s perception that 
individual wills of persons become objective in the possession, use and alienation of 
property.679 Emphasising the role of property rights in maintaining a legal relationship in 
which recognition of my possession by others is conditional upon my reciprocation of this 
recognition, Douzinas commented that,  
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[p]roperty therefore leads to a form of interpersonal recognition, a type 
of intersubjectivity achieved through the medium of the object; others 
recognize me by acknowledging and respecting the existence of my will 
in the thing.680   
The contractual relationship is the specific context in which reciprocal recognition takes 
place. In this regard, Hegel wrote that ‘[t]hat kind of property of which the aspect of 
existence or externality is no longer merely a thing but contains the moment of a will (and 
hence the will of another person) comes into being through contract.’681 Therefore, Douzinas 
commented that through contractual relations ‘contractors not only exchange objects but 
they also recognize each other as separate and free and as possessors of rights and duties — 
in and through contract they constitute one another as subjects.’682 In light of the examples 
of property and contract, Douzinas noted that  
[t]he imperative of rights is to be a person and to respect others as 
persons. In recognizing rights, the law gives the person dignity and by 
upholding contracts it makes dignity actual in the world. The 
interpersonal relation of right offers recognition of what is universal in 
every particular and a desire for the most abstract form of law.683  
While the contribution of rights to the progress of recognition is, hence, established, 
Douzinas used the same framework — i.e. the legal recognition of universality — in pointing 
out two major shortcomings of this contribution.  
                                               
680 Douzinas (2002) op. cit. at p.389. 
681 Hegel (1991) op. cit. at §72, p.104. [my emphasis] 
682 Douzinas (2002) op. cit. at p.389. 
683 Ibid, p.390. 
   203
 The first of these is the formalism of the law, that is to say ‘the lack of concern for 
the material circumstances that allow the realisation of rights.’684 The second is the 
“abstraction, the recognition of a non-substantial, a thin personality.685 In light of these 
deficiencies Douzinas emphasised that ‘[r]ights formalize and stabilize identities by 
recognizing and enforcing one type of reciprocal recognition.’686 Therefore, Douzinas’ 
conclusion is that ‘[a] complete identity cannot be based on the universal characteristics of 
law but on the continuous struggle for the other’s unique desire and concrete recognition.’687 
Nevertheless, within this struggle, ‘the avoidable misrecognitions, the myriad instances of 
mismatch between self-image of an individual or group and the identity of law and rights 
allow them to project, make law a necessary but inadequate and defective partner in the 
struggle for identity.’688    
 To sum up, Douzinas began his argument with the concept of identity which he 
derived from Hegel’s notion of self-consciousness. This conception rejected the liberal 
theory’s atomocentric take on the subject. Instead, Douzinas argued that the subject is 
always a self-plus-other. This argument accorded a constitutive role to Hegel’s theory of 
recognition and regarded lordship and bondsman as a narcissistic form of desire. This type 
of desire had to be overcome en route to achieving full identity. Douzinas also showed the 
manner in which the theory of recognition played a role in the construction of subjects of 
legal rights. Intersubjective aspect of mutual recognition enabled Douzinas to argue against 
the abstract personality of the legal subject. According to this argument, the abstract 
personality could only be actualised through recognition of individual’s legal rights.   
 
                                               
684 Ibid, p.397. 
685 Ibid. 
686 Ibid, p.404. [my emphasis] 
687 Ibid, p.405. 
688 Ibid. 
   204
Conclusion 
 At the outset, I set the purpose of this chapter as the overcoming of the problematic 
aspect of the atomistic perception of sovereignty. In the previous chapter, I derived this 
perception from Vattel’s notion of absolute sovereignty and its restrictive effects upon the 
prevalent theories of recognition. My argument, therein, was that, both the constitutive and 
the declarative theories failed to ask the conceptual question of other’s role in establishing 
the personality of international subjects. In order to circumvent this failure, in this chapter, 
I introduced Hegel’s theory of recognition. Turning to Hegel’s theory served two purposes. 
Firstly, it enabled rethinking the role of recognition outside the boundaries set by the 
prevalent theories. Secondly, it presented recognition as a constitutive imperative based on 
elements of mutuality and flux.  
 However, the Hegelian turn for an apt theoretical framework also posed certain 
challenges. Firstly, one encounters two prominent versions of this theory in different works 
of Hegel. One of these versions was presented in the Philosophy of Right and featured 
Hegel’s ideas on recognition within the context of international law. The other version was 
introduced in the Phenomenology, however, it featured ideas on the elevation of cognition 
to the level of absolute knowledge. In the first two parts of this chapter, I considered these 
two variations respectively. The overall orientation of the chapter is towards the adaptability 
of the latter version, on an ad hoc basis, to account for the constitution of subjects under 
international law.  
 This orientation, however, posed the second challenge: to what extent and in what 
manner could one abstract a theory of recognition from a phenomenological treatise on the 
appearance of absolute knowledge in this world?  I dealt with this challenge in the final part 
of the chapter. Therefore, the structure of the chapter comprised the following. In the first 
part, I introduced Hegel’s theory of recognition as presented in his Philosophy of Right and 
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demonstrated that this work anticipated the failures of the constitutive theorists in a later 
age. In the second part of the chapter, I departed from these views by focusing upon the 
theory of recognition in the Phenomenology. I took up the contextual challenge posed by 
this latter treatise in the third part of the chapter by referring to works of three scholars who 
adapted Hegel’s theory of recognition to explain the constitution of different forms of 
subjects.  
 Inasmuch as Hegel was of the view that external recognition was needed to 
supplement the internal sovereignty of a state, in the first part of the chapter, I showed that 
his ideas on this necessity remained somewhat ambivalent. In Hegel’s view, recognition was 
an absolute entitlement, yet this entitlement was contingent upon the will of each and every 
state. Furthermore, as a constitutive supplement, recognition remained purely formal. I 
argued that the equivocal approach presented in the Philosophy of Right foretold the 
problems pertaining to the constitutive theory which I considered in the previous chapter. 
Based on the connection between Hegel’s thoughts in the Philosophy of Right and the ideas 
of the constitutive theorists, in the second part of the chapter, I moved on to an alternative 
perspective on the notion of recognition. This alternative stance was presented by Hegel in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit.  
 The primary obstacle this move engendered was contextual. In the initial section of 
the second part, I traced consciousness’ development through three stages of sense-certainty, 
perception, and understanding. I followed this progress, in the second section, with 
consciousness’ transformation into self-consciousness via the notions of desire, recognition, 
and the dialectic of lordship and bondsman. Insofar as Hegel provided a theoretically 
detailed definition of the act of recognition in the Phenomenology, this act did not take place 
within the realm of international law. In other words, an ad hoc utilisation of the theory of 
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recognition depended upon the abstraction of this theory from the framework of the 
Phenomenology and the examination of probable repercussions of this abstraction.   
 I offered examples of such abstractions in the final part of this chapter by referring 
to the respective works of Honneth, Taylor, and Douzinas. Central to the thoughts of these 
scholars was the idea that the intersubjective element of Hegelian recognition provided a 
viable theoretical basis for the construction of subjects on a mutual basis. According to 
Honneth, the moral order of a society is constructed upon spheres of mutual recognition. In 
Taylor’s perspective, groups establish their cultural identities through a struggle for 
recognition informed by the politics of universality and of difference. Finally, and contrary 
to the atomocentric perception of liberal theory, Douzinas argued for the construction of 
legal subjects through mutual recognition of legal rights. In Douzinas’ view, such 
recognition transforms the abstract person of rights into an actual legal subject.    
 In addition to presenting successful employment of Hegel’s theory of recognition, 
reference to these scholars brought another obstacle to the fore, that one needs to deal with 
the repercussions especially of the dialectic of lordship and bondsman upon the theory of 
recognition. I showed that Honneth’s approach to this problem was ambiguous. Initially, 
Honneth thought that in the Phenomenology Hegel abandoned of the societal structure of 
ethical life for the individualistic development of self-consciousness. Later on, however, 
Honneth perceived the notion of self-consciousness as comprising an elementary sense of 
morality. However, this perception did not include a re-evaluation of the repercussions of 
lordship and bondsman. In Taylor’s perspective, lordship and bondsman presented a stage 
among the historical development of the concept of identity. This stage demonstrated the 
flaw in honour-oriented hierarchical societies. Thus, a modern understanding of identity was 
built open the overcoming of such societies.  
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 Douzinas understood lordship and bondsman as a narcissist mode of desire that, 
similar to Taylor’s approach above, one had to surpass in order to achieve full identity. 
Compared to Honneth’s unclear approach, Taylor and Douzinas respectively acknowledged 
the challenge of lordship and bondsman upon the theory of recognition and thought of this 
challenge as surmountable. I conclude this chapter by arguing that, inasmuch as this 
challenge may be surmountable, Douzinas and Taylor presented inadequate accounts of its 
repercussions. Reading the works of these scholars, one could interpret the effect of lordship 
and bondsman as having no trace upon the act of recognition. Despite his fleeting 
engagement with the subject matter, however, Honneth highlighted that lordship and 
bondsman oriented self-consciousness towards the notion of labour. Similarly, one can also 
recall the fact that the struggle for recognition culminates in the independence of servile 
consciousness which is gained not through mutual recognition but via the bondsman’s 
relation with the thing upon which he/she labours. These concerns render the idea of 
prevailing over lordship, without any traceable or residual effects upon recognition, less 
viable. 
 The issue of such effects brings us back to one of the two questions I asked at the 
beginning of this chapter. Can we employ Hegel’s theory of recognition by extracting this 
theory from the context of the Phenomenology? I answered this question in the affirmative 
by providing several examples of such application in the third part of the chapter. The next 
question was whether the saga of lordship and bondsman set any contextual repercussions 
for these applications. We observed above that the respective works of Honneth, Taylor, and 
Douzinas lack the detailed engagement necessary for an adequate answer to this question. 
In the next chapter, therefore, I take into account Kojève’s lectures on Hegel’s thought. For 
the purposes of my thesis, the significance of these lectures lies in the fact that Kojève placed 
lordship and bondsman at the epicentre of his interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy. Shifting 
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the focus onto these lectures, in turn, provides me with the opportunity to give a sufficient 
answer to the aforementioned question.   
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CHAPTER FIVE  
LORDSHIP AND BONDSMAN: THE END OF HISTORY 
 
Introduction 
 In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the transformation of consciousness into self-
consciousness commences with the notion of desire, develops through mutual recognition, 
is followed by a life and death struggle, and finally culminates in the relation between 
lordship and bondsman. This transformation is aimed at achieving the truth of independent 
consciousness. According to Hegel, only bondsman is capable of attaining this truth. He 
does so by holding desire in check and by labouring upon the object which is later consumed 
by the lord. In the previous chapter, I argued that the theory of recognition can be extracted 
from the context of the Phenomenology for ad hoc purposes. I supported this argument by 
referring to several authors who successfully utilised this theory to explain the formation of 
different types of subjects. However, I also maintained that these references were deficient 
in their treatment of the repercussions of the dialectic of lordship and bondsman upon the 
notion of recognition. Taylor and Douzinas respectively regarded the dialectic as a transient 
stage that could be overcome with no residual effects. Honneth merely acknowledged the 
dialectic’s orientation towards the notion of labour, however, failed to contemplate the 
consequences of this orientation.  
 It is in light of these inadequate engagements with lordship and bondsman that, in 
this chapter, I present a more detailed scrutiny of the dialectic and its consequences on the 
act of recognition. The primary reference for this scrutiny is Alexandre Kojève’s 
anthropogenetic account of human reality. Kojève based this account on Hegel’s theory of 
recognition. Inasmuch as acts of desire and recognition are constitutive of subjects within 
this reality, Kojève was of the view that, the reality is generated by the struggle between lord 
and bondsman. For the purposes of this chapter, Kojève’s approach provides a valuable 
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insight into the ways in which lordship and bondsman may come to affect the intersubjective 
system of recognition. Two features of this insight are particularly relevant to my attempt to 
abstract a theory of recognition from the context of the Phenomenology. 
 The first feature is Kojève’s interpretation of the struggle between lord and 
bondsman as teleological. As the generator of human reality, the struggle creates both 
freedom and history, however, it does so with an ultimate purpose. The manner in which 
this eventual goal is achieved comprises the second feature. To the extent that the struggle 
generates reality, the final objective is attained when the clash between lord and bondsman 
ceases to exist. Kojève read this cessation as a form of reconciliation which is reached by 
the creation of the homogenous and the universal state. These teleological and state-centric 
insights into the effects of the dialectic of lordship and bondsman, in turn, pose significant 
challenges to my aim to derive a theoretical framework, from the context of the 
Phenomenology, for the constitution of subjects under international law. How could one 
extract a theory of recognition if the scope of such theory is limited to a certain historical 
progress with a specific telos? Furthermore, in Kojève’s perspective, the homogenous and 
the universal state comprises this telos. The state-centrism of this end-goal, thus, drags us 
back to the problem I tried to circumvent in the third chapter: How could one resolve the 
problems associated with the state-centrism of the prevalent theories under international law 
by adapting a notion of recognition which ostensibly has a similar orientation?  
 I present my engagement with these questions by dividing this chapter into two parts. 
In the first part, I introduce Kojève’s anthropogenetic account of human reality. As I 
mentioned earlier, the struggle between lord and bondsman is at the epicentre of this reality. 
Thus, Kojève’s work renders intelligible reverberations of this struggle on the theory of 
recognition. In order to highlight the essential role the idea of reconciliation plays vis-à-vis 
these effects, I supplement my reference to Kojève’s work with an allusion to Francis 
Fukuyama’s end-of-history thesis. I demonstrate that, in respective works of Kojève and 
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Fukuyama, the resolution of the struggle between lord and bondsman corresponds to the 
reconciliation of the notion of society with the notion of individual. In other words, in the 
first part of this chapter, I show that underlying the aforementioned problems of teleological 
historicism and state-centrism is the perception that the reconciliation between lord and 
bondsman is possible.  
 In the second section of the first part, I endeavour to tackle these problems by arguing 
against the possibility of such reconciliation. For this argument, I rely upon Fredric 
Jameson’s contention that a synthesis of the notions of society and individual never takes 
place in Hegel’s thoughts. In order to substantiate this contention, I take a detour into 
Hegel’s interpretation of Sophocles’ play Antigone. I demonstrate that, in Hegel’s 
perspective, the characters of the play represented separate ethical powers that were in 
conflict with each other. I, then, rely upon Jameson’s reading of this conflict and the ensuing 
double-tragedy of the play as the impermanence of ethical orders or social forms. According 
to Jameson, the society as an ethical order (or the Spirit which represents this order) is 
comprised of flowing moments and, as such, is subject to continuous change. Thus, 
Jameson’s interpretation helps one to perceive the struggle between lord and bondsman as 
irresolvable, at least, not in the sense that Kojève and Fukuyama respectively predicted. This 
perception, in turn, enables the departure from Kojève’s teleological insight into the 
constitution of the homogenous and the universal state.  
 In the second part of the chapter, I argue that the continuity of moments, that make 
up the dialectic and result in constant change, pertains not only to Hegel’s notion of social 
forms but also to his theory of recognition. The intention of this argument is to return to the 
question at hand: how could one extract a theory of recognition if the scope of such theory 
is limited to a certain historical progress with a specific telos? By relying upon Jameson’s 
work, one can react to the specific telos Kojève had in mind; therefore, one could contend 
that a homogenous and universal state, as a domain of reconciliation between the society 
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and the individual, never existed in Hegel’s thought. Nevertheless, this contention does not 
necessarily mean that the theory of recognition lacks any other possible telos. Understood 
as a process serving any specific end renders recognition a difficult notion to extract for ad 
hoc purposes. In the last part of this chapter, therefore, I present Hegel’s idea of recognition 
as a concept which accommodates constant change and encompasses a continuous flow of 
moments that defy any ultimate object or aim.  
 The main point of reference for such conception is Jean-Luc Nancy’s interpretation 
of Hegel’s notions of negativity and self. Central to the former’s interpretation is the 
perception of negativity — i.e. the elementary notion of recognition — as restless. The 
restlessness, in turn, informs Nancy’s understanding of the notion of self not only as 
constitutively dependent upon its relation to an other, but also as something that is constantly 
determined and re-determined by this relation. Expressed in different terms, Nancy’s work 
presents the idea of a subject which is always in flux. The act of recognition, empowered by 
restless negativity, ceaselessly creates this subject of change and difference. My argument 
is that, understood as such, recognition does not only resist any teleological outcome, it 
renders becoming an imperatively relational and continuous matter.  
 Nancy drew extensively upon Hegel’s preface to the Phenomenology to elucidate the 
conceptual features of the notions of self and negativity. Therefore, I begin the third part of 
this chapter with a brief introduction to the preface. This introduction focuses upon Hegel’s 
definition of Absolute both as Substance and as Subject. This definition underlies the 
scientific system of truth presented in the Phenomenology. By perceiving Absolute as 
Subject, Hegel endowed the former notion with the power of the negative, that is to say, 
with the power to know itself. Inasmuch as such definition of the Absolute underlies the 
cognitive turn in Hegel’s thought, it also provides a broader understanding of the ways in 
which negativity works. Next in this part, I move on to demonstrate Nancy’s incorporation 
of this understanding vis-à-vis the concepts of desire and recognition. This incorporation 
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produces an enriched notion of self that circumvents both the teleological restrictions and 
the idea of a subject that is complete-in-itself.  
 In the section on Nancy’s thought, I initially focus upon the concept of restlessness. 
I demonstrate the way in which Nancy derived this concept from Hegel’s definition of 
Absolute as Subject. Following this derivation, I show the connection between the notion of 
a restless Subject and the self-conscious subject of mutual recognition. For this connection, 
I shift my focus upon Nancy’s perception of the subject as becoming. I demonstrate that this 
perception locates subject within a mediated moment that overcomes immediate notions of 
being and nothingness. Here, I explain that Nancy relied upon Hegel’s logical concepts to 
elucidate the coming-into-being of the subject through its negative movements and that this 
elucidation augmented the constitutively imperative role one’s relation to its other has. I 
conclude the chapter by recapitulating that the limiting effects of Kojève’s teleological and 
state-centric interpretation of lordship and bondsman can be surmounted by understanding 
the Hegelian subject as embodying the restless power of negativity. This embodiment, in 
turn, situates the subject within a constant state of becoming that accommodates the 
imperative aspect of one’s continuous relation to its other and highlights the aptness of 
Hegel’s notion of recognition for the aforementioned ad hoc purposes. 
 
Part One 
1.1. Introduction  
  As I pointed out at the outset of this chapter, the purpose of turning to Kojève’s 
reading of Hegel’s work is to accentuate the effects of the dialectic of lordship and bondsman 
on the theory of recognition. To achieve this purpose in this part, I present Kojève’s step-
by-step incorporation of the relation between lord and bondsman into his notion of human 
reality. The first step is to understand this reality as one that centres upon notions of desire 
and recognition. Kojève distinguished between two different types of desire, namely, animal 
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and human, and argued that, through mutual recognition, the latter is capable of existing in 
a social reality. The construction of this reality begins with the separation of two forms of 
desire by means of a life and death struggle and continues through three stages of the 
aforementioned dialectic. I show that, according to Kojève, these three stages contribute to 
the generation of history and freedom.  
 In the latter section of this part, I present Kojève’s thesis on the end-of-history as the 
outcome of this generation.  This thesis suggests that the reconciliation of the struggle 
between lord and bondsman leads to the establishment of the homogenous and the universal 
state. I refer to Fukuyama’s utilisation of this thesis to further underscore the role of this 
reconciliation. I show that Fukuyama adapted the thesis to argue that, in contemporary times, 
such reconciliation is exclusively and most sufficiently provided in the liberal democratic 
state, that this state marks the end of history. After demonstrating that Kojève’s and 
Fukuyama’s respective approaches restrict the use of recognition to particular contexts, I 
move on to counter this restriction by arguing against the perceived reconciliation of the 
society and the individual. I begin this move by introducing, in the conclusion of this part, 
Jameson’s argument that, the idea of such reconciliation is a misplacement of Hegel’s 
thoughts on the concept of society. Central to this argument is the idea that societies are in 
a perpetual flux which resists a teleological end to the progress of history.  This idea, in turn, 
informs my argument, in the final part of this chapter, that such continuous change also 
pertains to the notion of recognition.  
 I begin the section on Kojève with a note on the alternative use of the terms lordship 
and bondsman. In the previous chapters of the thesis, I referred to the parties of the 
dialectical struggle as lord and bondsman. These references reflected the translation 
provided in Hegel’s Phenomenology which I extensively quoted in the previous chapter. In 
the English translation of Kojève’s works, however, these parties are referred to as master 
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and slave.  The alternative usage is extensive in the field of studies on Hegel.689 In order to 
refrain from altering lengthy quotes from Kojève, hereon, I will be referring to both lord and 
bondsman, and master and slave without intending any variation in the meaning of the terms.  
 
1.2. Kojève’s Reading of Hegel   
 Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s theory of recognition is anthropocentric. This means 
that Kojève interpreted the link between Hegel’s notions of desire, recognition and self-
consciousness as reflecting humans’ endeavour to achieve freedom and historicity. The 
principal reference for Kojève’s anthropogenetic approach is the first chapter of his 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel wherein he asserted outright that ‘[m]an is Self-
Consciousness.’690 This type of consciousness, according to Kojève, entails an essential 
distinction between humans and animals; therefore, in contrast to animals, humans are 
conscious of themselves, of their human reality and dignity.691 Central to Kojève’s reading 
of Hegel’s notion of self-consciousness, and fundamental to the above-mentioned distinction 
is Kojève’s conviction that humans possess an anthropogenetic Desire.692 
 As observed in chapter four of this thesis, according to Hegel, Desire (that is to say, 
the act of negation, destruction or consumption of the encountered object) formed the initial, 
but, nonetheless, inadequate attempt to achieve self-certainty; and, out of necessity which 
arises from the conditioning of the independent object, Desire had to give way to 
Recognition as the sole means of achieving this certainty. Kojève interpreted this transition 
by distinguishing between human (or, as already mentioned, anthropogenetic) Desire and 
animal Desire: 
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University Press, 1969) p.3. 
691 Ibid.  
692 Ibid, p.6. 
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Human Desire, or better still, anthropogenetic Desire, produces a 
free and historical individual, conscious of his individuality, his 
freedom, his history, and finally, his historicity. Hence, 
anthropogenetic Desire is different from animal Desire (which 
produces a natural being, merely living and having only sentiment 
of life) in that it is directed, not toward a real, “positive,” given 
object, but toward another Desire.693   
To further explicate the meaning of directing a Desire toward another Desire, Kojève wrote 
the following: 
[…] in the relationship between man and woman, for example, 
Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire 
of the other; if he wants “to possess” or “to assimilate” the Desire 
taken as Desire — that is to say, if he wants to be “desired” or 
“loved” or, rather, “recognised” in his human value, in his reality as 
a human individual.694 
To achieve recognition of his/her human value or his/her human reality, individuals must do 
away with their animal desires. The consequences of this conditionality are twofold. Firstly, 
according to Kojève, the act of recognition requires the existence of ‘a multiplicity of 
Desires’ rendering human reality social.695 Underlying the sociality of human reality is, 
however, the need to enter into a life and death struggle — the very method with which 
persons can do away with their animal desires.  
 Kojève’s anthropocentric interpretation of Hegel’s thought marks the life and death 
struggle as the essential moment which distinguishes human desire from animal desire. 
Therefore, the former integrated the latter’s dialectic of master and slave as the constructive 
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element of human reality. This integration stands in stark contrast to Taylor’s and Douzinas’ 
works wherein master and slave constituted a fleeting stage within the development of social 
reality. Kojève’s approach entails reading the struggle between master and slave as the 
generator of human reality. Accordingly, Kojève noted that,  
[…] in his nascent state, man is never simply man. He is always, 
necessarily, and essentially, either Master or Slave. If the human 
reality can come into being only as a social reality, society is 
human — at least in its origin — only on the basis of its implying 
an element of Mastery and an element of Slavery, of autonomous 
existences and dependent existences.696 
The separation of human desire from animal marks the central aspect this human social 
reality. Therefore, for a person to be considered human, his/her human Desire must 
overcome his/her animal Desire.697 Since ‘[a]ll the Desires of an animal are in the final 
analysis a function of its desire to preserve its life,’ the overcoming of such desire takes the 
form of risking one’s own ‘(animal) life for the sake of his human Desire.’698 
 Kojève derived the stages of the construction of human reality from a division of the 
dialectic of master and slave into three notions. These are the notions of action (or activity), 
absolute negating-negativity, and dialectical negation. Kojève’s deliberation on each notion 
provides a detailed insight into the manner in which the dialectic affects Hegel’s theory of 
recognition particularly when the theory is used to account for constitution of subjects. In 
order to clearly establish this effect, in what follows, I present Kojève’s construction of 
human reality with the corresponding notions. Afterwards, I derive on the dialectic’s effect 
on the theory of recognition to discuss the theory’s limits and the ways to overcome these 
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limits for an ad hoc utilisation of the theory for the purposes of accounting for subjects under 
international law.  
 The first of the aforementioned notions, activity, relates to the initiation of the life 
and death struggle that results in lordship and bondsman. According to Kojève’s 
interpretation, the first encounter between two persons involves an act whereby each person 
tries to assert his/her absolute and autonomous reality.699 Such an assertion is necessary to 
transform the subjective certainty of each person’s reality into an objective reality which 
others also recognise.700 The concept of action (or activity) corresponds to the 
transformation of ‘the (natural and human) world in which one is not recognised into a world 
in which this recognition takes place.’701 Therefore, action forms the basis upon which 
recognition takes place, and according to Kojève, ‘[t]his action — essentially human, 
because humanising and anthropogenetic — will begin with the act of imposing oneself on 
the first other man one meets.’702 This act of imposition, in turn, results in ‘a fight to the 
death between two beings that claim to be men, a fight for pure prestige carried for the sake 
of recognition by the adversary.’703 
 The notion of absolute negating-negativity is important for grasping why the fight 
for recognition is, initially, a fight to death. In the opening encounter, what is important for 
one party is the establishment of his/her objective reality through recognition from another. 
While it is the need for this recognition that initiates the fight, it is the same need that 
determines one’s dependence upon the other. Thus, Kojève explained that,  
[i]n the beginning, as long as he is not yet actually recognized by the 
other, it is the other that is the end of his action; it is on this other, it 
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is on recognition by this other, that [man’s] human value and reality 
depend; it is this other that the meaning of his life is condensed. 
Therefore, he is outside of himself. But his own value and his own 
reality are what are important to him, and he wants to have them in 
himself. Hence, he must overcome his other-being.704  
To put the process of recognition into order and perspective, the starting point for Kojève is 
human reality’s emergence from animal reality. This emergence is occasioned by risking 
one’s animal reality. The aim of this risk is to achieve recognition of one’s human reality 
from another. The concept of action underlies this aim. That is to say, one needs to transform 
the natural and/or the given world to achieve recognition. The first step towards this 
transformation is to impose oneself upon another. This imposition, in turn, reveals that one’s 
human reality is contingent upon another. The outcome of this contingency is that one 
becomes outside of oneself and needs to overcome this otherness in order to attain objective 
certainty. According to Kojève, this act of overcoming takes place in two steps.   
 The first step is to realise that human reality emerges from animal reality. Hence, 
Kojève noted that, while, 
[…] in the beginning [of the encounter,] he sees in the other only the 
aspect of an animal. To know that this aspect reveals a human reality, 
he must see that the other also wants to be recognised, and that he, 
too, is ready to risk, to deny, his animal life in a fight for the 
recognition of his human being-for-self.705  
The second step, therefore, is to provoke the other into starting the fight for pure prestige. 
However, ‘[…] having done this, he is obliged to kill the other in order not to be killed 
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himself.’706 Absolute negating-negativity corresponds to the killing of the other. Kojève 
followed Hegel’s thought in conceding that absolute negation (that is to say, the death of 
one of the parties in the fight) will do away with the truth that was supposed to issue from 
the fight.707 Therefore, the process of recognition must involve another form of negation as 
a result of which the subject can objectively ascertain his/her human reality. Hegel called 
this other form ‘negation coming from consciousness.’708 In Kojève’s reading, this negation 
is referred to as the dialectic overcoming of the above-mentioned otherness:  
[…] it does the man of the Fight no good to kill his adversary. He 
must overcome him dialectically. That is, he must leave him life and 
consciousness, and destroy only his autonomy. He must overcome 
the adversary only insofar as the adversary is opposed to him and 
acts against him. In other words, he must enslave him.709    
As opposed to absolute negation, dialectical overcoming will preserve the other that is 
overcome. However, such overcoming will also entail the enslavement of one of the parties.  
 Recognised reality is not yet achieved within the conditions of enslavement. 
According to Kojève ‘real and true man is the result of his inter-action with others; his I and 
the idea he has of himself are mediated by recognition obtained as a result of his action. And 
his true autonomy is the autonomy that he maintains in the social reality by the effort of that 
action.’710 At the stage corresponding to dialectical overcoming of the other, aforementioned 
mediation by recognition is not attained. In order to reach such mediation, Kojève 
incorporated the remaining part of the dialectic of lord and slave into his construction of 
human reality. This incorporation entails Kojève’s interpretation of respective positions of 
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the lord and the slave. According to him, the position of Hegel’s master is ‘an existential 
impasse.’711 The reason for this position is that, while lord enjoys mastery over slave, this 
enjoyment does not amount to the truth of independent consciousness since lord is 
recognised by slave — that is to say, by someone who is not recognised by lord. Therefore, 
slave’s recognition of lord remains insufficient and tragic for the latter.712  
 In stark contrast to the existential impasse of the lord, Kojève noted the following 
about the slave’s position:  
[t]he complete, absolutely free man, definitely and completely 
satisfied by what he is, the man who is perfected and completed in 
and by this satisfaction, will be the Slave who has overcome his 
Slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in contrast, 
is the source of all human, social, historical progress. History is the 
history of the working Slave.713 
Clearly, servile consciousness is the truth of independent consciousness because slave 
labours and it is the very act of labouring which generates human reality and historical 
progress. Therefore, Kojève argued that, 
[t]he future and History […] belong not to the warlike Master, who 
either dies or preserves himself indefinitely in identity to himself, 
but to the working Slave. The Slave, in transforming the given World 
by his work, transcends the given and what is given by that given in 
himself; hence, he goes beyond himself, and also goes beyond the 
Master who is tied to the given which, not working, he leaves intact. 
If the fear of death, incarnated for the Slave in the person of the 
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warlike Master, is the sine qua non of historical progress, it is solely 
the Slave’s work that realises and perfects it.714  
According to Kojève, slave acquires an attribute which drives the historical progress. This 
acquisition marks Kojève’s historical contextualisation of Hegel’s work. The first 
consequence of this contextualisation is that Kojève situated the dialectic of master and slave 
within his broader interpretation of man’s struggle against nature. Secondly, the historical 
contextualisation led Kojève to construe Hegel’s theory of recognition within the confines 
of a telos. 
 Consequent to reaching the conclusion that the slave’s labour drives historical 
progress, Kojève did not abandon the struggle between lordship and bondsman. Instead, he 
placed this struggle within man’s overall struggle against nature. In relation to Kojève’s 
anthropogenetic approach, man’s struggle against nature corresponds to the condition that 
persons have to overcome their animal desires to attain human reality. This condition lends 
itself to the notion that human reality is generated via the transformation of a given natural 
reality. According to Kojève, therefore, 
[…] universal history, the history of the interaction between men and 
of their interaction with Nature, is the history of the interaction 
between warlike Masters and working Slaves. Consequently, 
History stops at the moment when the difference, the opposition, 
between Master and Slave disappears […]715 
In Kojève’s reading, the opposition disappears when the synthesis of master and slave is 
achieved; this achievement consists of the inception of the ‘whole Man, the Citizen of the 
universal and homogenous State created by Napoleon.’716 Thus, incorporation of the 
dialectic of master and slave into the conception of history entails the sectioning of historical 
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evolution into three segments each of which are respectively determined by the existence of 
master, slave, and the ultimate overcoming of both.717 However, this ultimate overcoming 
marks the moment when history stops.  
 Kojève’s anthropogenetic approach located recognition at the centre of man’s 
creation as a free and historical subject who emerges from his animal reality and progresses 
into a human reality. Nevertheless, Kojève trapped this creation within the teleological end 
of the universal and the homogenous state.  In other words, the subject is if he/she is the 
citizen of the Napoleonic state. Therefore, the effect of the dialectic of master and slave upon 
the theory of recognition is to set the context in which coming-into-being of the subject is 
conditioned. This effect is problematic vis-à-vis the purpose I set at the outset of this chapter: 
How could one utilise Hegel’s theory of recognition on an ad hoc basis to account for the 
constitution of subjects under international law if the dialectic of master and slave sets a 
teleological limit upon its function? 
 My answer to this question is that it is possible to overcome such a limit. I present 
my answer in three steps. First, I show that underlying Kojève’s reference to the Napoleonic 
state is what Fredric Jameson called the ‘stereotypical struggle between the individual and 
society.’718 In other words, I demonstrate that Kojève’s idea of the termination of the 
struggle between master and slave is contingent upon the reconciliation of what Kojève 
portrayed as the struggle between the society and its individual members. Second, I 
introduce Fukuyama’s adoption of Kojève’s end-of-history thesis to draw comparisons 
between these authors’ approaches and clarify the manner in which such societal 
reconciliation may be achieved. Finally, I present Jameson’s challenge to Fukuyama’s work 
that such reconciliation never takes place within Hegel’s thought. I conclude that, relying 
                                               
717 Ibid, pp. 44, 45.  
718 Jameson F., The Hegelian Variations: On the Phenomenology of Spirit, (London: Verso, 2010) p.78. 
   224
upon Jameson’s work, one can begin to overcome the teleological limit exerted upon the 
theory of recognition through Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s philosophy.  
 
1.3. Reconciliation Between the Society and the Individual 
 According to Kojève, the struggle between master and slave develops into a struggle 
between society and the individual. The reason for this development is given in different 
human values master and slave respectively constitute. In relation to the value master 
creates, Kojève noted the following.  
The Master constitutes his human value in and by the risk of his life 
[…] The human value constituted by the Fight [to death in risking 
one’s life] is essentially universal, “impersonal.” And that is why the 
Masters’ State, which recognises a man only to the extent that this 
man risks his life for the State in a war for prestige, recognises only 
the purely universal element in man, in the citizen.719 
Whereas, the human value created by the working slave’s existence is particular:  
Bildung, the educative formation of Worker by Work, depends on 
the concrete conditions in which the work is carried out, conditions 
that vary in space and are modified in time as a function of this very 
work. Therefore it is by Work, finally, that the differences between 
men are established, that the “particularities,” the “personalities,” 
are formed.720 
The synthesis which overcomes both the master and the slave, and terminates the struggle 
between them is, thus, the synthesis of the universal and the particular elements of human 
values.  
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 Underlying Kojève’s insistence that Napoleon’s state marks the end of history is the 
belief that this state offers the means by which the aforementioned synthesis takes place. 
Two moments of recognition are relevant to this synthesis. The first is the recognition of 
individuals’ particularity by all — and ‘by all’ here refers to ‘Universality incarnated in the 
State.’721 The second recognition comes from the Particular wherein individuals recognise 
the ‘universal value of the State.’722 Hence, it is mutual recognition or reconciliation between 
individuals and the state (or society) which brings an end to the struggle between master and 
slave. By adopting Kojève’s end-of-history thesis, Francis Fukuyama merely changed the 
focus upon the historical epoch — as his arguments are premised upon the liberal democratic 
state — but retained the same conclusions.  
 Central to Fukuyama’s thesis is the concept of rational recognition which he defined 
as ‘recognition on a universal basis in which the dignity of each person as a free and 
autonomous human being is recognised by all.’723 Following Kojève, Fukuyama associated 
this form of recognition with the resolution of the ‘internal conflict of the master-slave 
relationship.’724 While it is the resolution of this conflict that marks the end of history, 
Fukuyama’s claim was that such resolution is achieved within the liberal state; thus, ‘[t]he 
liberal state […] is rational because it reconciles […] competing demands of recognition on 
the only mutually acceptable basis possible, that is, on the basis of the individual’s identity 
as a human being.’725  
 According to Fukuyama, recognition of individuals as human beings underlies the 
universal and homogenous aspect of the liberal state. Thus, Fukuyama argued that,  
[t]he liberal state must be universal, that is, grant recognition to all 
citizens because they are human beings, and not because they are 
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members of some particular national, ethnic, or racial group. And it 
must be homogenous insofar as it creates a classless society based 
on the abolition of the distinction between masters and slaves.726  
In Fukuyama’s perspective, the means by which the liberal state achieves this abolition is 
the establishment of popular self-government: 
Popular self-government abolishes the distinction between masters 
and slaves; everyone is entitled to at least some share in the role of 
master. Mastery now takes the form of promulgation of 
democratically determined laws, that is, sets of universal rules by 
which man self-consciously masters himself. Recognition becomes 
reciprocal when the state and the people recognise each other, that 
is, when the state grants its citizens rights and when citizens agree to 
abide by the state’s laws.727 
Similar to Kojève’s above-considered approach, Fukuyama placed reciprocal recognition at 
the very centre of the coming-into-being of the citizens as subjects. In similar vein, his 
formulation of the modern liberal democracy as the universal and homogenous state 
contributes to the problem I identified above vis-à-vis my approach to use recognition on an 
ad hoc basis.  
 In both Kojève’s and Fukuyama’s separate utilisations of the theory of recognition, 
the dialectic of master and slave provides the ultimate context in which reciprocal 
recognition is achieved. Such context is set by a final act that, as these authors claimed, 
reconciles the dialectical struggle. I explained above that, for the utilisation of Hegel’s 
theory to account for the constitution of subjects under international law, such teleological 
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contextualisation constitutes a significant restriction. In order to overcome this constraint, I 
take into account Fredric Jameson’s critique of the end-of-history thesis.   
 At the centre of my attention is Jameson’s book The Hegel Variations wherein the 
author provided a concise interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology. For the purposes of this 
section, the relevance of Jameson’s work lies in the author’s rejection, at the outset of the 
book, of the teleological perception of the notion of Absolute Spirit.728 This rejection sets 
Jameson’s interpretation apart from Kojève’s and Fukuyama’s above-considered 
approaches. Therefore, in what follows, I rely on the Jameson’s work to problematise the 
teleological aspects of the latter authors’ historical contextualisation of Hegel’s theory of 
recognition. Two notions — class struggle and reconciliation — are key to this 
problematisation. In what follows, I present Jameson’s critical engagement with these 
notions and move on to suggest ways in which the dialectic’s restrictive effect upon the 
theory of recognition can be overcome.   
 As we observed above in relation to Fukuyama’s work, class struggle ceases to exist 
within the liberal democratic state. Termination of this struggle, in Fukuyama’s perspective, 
is derived from the reconciliation of the struggle between master and slave. In his attempt to 
argue that Hegel’s thought, as presented in the Phenomenology, does not comprise a closed 
system with a specific telos, Jameson contested the idea that class struggle does effectively 
come to an end within the liberal democratic state. He distinguished between two forms of 
class struggle. These are socio-cultural and economic forms. Based on this distinction, 
Jameson argued that while Kojève foretold an end to history with the realisation of the 
universal and homogenous state, this foretelling can only be associated with the emergence 
of a classless society ‘only if “class” is grasped as a purely social concept and redefined 
around the notion of recognition.’729  
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 Jameson identified the social concept of class struggle as a mass cultural 
mentality.730 He explained that a new socio-cultural form emerged with the disappearance 
of the feudal aristocracy in Europe and that this form was democratic ‘not so much in the 
sense in which each individual is henceforth recognised but rather by virtue of that demand 
of each subject for equal recognition and that egalitarian hatred of special privileges […]’731 
In other words, to the extent that liberal democratic states accommodate individuals’ 
demands for equal recognition, the struggle for the attainment of a certain level of social-
class is resolved. However, in Jameson’s perspective, this resolution should not be attributed 
to the termination of class struggles at the economical level ‘or  [to] the emergence of some 
new kind of radical-democratic impulse on the political level.’732 The possibility of the 
continuation of the class struggle at the economic or political level is, thus, a formidable 
charge against Fukuyama’s use of the notion of a classless society.  
  Nevertheless, the distinction between the economic and socio-cultural aspects of 
class struggle is not unnoticed in Fukuyama’s work. Fukuyama argued that the universal and 
homogenous state rests on two pillars; while the first of these pillars is the struggle for 
recognition, the second pillar consists of economics.733 Recognition of the economic aspect 
of the struggle, however, does not dispel the aforementioned possibility of the continuation 
of the class struggle. In this regard, Fukuyama provided a self-defeating reason by 
considering capitalism as the appropriate form of economics that befits the second pillar.734 
The suitability of capitalism is premised upon its provision of necessary economic 
development which ‘demonstrates to the slave the concept of master, as he discovers he can 
master nature through technology, and master himself as well through the discipline of work 
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and education.’735 As a consequence of better education of societies, Fukuyama explained 
that ‘[o]ld class barriers are broken down in favour of a general condition of equality of 
opportunity.’736 Albeit, this type of opportunity may fall short of meeting Jameson’s charge 
that there may not be an end to class struggle. In this regard, Fukuyama conceded that due 
to economic status or education, new classes will emerge.737   
 In Fukuyama’s perspective, reconciliation of the struggle between lordship and 
bondsman marks the end of the class struggle. However, in light of Fukuyama’s 
aforementioned conceder and Jameson’s distinction between two types of classes, doubts 
may be raised as to the viability of such reconciliation. These doubts can be extended to 
cover Kojève’s work too. This extension can be achieved by taking into account Jameson’s 
contention against the utilisation of the idea of reconciliation ‘in terms of the stereotypical 
struggle between the individual and society.’738 In what follows, I examine whether Hegel 
intended reconciliation — as read by Kojève and Fukuyama — to comprise the ultimate 
object of the dialectic between master and slave. I rely upon Jameson’s interpretation of 
Hegel’s notion of society to argue that such reconciliation never takes place in Hegel’s 
thought. This argument paves the way for dismissing the teleological repercussions of the 
dialectic upon the theory of recognition.  
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1.4. Antigone’s Intervention 
 According to Jameson, the idea of reconciliation is commonly derived from 
interpreting Hegel’s notion of the experience of Spirit.739 As we saw in the previous chapter, 
this experience comprises the process of Recognition.740 In Hegel’s words, this process 
consists of ‘the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their 
opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.’741 
In Jameson opinion, to formulate this process as the reconciliation of the subject’s 
individuality with the universal would be ‘a starkly oversimplified formula with which it 
would be best to remain unsatisfied.’742 The cause of Jameson’s dissatisfaction is the 
association of Hegel’s idea of the We ‘with some reified entity imagined to be the social 
totality.’743 In Fukuyama’s thought this reified entity appears to be the universal liberal state 
which reconciles competing demands of recognition.744 Jameson’s contention against 
relying on the notion of society as the locus of reconciliation is based upon identifying  a 
notion other than the society as the universal.745 The reason for this contention, Jameson 
stressed, is that Hegel’s thoughts on Sophocles’ Antigone testifies to a certain irreconcilable 
singularity which not only distinctly contrasts with any notion of societal reconciliation but 
also renders a teleological reification impossible.746  
  In what follows, I analyse Hegel’s engagement with Sophocles’ Antigone to 
establish the impossibility of Kojève’s (and consequently Fukuyama’s) teleological 
reification.747 The purpose of establishing this impossibility is to overcome the restrictive 
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repercussions of the dialectic of master and slave upon the theory of recognition. In order to 
achieve this purpose, firstly, I introduce the main elements of Hegel’s reading of Antigone. 
At the outset, these elements comprise the conflict of two ethical powers — those of the 
state and the family — represented by the characters of Creon and Antigone. Secondly, I 
take into account contrasting interpretations from Judith Butler and Frederic Jameson of the 
end result of this conflict. By distinguishing the latter’s view from that of the former, I 
differentiate between an approach which complies with Kojève’s teleological reification and 
another which circumvents it. 
 Hegel offered a sustained engagement with Sophocles’ above-mentioned play in his 
Aesthetics.748 The context of this engagement is the former’s study of Greek tragedy as a 
genre of dramatic poetry. According to Hegel, the setting for Greek tragedy is the heroic 
age; this is an age in which ‘the universal ethical powers have not been explicitly fixed as 
either the law of the land or as moral precepts and duties.’749 Hegel noted that in the absence 
of such fixedness, Greek tragedy presented a variety of ethical powers ‘in original freshness 
as the gods who either oppose one another in their own activity or appear themselves as the 
living heart of free human individual.’750 In relation to the characters of Greek tragedy, such 
ethical ordering manifested itself as the individual pathos which compelled the protagonists 
into conflictual opposition with each other.751 Hegel explained that, 
[t]he individuals animated by this pathos are not what we call 
characters in the modern sense of the word, but neither are they mere 
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abstractions. They occupy a vital central position between both, 
because they are firm figures who simply are what they are, without 
any hesitating recognition of someone else’s pathos, and therefore 
[…] lofty, absolutely determinate individuals, although this 
determinacy of theirs is based on and is representative of a particular 
ethical power.752  
According to Hegel, in Antigone, Sophocles presented tragedy’s major conflict which ‘is 
that between the state, i.e. ethical life in its spiritual universality, and the family, i.e. natural 
ethical life.’753 While Creon, who, in Hegel’s words, ‘honours Zeus alone, the dominating 
power over public life and social welfare,’ presents the former ethical power; Antigone, 
‘who honours the bond of kinship, the gods of the underworld,’ presents the latter.754 Hegel 
consistently extended this ethical allusion to Antigone in the Philosophy of Right as well as 
the Phenomenology of Spirit. In the latter, he relied on Antigone’s definition of tacit and 
unerring laws of the gods: ‘They are not of yesterday or today, but everlasting/Though where 
they came from, none of us can tell.’755 Hegel referred to the section of the play where 
Antigone revealed to Creon that she broke the king’s decree by burying Polynices. In this 
section, Antigone asserted that, by doing so, she was complying with justice which is 
associated with ‘gods dwelling beneath the earth,’ ‘the great unwritten, unshakable 
traditions’ as opposed to Creon’s (who Antigone calls ‘a mere mortal’) edict which lacks 
any force to override laws ordained by gods.756 
 In the Phenomenology, Hegel’s explicit reference to Antigone’s definition of the law 
of gods precedes the section on ethical world where Hegel considered the confrontational 
ethical powers of Human and Divine laws. In this section, Hegel eschewed overt allusion to 
                                               
752 Ibid, pp.1209, 1210. 
753 Ibid, p.1213. 
754 Ibid.  
755 Hegel (1977) op. cit. at §437, p.261. 
756 Sophocles, op. cit. at p.82.   
   233
Sophocles’ play; however, his definition of the laws resembled the above-mentioned 
character-study he presented in the Aesthetics. Therefore, Human law corresponds to the 
ethical power of the State (i.e. the actual ethical community); whereas, this power finds its 
antithesis in the Divine law at the centre of which is the Family as the natural ethical 
community.757 In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel was less covert about the Antigone 
connection when he offered remarks on the difference of sexes. In his perspective, man ‘has 
his actual substantial life in the state;’ whereas, woman ‘has her substantial vocation in the 
family, and her ethical disposition consists in this piety.’758 According to Hegel, Sophocles 
presented this piety in Antigone as  
[…] primarily to be the law of woman, […] the emotive and 
subjective substantiality […] as the law of the ancient gods and of 
the chthonic realm as eternal law of which no one knows whence it 
came, and in opposition to the public law, the law of the state —  an 
opposition of the highest order in ethics and therefore in tragedy and 
one which is individualised in femininity and masculinity in the 
same play.759 
Therefore, throughout his engagement with and allusions to Antigone, Hegel laid the 
emphasis upon the conflictual opposition of ethical powers as embodied within the 
individual pathos of Creon and Antigone. These conflicting powers were presented by Hegel 
as several dichotomies: universal/natural ethics, state/family, human/divine, public/eternal 
law, and, finally, as shown in the above indented quote, law of masculinity/femininity.  
 Following this brief introduction to Hegel’s interpretation of Antigone, I shift my 
attention to the conflictual opposition of ethical powers and evaluate the repercussions of 
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this opposition on Kojève’s and Fukuyama’s end-of-history theses. The evaluation takes into 
account the question on the perpetuity of the opposition between ethical powers. In order to 
answer this question, I consider two separate analyses of Hegel’s reading of Antigone. The 
first of these analyses is from Judith Butler who is critical of Hegel’s confinement of 
Antigone to roles inside the realm of divine or eternal laws. Butler’s perspective is 
suggestive of the termination of the ethical opposition to the benefit of the public law of the 
state. I contrast this perspective with Frederic Jameson’s reading wherein the perpetuity of 
the opposition is not only affirmed but is also interpreted to apply to and therefore perpetuate 
societal conflicts — conflicts which Kojève and Fukuyama hastened to conclude with a 
certain reconciliation.  
 In Antigone’s Claim, Butler provided an analysis of Hegel’s take on Antigone 
wherein the former criticised the latter for helping ‘to usher [Antigone] off [the] stage into 
her living tomb.’760 Central to Butler’s critical approach to Hegel’s reading is the way in 
which the latter developed the opposition between the laws of the state and of the gods. 
Butler demonstrated that in this development Antigone’s stance is transformed into the 
unconscious and the nonexisting aspects of public law.761 This transformation, Butler 
argued, comprised not an ethical opposition as Hegel claimed to exist between two 
conflicting ethical powers but Antigone’s surrender to the laws of the state. The possibility 
of such a surrender ostensibly supports Kojève’s thesis that there may be a teleological end 
to the conflict between master and slave.  
 Butler’s notion of the unconscious and the nonexisting emerges from her assessment 
of the position Antigone is deemed by Hegel to occupy against public law. Expanding upon 
Hegel’s distinction between public and eternal laws (i.e. the laws of the state and the divine 
law), Butler noted that, ‘the one who acts according to the law, where the law is always 
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either human or divine but not both, is always blind to the law that is disobeyed at that 
instant.’762 Therefore, with her attempt to obey the laws ordained by gods, Antigone stakes 
a claim which renders her blind to human/public law. Butler demonstrated that for Hegel, 
Antigone’s claim as an ‘act that grounds itself in a law that counts as no law within the realm 
of [public] law’ constitutes her as the unconscious, or the nonexisting.763 Therefore, the 
former questioned whether the law Antigone is obedient to is to be considered as ‘law 
beyond law, beyond conceptualisation, which makes her act and her defence in speech 
appear as nothing other than a breaking of law, a law that emerges as the breaking of law;’ 
or whether ‘this is a law that defies conceptualisation and that stands as an epistemic scandal 
within the realm of [public] law.’764  
 In light of these questions, Butler’s suggestion is that for Hegel ‘[Antigone’s law] is 
a legality of what does not exist and of what is unconscious, not a law of the unconscious 
but some form of demand that the unconscious necessarily makes on law, that which marks 
the limit and condition of law’s generalisability.’765 Therefore, instead of what Hegel 
initially expressed as conflictual opposition between two ethical powers, Butler’s reading of 
Antigone’s position reveals the role of this tragic character only as a limit on the general 
application of public law. The view that this limit may not be read as conflictual opposition 
is suggested by Butler in her expression that ‘[Antigone] exists for Hegel at the limit of the 
publicly knowable and codifiable.’766 Butler reached this conclusion by probing Hegel’s 
emphasis on Antigone’s statement about the everlasting aspect of law of gods whose origins 
cannot be known.767 Concerned with unambiguously identifying these laws which Hegel 
considered as unwritten Butler posed the following question:  
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[i]ndeed, what kind of law would it be? A law for which no origin 
can be found, a law whose trace can take no form, whose authority 
is not directly communicable through written language.768 
The irrecoverability of the laws Antigone refers to ostensibly enhances the character’s status 
as the unconscious aspect of the public law. This aspect is the reason why Butler interpreted 
the position of the character as being at the limit of — and, therefore, not quite in conflictual 
opposition to — public law and what may be publicly intelligible.   
 Another aspect of Hegel’s approach to Antigone which Butler read as starkly 
contrasting with the idea of opposition between ethical powers is the former’s interpretation 
of Antigone as representing kinship in her conflict with Creon who, in turn, represented the 
state. In this regard Butler explained that  
[Hegel] insists that the conflict between them is one in which kinship 
must give way to state authority as the final arbiter of justice. In other 
words, Antigone figures the threshold between kinship and the state, 
a transition in the Phenomenology that is not precisely Aufhebung, 
for Antigone is surpassed without ever being preserved when ethical 
order emerges.769  
The idea that as representing kinship Antigone is to yield to state authority contributes to 
Butler’s doubt regarding the existence of ethical opposition between the two tragic 
characters of the play. Butler contrasted Antigone’s surrender to state authority with Hegel’s 
notion of sublation and suggested that Antigone’s eclipse by the state authority does not take 
place within Hegel’s usual formula of sublation where the sublated entity is not wholly 
obliterated but preserved. One may draw two possible conclusions from Butler’s suggestion. 
First of these is that, Hegel’s notion of Aufhebung (i.e. sublation) does consist of some form 
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of opposition. Second, if Antigone is indeed eclipsed by the state and hence furtherance of 
the opposition between ethical powers is obliterated, such a result may lend support to 
Kojève’s (and consequently Fukuyama’s) thesis that the emergence of the universal and 
homogenous state signals the end of history.  
 Butler’s interpretation, therefore, does not rule the notion of Aufhebung out as a 
source of conflict or struggle within Hegel’s thought. Kojève did rely on this notion at a 
certain stage of his interpretation of Hegel’s thought, nevertheless, the former did not read 
Aufhebung to engender perpetual opposition. Kojève referred to this notion when he 
commented upon the notion of dialectical negation in relation to the life and death struggle 
of two consciousnesses. However, in Kojève’s perspective, the purpose of this negation was 
limited to the role of sustaining the lives of the parties involved in the struggle. This limit is 
discernible from Kojève’s failure to consider Aufhebung (sublation or dialectical negation) 
as a pervasive element of Hegel’s philosophy. Instead, the former’s focus remained upon 
historicising, and, in order to do so, reconciling the struggle between master and slave 
without paying much attention to the dialectical factor of this struggle, that is to say, the 
continuity of Aufhebung within the development of the relation between lord and bondsman.  
 The perpetual pervasiveness of sublation emerges from Jameson’s reading of 
Hegel’s thoughts on Antigone. Jameson’s interpretation differs from that of Butler on one 
essential point upon which he construed the aforementioned perpetuity. Jameson is of the 
conviction that Hegel attached equal significance to both Antigone and Creon.770 This 
conviction contrasts with Butler’s view that Hegel helped to usher off and thereby surpass 
Antigone without preserving any of the ethical values this character presented in the play. 
Fundamental to Jameson’s insistence upon the attachment of equal value to each ethical 
position is the notion that, dissimilar to Butler’s view, there is no end to the opposition 
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between Antigone and Creon. In order to highlight this notion, Jameson drew attention to 
the tragic aspect of the play.      
 Thus, central to Jameson’s interpretation of Hegel’s thoughts on Antigone is the 
tragic aspect of the play which is manifest not only in the banishment of Antigone into the 
live tomb but also in the loss of family members Creon suffers as a result of his decision to 
banish Antigone. Hegel’s thoughts, as presented in his Aesthetics, on the characters of Greek 
tragedy may be quoted in support of Jameson’s belief that there is no end to the opposition 
between the characters. Remarking upon the individual pathos which impel characters into 
conflict with each other, Hegel wrote about a ‘collusion of equally justified powers and 
individuals.’771 More significantly, the equality of Antigone and Creon is ostensibly retained 
in the Phenomenology, where human and divine laws emerge as distinct ethical substances 
into which Spirit, as ethical order, is divided.772 Furthermore, echoing the conclusion of 
Sophocles’ play, Hegel contemplated that the opposition between these substances will 
destroy the ethical order.773  
 Jameson read this destruction as ‘the mortality of social forms’ whereby society is 
initially brought into being by the opposition which later tears it apart.774 Jameson defined 
this dialectical process as a ‘process of flux and perpetual transformation and fission.’775 
The perpetually transformative aspect of the dialectic, in turn, underlies the notion of 
irreconcilable singularity. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Jameson employed this 
notion to contest the idea of societal reconciliation noting that ‘Antigone testifies to the 
existence of problems that cannot be solved, and as such utterly invalidates the myth of 
Hegel as a teleological thinker.’776 In other words, by drawing upon Hegel’s reading of 
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Antigone, Jameson dismissed the central tenet of Fukuyama’s utilisation of Kojève’s thesis 
on the end of history. The societal resolution which is supposed to be attained as an outcome 
of the cessation of the struggle between master and slave is, therefore, a misconception.  
  
1.5. Conclusion 
 In the previous chapter I introduced Hegel’s theory of recognition as presented in the 
latter’s Phenomenology of Spirit. I showed that this theory was situated within Hegel’s 
account of consciousness’ transformation into a self-conscious subject. In other words, the 
context of recognition was comprised by cognition’s elevation to scientific truth of absolute 
knowledge. I referred to respective works of Honneth, Taylor, and Douzinas to demonstrate 
that the theory can be abstracted from this context to account for the constitution of different 
forms of subjects. However, I identified a problem vis-à-vis these authors’ transient 
engagement with the dialectic of lordship and bondsman. Neither of the authors ostensibly 
considered the effects of dialectic to have traceable effects upon the theory of recognition. 
This problematic informed the purpose of this chapter.  
  Therefore, in the first part of this chapter, I referred to Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s 
thought to present an account of human reality that placed the struggle between lord and 
bondsman at its centre. This placement, in turn, provided the opportunity to assess whether 
the dialectic had any residual effects upon the act of recognition. I identified two effects. 
The first was the historical contextualisation of the process of recognition. The second was 
the teleological perception of this historicism which understood recognition as a progress 
aimed towards the attainment of the universal and the homogenous state. In order to 
circumvent the limiting effects of the dialectic of master and slave, I relied upon Jameson’s 
assessment that a particular notion of reconciliation underlay Kojève and Fukuyama’s 
respective theses on the end-of-history. Jameson contested the idea of a reified social totality 
in Hegel’s thought by referring to the latter’s interpretation of Antigone. In Jameson’s 
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perspective, Hegel’s take on the tragic aspect of the play marked the mortality of social 
forms. Therefore, neither the Napoleonic state nor the liberal democratic state could amount 
to a reified totality in which the struggle between master and slave ceases. 
 Insofar as Jameson identified the dialectical process as continuous moments of 
constant change, his perception of social forms dismisses one particular type of telos for the 
act of recognition, but it does not elucidate whether this act would culminate in any other 
form of ultimate objective. In other words, the process of recognition did not stop at 
Napoleon’s state as history moved on from that particular type of societal form. In addition, 
the class struggle, which is associated with the struggle between lord and bondsman, did not 
cease to exist. Jameson’s focus, therefore, remained upon dismissing the end-result of the 
process. This result-oriented focus can be justified with reference to Jameson’s overall 
attention to the notion of class struggle. In his book The Hegel Variations, Jameson’s 
principal concern was whether the Hegelian struggle for recognition can illuminate classic 
forms of class struggle.777 Following this concern, Jameson thematised the master and slave 
saga as a class struggle which, in light of the above-mentioned incompleteness, would 
eventually coincide with the struggle for recognition.778 Compared to Jameson’s approach, 
my main aim lies in the constitutive potential of the notion of recognition for the coming-
into-being of subjects. To a certain extent Jameson rescued this notion from the teleological 
bounds of the resolution of the struggle between master and slave by arguing that the 
Hegelian dialectic is a perpetual process. Furthermore, Jameson noted that Hegel’s 
watchword in this regard was negativity.779 However, he offered neither a detailed analysis 
of this watchword nor an explanation of how the word may bring about this perpetuity.  
 In the next part of this chapter, I argue that the perpetual flux pertains not only to 
Hegel’s notion of society but to the very process of recognition. The purpose of this 
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argument is twofold. Firstly, it establishes the process of recognition as a continuous flow 
of transformative movements. These movements, in turn, defy any general telos and render 
extraction of recognition from the context of the Phenomenology less problematic. 
Secondly, understanding recognition as ceaseless movements of alteration and change 
provides an insight into the type of subject produced by these movements. In stark contrast 
to Kojève’s citizen of the Napoleonic state, the primary feature of this subject is that it is not 
complete-in-itself, that its determination is contingent upon subject’s ongoing relations with 
its others.   
 
Part Two 
2.1. Introduction 
 In this part of the chapter, I rely upon Jean-Luc Nancy’s work to argue that the above-
mentioned perpetual flux pertains to Hegel’s theory of recognition. The primary reference 
for this argument is Nancy’s book entitled Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative wherein 
Nancy contemplated Hegel’s notions of negativity and self.780 By grasping negativity as 
restless, Nancy presented the idea of self not only as constitutively dependent upon its 
relations with others but also as something that is constantly redefined by these relations. In 
the overall scheme of my thesis, the significance of Nancy’s conception of self is twofold. 
Firstly, this conception overcomes the teleological constraints Kojève’s interpretation levied 
upon Hegel’s theory of recognition. Hence, it opens the way for the utilisation of this theory 
to account for the constitution of subjects under international law. Secondly, insofar as 
Nancy’s conception highlights recognition as a constitutive imperative, it does also provide 
an enriched understanding of the subject. Later in the thesis, I use this improved perception 
to return to my critique of the prevalent theories of recognition and the concept of statehood.  
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 However, to begin at the beginning, a detour into Hegel’s preface to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit is necessary as Nancy drew extensively upon this preface to 
elucidate the conceptual features of negativity and self.  Therefore, I begin this part of the 
chapter by introducing the preface. This introduction focuses upon Hegel’s preliminary 
explanation of the relation between notions of Truth, Absolute, and Spirit. An important 
aspect of the relation between Truth and Absolute is that the latter has the ability to attain 
the former. Hegel endowed the Absolute with this capability by defining Absolute as both 
Substance and Subject. I pointed out in the introduction to this chapter that, this definition 
underlies the scientific system of truth presented in the Phenomenology. As Subject, 
Absolute acquires the power of the negative, that is to say, it acquires the power to know 
itself. To the extent that this acquisition underlay the cognitive turn in Hegel’s thought, it 
also provided Hegel with the opportunity to explain the manner in which negativity 
functioned forcing Absolute through several stages of the Spirit. My brief introduction to 
Hegel’s preface to the Phenomenology, therefore, outlines the progress of Absolute as 
Subject through the stages of immediate intuition, Understanding, and Spirit as absolute 
knowledge.  
 The purpose of the second section of this part is to present Nancy’s conception of 
self as restless negative. To achieve this purpose, first, I demonstrate the manner in which 
Nancy interpreted restlessness as the essential feature of negativity and derived this 
characteristic from Absolute’s ability, as Subject, to conceive itself. Then, I show that Nancy 
relied upon Hegel’s formulation of the notion of Absolute as Subject to incorporate the idea 
of restlessness into the very constitution of the self. The conception of self as restless 
negative, in turn, achieves two goals. First, this conception defies any ultimate purpose; self 
is restless and, as such, neither does it begin nor end. Second, self is therefore defined as 
always becoming, hence, always in relation with others — relations which constantly 
determine the very being of both parties involved.  
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2.2. Hegel’s Preface to the Phenomenology 
  The preface to the Phenomenology consists of the preparatory remarks on the 
connections between the notions of Truth, Absolute, and Spirit. Therein, Hegel concerned 
himself with the subject-matter of philosophical expounding of truth. His argument was that 
philosophy explains truth through actual cognition of the processes which make up the 
whole.781 Through such cognition, Hegel wrote that, philosophy ‘can lay aside the title of 
‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowing.’782 To attain such actualisation of knowledge, 
Hegel explained that ‘[t]he true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system 
of such truth.’783 Scientific systematisation of truth would not only ‘bring philosophy closer 
to the form of Science’ but it would also mean that ‘truth has only the Notion [Concept] as 
the element of its existence.’784 Therefore, in what follows, I briefly introduce Hegel’s 
exposition of Absolute as the notion which achieves such scientific systematisation of truth. 
 The starting point is to grasp Hegel’s usage of the term Concept and understand the 
manner in which this term leads to the division of Absolute into Substance and Subject. 
Next, I trace Absolute’s movements as Subject towards the attainment of Truth. These 
movements, in turn, reveal the very nature of Absolute as Spirit. This nature consists of 
Absolute’s use of the power of negative to form oppositions and supersede these oppositions. 
As we observed in the previous chapter, such progressive movements form the basis of 
consciousness’ development (through notions of sense-certainty and understanding) to self-
consciousness (via notions of desire and mutual recognition). However, the preface sheds a 
different light on this process by revealing that it culminates in the manifestation of the 
Substance as Subject. This manifestation marks the very structural feature of Absolute, and, 
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as such, it also brings to the fore the notion of negative which enables such a feature to be 
acquired in the first place.  
 In A Hegel Dictionary, Inwood explained that ‘[t]he noun Begriff means both 
‘concept’ and ‘conception’, especially in the sense of ‘ability to conceive.’’785 Therefore, to 
state that truth exists as concept is to suggest that truth can be mentally grasped or 
comprehended. Hegel contrasted the idea of grasping the whole with the idea of intuition 
wherein truth exists as divine substance, as God, which manifests itself as ‘intuition’ or 
‘immediate knowledge of the Absolute, religion or being.’ 786 Hegel argued that such 
intuition rejects the idea that truth can be comprehended; instead, the Absolute is ‘to be felt 
and intuited’ wherein ‘the differentiations of the [Concept]’ are suppressed and ‘the feeling 
of essential being’ is restored.787  Hegel was of the opinion that intuition of the Absolute can 
only provide edification, which he described as ‘[wanting] to shroud in a mist the manifold 
variety of [one’s] earthly existence and of thought, in order to pursue the indeterminate 
enjoyment of this indeterminate divinity.’788 According to Hegel, Science demanded insight; 
therefore, mere edification of intuitive Absolute did not befit Science.789 Therein lay the 
need for Hegel to set on a philosophical expounding of a scientific system of truth in the 
Phenomenology.  
 Hegel took the first step in this exposition by departing from what he regarded as 
monochromatic formalism of contemporary science.790 This formalism consists of applying 
a ‘single inert form to whatever [the knowing subject] encounters, and dipping the 
[encountered] material into this placid element from outside.’791 What Hegel referred to as 
the placid element is the universal Idea; the application of this formula comprises the 
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cognition of universal Idea in everything regardless of the distinct and determinate aspects 
of each encountered material.792 While through this formalism contemporary science 
‘display[s] a great expanse of [content],’ Hegel remarked that this is ‘merely a boring show 
of diversity.’793 There are three reasons for the tediousness of this diversity.  
 Firstly, the monochromatic formalism consists of ‘the shapeless repetition of one and 
the same formula.’794 The universal Idea is externally applied to diverse material, and this 
external application renders it shapeless. In other words, because it is regarded as external, 
one cannot conceive of a universal Idea which can spontaneously assume different shapes 
of materials on its own accord. Therefore, a shapeless universal cannot quite account for the 
differentiation of the actual material. Secondly, through the external application of the same 
formula one ‘only arrives at the differentiation of [the encountered] material since this has 
been already provided and is by now familiar.’795 In other words, what is really arrived at is 
not actual differentiation but the cognition of the same (and therefore, familiar) universal 
Idea in everything. Finally, the shapeless repetition and external provision of this formula 
entails that the universal Idea consists of a non-actual form, which, according to Hegel, 
amounts to ‘the undoing of all distinct, determinate entities.’796  
 The major issue, for Hegel, was the interpretation of this shapeless, externally 
provided, familiar and non-actual formalism as the Absolute. The problematic aspect of this 
interpretation is that any notion of universality, which is to result from a shapeless and non-
actual form and is to be attributed to the Absolute, can only remain abstract.797 Hegel 
explained the scientific repercussions of attributing abstract universality to the Absolute in 
the following passage: 
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[d]ealing with something from the perspective of the Absolute 
consists merely in declaring that, although one has been speaking of 
it just now as something definite, yet in the Absolute, the A=A, there 
is nothing of the kind, for there all is one. To pit this single insight, 
that in the Absolute everything is the same, against the full body of 
articulated cognition, which at least seeks and demands such 
fulfilment, to palm off its Absolute as the night in which, as the 
saying goes, all cows are black — this is cognition naïvely reduced 
to vacuity.798  
It is in light of this cognitive reduction that Hegel departed from the perception of truth as 
substantial knowledge — that is to say, the immediate (or intuitive) knowledge of the 
Absolute or perception of God as one Substance.   
 Against this problematic reduction, Hegel presented the solution of ‘grasping and 
expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.’799 If the True was to 
remain solely as Substance, universality in itself (i.e. thought as thought) would amount to 
the very same simplicity of undifferentiated, and unmoved substance.800 Hegel added that, 
even if ‘thought does unite itself with the being of Substance, and apprehends immediacy or 
intuition as thinking, the question is still whether this intellectual intuition does not again 
fall back into inert simplicity, and does not depict actuality itself in a non-actual manner.’801 
To break with this inert simplicity, the True must also be capable of actualising itself; by 
grasping True as Subject, Hegel provided the means for this capability. 
 Hegel explained that, Subject is ‘pure, simple negativity, and is for this very reason 
the bifurcation of the simple.’802 As pure negativity, the Subject  
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is the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation 
of this indifferent diversity and of its anti-thesis (the immediate 
simplicity). Only this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in 
otherness within itself — not an original or immediate unity as such 
— is the True. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that 
presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; 
and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual.803  
The significance of the Subject is not limited to its pure negativity. With the introduction of 
the Subject, Hegel effected a cognitive turn which enabled him to comprehend Absolute. 
Therefore, in his view, Absolute was no longer to be regarded as God as one Substance or 
as an immediate unity the intuitive knowledge of which led to abstract universality. Such 
Absolute exists only in essence (that is to say, exists only in itself) and therefore, cannot 
attain an actual form. Whereas, according to Hegel, ‘[t]hat the True is actual only as system, 
or that Substance is essentially Subject, is expressed in the representation of the Absolute as 
Spirit.’804  
 Hegel explained that Spirit is Substance to the extent that it is essence which has 
being in itself; however, in addition to this, Spirit is also Subject which relates itself to itself 
thereby becoming determinate, or in other words, existing for itself.805 Hence, ‘[t]he spiritual 
alone is actual.’806 To regard Absolute as Spirit circumvents the problematic aspect of 
regarding God as one Substance. In the latter perspective, Absolute consisted of abstract 
universality; and hence, it had to be intuited. In The Hegel Dictionary, Magee noted that 
‘Spirit refers to the unique form of consciousness possessed by human beings. Unlike all 
other animals, human beings are capable of self-consciousness or self-awareness: we are the 
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beings who are able to know ourselves.’807 As Spirit, Absolute circumvents the problem of 
abstract universality by attaining actuality. More significantly, taking into account Spirit’s 
attribute of self-awareness, Absolute becomes comprehensible. This comprehensibility 
corresponds to Hegel’s aim to bring philosophy closer to the form of Science by rendering 
it actual knowing.   
 In order to achieve this self-awareness, Hegel explained that, the Spirit must mature 
into that which knows itself as Spirit; such knowledge corresponds to Spirit recognising the 
pure Concept as the objective element of its own existence.808 Hence, Hegel wrote that, 
‘[t]he Spirit that, so developed, knows itself as Spirit, is Science; Science is its actuality and 
the realm which [Spirit] builds for itself in its own element.’809 Since Spirit’s element is 
consciousness, Hegel indicated that the major philosophical task is to demonstrate the 
elevation of this consciousness to the level of Science; the level (or in Hegel’s words, the 
ground and soil) of Science is  ‘[p]ure self-recognition in absolute otherness.’810 
Phenomenology of Spirit describes the progress of self-consciousness towards achieving that 
level and thereby, actualising Science. In its simplest form, Hegel described this progress as 
‘[t]he task of leading the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge.’811  
 Hegel defined the single individual as an ‘incomplete Spirit, a concrete shape in 
whose whole existence one determinateness predominates, the others being present only in 
blurred outline.’812 This single individual is contrasted with the universal World Spirit which 
‘[has taken] upon itself the enormous labour of world-history.’813 Hegel wrote that, ‘[t]his 
past existence is the already acquired property of universal Spirit which constitutes the 
Substance of the individual, and hence, appears externally to him as his inorganic nature.’814 
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Through education, the individual will pass through the formative stages of universal Spirit 
‘by devouring his inorganic nature, and taking possession of it for himself.’815 Hegel noted 
that, ‘regarded from the side of universal Spirit as substance, this [passing through] is 
nothing but [universal Spirit’s] own acquisition of self-consciousness, the bringing-about of 
its own becoming and reflection into itself.’816  
 For the individual, the first aspect of this formative education is to break away from 
the familiarity of the acquired property of the universal Spirit. Thus, Hegel explained that, 
[t]he commonest way in which we deceive either ourselves or others 
about understanding is by assuming something as familiar […] 
Subject and object, God, Nature, Understanding, sensibility, and so 
on, are uncritically taken for granted as familiar, established as valid, 
and made into fixed points for starting and stopping. While these 
remain unmoved, the knowing activity goes back and forth between 
them, thus moving only on their surface.817  
Knowing activity exists this back and forth movement through Understanding. The latter is 
defined by Hegel as ‘the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute 
power.’818 Understanding’s prowess results from its ability to detach concrete objects or 
ideas from what circumscribes these objects, and its ability to separate them from the context 
to which they are bound and wherein they are actual.819 This ability arises from 
Understanding’s embodiment of ‘the tremendous power of the negative.’820 Therefore, 
Understanding is the act of separation (Hegel also used the word ‘dissolution’) effected by 
the negative. Hegel explained that, ‘what is thus separated and non-actual is an essential 
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moment; for it is only because the concrete divides itself, and make[s] itself into something 
non-actual, that it is self-moving.’821   
 Since separation is an act of Understanding which leads to self-movement, knowing 
activity cannot be contained within the above-mentioned to and fro movement. However, as 
much as separation creates its own sphere of freedom, it also consists of non-actuality. Hegel 
defined this non-actuality as death.822  Understanding demands that  
[…] the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps 
itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and 
maintains itself in it. It [Spirit] wins its truth only when, in utter 
dismemberment, it finds itself […] Spirit is this power only by 
looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it.’823   
This demand cannot be met by Beauty for, in Hegel’s perspective, Beauty is without 
strength.824 The Spirit, as Subject, has this power and with it, through the work of 
Understanding, Spirit gives the actual, the concrete, or the determinate object an existence 
in consciousness; however, as Hegel wrote, ‘[t]he fact that the object represented becomes 
the property of pure self-consciousness, its elevation to universality in general, is only one 
aspect of formative education, not its fulfilment.’825 Understanding requires that the Subject 
separates the object from the context wherein it is actual. With the power of the negative, 
Subject meets this requirement; the object gains a non-actual existence within 
consciousness, that is to say, Subject thinks about the object, therefore, the object exists in 
thought. But this non-actual existence is only one facet of the formative education.  
 As observed above, the aim of this education is to raise the individual spirit from his 
uneducated standpoint to knowledge. In order for it to attain the point of knowledge, it is not 
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sufficient for the Spirit to think, and thereby, create a separate sphere of freedom wherein 
the object becomes the property of consciousness. As such property, these thoughts remain 
fixed to the ‘I’ — i.e. the Subject, the power of the negative — which constitutes their 
substance and element of existence.826 I think, and in doing this, I attach objects to my 
consciousness making them its property; remained as fixed properties of consciousness, 
however, thoughts lack spiritual life.827 Hegel wrote that ‘[t]houghts become fluid when pure 
thinking, this inner immediacy, recognises itself as a moment or when the pure certainty of 
self abstracts from itself.’828 In other words, initially, I think without realising that what I 
am doing is thinking. Later on, I can withdraw from this state of self-certainty by realising 
that I am actually committing a momentous act that is thinking. This realisation amounts to 
the abandonment of the permanency of self-positing. That is to say, thoughts are the property 
of my consciousness; but as such, they are also Concepts which ‘are only now what they are 
in truth, self-movements, circles, spiritual essences, which is what their substance is.’829 
Thoughts, as Concepts, attain spiritual life by breaking away from the fixity of the I; 
therefore, ‘I’ no longer constitutes the substance of thoughts. In attaining spiritual life, 
Concepts become pure essences.830  
 The act of breaking away from the fixity of the I, however, does not amount to the 
exclusion of the Subject or consciousness from the self-movement of the Concept. It is the 
development of consciousness which corresponds to the understanding that Concepts are 
capable of this self-movement and as such, are spiritual substances. In attaining such 
understanding, cognitive activity engages itself with the substantial aspect of the Spirit. It is 
as a result of this cognitive engagement that Hegel indicated that the ‘movement of pure 
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essences constitute the nature of scientific method in general.’831 In their connectedness, the 
contents of these Concepts necessarily expand into what Hegel called ‘an organic whole.’832 
Expressed in other words, as essentially constitutive of Spiritual substance, Concepts, in 
total, make up the very Substance that is the Spirit. In its development, and the resultant 
understanding of Concepts, consciousness begins to gain knowledge of this organic whole. 
Therefore, the notion of absolute knowledge can only be attained when consciousness 
completes its development by concluding the entire movements of the Concept.  
 According to Hegel, consciousness ‘contains the two moments of knowing and 
objectivity negative to knowing.’833 To have these two moments amounts to a ‘disparity 
which exists in consciousness between the ‘I’ [of knowing] and the substance which is its 
object.’834 The phenomenology of Spirit is concluded when Substance shows itself to be 
essentially Subject.835 It will be remembered that, philosophy is set on a course of actual 
knowing when True is grasped not only as Substance but also as Subject. Another aspect of 
this actual knowing is to represent Absolute as Spirit. It is in this representation that Hegel 
formulated the grasping of the True as Substance and Subject. Hence, the Spirit, or the 
absolute knowledge, occurs when Substance manifest itself as Subject.  
 For this manifestation to occur, however, the above-mentioned disparity inherent in 
consciousness must be bridged; it must be manifested that the I of knowing is the same as 
the substance which is the object of its knowing. In clearer terms, the Spirit (as the Subject, 
or I) must become an object (Substance) to itself. Absolute must be presented in cognitive 
terms; that is to say, as that type of consciousness which is peculiar to human beings. The 
reason for this is that, human consciousness embodies the power of negativity. This is the 
very power which sets up oppositions and then negates these by returning into itself. In other 
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words, the negative is the ‘movement of becoming an other to itself, i.e. becoming an object 
to itself and of suspending this otherness.’836 Negative is what ‘appears at first as a disparity 
between the ‘I’ and its object;’ however, it is also the very power that enables the Spirit to 
overcome this disparity by becoming an object to itself, and therefore, the Substance 
showing itself to be essentially the Subject.837  
 In the previous chapter, we encountered similar movements wherein oppositions 
were established and later negated in relation to the notions of desire and mutual recognition. 
Precisely, Hegel’s definition of self-consciousness as Desire corresponded to the certainty 
which arose from the explicit affirmation of the nothingness of the encountered other; 
satisfaction of such Desire, therefore, necessitated that the self consumes, destroys or 
supersedes the other.838 In other words, Desire hurled the self out of itself and onto an other 
demanding for its satisfaction the supersession of the other; this supersession was, then, 
followed by ‘the reflection of self-consciousness [back] into itself.’839 According to Butler’s 
interpretation of this three-step moment, ‘desire signifies the reflexivity of consciousness, 
the necessity that it become other to itself in order to know itself.’840 Brady and Schirato 
elaborated upon Butler’s notion of reflexivity in the following:  
This is how, for Hegel, the reflexive subject is formed: desire 
moves consciousness outside of itself to form a relation with the 
world-as-difference, which in turn reflects and demonstrates both 
the limits of subject (I can only know myself through reference 
to the process of mediation and connectedness with the other), 
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and its conditions of being (I continue to exist and know myself 
by way of my relation to difference).841  
Jean-Luc Nancy seemed to share Butler’s views vis-à-vis the necessity such desire 
generated. Thus, according to the former, too, ‘[t]he self must come from the other, and it is 
in this coming, as this coming, that it has to be “self” […] This necessity makes desire.’842 
While Butler identified such necessity as reflexive, Nancy associated this requirement with 
the notion of restlessness of negativity. Nancy derived this notion from Hegel’s definition 
of Absolute as Subject. In what follows, I present this derivation and the manner in which it 
occasioned the grasping of self as becoming. 
 
2.3. Nancy: Restlessness of Negative and Self as Becoming 
 In this section, my engagement with Nancy’s work centres upon the latter’s reading 
of Hegel’s preface to the Phenomenology. My intention in presenting this reading is to 
highlight two significant notions that Nancy developed; these are the restlessness of negative 
and self as becoming. To achieve this purpose, I begin this section by introducing Nancy’s 
interpretation of Hegel’s conception of Absolute as Subject. I show that this interpretation 
informs Nancy’s idea of a restless subject which transforms the given world. The resultant 
possibility of restless transformation, in turn, helps me enhance my argument against 
Kojève’s thesis on the end-of-history.  
 Next, I present Nancy’s perception of self as becoming. I demonstrate that this 
perception, too, benefits from the formulation of Absolute as Subject, that Nancy understood 
the notion of self as a moment between logical concepts of being and nothingness. By 
incorporating the feature of restlessness into this moment, Nancy was able to stress upon the 
ontological significance of self’s constitutive correlation with its others. I demonstrate the 
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manner in which Nancy connected the logical aspects of Absolute to the notions of Desire 
and Recognition, and how this connection produced an improved understanding of the 
concept of Subject. This is a subject which, encompassing a restless self, is always in flux, 
always constitutively dependent upon its relation to others. 
 Nancy began his reading of Hegel’s preface by noting that ‘Hegel is the inaugural 
thinker of the contemporary world.’843 The former explained this contemporary world as ‘a 
world of separation and of pain, a world whose history is of one atrocity after another’ 
wherein ‘the movement of a transcendence that would raise [this world] toward a supreme 
signification’ is lost.844 This definition rested upon a distinction between two forms of 
Absolute. The first is a lifeless exteriority of a supreme God which comprises the identity of 
meaning and, as such, signifies the beyond of death.845  It is this type of transcendental and, 
therefore, abstract supreme signification that is lost within the contemporary world. The 
other is Hegel’s notion of Absolute equipped with absolute negativity which, in contrast to 
the aforementioned abstract God, ‘appears to constitute all experience of this world and its 
consciousness of itself.’846   
 In simple terms, according to Nancy, the Hegelian Absolute constituted the 
contemporary world. Three notions that pertain to Absolute, in turn, illuminate the nature of 
this world. These notions are A=A, Concept, and Subject. Hegel’s deviation from the 
formula of A=A marks the relational capacity of this contemporary world. The word 
absolute conjoins Latin words ab and solutum that are respectively translated into English 
as ‘free’ and ‘from’ rendering the meaning of the word ‘unrelated’ — in the sense that it is 
free from relation.847 Remarking on this meaning, Nancy noted that  
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[t]he absolute must be the absolute of its own absoluteness, or not 
be at all. In other words: to be absolutely alone, it is not enough 
that I be so; I must also be alone being alone — and this of course 
is contradictory. The logic of the absolute violates the absolute. 
It implicates it in a relation that it refuses and precludes by its 
essence. This relation tears and forces open […] the “without 
relation” from which the absolute would constitute itself.848   
One can attest that, this violent logic is at work in Hegel’s rejection of the formula of A=A 
or of God as one Substance. Absolute cannot be equal to itself, cannot be self-identical. It 
has to be something other than itself, has to be capable of coming out of itself. Thus, 
Absolute must relate. 
 The notion of Concept gives a certain direction to the contemporary world’s ability 
to relate.  In the previous section of this part, I referred to the German noun Begriff and 
explained that Hegel’s use of the notion of Concept conveyed the meaning of Absolute’s 
ability to conceive itself. Nancy interpreted this ability as the contemporary world’s capacity 
to effectuate itself.849 This capacity ties in with Nancy’s previous distinction between two 
forms of Absolute; it is in a world which can conceive and grasp itself that an external God 
is too abstract to be identified as meaning. The remaining piece of the puzzle is to figure out 
how the contemporary world conceives itself. This is when the third notion comes into play.  
 Contemporary world conceives itself as Subject. This subject is not merely the self-
conscious being which emerges from mutual recognition. It is, also, the Subject which 
carries all the features of Absolute. In this regard, Nancy wrote that,  
Hegel takes it upon himself to think how the obscure knowing 
wherein this world undergoes itself is knowing of the self as non-
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given relation, or infinite relation: how, consequently, what (or 
the one whom) he names subject is revealed in this relation, and 
how the subject constitutes and liberates itself in the dimension 
and according to the logic of the negation of the ‘given’ in 
general.850 
In other words, as Absolute, Subject acquires the power of negation, of infinite 
transformation. Such acquisition would entail situating the subject in   
[a] world of movement, of transformation, of displacement, and 
of restlessness, this world that is in principle and structurally 
outside itself, this world where nature does not subsist but steps 
out of itself into work and into history, this world where the 
divine does not subsist but exhausts itself beyond all its figures.851 
Although there is a historical element to this world, it is not to be understood in terms of 
Kojève’s idea of history capable of coming to a teleological end. In fact, in Nancy’s view, 
the Subject, whose thought or consciousness embodies restlessness, indicates otherwise.  
 Nancy argued that Absolute, as a restless Subject, has two major features: it does not 
have any beginning nor does it have any end.852 In Absolute’s continuous movement, 
‘everything has already begun: that there will therefore be no foundation, that the course of 
the world will not be stopped in order to be recommenced.’853 Likewise, there will not be 
any end for ‘all is equally already finished.’854 However, this termination should not be 
understood as the end of history. Rather, it signifies the finitude of the presentation of the 
Absolute in determined figures.855 What could, therefore, be considered as finished in the 
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contemporary world is the finite figure of a supreme being as Absolute. According to 
Nancy’s interpretation, Absolute corresponded to ‘the full and complete actuality of the 
infinite that traverses, works, and transforms the finite.’856 
 Insofar as Absolute is a Subject who traverses and transforms the given world, this 
Subject is restless. The restlessness of the Subject is derived from the condition that the logic 
of the Absolute demands that Absolute cannot cease to relate to itself and therefore to 
something other than itself. One major consequence of this restlessness is that, contrary to 
Kojève’s and Fukuyama’s respective interpretations we cannot locate this Subject at the end 
of history. In other words, the notion of restless negative conforms neither to a beginning 
nor to an end. A closer inspection of the notion is, nevertheless, necessary to sufficiently 
establish the connection between the Subject of Absolute and subjects which emerge from 
the struggle for recognition.  
 The task is to demonstrate the prevalence of restless negative in Hegel’s theory of 
recognition. Nancy achieved this task by developing the idea of self through the notion of 
becoming. Thus, in what follows, I trace this development. I begin with an introduction to 
Hegel’s derivation of becoming as a mediated moment among the immediate notions of 
being and nothingness. Next, I show that this mediated moment is peculiar to what Hegel 
called sublation, a particular form of negation which preserves what is negated. Then, I refer 
to Nancy’s perception that sublation pertains to the notion of self. Nancy’s work, therefore, 
helps us understand what becoming entails for the idea of self. Starting with the initial 
mediation between being and nothingness, Nancy demonstrated self’s emergence as 
becoming and its development into the notion of desire. By drawing a link between 
becoming and desire, I show that Nancy was able to highlight the imperatively constitutive 
aspect of subject’s relations to its others within the context of Hegel’s theory of recognition.  
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 One must turn to Hegel’s The Science of Logic to grasp the logical argument 
underlying his distinction between the immediacy of the notion of being and the mediational 
aspect of the notion of becoming. In this treatise, Hegel explained pure being in the 
following:  
[i]n its indeterminate immediacy [pure being] is equal only to itself 
and also not unequal with respect to another; it has no difference 
within it, nor any outwardly. If any determination or content were 
posited in it as distinct, or if it were posited by this determination or 
content as distinct from an other, it would thereby fail to hold fast to 
its purity. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness.857 
The definition quoted above underlies Hegel’s objection to perceiving God or the Absolute 
as immediate which is to be intuited, as opposed to an Absolute which actualises itself 
through cognition. The intuition of God as an original and immediate being is problematic 
not only by way of such intuition distancing philosophy from a form of Science wherein it 
can become actual knowing as argued by Hegel in the preface to the Phenomenology.858 It 
is also problematic for the reason that, as observed in the indented quote above, a pure, 
indeterminate, and immediate being which has no difference or content both within and 
outside of itself can only be regarded as emptiness. 
 Elsewhere, Hegel argued against considering this empty and abstract notion of being 
as the beginning of science or philosophy: 
Being can be determined as ‘I=I’, as the absolute indifference or 
identity, etc. In the need to begin with something absolutely certain, 
i.e. the certainty of oneself, or with a definition or intuition of the 
absolutely true, these and other similar forms can be regarded as 
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what must be the first. However, insofar as mediation is already 
present within each of these forms, they are not truly the first.859   
In simpler terms, ‘[m]ediation means to have gone from a first to a second and to emerge 
from something differentiated.’860 Within the context of the mediation of being, this second 
is nothingness. Hegel asserted that ‘[b]eing, the indeterminate immediate is in fact nothing, 
and neither more or less than nothing.’861 Therefore, pure nothingness is also ‘simple 
equality with itself, complete emptiness, complete absence of determination and content; 
lack of all distinction within.’862 As this complete emptiness, both being and nothing are 
devoid of any meaning. We can intuit or think these notions and these acts would bestow 
some sort of meaning upon them; however, this meaning would result from the distinction, 
which these acts would effect, between pure being/nothingness and the being/nothingness 
that acquire a concrete existence within our intuition or thought.863 Thus, immediate pure 
being or nothingness (which essentially amount to the same emptiness) cannot be regarded 
as absolute meaning or truth.  
 For this absolute truth, one must consider the ways in which this mediation inherent 
to the notions of being and nothingness is effected. According to Hegel, therefore, truth ‘is 
neither being nor nothing, but rather that being has passed over into nothing and nothing 
into being.’864 In light of this act of passing into another, one must also take into account 
Hegel’s assertion that ‘pure being is a pure abstraction and thus the absolutely negative 
which, when likewise taken immediately, is nothing.’865 Thus, the act of passing over entails 
that being ‘immediately vanishes in its opposite,’ that is to say, it vanishes into nothing, and 
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vice versa.866 This immediate vanishing is the mediational movement of becoming: ‘a 
movement in which the two [i.e. being and nothing] are distinguished, but by a distinction 
which has just as immediately dissolved itself.’867 As opposed to the immediate emptiness 
of each notion, becoming creates a mediated and, therefore, determined unity of being and 
nothingness; it is within this unity that both these notions are.868 However, ‘they are, but as 
vanishing, only as sublated.’869 
 From the preliminary concepts of logic, Hegel was able to derive the notion of 
sublation. This notion is the manifestation of the negative inherent to being and nothing in 
the peculiar form of negation which has a dual meaning. In Hegel’s words, ‘[t]he German 
“aufheben” (‘to sublate’ in English) has a twofold meaning in the language: it equally means 
“to keep,” “to preserve,” and “to cause to cease,” “to put an end to.”’870 However, as Nancy 
highlighted, this cancelling does not amount to a return to nothing; nothing is immediate, 
whereas, ‘to sublate is […] to mediate.871  For the purposes of this part of the chapter, the 
significance of the notion of sublation lies in its relation to the idea of self; in Nancy’s words, 
‘sublation ceaselessly functions, accelerates, and tightens its functioning right at the level of 
the self and, in a certain way, as if it informed ipseity, or better, the process of the ipseity of 
the self itself.’872  
 The next step is to ascertain the repercussions of the notion of sublation upon the 
concept of self. Nancy achieved this by incorporating the idea of self into the moments of 
becoming and commenced this incorporation by distinguishing between self and immediate 
being. Thus, Nancy argued that self is not being, but, rather,  
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self means being unto the ordeal of being. Being that has nothing to 
found itself, to sustain itself, or to fulfil itself is being posited naked 
in its identity with the logos — its naked substance identical to its 
absolute freedom […]873    
Self cannot be being which remains at rest. Instead, it is related to what is immanent to being; 
the ordeal, Nancy explained, ‘is that of immanence.’874 We already observed above that 
according to Hegel, inherent to pure being are notions of immediacy, indeterminacy and 
emptiness. In other words, what is immanent to the notion of being is the very notion of 
nothing. The self is, therefore, the ordeal which pertains to this immanent relation between 
being and nothing. 
 Hegel called this ordeal becoming wherein being vanished into nothing and vice 
versa. Regarding the relevance of this disappearance vis-à-vis the notion of self, Nancy 
offered the following interpretation.  
Being rests in itself, and this rest itself awakens and unsettles it: at 
rest, it feels itself lose its sense of being. In truth, it has already lost 
it. The simple position of being is privation of sense, but it is as 
privation that sense first manifests itself.875 
Pure being, as pure negativity, cannot rest in itself. It is restless and, as such, it wakes up 
into a feeling of loss. Taking into account the notion of becoming wherein being vanishes 
into nothing, this loss can be attributed to the disappearance. What disappears is being’s 
feeling of sense for the reason that, through becoming, sense progresses into nothing.  
 Since, self, according to Nancy, is being onto the ordeal of being and this ordeal 
consists of the privation of sense;  
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self therefore means sense left to its own devices, sense that makes 
itself sense, not by a recourse, but by an infinite return to the same, 
to this other-sameness that is all that offers itself. Self is therefore 
first of all what finds itself as nothingness. Rigorously: self is what 
does not find itself. Self is negation of self, negativity for itself.876   
However, if the Subject is self as pure negativity and becoming entails negation of self, what 
would this negation entail for the subject? Would it mean that subject kills or consumes 
itself? Nancy explained that, ‘[t]he subject does not negate itself as someone who commits 
suicide. It negates itself in its being; it is this negation.’877  
 The constitution of self comprises this negation. Thus, self must be restless and 
devoid of any beginning and end. Furthermore, self, or the subject into which it develops, 
cannot be immediate. The being which self negates is immediate. As the effectivity of the 
restless negative, self is mediated. Imperative to this mediation is the other. To follow the 
last quote from Nancy,  
[the subject] negates itself in its being; it is this negation, and thus 
does not return to itself. Self is precisely without return to self; self 
does not become what it already is: becoming is being outside of self 
— but such that this outside, this ex-position, is the very being of the 
subject.878    
By negating it, self finds itself outside of being. In relation to the notion of becoming, we 
know that being vanishes into nothing. Therefore, this outside signifies self finding itself as 
nothing, or, in other terms, self not finding itself. However, this outside position does also 
constitute the very being of the subject.  What underlies this constitution is that in the ex-
position, self finds an other.  
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 This finding is significant to the extent that, as Nancy wrote, ‘[t]he concretion of 
negativity begins with the other.’879 In other words, the subject comes into being with the 
other; that, the other is the very constitutive element of the subject and vice versa. Nancy 
explained this imperative in the following.  
The self that negates itself, instead of coming back to itself, throws 
itself into the other, and wills itself as other. This is why the other is 
not second, does not come after […] The one does not begin: it 
begins with the other.880 
The effect of this conjoined beginning is the dissolution of the given-ness of the other and it 
is this dissolution which, in turn, signifies the concretion of negativity. To the extent that the 
other — as would be the case in mutual recognition — is also a self ‘that would have, all to 
itself, the subsistence that I lack,’ my self-negation would throw me onto some other 
identical self.881 Hence, this throw results in self finding itself in the other. According to 
Nancy, the effect of this result is that ‘[t]he other posited as a consistent and given exteriority 
is precisely what is negated in the very movement of the negation of the self.’882   
 Nancy interpreted the negation of the given exteriority as self’s appropriation of the 
other.883 However, this appropriation is not synonymous with the enslavement of the other. 
Instead, Nancy emphasised that ‘[t]he relation with the other, precisely to the extent that it 
is appropriation, is appropriation of the negativity out of which this relation comes.’884 Thus,  
[n]egativity dissolves the given-other, not in order to restore it to a 
self that has precisely been shattered in itself, but in order to make it 
a nongiven-other: to make it the other which, as my other, is the 
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infinite alterity, in me, of the self itself, or what is in itself the infinite 
alteration of the self.885  
The significance of this alterity is twofold. Firstly, it underlies the very notion of self-
consciousness. Secondly, in doing so, it provides a clearer insight into the function of the 
notion of desire vis-à-vis the constitution of the subject.  
 According to Nancy, ‘[i]f self-consciousness kept itself within the immediate 
immobility of “I=I,” it would not even be consciousness.’886 The immediate immobility is 
that of the notion of being. Self, as pure negativity, is restless, and, as such, we can recall 
that it unsettles being by awakening it. This awakening is interpreted by Nancy as ‘the 
concrete awakening of the I [which] is its awakening to the world and by the world — the 
world of alterity in general.’ 887  The onset of this waking up is generated by self’s encounter 
with the other. This encounter does not only concretise negativity; in doing so, it establishes 
the infinite alterity of the self.  Without this alterity, the self is the selfsame I=I; in order to 
reach this alterity, self needs the other. This is the necessity which, according to Nancy, 
makes desire; 
Desire is the necessity of consciousness: it is the necessity that the 
unity of consciousness come and become for consciousness itself. 
Desire is therefore less the tension of a lack, and the projection of a 
satisfaction that would annul it, than it is the tension of the coming 
of the other as the becoming of the self.888 
Earlier we observed that Butler called this necessity the reflexivity of consciousness.889 In 
Butler’s perspective, the Hegelian notion of desire ‘is understood as or stands in for the 
reflexive consciousness, whereby consciousness seeks to know and comprehend itself 
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through the mediation of otherness.’890 By considering the role of desire within the context 
of Hegel’s logical concept of becoming, Nancy provided a clearer insight into whence this 
necessity arises.  
 Self is neither being nor nothing. It is the movement between these two notions, 
namely, it is becoming. The modus operandi of this movement is restless negativity which 
effects the vanishment of being into nothing and vice versa. The movement which is 
constitutive of self pushes it outside of itself onto an other; hence, Nancy remarked that 
‘becoming and the other are indissociable.’891 Nancy’s interpretation that ‘one begins with 
the other,’ therefore, underlies the viability of self-consciousness. It is an imperative that the 
constitution of the subject has to involve the other. Otherwise, the self that develops into the 
self-conscious I would, instead, eternally remain the self-same being that I=I suggests. Thus, 
the necessity of desire, of mediation through otherness, arises from the very fact that Hegel 
conceived Absolute not as a supreme being, an immediate unity which is identical to itself 
or is comprised of a selfsame substance. Instead, Absolute is a Subject capable of movement 
and mediation, without any beginning or end, and finally, it is comprised of the restless 
negative. 
 
Conclusion 
 I concluded the fourth chapter by arguing that Honneth’s, Taylor’s, and Douzinas’ 
respective works effectively demonstrated the manner in which one can successfully utilise 
Hegel’s theory of recognition to account for the constitution of different forms of subjects. 
However, I also maintained that the dialectic of lordship and bondsman may have certain 
repercussions for the act of recognition and that aforementioned scholars’ scrutiny of the 
dialectic were rather brief. The failure to provide a detailed engagement with the question 
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of lordship and bondsman informed the purpose of the current chapter. Therefore, I began 
this chapter with a focus on Kojève’s anthropocentric account of human reality. The 
significance of this account lay in the insights Kojève offered into the probable effects of 
lordship and bondsman upon the intersubjective system of recognition.    
 I presented Kojève’s idea of human reality by first considering the latter’s 
differentiation between animal and human desires. Kojève incorporated the life and death 
struggle as the means to achieve this differentiation and identified the outcome of this 
achievement as the recognition of one’s human desire. This form of desire and ensuing 
recognition, according to Kojève, were the building blocks of human reality wherein humans 
generated freedom and history. Lord, bondsman, and the struggle between the two marked 
the historical stages of this reality. Thus, Kojève claimed that the reconciliation of the 
conflict between lord and bondsman comprised the end of history. Such an end would be 
attained with the establishment of the universal and the homogenous state — in Kojève’s 
perspective, this being the Napoleonic state.    
 I identified two serious repercussions in Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel’s work. 
The first of these was that Kojève thought of the progress of recognition, therefore the 
development of human reality, as oriented towards an ultimate purpose. Secondly, this 
teleological direction was given a final destination in the shape of a homogenous and 
universal state. In light of these two problematic consequences, I asked two relevant 
questions. Could one extract a theory of recognition from the Phenomenology if the scope 
of such a theory is limited to a certain historical progress with a specific telos? Could one 
resolve the problems associated with the state-centrism of the prevalent theories of 
recognition under international law by adapting a notion of recognition which ostensibly had 
a similar orientation?  
 My first attempt was to seek a solution to the problem of the specific telos of the 
Napoleonic state. By referring to Fukuyama’s adoption of Kojève’s thesis, I, initially, 
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demonstrated that the telos may vary according to times. Fukuyama thought that the end was 
achieved with the liberal democratic state. Then, I highlighted that in both Kojève’s and 
Fukuyama’s separate works, the fulfilment of the telos relied upon the reconciliation of the 
struggle between lord and bondsman. My second attempt was to show that by problematising 
this notion of reconciliation, one may dismiss the state-centric orientation. I relied upon 
Jameson’s critique of Fukuyama’s work to achieve this dismissal.  
 Jameson argued against the reification of a presumed social totality which he thought 
was prevalent to Fukuyama’s idea of reconciliation. Jameson’s argument was based upon 
the mortality of social forms in Hegel’s thoughts. This argument necessitated a detour into 
Hegel’s reading of Sophocles’ play Antigone. Jameson was of the view that Hegel’s 
interpretation of the opposition between and the ensuing tragedies of ethical characters of 
the play suggested the perpetual flux of social forms. This flux, in turn, defied any form of 
definite reification. I relied upon Jameson’s contention to argue that the challenge, at least, 
of a state-centric telos may thus be overcome. My following argument was that, in order to 
unburden the theory of recognition from any form of teleological purpose, one had to prove 
that the perpetual flux pertains to this theory too.  
  I turned to Nancy’s interpretation of Hegel’s thought to demonstrate that perpetual 
flux also pertained to the theory of recognition. The starting point of this interpretation was 
Nancy’s perception of the element of negativity as restless. Nancy drew upon Hegel’s notion 
of Absolute to link the power of the negative to the concept of Subject. Empowered as such, 
the restless Subject had two major features: it did not have a beginning, nor did it have an 
end. So far, Nancy’s interpretation suggested a way out of the teleological constraints of 
Kojève’s reading. What remained to be achieved was to demonstrate that the Subject (as 
Absolute) was connected to the self-conscious subject of mutual recognition. My argument 
was that, Nancy achieved this connection with the notion of becoming. According to 
Nancy’s reading of this notion, negative moments between logic’s preliminary concepts of 
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being and nothingness comprised the idea of self. In other words, self was a mediated 
concept that encompassed the restless negative. Hegel called this mediation sublation and 
this particular type of negation, which preserved whatever it overcame, generated desire. 
Nancy captured the relation between self, sublation, and desire by the maxim that one begins 
with the other. Similar to (Absolute as) Subject which defied the formula of A=A, self-
conscious subject of desire and mutual recognition was not to conform to I=I. Subject is as 
it moves out of itself and encounters an other for the very reason that subject cannot be 
immediate, that it is necessary for it to go through the mediation of otherness.   
 In the introduction to this chapter, I asked two questions that were related to the 
challenge of extracting a theory of recognition from the context of the Phenomenology. One 
of the questions was whether one could circumvent the issues related to the prevalent 
theories of recognition I considered in the third chapter by relying upon a theory of 
recognition which ostensibly had a similar orientation. Throughout this chapter, I attempted 
to answer this question by demonstrating that Hegel’s theory of recognition did not have a 
state-centric orientation.  My reference to Jameson’s work helped me dismiss reconciliation 
as an ultimate objective of the dialectic of master and slave. This dismissal, in turn, solved 
the problem of Kojève’s idea of the homogenous and the universal state. 
 However, a second challenge was presented by the other question which tested the 
viability   of abstracting a theory with teleological restrictions. Insofar as the reference to 
Jameson dismissed a particular type of telos (i.e. the Napoleonic state, or the liberal 
democratic state) it did not adequately rule out the possibility of a definite end-purpose to 
the dialectic. I turned to Nancy’s work to overcome this challenge. Nancy perceived self as 
a restless subject which is always in flux and is always becoming. This perception 
highlighted one’s relation to its other not only as constitutively imperative, but also as a set 
of continuous moments that does not come to rest. The significance of this highlight is 
twofold. First, it shows that the perpetual flux pertains to the theory of recognition and, in 
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turn, renders this theory less difficult to extract from the context of Phenomenology for ad 
hoc purposes. Second, the specific outcome of the process of recognition starkly contrasts 
with Vattel’s understanding of subject as absolute, closed, and complete-in-itself.   
Overall, in this chapter, I engaged with the issue of reconciliation of the struggle 
between lords and bondsman, and the resultant end-of-history theses. The challenges posed 
by the dialectic of lordship and bondsman, however, are not limited to Kojève’s and 
Fukuyama’s respective approaches presented here. As will be remembered from the 
previous chapter, Hegel’s idea of truth of independence was to be found in servile 
consciousness. This was the type of consciousness which held desire in check and laboured 
on the object consumed by the lord. Kojève touched upon the idea of labour within the 
concept of history but subsumed this idea under the notion of reconciliation of the struggle 
between master and slave. In the next chapter, I follow upon the probable effects of lordship 
and bondsman by offering an analysis of the relation between servile consciousness and the 
theory of recognition. The aforementioned comparison between Nancy’s notion of a subject 
in flux and Vattel’s idea of states as absolute persons is relevant to the analysis I offer in the 
next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESTRICTIVE ECONOMY OF RECOGNITION 
Introduction 
 In the fourth chapter of the thesis, I introduced Hegel’s theory of recognition by 
tracing the development of consciousness through stages of sense-certainty and 
understanding, and by presenting consciousness’ transformation into self-consciousness via 
the notions of desire and mutual recognition. The purpose of this introduction was to present 
an apt theoretical framework to account for recognition as a constitutive imperative for the 
coming-into-being of international subjects. I also pointed out that Hegel’s idea of mutual 
recognition culminated in a life-and-death struggle which produced the dialectic of lordship 
and bondsman. I argued that a successful abstraction of an applicable theoretical framework 
depended on overcoming the repercussions of this dialectic vis-à-vis the theory of 
recognition.  
 In the fifth chapter, I relied upon Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel’s work to identify 
two obstacles against the ad hoc utilisation of the latter’s theory. Firstly, the struggle 
between lord and bondsman marked a historical progress towards a teleological end. 
Secondly, this end was ostensibly reached by the establishment of the homogenous and the 
universal state. Central to Kojève’s interpretation was the understanding that the conflict 
between lord and bondsman could be reconciled. My attempt to overcome the 
aforementioned obstacles was, thus, premised upon contesting this reconciliation. Nancy’s 
notion of a restless negative assisted this attempt in two major ways. First, endowed with 
the power of negative, Nancy showed that the subject never begins, nor does it ever end; 
thus, the subject is conceived as always becoming, rendering its relation to its other as 
imperatively constitutive. Second, such a subject is not complete-in-itself and its very being 
is constantly determined and re-determined by its relations. 
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 Nancy’s idea of a subject that is in perpetual flux refutes Kojève’s reading which 
contained Hegel’s theory of recognition within the telos of the homogenous and the 
universal state. One can also show this containment to be misconceived as Hegel concluded 
the section on the dialectic of lordship and bondsman with an entirely different 
accomplishment than the Napoleonic state. The section ended with the notion of servile 
consciousness attaining truth of independent consciousness. In the previous chapter, the 
challenge set by Kojève’s reading led to the conception of a particular form of subject. As 
well as rebutting the idea of an end-purpose, this form of subject provides the means to 
counter Vattel’s perception of the personality of states as absolutely sovereign, as 
completely closed-in-itself, and in no need of any relations. The next challenge is set by 
Hegel’s conclusion to the segment on master and slave.    
 Thus, in this chapter, I evaluate the possible repercussion of servile consciousness 
upon the theory of recognition. In this regard, I identify servile consciousness as the product 
of a restrictive economy imposed upon the process of recognition. I demonstrate that the 
effect of this economy is to circumscribe the outcome of recognition to the production, 
reproduction, and circulation of one particular form of subject; and that this subject does not 
readily match Nancy’s perpetually changing subject of becoming. For the overall purposes 
of the thesis, the relevance of this restricted economy is twofold. Firstly, in order to grasp 
the economy, one has to scrutinise the connection between the notions of death and 
negativity in Hegel’s thought and this scrutiny, in turn, provides a critical insight into the 
functioning of recognition. I rely upon this insight to draw an analogy between the restricted 
economy of Hegelian discourse on recognition and the failure of the prevalent theories 
which I considered in the third chapter of this thesis. Secondly, insofar as the critical insight 
reveals the manner in which Hegel’s particular utilisation of the notion of negative affects 
the outcome of recognition, this insight also exposes the potential of Hegel’s thought to 
transgress this inhibited outcome.  
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 In other words, attempting to figure out the effects of servile consciousness, I focus 
upon critiques of Hegel’s works to unveil recognition as a repetitive process with a 
predetermined outcome. I argue that this process informs the shortcomings of the 
aforementioned prevalent theories but that inherent to this process is, also, the very means 
to surpass these shortcomings. These are the means with which a general economy of 
recognition can be attained to generate a subject more akin to Nancy’s idea of becoming. 
Similar to the previous chapter, the departure point of the arguments I present herein is, once 
again, Alexandre Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s thoughts. The focus is on Kojève’s essay 
entitled ‘The Idea of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel.’892 The central argument Kojève 
advanced in the essay is that Hegel’s work comprises a philosophy of death. This argument 
presents one with the opportunity to examine the relation between notions of death and 
negativity in Hegel’s thought and understand the manner in which Hegel utilised the latter 
notion to contain the end product of recognition.  
 Therefore, I commence the first part of this chapter by introducing Kojève’s thoughts 
on Hegel’s philosophy of death. These thoughts are premised upon Kojève’s familiar notion 
of man’s struggle against nature. I demonstrate that Kojève understood this struggle as 
essence versus existence and drew upon Hegel’s definition of Truth as Subject and 
Substance to define key elements of man’s existence in and against nature.  This existence 
presents a challenge similar to the division Kojève’s approach disclosed in the previous 
chapter regarding human and animal forms of desire. Thus, for man to exist in a humanised 
reality, he must not only risk his life to dispose his animal desire, but he must, as I show in 
this chapter, also encounter death and become conscious of his own mortality. This 
consciousness is not only gained against animal desire but also as a transformative element 
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which separates man the subject from nature the substance. The significance of Kojève’s 
work lies in the elaboration of the type of negation that achieves such transformation.  
 In the second part of the chapter, I take into account George Bataille’s critique that 
subterfuge and servility are inherent to this transformation. I show that the critique is 
premised upon Bataille’s understanding that Hegel withheld the power of negative to serve 
the purposes of absolute knowledge. In order to reach this understanding Bataille contrasted 
Hegel’s interpretation of the link between notions of death and negation with the former’s 
conception of a novel form of Sovereignty. The disparity between Hegel’s interpretation and 
Bataille’s conception exposes the alteration the idea of negation goes through in man’s 
attempt to gain consciousness of his own death. Bataille understood that only a subterfuge 
can help one gain such consciousness and that the consequence of this subterfuge, in Hegel’s 
thought, was to limit the absolute power of negative. According to Bataille, this limitation 
pertained to the very process of recognition and the ensuing struggle for life and death.    
 In the third part of the chapter, I rely upon Jacques Derrida’s work to elaborate the 
effects of subterfuge upon the process of recognition. I show that Derrida grasped these 
effects as a restricted economy which confined the outcome of recognition to the production, 
reproduction and circulation of a particular form of subject. I demonstrate the manner in 
which Derrida contrasted Hegel’s notion of lordship to Bataille’s idea of Sovereignty to 
distinguish between two ways of utilising the notion of death. While Hegel shunned absolute 
negation or death in the life-and-death struggle, Bataille showed that such negation was 
capable of transgressing the limits of the Hegelian discourse on knowledge. According to 
Derrida, Hegel’s evasion of the idea of actual death and its unlimited notional scope 
amounted to a restricted economy of lordship; this was an economy which held desire in 
check and preferred servile labour to produce absolute knowledge, but was, nevertheless, 
blind to what lay beyond this knowledge.   
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 I conclude the chapter by arguing that the idea of a restrictive economy of recognition 
is applicable to the prevalent theories of recognition of states under international law, that 
the constitutive and the declarative theories commit a similar error in remaining blind to 
what lies beyond the discourse of absolute sovereignty of states. This argument, however, 
does not depart from the premise I defended throughout this thesis that Hegel’s notion of 
recognition offers an apt theoretical framework to account for the coming-into-being of 
international subjects. Thus, I supplement the aforementioned argument by drawing upon 
the transgressive potential of negation to argue that a general economy of recognition is 
possible and, indeed, achievable within the very own means of Hegel’s theory. This is a new 
economy that does not only overcome the servile discourse of lordship but also 
accommodates Nancy’s notion of subjects of becoming.  
 
Part One 
Kojève reads Hegel again: A Philosophy of Death  
 In this part of the chapter, I present Kojève’s engagement with the notion of death in 
Hegel’s philosophy. The purpose of this presentation is to lay the groundwork for the 
critique of the notion of servile consciousness later in the chapter. Therefore, in the current 
part, I focus upon Kojève’s perception that the idea of death is central to the construction of 
human reality. I already introduced a set of Kojève’s thoughts on this type of reality in the 
preceding chapter. The difference between two sets of thoughts on the same topic is marked 
by Kojève’s argument that this reality is conditional upon man’s consciousness of his own 
mortality. Thus, here, I present this conditionality and its manifestation within the human 
reality through Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s preface to the Phenomenology and the former’s 
reinterpretation of the life and death struggle.  
 The point of departure is, therefore, Kojève’s idea of human reality wherein man’s 
struggle against nature takes place. I demonstrate the manner in which Kojève relied upon 
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Hegel’s definition of Absolute as Substance and Subject to elaborate this struggle; while 
man comprised the subject empowered with negation, nature amounted to the substance man 
negated to create his reality. Such negation however entailed the possibility of man negating 
himself as he was also situated within the very nature he was to negate. This possibility, in 
turn, necessitated reconception of negation as something other than actual death, it 
necessitated grasping consciousness of man’s mortality as the very condition of human 
reality and the discourse which revealed this reality.  
 Next in this part, I show how this conditionality is manifested through the act of 
understanding. This is an act that separates essence from existence. The effect of this 
separation is the generation of a distinct domain of freedom for man wherein the animal in 
man is also negated. This negation, too, reveals something about the notion of death in 
Hegel’s thought. Since man cannot kill the animal within — similar to his inability to totally 
negate nature — such death, according to Kojève, is postponed and this postponement 
underlies the very notion of man as a dialectical being, capable of individuality and freedom. 
Subsequently, the idea of death postponed forms the premise of Bataille’s critique of the 
Hegelian subterfuge which I consider in the second part of the chapter. 
 To begin at the beginning, in what follows, I present Kojève’s interpretation of 
Hegel’s preface as reflecting man’s struggle against nature. In the opening pages of the 
preface to the Phenomenology Hegel wrote that ‘[t]he true shape in which truth exists can 
only be the scientific system of such truth.’893 The scientific systematisation of truth is based 
upon the notion that ‘truth has only Concept as the element of its existence.’894 Hegel noted 
that this notion contrasts with the traditional view that the True existed as intuition or 
immediate knowledge of the Absolute or being.895 He contested that such view renders 
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Absolute incomprehensible by deeming it something to be intuited or felt.896 Hegel’s central 
argument was that the exposition of philosophy must have as its object the comprehension 
of the Absolute, that only by achieving such object can philosophy ‘lay aside the title of love 
of knowing and be actual knowing.’897 In order to set philosophy on such a task, Hegel wrote 
that ‘everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but 
equally as Subject.’898  
 Kojève interpreted the scientific systematisation of truth as the revelation or 
description of Being; he named this systematic revelation Discourse.899 Therefore, the 
Conceptual existence of the Truth corresponds to what Kojève called ‘Being-revealed-
through-discourse-in-its-reality.’900 Thus, Hegel’s task for philosophy was interpreted by 
Kojève as the exposition of the revealed-Being and the ways in which Discourse achieves 
this revelation. It is in light of this discursive explanation that Kojève read Hegel’s 
expression of True as both Substance and Subject:   
The philosopher therefore is concerned not only with static-and-
given Being or with the Substance, which is the Object of Discourse, 
but with the Subject of Discourse and of philosophy: It is not enough 
for him to speak of Being that is given to him; he must also speak of 
himself and must explain himself to himself insofar as he is speaking 
of Being and of himself.901 
Identifying the subject of discourse as Man, Kojève suggested that philosophy’s obligation 
is not only to account for the realisation of Being as Nature and natural World, but also for 
its realisation as Man and as historical World.902 In Kojève’s perspective this obligation 
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marks an anthropological turn in philosophy wherein ‘in addition to the ontological bases of 
natural reality [philosophy] must investigate those of human reality, which alone is capable 
of revealing itself through Discourse.’903   
 Kojève’s identification of Subject as Man led him to take into account Hegel’s 
definition of Subject as pure negativity. In applying this definition to Man, Kojève noted 
that,  
Man who is dominated in his very being by Negativity is not static-
and-given Being, but Action or the Act-of-positing-itself or of 
creating itself. And it is objectively-real [i.e. actual] only as a 
dialectical movement, whose result is mediated by negation of the 
given-Being that serves it as a point of departure.904 
In Kojève’s perspective, the static-and-given Being corresponds to Nature; therefore, in the 
above-mentioned quote, Man’s actuality depends on his negation of Nature.905 Kojève 
derived Man’s opposition to Nature from Hegel’s distinction between Substance and 
Subject. The latter elucidated this distinction within the context of consciousness. We 
observed earlier in the previous chapter that a ‘disparity […] exists in consciousness between 
the ‘I’ [as the knowing Subject] and the substance which is [this knowledge’s] object.’906 
This disparity is the work of the negative which sets up oppositions by becoming an other 
to itself; nevertheless, it is also the work of the same negative to negate these oppositions by 
returning to itself.907 We observed that the outcome of such return, according to Hegel, is 
the Substance which proves itself to be essentially the Subject; that is to say, the outcome is 
a reunified Substance and Subject intrinsic to a self-conscious Spirit the phenomenology of 
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which is finally complete.908 By opposing Man to Nature, Kojève was enacting the disparity 
which Hegel suggested exists within consciousness. Therefore, the former explained that,  
[i]t is Negativity […] that splits […] Being into Object and Subject, 
in creating a Man opposed to Nature. But it is also this same 
Negativity, realised as human existence in the midst of Nature, that 
reunites anew the Subject and Object in and through true 
consciousness, in which Discourse coincides with the Being that it 
reveals.909  
By interpreting the concepts of Subject and Substance as Man and Nature, Kojève elucidated 
the anthropologic aspect of Hegel’s philosophy. This elucidation empowers Man with the 
force of the Negative; hence, Kojève captured the Hegelian completion of the 
phenomenology of Spirit within the context of human reality. However, the significance of 
Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s preface to the Phenomenology is not limited to the emphasis 
the former lay upon the anthropologic feature of the latter’s thought. More importantly, 
Kojève provided an analysis of what the completion of the phenomenology entails for 
human reality and how the account of this phenomenology constitutes the originality of 
Hegel’s thought.    
 In order to clarify the concept of human reality, Kojève compared this concept with 
ancient Greek and Judeo-Christian prehistorical traditions. According to Kojève the ancient 
Greeks and the philosophical traditions that followed them limited themselves ‘to the 
phenomenological, metaphysical, and ontological description of given-Being and of the 
natural and eternal Cosmos.’910 Regarding the Greek tradition’s perception of Man, Kojève 
wrote that,  
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[t]his pretended Man of the ancient or Greek tradition is in fact a 
purely natural being, who has neither freedom, nor history, nor 
individuality properly speaking. Just like the animal, he can only 
represent, in and through his real and active existence, an eternal idea 
or essence, given once and for all and remaining identical with itself. 
Just like the life of an animal, his empirical-existence is absolutely 
determined by the natural place (topos) that he occupies for all time 
in the midst of a given and unchanging Cosmos.911 
Kojève explained that the manner in which man differs from animal in this tradition is man’s 
coherent discourse (i.e. Logos); however, this Logos does not negate the given-Being and 
its ‘appearance in the Cosmos, moreover, could never be explained.’912 Therefore, man and 
his discourse are incorporated into this ‘one and unique Being, which thinks itself eternally 
in its given totality;’ hence, man, in the ancient philosophical tradition, lacks both freedom 
and individuality.913 
 Kojève was of the opinion that Hegel derived the notion of free historical Individual 
from the Judeo-Christian tradition.914 According to Kojève, within this tradition the 
perception of ‘Man differs essentially from Nature,’ and in contrast to the ancient tradition, 
this variance occurs ‘not in [Man’s] thought alone, but by his very activity.’915 He explained 
that in Judeo-Christianity, Nature is regarded as a sin in and for Man which he must oppose 
and negate by not submitting to its laws or miracles despite the fact that he lives in it.916 It 
is in light of this opposition that man frees himself from the natural World and creates his 
own historical World wherein a free conversion can take place.917 Kojève noted that, this is 
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man’s conversion from ‘an eternal or immutably given species’ into a self-created man who 
is ‘an individual unique of its kind.’918 Kojève referred to the aforementioned triad of 
freedom, historicity and individuality as the spirituality of Man and he read Hegel’s use of 
the word Spirit as the latter’s attempt to underscore the Judeo-Christian perception of free, 
historical and individual Man.  
 However, the significance of Kojève’s analysis lies not in recounting the similarities 
between the Judeo-Christian tradition and Hegel’s thought but in the former’s analysis of 
the difference between this tradition and the latter’s thought. According to this analysis, 
contrasting accounts of the manner in which Spirit fully manifests itself comprise the 
difference. Kojève explained that although the notion of spirituality of man is a Judeo-
Christian invention, this tradition ‘has maintained itself in the course of modern times in the 
form of faith or theology.’919 Within this essentially religious or theist tradition, Kojève 
noted that, ‘spirituality is realised and manifests itself fully only in the beyond, and Spirit, 
properly so-called, truly objectively-real Spirit, is God: that is to say, an infinite and eternal 
being.’920 In other words, the actualisation of Spirit takes place in a transcendental World of 
the beyond into which Man gains access only after his death. Such access ensures the 
immortality of the soul of Man; however, this divine or eternal World of the beyond is not 
the historical World Man creates by negating or transforming Nature. The former is a given 
World which does not depend upon Man, and ‘its one and unique totality, which is Spirit, is 
not Man but God.’921 Therefore, Kojève suggested that the tradition which invented the free, 
historical, and individual Man, subordinates this spirituality to a God that ‘can be nothing 
other than the one and unique Being who thinks himself while remaining eternally 
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identical to himself.’922 Kojève noted the similarity of this Judeo-Christian God with the one 
and unique Being of the aforementioned ancient Greek tradition.923  
 According to Kojève, Hegel derived the spiritual triad of Man from the Judeo-
Christian tradition; however, he did also ‘understood that Man could not be a free historical 
individual except on condition of being mortal in the proper and strong sense of the term, 
that is, finite in time and conscious of his finitude.’924 Therefore, Hegel’s Spirit appears as 
Man-in-the-World.925 This appearance is in stark contrast with the Judeo-Christian Spirit 
whose manifestation in a transcendental World subordinates the freedom, historicity, and 
the individuality of Man to the unique totality of God. Kojève claimed that Hegel’s 
derivation of the spirituality of Man is a ‘radically secularised or atheistic form’ of the Judeo-
Christian anthropological tradition.926 In support of this claim, Kojève pointed to the 
following passage in the preface: 
The Spirit that, so developed, knows itself as Spirit, is Science; 
Science is [Spirit’s] actuality and the realm which [Spirit] builds for 
itself in its own element.927 
Science, according to Kojève, denotes Hegelian philosophy which appears ‘in the midst of 
the natural World at the end of the historical becoming of Man’ and encompasses ‘the true 
meaning of all the discourses spoken by men in the course of History.’928 Therefore, the 
Hegelian Spirit is the sum total of human discourse revealing a human reality. However, as 
mentioned above, Hegel’s Scientific or radically secularist turn is conditioned upon the 
rejection of the Judeo-Christian notion of the immortality of Man’s soul — a notion which 
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subordinates Man’s spirituality to God’s uniqueness. This rejection, as we observed above, 
necessitates the conception of Man as mortal.  
 In what follows, I present an account of Kojève’s analysis of the notions of human 
reality and Discourse. The purpose of this presentation is to outline Kojève’s underlying 
argument that the philosophy of Hegel is a philosophy of death.929 Above, I referred to two 
specific features of the notions of human reality and Discourse. The first feature was that, 
this reality is established by Man’s negation of Nature. The second was that, this reality is 
conditioned by Man’s mortality. In order to highlight the contours of his aforementioned 
argument, I take into account Kojève’s elaboration of these two features. This elaboration 
focuses upon the complexity of Man’s negation of the Nature in which he also exists and 
upon the manifestation of the condition of mortality through understanding’s separation of 
essence from existence. I begin with Kojève’s engagement with the second feature.  
 Science, grasped as the discursive revelation of human reality, is tasked with the 
fulfilment of the condition of man’s mortality; according to Kojève, this task is achieved 
through the philosophical explanation of ‘Man understood as free historical Individual.’930 
This explanation is offered on three levels; ontological, metaphysical and 
phenomenological. In the first level, Man must be described as ‘finite in and through 
himself;’ in the second level, ‘as worldly or spatial and temporal;’ and in the final level, as 
‘mortal.’931 Kojève further elaborated the phenomenological level: ‘On this last level, Man 
appears as a being who is always conscious of his death, who often freely accepts it, and, 
aware of what he is doing, sometimes inflicts it on himself.’932 
 Expression of mortality in three distinct philosophical levels underlies Kojève’s 
argument that the philosophy of Hegel is the philosophy of death. In order to shed light upon 
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the way in which this expression is manifested — in other words, in order to explain how 
man becomes conscious of his death — Kojève referred to Hegel’s notion of Understanding. 
We previously observed that, in Hegel’s perspective, Understanding embodies the power of 
the negative.933 This power is deemed by Hegel as the absolute power, and, as such, it leads 
to the activity of separation.934 Kojève interpreted this activity as Man’s ability to separate 
the constitutive elements of the totality in order to be able to reveal these elements in 
‘isolated words or partial discourses.’935 Thus, man’s revelatory use of words amounted to 
the negation of natural or immediate relation between existence and essence.936 Kojève 
explained that, 
[t]he absolute power of Understanding goes so far as to separate an 
essence from its natural support: The essence dog is separated from 
this dog that runs and barks here and now […] Once detached from 
its natural support, the essence becomes meaning or idea. But the 
meaning does not float in the void: It is necessarily the meaning of a 
word or of a discourse.937 
The negation of natural or immediate relation between existence and essence results in 
‘disengaging meaning from [given-]Being, of separating essence from existence and of 
embodying the meaning-essence in discourse.’938 Kojève interpreted man’s derivation of 
meaning from the negation of given-Being or Natural existence, as action or labour.939 This 
action was considered by Hegel to be ‘most astonishing.’940 Kojève explained what is most 
astonishing or miraculous about this action in the following:  
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Now the essence is a bound-entity, tied to its [natural] support, and 
it is objectively-real only in its connection with its support. 
Nevertheless Understanding succeeds in separating the essence from 
its natural support and procures for it an empirical-existence of its 
own by incarnating it in a spoken, written, or thought word or 
discourse.941  
By creating this empirical-existence, action, that is the embodiment of the force of the 
negative, produces ‘an autonomous reality’ wherein empirically existing essence becomes 
meaning and thereby acquires its own ‘separated-or-isolated freedom.’942 Miraculous is, 
therefore, ‘the fact that some thing [i.e. essence] that is really inseparable from some other 
thing [i.e. its natural support] achieves nevertheless a separate existence.’943  
 Kojève was of the opinion that this miracle does not only bring discourse into 
existence, but it also is ‘the miracle of the existence of Man in the world.’944 Kojève formed 
this opinion by applying the separation effected by Understanding to the notion of Man: 
For Man is also a bound-being that is objectively-real only in its 
connection with something-else: he is nothing without the animal 
that serves him as support, and he is pure nothingness outside the 
natural World. Yet nevertheless he separates himself from this 
World and opposes himself to it. He creates for himself an empirical-
existence of his own, essentially different from every purely natural 
empirical existence.945 
Man’s own empirical-existence affords him a separate sphere of freedom; however, this 
separation has repercussions for the animal which constitutes Man’s natural support. Kojève 
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explained that Man’s freedom ‘permits him to move and to act completely differently from 
the way in which the animal that incarnates him would have moved and acted, if that animal 
did not incarnate Negativity and were not therefore an Ego who thinks and who speaks.’946 
Thus, Kojève wrote that ‘just like the discourse he utters, Man is not a given-Being, nor is 
he the accident of a Substance. He is the result of effort by an absolute power, and he is that 
power itself: He is Negativity incarnate.’947 On the one hand, elaboration of the embodiment 
of Negativity illuminates the aforementioned conditionality of mortality. On the other, we 
already observed that, action, which utilises the force of the negative, separates essence from 
existence. In the case of essence that is Man and the animal that is his natural support, the 
latter must, therefore, be negated. In what follows, I present Kojève’s further clarification 
of the conditionality of mortality and the complexity inherent to the negation of the animal. 
 Previously, I referred to Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel’s notion of scientific 
system of truth as the discursive revelation of human reality. We observed that Hegel’s 
radically secularist approach to the spirituality of Man necessitated the condition of man’s 
mortality. According to Kojève, Science meets this condition by incorporating mortality into 
three levels of philosophical explanation of this reality. We observed that within the context 
of Judeo-Christian theology, the spiritual triad of man is subordinated to a transcendental 
notion of one God. In order to maintain his freedom, historicity and individuality, Man had 
to be emancipated from this theological subordination. We observed above that the condition 
of Man’s mortality arises from this necessity. While the Judeo-Christian comparison reveals 
the necessity of this condition; the manner in which this condition must be expressed within 
three levels of philosophy is revealed by the notion of Man as Negativity incarnate.  
 Therefore, on the ontological level, Kojève explained that Negativity is pure 
Nothingness, and, as such, it corresponds to the annihilation of Being.948 This is the reason 
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why, on this level, man, as negativity incarnate, must be described as ‘finite in and through 
himself.’949 If Action is Negativity and Negativity is Nothingness, Action has to enact the 
annihilation of Being. The resultant finitude of Being would, however, occasion the finitude 
of Action.950 Thus, on the metaphysical level, the historical World has to have a beginning 
and an end since the Action which creates this World is itself finite.951 In light of this 
finitude, Kojève explained the metaphysical description of man ‘as worldly or spatial and 
temporal.’952 Finally, on the phenomenological level, ‘an entity that is Action in its very 
being [can only appear] to itself and to others as irremediably mortal.’953 
 As I pointed out earlier, the consequences of man’s incarnation as negativity is 
twofold. While this incarnation determines the condition of mortality, it does also suggest 
the negation of the animal which provides natural support for man. Despite the fact that 
without this support man would cease to exist, Kojève noted that, with this negation, man 
achieves the separation from the natural World. This achievement underlies Kojève’s 
continuous emphasis on the notion of Man’s opposition to Nature. Having created himself 
a separate empirical-existence, Man differentiates himself from ‘every purely natural 
empirical existence.’954 In what follows, I consider Kojève’s interpretation of the impact of 
this separation upon the animal that naturally supports man. This interpretation brings to the 
fore the impossibility of killing man’s natural support and reflects death as postponed.  
 With the force of the negative, Understanding effects a dissolution. Hegel described 
the outcome of this dissolution as an essential moment which is both separated and non-
actual.955 This non-actuality amounted to death.956 Using the notions of negativity and death 
interchangeably, Hegel wrote that ‘Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death’ and that, 
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‘Spirit is the power only by looking negative in the face and tarrying with it.’957 Taking 
Hegel’s perspective into account and in light of his own description of Man as Negative 
incarnate, Kojève wrote that ‘Man is, in his human or speaking existence, only a death.’958 
However, in view of the fact that man would not survive the negation of the animal which 
provides him natural support, Kojève deemed this death ‘more of less deferred, and 
conscious of itself.’959 
 Death is postponed for the reason that the consciousness of man’s finitude suffices 
to engender Man in Nature and occasion the birth of his Discourse.960 Therefore, Kojève 
explained that ‘Discourse is born in the Man who opposes himself to Nature, or who negates 
— in Struggle — the given animal that he is himself, and through Labour, the natural World 
that is given to him.’961 The reference to the negation of the animal in the preceding quote 
does not amount to the actual death of the animal for the negation is contextualised within 
the life and death struggle for recognition — or as Kojève called it, struggle for pure prestige: 
For it is in the Struggle to the death, for pure prestige, that the power 
of the Negative manifests itself through the voluntary acceptance of 
the risk of life (the Master) or through the anguish inspired by the 
conscious apparition of death (the Slave), it is only in the Struggle 
that Man creates his human being, by thus transforming, as if by 
magic, the Nothingness that he is and that is manifest to him and 
through him as death, into a negative existence, of the warrior and of 
the labourer, creators both, of History.962 
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The reference to negation does not denote the death of the animal but the risking of its life. 
The manifestation of the power of the negative occurs as Master’s voluntary acceptance of 
the risk of death and not his actual commitment of suicide or murder. In addition, for the 
same manifestation, the Slave does not have to die as a ‘conscious apparition of death’ 
would suffice for him to become one of the creators of History. With the contextualisation 
of death within the struggle for recognition, one can begin to understand death as something 
other than the actual killing of the animal.  
 Kojève wrote that negation or negative Action is that which ‘realises Nothingness 
by nullifying Being — the given-being of Man in the Struggle, and the given-being of Nature 
through Labour;’ therefore, man, who in his very being is this Action, is ‘death that lives a 
human life.’963 However, we already observed that, Man’s negation of Nature is through his 
Labour. Thus, this type of negation constitutes transformation of nature and not necessarily 
death. Neither did Kojève refer to actual death in relation to the power of Understanding, 
with which man encompassed the force of the negative:  
For it is in separating and recombining [constitutive elements of 
totality] in and through his discursive thought that man forms his 
technical projects, which, once realised through work, really 
transform the aspect of the natural and given World by creating 
therein a World of culture.964 
Therefore, there only remains man’s negation of himself wherein death might play an actual 
role. The outcome of this type of negation is man’s own separation from the immediacy of 
nature. However, we also know that for such separation man’s consciousness of his own 
death suffices. Kojève explained that ‘the human being, to the extent that he implies the 
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consciousness of and the will for his own death, is a being mediated by Negation — that is, 
a dialectical being.’965 
 The mediation of man into a dialectical being is achieved through man’s cognisance 
of his own death.966 While this mediation ensures the triad of spirituality for man in his 
historical world, Kojève referred to the notion of recognition to explain how this spirituality 
is safeguarded: 
To be sure, the idea of death does not add to the well-being of man; 
it does not make him happy, and procures no pleasure for him, nor 
any joy. But is unique in being able to satisfy his pride, [that is to 
say,] the full satisfaction of the human and anthropogenetic desire 
for Recognition of man’s desire to see all other man attribute an 
absolute value to his free historical individuality or to his 
personhood.967  
The desire for recognition, however, leads to a life and death struggle the outcome of which 
is the relation between master and slave. Kojève ended his argument on Hegel’s philosophy 
and its relation to death by demonstrating how within the above-mentioned relation the idea 
of death manifests itself. Confirming that Hegel’s intention within the context of the struggle 
for recognition was not to associate the realisation of Man with actual death or annihilation, 
Kojève wrote that ‘mere risk of life suffices to realise the human being.’968 It is this act of 
risking one’s life that humanises the Master. 969  The Slave, however, does not take this risk; 
it is his act of running away from this risk that enslaves him in the first place. Nonetheless, 
Kojève noted that the latter is also humanised, not by risking his life, but ‘through the 
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cognisance he takes of his essential finitude in experiencing the dread of death.’970 
Therefore, as a man conscious of his death, Slave transforms the world through his labour. 
Kojève remarked that it is this transformation that helps Slave to ‘[raise] himself to the level 
of discursive thought and [elaborate] the abstract notion of freedom.’971 Slave’s 
development is in stark contrast to Master who, as Kojève understood, ‘remains forever 
fixed in his humanity as Master.’972 The consequence of this fixity is that Slave is exclusively 
capable of creating himself through transformative Labour as the Man who is ‘free and 
ultimately fully satisfied’ and as ‘the individual who freely creates History.’973 Kojève 
insisted that ‘we must not forget to notice that Service and Labour are free and creative only 
to the extent that they are accomplished within or in terms of the Dread that is born of the 
consciousness of death. It is therefore, when all is said and done, this consciousness of death 
that humanises Man and constitutes the ultimate basis of his humanity.’974 
 To sum up my preceding engagement with Kojève’s work, above I presented 
Kojève’s argument that the philosophy of Hegel is a philosophy of death. This argument 
was premised upon what Kojève regarded as an anthropocentric turn in Hegel’s philosophy. 
By replacing the notion of divine God with that of mortal Man, Hegel’s anthropocentric 
approach confirmed and sustained the historicity, freedom, and the individuality of Man. 
Kojève emphasised that the modus operandi of this turn is the force of the negative which is 
embodied by Man. However, Kojève also associated negativity with the notion of death. 
With this association, he situated Man against Nature and emphasised the negation of the 
animal for the attainment of Human reality.  
 In Kojève’s reading, the struggle for recognition encompasses man’s encounter with 
death wherein master emerges triumphant having voluntarily risked his life. However, 
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bondsman is enslaved for shying away from death; nevertheless, bondsman does eventually 
gain his humanness through his labour which transforms the given world into a world of 
culture. Kojève fitted the notion of death into the process of recognition by commenting that 
mere risking of life would suffice for man to pass the life and death struggle and attain 
humanness. Negativity initially corresponded to death which was concomitant with 
nothingness. However, the struggle for recognition transformed this nothingness into a risk; 
that is to say, one would not have to commit absolutely to death whether this meant murder 
or suicide. Instead, to take the risk would suffice for attaining freedom, historicity and 
individuality. In other words, Kojève read recognition as a process of risk-taking which is 
oriented towards the notion of death and thought that this orientation was essential for man 
to achieve his human reality. Kojève’s interpretation of the notions of negativity and death 
sets up the basis for George Bataille’s critique of Hegel’s work. This critique is relevant for 
understanding the repercussions of servile-consciousness upon the process of recognition. 
In the next part of this chapter, I present Bataille’s critique with a particular focus on the 
notions of subterfuge and servility.    
 
Part Two  
Bataille on Hegel (via Kojève): Subterfuge, Sovereignty, and Sacrifice 
 In his essay ‘Hegel, Death and Sacrifice’ Bataille argued that subterfuge and servility 
underlie the process of recognition.975 The point of departure for Bataille’s argument is 
Kojève’s situation of man in opposition to nature and the resultant complexity that pertains 
to man’s negation of the very nature in which he exists. Within the context of this chapter, 
reference to Bataille’s critique of Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s thought serves two purposes. 
Firstly, the critique brings to the fore the aforementioned complexity as a subterfuge which 
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the notion of negation/death has to undergo in Hegel’s thought. This subterfuge is 
epitomised by the notion of sacrifice. Thus, secondly, Bataille’s work demonstrates Hegel’s 
dismissal of the lessons of sacrifice to confine negation to the servile ends of knowledge; 
this is a confinement which, in turn, elucidates the very effects of servile consciousness upon 
the theory of recognition.    
  Therefore, I commence this part of the chapter by introducing Bataille’s derivation 
of subterfuge from man’s paradoxical negation of nature. I show that Bataille associated 
subterfuge with the notion of sacrifice. Next, I consider Bataille’s distinction between two 
possible approaches to the idea of sacrifice, the restrictive approach found in Hegel’s work, 
and another conducted through the notion of sovereignty. In order to present this distinction, 
I, first, introduce Bataille’s idea of sovereignty as life beyond utility, life opposed to servility 
and to limits. Then I show how Bataille used this conception to point out the restrictive 
elements in Hegel’s take on sacrifice. Bataille located this take in Hegel’s discourse on 
absolute knowledge and understood this knowledge to limit the potential of negation to the 
consciousness of death. Bataille contrasted this approach to the sovereign moment of 
unknowing in which all limits set by fear of death are transgressed. Inasmuch as the notion 
of negativity hinted at the possibility of such transgression, Hegel imposed the 
aforementioned limit onto this notion through the process of recognition and the ensuing life 
and death struggle — a limit which was finally manifest in the notion of servile 
consciousness. This is a particular type of consciousness which holds desire in check and 
advances labour for the servile purposes of absolute knowledge. I conclude this part by 
referring to Bataille’s interpretation of the servile operation of knowledge as a blind spot 
which kept Hegel from utilising the full potential of the link between negation and death.  
 As I mentioned above, Bataille’s engagement with Kojève’s work is premised upon 
the former’s reading of the latter’s notion of Man in opposition to Nature. Within the context 
of this opposition, Man negates Nature and it is as a result of this negation that Man creates 
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a historical world. According to Bataille to pay attention to the primary consequences of this 
negation entails the following: 
[…] the man who negates nature could not in any way live outside 
of it. He is not merely a man who negates nature, he is first of all an 
animal, that is to say the very thing he negates: he cannot therefore 
negate nature without negating himself. 976 
We observed above that, in Kojève’s perspective, man’s negation of himself corresponds to 
a death ‘more or less deferred, and conscious of itself.’977 According to Bataille, however, 
such consciousness was inherently paradoxical: 
[i]n order for man to reveal himself ultimately to himself, he would 
have to die, but he would have to do it while living — watching 
himself ceasing to be. In other words, death itself would have to 
become (self-) consciousness at the very moment that it annihilates 
the conscious being.978  
In light of the impossibility of being conscious of one’s own death, Kojève employed the 
notion of recognition to explain death’s deferral. We observed that with this notion, the act 
of tarrying with the negative/death is transformed into a mere risking of one’s life. In order 
to reveal the consequences of this deferral Bataille juxtaposed the notion of sacrifice with 
Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s preface.  
 Bataille did not reject Kojève’s reading that consciousness of death engenders Man 
in Nature; nonetheless, the former recognised the above-mentioned complexity of attaining 
this consciousness. In view of this recognition, Bataille reasoned that ‘[the] difficulty [of 
attaining consciousness of death] proclaims the necessity of spectacle, or of 
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representation.’979 In other words, in order to become a Man amidst Nature ‘at all costs, man 
must live at the moment that he really dies, or he must live with the impression of really 
dying.’980 Sacrifice is the age old spectacle which provides such impression and, according 
to Bataille, this spectacle is implicitly represented in Hegel’s preface.981 The former 
explained that ‘[i]n the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is 
struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die, and even, in a certain way, by his 
own will, one in spirit with the sacrificial weapon.’982 Bataille’s juxtaposition of sacrifice 
with Kojève’s reading renders intelligible two intrinsic features of Hegel’s thought. These 
are subterfuge and servility.  
 Bataille thought that, consciousness of death can only be attained through subterfuge 
which the spectacle of sacrifice epitomises.983 This is a necessary deception ‘without the 
practice of which it would be possible for us to remain alien and ignorant of death, just as 
beasts apparently are.’984 While Kojève covertly opted for the idea of risking one’s life in a 
struggle for recognition to circumvent the above-mentioned impossibility, Bataille overtly 
pointed out the inherent necessity of subterfuge. The latter explained this necessity in the 
following way:  
Man does not live by bread alone, but also by the comedies with 
which he willingly deceives himself. In man it is the animal, it is the 
natural being, which eats. But man takes part in rites and 
performances. Or else, he can read: to the extent that it is sovereign 
— authentic — literature prolongs in him the haunting magic of 
performances, tragic or comic. 985  
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Therefore, according to Bataille, the subterfuge is not peculiar to Hegel’s thought for the 
reason that with the representation of death in art, festivals or performances ‘it is all of 
humanity which everywhere always sought, obliquely, to seize what death both gave and 
took away from humanity.’986 What is peculiar to Hegel’s thought is, nonetheless, the 
rejection of the sovereign aspect of this comedy or tragedy. Before considering Bataille’s 
analysis of this rejection, however, it is necessary to provide a brief explanation of the way 
in which Bataille employed the notion of sovereignty. 
 The third volume of Bataille’s Accursed Share bears the title Sovereignty. Under this 
title, Bataille studied the conceptual link between the notions of sovereignty, miracle, 
unknowing and death, and juxtaposed this link with Hegel’s discourse on knowledge to 
expose the boundaries of this discourse. The volume opens with Bataille’s warning that his 
perception of sovereignty has not much in common with ‘the sovereignty of States, as 
international law defines it.’987 His notion of sovereignty consists of ‘an aspect that is 
opposed to the servile and the subordinate.’988 Within the context of this opposition, Bataille 
explained that, ‘the sovereign (or the sovereign life) begins when, with the necessities 
ensured, the possibility of life opens without limit.’989 Theoretically, this is not the life of ‘a 
man [who is] compelled to work [and to consume] the products without which production 
would not be possible.’990 In light of such utility oriented consumption, Bataille noted that 
‘it is servile to consider duration first, to employ the present time for the sake of future.’991 
In contrast to this servility, ‘[life] beyond utility is the domain of sovereignty’ wherein ‘the 
sovereign consumes rather the surplus of production [and, therefore,] truly enjoys the 
products of this world.’992  
                                               
986 Ibid, p.288.  
987 Bataille G., Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy Volumes II & III, (New York: Zone Books, 
1993) p.197. 
988 Ibid.  
989 Ibid, p.198.  
990 Ibid. 
991 Ibid.  
992 Ibid.  
   297
 Bataille associated the notion of miracle with that of sovereignty; he declared that 
‘[b]eyond need, the object of desire is, humanly, the miracle; it is sovereign life, beyond the 
necessary that suffering defines.’993 Furthermore, he explained that, 
this miracle to which the whole of humanity aspires is manifested 
among us in the form of beauty, of wealth — in the form, moreover, 
of violence, of funeral and sacred sadness; in the form of glory.994 
The significance of the association among the notions of miracle and sovereignty is clarified 
within the context of Bataille’s differentiation between the latter notion and that of 
knowledge. Knowledge, according to Bataille, contrasts with sovereignty on the account of 
the former being ‘always a servile operation, indefinitely resumed, indefinitely repeated.’995 
Bataille relied on Hegel for the affirmation of the servility of knowledge:  
Hegel saw very well that, were it acquired in a thorough and 
definitive way, knowledge is never given to us except by unfolding 
in time. It is not given in a sudden illumination of the mind but in a 
discourse, which is necessarily deployed in duration. Knowledge and 
the most profound knowledge, never appears to us in full except, 
finally, as the result of a calculated effort, an operation useful to 
some end. Knowledge [cannot] in any way be confused with the last 
moment or the end of the operation; it is the entire operation.996 
Knowledge is servile for the very reason that its revelation extends to a duration and requires 
utilitarian work. As we observed above, Bataille opposed sovereignty to servility. The 
former notion cannot have a duration which would necessitate some sort of servile work. 
Therefore, Bataille noted that sovereignty occurs in a moment, and since to know would be 
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servile, ‘we know nothing absolutely, of the moment.’997 In other words, one cannot have 
access to this sovereign moment through knowing; this access could only be gained by the 
consciousness of the moment. However, in view of the opposition between sovereignty and 
knowing, Bataille argued that, ‘[c]onsciousness of the moment is not truly such, is not 
sovereign, except in unknowing.’998 Miracle plays an important role in attaining this 
consciousness.  
 Bataille explained unknowing as the nullification of every function of knowing 
within one’s self.999 Such nullification is effected by severing the continuous process of 
thinking. This severance is possible ‘in the grip of strong emotions that shut off, interrupt or 
override the flow of thought.’1000 Bursts of laughter and/or tears attest to these moments; 
these are bursts that fill in the ‘vacuum of thought’ created by the object of laughter or tears 
in one’s mind.1001 Bataille regarded this vacuum as ‘the moment of rupture, of fissure’ which 
‘the deeply rhythmed movements of poetry, of music, of love, of dance, have the power to 
capture and endlessly recapture.’1002 The rapture is the ‘miraculous moment when 
anticipation dissolves into nothing.’1003 Bataille expanded upon this miraculous moment by 
stating that,  
it is the moment when we are relieved of anticipation, man’s 
customary misery, of the anticipation that enslaves, that subordinates 
the present moment to some anticipated result. Precisely in the 
miracle, we are thrust from our anticipation of the future into the 
presence of the moment, of the moment illuminated by a miraculous 
light, the light of sovereignty of life delivered from its servitude.1004 
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What thrusts one from the anticipation of future into the present moment is an uncalculated 
reaction and/or an unreasoned impulse which the miracle evokes.1005 The miraculous quality 
which evokes such reaction, as Bataille noted, ‘is conveyed rather exactly by the expression: 
impossible and yet there it is.’1006 In other words, ‘[w]hat matters most from [the point of 
anticipation’s dissolution into nothing] is that an unanticipated, unhoped-for aspect, 
considered impossible, reveals itself.’1007 Therefore, death, which causes sadness, is as much 
miraculous as beauty, which inspires joy; for death may also be regarded as ‘an impossibility 
that suddenly changes into a reality.’1008  
 In addition to its miraculous character, death has a certain preeminence over man’s 
activity; this pre-eminence manifests itself as a contradiction within man’s world of 
practice.1009 Bataille explained that the world of practice is the objective world which was 
first posited by the primitive man’s use of the ‘crude flint tool;’ he argued that in this world, 
man himself also becomes an object similar to the tool that he uses.1010 However, man cannot 
remain as an object or a thing within the world of practice for the reason that he also dies 
and decomposes. The contradiction is inherent in the fact that man is both a thing and not a 
thing; according to Bataille, this contradiction engenders a sacred world:  
Within the world of practice the sacred is essentially that which, 
although impossible, is nonetheless there, which is at the same time 
removed from the world of practice (insofar as it might destroy it) 
and valorised as something that frees itself from the subordinating 
characterisation of the world.1011 
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While the world of practice is subordinating, that is to say, it is a world wherein man serves 
a purpose, it is, nonetheless, an ordered world the coherence of which is established by man’s 
work.1012 The significance of death lays in the threat it poses to this coherence; ‘death in the 
midst of things that are well ordered in their coherence is an effect that disturbs that order, 
and which by a kind of miracle escapes that coherence.’1013 The cause of this disturbance is 
death’s destruction of the future of any man it strikes.1014 This destruction cannot be 
integrated into the coherent order of the world of practice. The reason for this is given above; 
servility, which is inherent to this world, is concomitant with employing present for the sake 
of future. Destruction of future instills fear of death into man; this fear, in turn, captures man 
in a continuous state of anticipation. Thus, Bataille commented that ‘man is always more or 
less in a state of anguish, because he is always in a state of anticipation.’1015  
 We previously observed that life beyond utility is the domain of sovereignty. While 
servility manifests itself in the utilisation of present in the interest of future, sovereignty 
occurs in the present moment. Similarly, since the world of practice is a world of anticipation 
pervaded by fear of death and the resultant anguish, Bataille wrote that, ‘in a fundamental 
sense, to live sovereignly is to escape, if not death, at least the anguish of death.’1016 This 
escape necessitates the ‘denial of the sentiments that death controls.’1017 In other words, 
Bataille explained that, ‘sovereignty is essentially the refusal to accept the limits that the 
fear of death would have us respect in order to ensure, in a general way, the laboriously 
peaceful life of individuals.’1018 The fear of death generates anticipation wherein man 
projects himself into a future; according to Bataille, this projection is ‘the precondition for 
conscious individualisation.’1019 Since sovereignty is situated in opposition to servile 
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utilisation of present for future, the former notion exists in the present moment. It escapes 
fear of death, anticipation of future, and the resultant anguish by existing within the moment. 
In addition to this existence, sovereignty opposes ‘a playful impulse’ to individual 
consciousness which underlies the world of practice.1020 While fear of death conditions this 
consciousness to work, sovereignty opposes this condition by play.1021 Bataille exemplified 
the play with a reference to the Egyptian pyramids; 
[in] the eyes of the Egyptians, the pyramid was an image of solar 
radiance. In the person of the dead king, death was changed into a 
radiance, changed into an indefinite being […] There [in the 
pyramid] death is no longer anything but death’s inability to 
maintain an icy little horror, which is the projected shadow of 
individual anguish.1022 
It is with the defiance of the horror of death that sovereignty transgresses its limits; sovereign 
makes a game of the pyramids for the very reason that the world of practice is absent from 
these structures — an absence marked by death’s above-mentioned inability. Along with 
laughter, tears, poetry, tragedy, comedy, ecstasy, the funeral horror, beauty, and the sacred, 
play is included in Bataille’s list of forms of effusions which his virtual sovereignty would 
conjoin if one was to ‘secretly attain it.’1023  
 In the foregoing, I provided an account of Bataille’s concept of sovereignty. For this 
account, I relied on the latter’s book entitled Accursed Share the third volume of which is 
devoted to this concept. The purpose of this account was to inform Bataille’s analysis of 
Hegel’s thought in his essay ‘Hegel, Death and Sacrifice.’ I introduced the essay above and 
highlighted Bataille’s argument that subterfuge and servility are inherent to Hegel’s notion 
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of absolute knowledge. In the essay, in order to render these inherent features more 
intelligible, Bataille contrasted absolute knowledge with the notion of sovereignty (hence, 
the need to refer to Accursed Share for a clearer perception of Bataille’s understanding of 
the latter notion). Bataille’s central argument was that, although he came very close, Hegel 
failed to find authentic sovereignty or full autonomy.1024 With the above-reference to 
Accursed Share, we now know that such full autonomy is concomitant with sovereign’s 
transgression of all limits set by death within the world of practice. In other words, it is the 
transgression of the rules that engender and maintain servility. With the purpose of 
demonstrating Hegel’s failure, Bataille focused upon the absence of two notions from the 
former’s scheme of absolute knowledge. These notions are beauty and sacred horror.   
 We previously observed that, according to Hegel, beauty cannot meet 
understanding’s demand to tarry with the negative. While he did not expand upon beauty’s 
inability to do so, Hegel only stated that ‘Beauty hates Understanding for asking her what it 
cannot do.’1025 Thus, in Hegel’s perspective, beauty is ostensibly impotent. Bataille 
explained this impotency with his perception of beauty as sovereign; beauty cannot act to 
meet this demand, for the reason that the action of supporting and maintaining ‘the work of 
human death’ would contradict the very notion of sovereignty — the notion which Bataille 
opposed to servile work and fear of death.1026 As sovereign, beauty is an end, and therefore, 
cannot be a laborious activity in anticipation of an end which is not itself, or a future for 
which the present is forsaken: 
[Beauty] cannot become conscious negativity, awakened in 
dismemberment, and the lucid gaze, absorbed in the negative. This 
latter attitude presupposes the violent and laborious struggle of man 
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against nature and is its end. That is the historic struggle where man 
constitutes himself as subject […] 1027  
On the one hand, Bataille acknowledged that Hegel’s theory of recognition is instrumental 
in the constitution of the subject. On the other, Hegel’s dismissal of the notion of beauty as 
impotent testifies to the gap between Hegel’s thought and Bataille’s perception of 
sovereignty. In order to further elucidate this gap, Bataille contrasted Hegel’s reaction vis-
à-vis death to that of naive man of sacrifice. 
 What distinguishes Hegel from the naivety of man of sacrifice is the former’s 
conscious depiction of negativity; Bataille explained that ‘Hegel was conscious of his 
representation of the negative: he situated it, lucidly, in a definite point of the coherent 
discourse which revealed him to himself. That totality included the discourse which reveals 
it.’1028 The man of sacrifice, however, is naive for the reason that he lacked ‘a discursive 
consciousness of what he did, [and] had only a sensual awareness, [that is to say,] an obscure 
one, reduced to an unintelligible emotion.’1029 For the naive man of sacrifice this emotion 
may remain unintelligible; nevertheless, Bataille identified the emotion as sacred horror: 
the richest and the most agonising experience [which] opens itself, 
like a theatre curtain, on to a realm beyond this world, where the 
rising light of day transfigures all things and destroys their limited 
meaning.1030  
In light of the above-presented engagement with the Accursed Share, one can assume that 
the realm beyond this world which Bataille mentioned in the above-indented quote is the 
sacred domain of sovereignty. This assumption can be verified by Bataille’s verdict that, 
while Hegel might have implicitly referred to sacrifice in the preface and, perhaps, was not 
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unaware of its moment, the latter, nonetheless, ‘did not see that sacrifice in itself bore 
witness to the entire movement of death.’1031 This is the movement which, in the Accursed 
Share, leads to sovereignty.  In other words, sacrifice horrifies the naive man and the horror, 
in turn, generates a sacred world. This world is removed from the world of practice for the 
reason that fear or the horror and the agony of death disturbs the coherence therein 
established by man’s work. Thus, sovereignty is attained by transgressing the limits which 
are governed by this fear. However, Hegel did not follow this route in its entirety, and 
therefore, ‘did not know to what extent he was right — with what precision he described the 
intimate movement of negativity.’1032 That is to say, he did not reach the sacred domain of 
sovereignty by overcoming the fear of death.  
 Instead of the fear of death and its overcoming, Hegel focused upon the 
consciousness of death. In the previous section we observed that according to Kojève’s 
reading, consciousness of death engendered man in nature and occasioned the birth of his 
discourse. One attains this consciousness by voluntarily risking one’s own life in a struggle 
for recognition; thus, the risking of life becomes the very act whereby the power of negative 
manifests itself. However, while the lord as the winner of the struggle is fixed in his 
humanity, it is the slave who by the experience of dread attains consciousness of death and 
through his labour raises himself to the level of discursive thought.  In view of the servile 
aspect of discourse, Bataille argued that  
[o]nly sacred, poetic words, limited to the level of impotent beauty, 
have retained the power to manifest full sovereignty. Sacrifice, 
consequently, is a sovereign, autonomous manner of being only to 
the extent that it is uninformed by meaningful discourse. To the 
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extent that discourse informs it, what is sovereign is given in terms 
of servitude.1033  
Therefore, by containing the power of negative for the purposes of discourse, Hegel 
distanced himself from what Bataille called sovereignty or full autonomy wherein the limits 
imposed by fear of death are transgressed. Bataille demonstrated Hegel’s failure to attain 
sovereignty through the latter’s exclusion of beauty from his overall scheme of absolute 
knowledge and his conscious rendering of sacrifice.  
 To conclude this part of the chapter, I recapitulate Kojève’s views, which I 
considered in the previous part, on recognition and sum up Bataille’s critique of these views. 
According to Kojève, recognition had a twofold meaning. Firstly, with the struggle for 
recognition one had the chance to voluntarily risk one’s life and thus, attain humanness. 
Secondly, recognition provided full satisfaction to the Wise Man.1034 I previously referred 
to Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy as the Science which encompasses the sum-
total of men’s discourses throughout history. In the former’s perspective, as the author of 
this overall discourse, Hegel is the Wise Man who ‘being satisfied by given-Being, ceases 
to negate it, transform it, and to disfigure it, even if this be only in his discourse.1035 Kojève 
wrote that such satisfaction meant ‘the full satisfaction of the human and anthropogenetic 
desire for Recognition of man’s desire to see all other men attribute an absolute value to his 
free historical individuality or to his personhood.’1036 Hegel is the Wise Man for his 
consciousness of man’s mortality and his awareness of what this consciousness entailed for 
man’s freedom. It is in light of the link between consciousness of death and man’s freedom 
that Kojève dissociated death from feelings of well-being, happiness, pleasure, and joy.1037 
Cognisance of death satisfies the Wise Man, however, not in the sense of giving him pleasure 
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or joy; it does so by occasioning the satisfaction of the anthropogenetic desire for 
Recognition. According to Kojève, the fully satisfied Wise Man embodies the Spirit; ‘[t]he 
point is that, Spirit is Being revealed by speech [or discourse,] and the life of the Spirit is 
the existence of the philosopher or of the Wise Man, conscious of the World and of itself.’1038   
 According to Bataille, however, the discourse of the Wise Man is built upon 
subterfuge and consisted of a servile operation. While subterfuge and servility condemn the 
Wise Man to failure in his attempt to achieve full autonomy, the process of recognition 
becomes an integral part of this failing system of discourse. Bataille based this failure upon 
Hegel’s conscious exclusion of sovereign elements of beauty and sacred horror from the 
latter’s scheme of absolute knowledge. This exclusion evinced Hegel’s failure to 
unreservedly follow the implications of the notion of negativity and revealed the latter’s 
employment of subterfuge to subject this notion to the servility of knowledge. Elsewhere, 
Bataille made a similar argument by submitting that ‘[t]here is in [Hegel’s notion of] 
understanding a blind spot.’1039 This argument is premised upon the idea that to know is to 
relate the unknown to the known.1040 According to Bataille, the consequence of the 
dialectical aspect of Hegel’s circular knowledge is that the unknown is contained within the 
latter’s scheme of absolute knowledge.1041 Therefore, in understanding, which renders man 
the embodiment of the force of the negative — that is to say, the force necessary for the 
completion of the circle and also for the completion of the self — there is a blind spot 
occasioned by the ever-presence of the unknown.   
 Since unknown is dialectically contained within Hegel’s scheme of circular 
knowledge, Bataille pointed out that, within this circle, the movement from the unknown to 
the known is bound to be reversed effecting a return to the unknown.1042 Such return, 
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however, is effected by ‘desire, poetry, laughter [which] unceasingly cause life to slip in the 
opposite direction, moving from the known to the unknown.1043 Hegel, according to Bataille, 
‘gets rid of [desire, poetry and laughter] in a hurry [for] he knows of no other end than 
knowledge.’1044 Through Bataille’s critique one begins to understand servile consciousness 
as a symptom of such blind spot or the aforementioned failure to attain authentic 
sovereignty. Getting rid of desire and favouring labour pertain to the outcome of the process 
of recognition and the manifestation of this outcome is in the shape of servile consciousness. 
In what follows, I shift my focus upon Derrida’s engagement with Bataille’s critique wherein 
the servility of consciousness is interpreted as a restrictive economy of meaning.  
 
Part Three 
Derrida: The Restricted Economy of Recognition 
 In this part of the chapter, I refer to Derrida’s work to elucidate the repercussions of 
subterfuge specifically upon the process of recognition. The point of departure is Derrida’s 
understanding that a ruse of life pertains to the life and death struggle whereby both lives 
remain alive so that truth or meaning can be achieved through self-consciousness. This ruse 
comprises an economy of life which enables lordship to experience his truth, an economy 
that shapes the entire outcome of the process of recognition. Next, I present Derrida’s 
comparison between Hegel’s notion of lordship and Bataille’s idea of Sovereignty to 
emphasise two distinct ways of utilising the notion of negation. While in the life-and-death 
struggle Hegel eschewed absolute negation or actual death via the utilisation of the 
aforementioned ruse, Bataille showed that such negation was capable of transgressing the 
limits of the Hegelian discourse on knowledge.  
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 According to Derrida, Hegel’s sidestepping of the idea of absolute negation and its 
unlimited notional scope amounted to a restricted economy of lordship. This economy is 
epitomised by Hegel’s use of the notion of sublation that canceled in a manner that preserved 
what was being negated. Sublation occasions the aforementioned ruse and the resultant 
economy. This is an economy which holds desire in check and generates servile labour to 
produce absolute knowledge or meaning, but is, nevertheless, blind to what lies beyond this 
meaning. Whereas, in Derrida’s perspective, Bataille’s idea of sovereignty encompasses an 
empty sublation, a negative-without-reserve capable of transgressing the constraints of 
meaning that lordship produces. The without-reserve aspect of the negative, thus, exposes 
two important attributes of Hegel’s thought. Firstly, servile consciousness is the outcome of 
a restricted economy imposed upon the process of recognition. Secondly, however, a radical 
overhaul of such an economy is possible due to a transgressive instant inherent to the very 
notion of negative Hegel utilised. This is an instant which parallels Nancy’s reading of the 
restless negative and, as such, introduces into Hegel’s theory of recognition an element of 
flux, of constant transformation.      
 The purposes of referring to Derrida’s interpretation of servility of consciousness as 
a restrictive economy of recognition are, therefore, threefold. Firstly, this interpretation 
applies Bataille’s critique, which is broadly directed at Hegel’s discourse on knowledge, 
more specifically to the workings and the outcome of the theory of recognition. Secondly, 
in doing so, Derrida’s interpretation renders the failure of the constitutive and the declarative 
theories of recognition more intelligible. In other words, the notion of restrictive economy 
supplements the argument I made in the third chapter regarding the limiting effects of the 
notion of absolute sovereignty on the prevalent theories. Thirdly, inasmuch as Derrida’s 
work exposes the drawbacks of Hegel’s theory of recognition, it does also reveal its inherent 
capacity to overcome these difficulties.    
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 The particular focus of this part of the chapter is upon the essay entitled ‘From 
Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve’ wherein Derrida began 
his assessment of Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave by asking whether Bataille’s notion 
of sovereignty ‘at first glance, translate[s] the lordship of Phenomenology.’1045 To the extent 
that ‘the lord is the man who has had the strength to endure the anguish of death and to 
maintain the work of death’ it may be said that lordship is translated by sovereignty.1046 
However, this translation is only at a first glance since in Derrida’s perspective,   
[l]ordship has a meaning. The putting at stake of life is a moment in 
the constitution of meaning, in the presentation of essence and truth. 
It is an obligatory stage in the history of self-consciousness and 
phenomenality, that is to say, in the presentation of meaning. For 
history — that is, meaning — to form a continuous chain, to be 
woven, the master must experience his truth.1047 
Therefore, insofar as master’s experience is an integral part of the construction of servile 
knowledge or meaning, Hegel’s lordship diverges from Bataille’s sovereignty.   
 According to Derrida, lord experiences his truth under two intertwined conditions; 
he must stay alive to enjoy the benefits of risking his life in the struggle for recognition, and 
the truth of independent consciousness is, nevertheless, the consciousness of bondsman.1048 
I referred to these two conditions in the fourth chapter of this thesis within the context of the 
one-sidedness of the recognition lord derives from staking his life. The essentiality and 
independence of lord is met by the inessentiality and dependence of slave and the thing upon 
which the latter works, and the former consumes. This one-sided recognition results in the 
truth of independent consciousness residing in servile consciousness. Derrida explained the 
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one-sidedness of this recognition and what it entails for servile consciousness as a 
‘dissymmetry, [an] absolute privilege given to the slave.’1049 Two important classifications 
emerge from this dissymmetry.  
 Firstly, according to Derrida, ‘the truth of the master is in the slave; and the slave 
become a master remains a repressed salve. Such is the condition of meaning, of history of 
discourse, of philosophy.’1050 Therefore, contrary to what Kojève predicted, slave cannot 
entirely overcome the master as the repressed servility somehow remains active and, as such, 
underlies what Bataille called the servility of knowledge. Secondly, and more importantly, 
this servility is occasioned by master staying alive. Thus, to probe into the means by which 
Hegel achieved and justified the retention of master’s life provides a critical insight into the 
functioning of Hegelian meaning or discourse.  
 In the Phenomenology Hegel wrote that ‘trial by death […] does away with the truth 
which was supposed to issue from it [i.e. from the struggle for recognition].’1051 Therefore, 
the life and death battle of two self-consciousnesses results in the dialectic of master and 
slave wherein, eschewing death, each self-consciousness continues to live. Derrida 
interpreted this continuation as an ‘economy of life’ for the reasons that will become clear 
below.1052 Central to this economy is Hegel’s treatment of the notion of negativity. Derrida 
explained this treatment by distinguishing between two forms of negativity. The first of these 
forms is abstract negativity; 
[t]o rush headlong into death pure and simple is thus to risk the 
absolute loss of meaning […] One risks losing the effect and profit 
of meaning which were the very stakes one hoped to win. Hegel 
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called this mute and nonproductive death, this death pure and simple, 
abstract negativity […]1053 
Opposed to such unproductive death, Derrida noted, Hegel had recourse to ‘the negation 
characteristic of consciousness, which cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains 
what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated.’1054 In other words, Hegel opted 
for a form of negation that does not amount to pure and simple death. This option is, 
however, both paradoxical and, as such, it engenders what Derrida called an economy of 
life.  
 Initially, in the preface, Hegel ‘places knowledge at the height of death.’1055 Kojève 
also reiterated this placement by stating that ‘Man is, in his human or speaking existence, 
only a death.’1056 Ultimately, however, in the life and death struggle of two self-
consciousnesses, neither of them experiences death. As we observed in the previous chapter, 
through sublation (that is to say, negation characteristic of consciousness) two self-
consciousnesses understand the essentiality of life, thus each survive the struggle. Despite 
the fact that initially Hegel placed knowledge at the height of death, it is the survival of both 
self-consciousnesses which ensures the meaning is not lost. This survival, in Derrida’s view, 
is an economy for the very reason that it carefully conserves life within what Kojève insisted 
was a philosophy of death. 
 More importantly, Derrida viewed the notion of sublation as the ruse by which Hegel 
achieved the aforementioned economy.1057  This view echoes Bataille’s assessment that in 
order for one to gain consciousness of one’s own death he or she has to die but must do so 
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while living, and that, in light of the impossibility of such consciousness, subterfuge 
becomes necessary. Derrida explained that  
[t]hrough a ruse of life, that is, of reason, life has thus stayed alive 
[…] This life is not natural life, the biological existence put at stake 
in lordship, but an essential life that is welded to the first one, holding 
it back, making it work for the constitution of self-consciousness, 
truth, and meaning. Such is the truth of life. Through this recourse to 
the [Sublation], which conserves stakes, remains in control of play, 
limiting it and elaborating it by giving it form and meaning, this 
economy of life restricts itself to conservation, to circulation and 
self-reproduction as the reproduction of meaning; henceforth, 
everything covered by the name of lordship collapses into 
comedy.1058 
In the opening section of this part, I referred to Derrida’s question on whether Bataille’s 
notion of sovereignty ‘at first glance, translate[s] the lordship of Phenomenology.’1059 To 
the extent that lord endured the anguish of death and maintained death’s work, it did 
resemble Bataille’s notion of sovereignty. Nonetheless, as Derrida suggested, this 
resemblance pertained only to the initial glance since a careful analysis revealed that 
lordship consisted not of enduring the anguish of death but of a ruse which engendered a 
restricted economy of life. Therefore, Derrida came to the conclusion that Hegel’s notion of 
Sublation signified ‘the busying of a discourse losing its breath as it reappropriates all 
negativity for itself, as it works the “putting at stake” into an investment, as it amortizes 
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absolute expenditure.’1060 In stark contrast to the restrictive economy, or the servile 
condition of lordship is Bataille’s notion of sovereignty. 
 In the previous part, I referred to Bataille’s definition of sovereignty in the third 
volume of his Accursed Share as consisting of ‘an aspect that is opposed to the servile and 
the subordinate.’1061 In order to distinguish sovereignty from the servility of knowledge, 
Bataille argued that the consciousness of the sovereign moment could only be attained in 
unknowing.1062 The manner in which one attained such unknowing contrasted with the 
servile operation of knowledge wherein calculated effort is directed towards a useful end 
over a duration.1063  As we observed in the previous part of this chapter, opposed to this 
operation is the notion of miracle. Bataille explained that unknowing consisted of the 
nullification of every function of knowing within one’s self.1064 The significance of miracle 
lay in the uncalculated reaction, an unreasoned or playful impulse which it evoked; it is only 
with this evocation that one is thrusted, in Bataille’s perspective, from the anticipation of 
future instrumental to the servile function of knowing into the sovereign moment of the 
present.1065 Recalling from the first part of this section, laughter, poetry, tragedy, comedy, 
the funeral horror, beauty, the sacred, and play would occasion such miracle — all of which 
were absent from Hegel’s schema of absolute knowledge.1066 
 The distinction between the servility of knowledge and the sovereignty of 
unknowing informed Derrida’s interpretation of negativity-without-reserve. Expanding 
upon Hegel’s reappropriation of negativity for the purposes of meaning and absolute 
knowledge, Derrida noted that in giving meaning to death Hegel concurrently blinded 
                                               
1060 Ibid, p.324. In Glas, Derrida expressed this restricted economy by defining Aufhebung (i.e. Sublation) as 
‘the dying away, the amortization, of death.’ As such, Sublation amounted, in Derrida’s view, to ‘the economic 
law of absolute reappropriation of the absolute loss.’ Derrida J., Glas, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1986) p.133. 
1061 Bataille (1993) op. cit. at p.197.  
1062 Ibid, p.203. 
1063 Ibid, p.202. 
1064 Ibid, p.203.  
1065 Ibid, p.209.  
1066 Ibid, p.230. 
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himself ‘to the baselessness of the nonmeaning [that is to say, of death] from which the basis 
of meaning is drawn.’1067 Opposed to such blind meaning is, however, the notion of 
sovereignty which consists of the moment of unknowing (or, in this context, nonmeaning) 
and is attained through the miraculousness of play, of beauty, or of death. Sovereignty 
renders Hegel’s blindness intelligible for the reason that it corresponds to the absolute 
expenditure. Derrida explained that for Hegel,  
destruction, suppression, death and sacrifice constitute so 
irreversible an expenditure, so radical a negativity — here we would 
have to say an expenditure and a negativity without reserve — that 
they can no longer be determined as negativity in a process of 
system. In discourse, (the unity of process and system), negativity is 
always the underside and accomplice of positivity. Negativity cannot 
be spoken of, nor has it ever been except in this fabric of meaning.1068   
Sovereignty, however, is absolute expenditure or corresponds to ‘the point of nonreserve’ 
for it is not oriented towards a meaning; more precisely, as mentioned above, it is the very 
moment at which knowing is suspended rendering meaning impossible through laughter, 
play, and/or beauty.1069  
 In his overall scheme of absolute knowledge, Hegel excluded notions of play and 
beauty. Bondsman’s obligations to keep desire in check and to work upon the object 
consumed by lord underlie the servile condition of Hegelian meaning. Bataille interpreted 
this condition as Hegel’s failure to attain an authentic notion of sovereignty. Following 
Bataille, Derrida demonstrated that a ruse is operative in Hegel’s notion of Sublation which 
reappropriates negativity for the purposes of the restrictive economy of meaning. Bataille’s 
idea of sovereignty, however, corresponded, in Derrida’s view, to an empty form of 
                                               
1067 Derrida, op. cit. at p.325. 
1068 Ibid, p.327.  
1069 Ibid. 
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Sublation.1070 Unburdened by the restrictive economy of meaning, this latter form enables 
absolute expenditure for, therein, negativity does not function as a ruse in the service of 
meaning but seeks out its radical end: 
[t]o go to the end both of absolute rending and of the negative 
without measure, without reserve, is not progressively to pursue 
logic to the point at which, within discourse, the Sublation (discourse 
itself) makes logic collaborate with the constitution […] of meaning. 
On the contrary, it is convulsively to tear apart the negative side, that 
which makes it the reassuring other surface of the positive; and it is 
to exhibit within the negative, in an instant, that which can no longer 
be called negative […] precisely because it has no reserved 
underside, because it can no longer permit itself to be converted into 
positivity, because it can no longer collaborate with the continuous 
linking-up of meaning […]1071  
With the possibility of a negative-without-reserve, sovereignty exposes not only the limits 
of discourse but also ‘the beyond of absolute knowledge.’1072      
 In the previous part, I referred to Bataille’s argument that Hegel failed to attain an 
authentic notion of sovereignty but that this failure was ‘weighty with sense’ as Hegel did 
not know with what precision he demonstrated the intimate movement of negativity.1073 
According to Derrida, this was a movement of absolute expenditure. Contrary to lordship’s 
restricted economy, this expenditure follows negativity through to its unreserved end. This 
end occasions a negative-without-reserve which, torn of its positive side, could not be 
utilised in the servile function of meaning. Equipped with such form of negative, sovereignty 
                                               
1070 Ibid, p.348. 
1071 Ibid, p.328. [my emphasis] 
1072 Ibid, p.330.  
1073 Bataille (1997) op. cit. at p.293.  
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exposes the limit of discourse and the beyond of absolute knowledge.1074 Derrida explained 
that to relate discourse to sovereignty is ‘to institute a relation in the form of a nonrelation, 
to inscribe rupture in the text, to place the chain of discursive knowledge in relation to an 
unknowledge which is not a moment of knowledge: an absolute unknowledge from whose 
nonbasis is launched chance, or the wagers of meaning, history, and the horizons of absolute 
knowledge.’1075 Such a relation marks the possibility of ‘an interminable negation which 
cannot be assimilated, represented, or even thought.’1076 Hegel did not know to what extent 
he was right because he contained such possibility by working negative to the servile ends 
of absolute knowledge blinding himself to what may lie beyond this knowledge.  
 
Conclusion 
 At the outset of this chapter, I pointed out that Hegel concluded his section on master 
and slave with the declaration that servile consciousness amounted to the truth of 
independent consciousness. Despite the fact that in the previous chapter I engaged with the 
repercussions of the dialectic of lord and bondsman upon the process of recognition, this 
engagement did not entail a specific focus upon the effects of the culmination of this process 
in servile consciousness. I took the consequences of servile consciousness into account in 
the current chapter. Similar to the preceding chapter, Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s thought 
comprised the starting point of my scrutiny. 
 Thus, in the first part of the chapter, I presented Kojève’s perception of Hegel’s work 
as a philosophy of death wherein consciousness of mortality played an elemental role in 
man’s struggle against nature. Insofar as man created human reality by dissociating himself 
from nature, such dissociation necessitated death of the animal in man. However, this death 
would entail the demise of the biological support man needed to survive. In light of the 
                                               
1074 Derrida, op. cit. at p.330.  
1075 Ibid, pp. 339, 340.   
1076 Kellog C., Law’s Trace: From Hegel to Derrida, (New York: Routledge, 2010) p.49. 
   317
inherent paradox of humans’ negation of nature, Kojève understood the notion of negation 
as death postponed. Epitomising the necessity of this deferral, consciousness of mortality 
was, thus, sufficient for man to create his human reality. 
 In the second part of the chapter, I presented a critical approach to the idea of 
consciousness of death by referring to Bataille’s understanding that a paradox inheres in 
such consciousness which can only be overcome by subterfuge. To the extent that sacrifice 
comprised such a subterfuge, Bataille argued that Hegel ignored the lessons of this sacrifice 
to limit the role of negation to servile operation of absolute knowledge. By contrasting 
Hegel’s notion of absolute knowledge to his understanding of sovereignty, Bataille 
demonstrated a blind spot in Hegel’s discourse by which Hegel ignored the possibility of a 
beyond of absolute knowledge. Thus, through a life and death struggle, the process of 
recognition culminated in servile consciousness which held desire in check and laboured to 
attain absolute knowledge by excluding actual death, poetry, beauty, laughter, and anything 
with an element of sovereignty or a connection to the unknown that could undermine the 
absoluteness of Hegel’s knowledge.   
 In the final part of this chapter, I relied upon Derrida’s reading of Bataille’s critique 
to identify the repercussion of servile consciousness as an economy that restricts the very 
function of recognition. Derrida traced this economy to the ruse of life inherent to the notion 
of sublation, to negation that is peculiar to consciousness. The ruse pertained to the condition 
of lord which Derrida juxtaposed against Bataille’s notion of sovereignty. While sovereignty 
tarried with the concept of negative to its radical end, lord stayed alive to contain this concept 
within the servility of Hegelian discourse. Three lessons can be derived from this 
juxtaposition. Firstly, as an outcome of lordship and bondsman, relations of dominance and 
dependence effect a restrictive economy upon recognition. Secondly, this economy produces 
a particular type of subject which conforms to the very discourse the economy serves. 
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Finally, transgression of such an economy is possible only if limits of the ostensibly absolute 
discourse are exposed. 
 In the conclusion of the thesis, I draw an analogy between Derrida's critique of 
Hegel’s discourse on absolute knowledge and Vattel’s notion of absolute sovereignty. The 
purposes of this analogy are twofold. The first object is to expose a restrictive economy of 
recognition within the context of international relations wherein one-sided recognition is 
maintained through relations of dependence and domination. The second purpose is to argue 
that the transgression of such an economy is possible through re-conception of the 
international subject as one that is always in flux. This re-conception will depart from the 
perception of statehood as always closed and complete-in-itself, from the very form of 
subject that conforms to the discourse of absolute sovereignty. Overall, therefore, the 
analogy will help me to relate the discussion of Hegel’s notion of recognition and the 
dialectic of lordship and bondsman back to international law, and to clarify the move from 
the subject of recognition in the Phenomenology to the international subject in international 
law.   
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CONCLUSION  
 
 The central thesis I developed here is that recognition is imperative for the 
constitution of subjects under international law, that the criteria of statehood must be 
supplemented with recognition to reflect an accurate perception of international personality. 
As opposed to a notion of statehood which is closed and complete-in-itself, and, can, thus, 
be attained on an individualistic basis, I argued for an international subject which is always 
in flux, is determined by its relations to its others. I built the thesis upon two premises. The 
first premise is that, entities cannot survive without relations of recognition, that, these 
relations are constitutive of the very being of each entity. Secondly, the prevalent theories 
of recognition of states fail to account for such relational coming-into-being of the 
international subject. I established these premises in the first three chapters of the thesis and 
moved on to suggest an alternative approach to recognition by adopting Hegel’s theory 
presented in the Phenomenology. In the remaining chapters of the thesis, I considered the 
difficulties utilisation of Hegel’s theory on an ad hoc basis posed and the lessons overcoming 
of these difficulties entailed.  
 I established the initial premise in the first two chapters with a case-study on the 
political impasse surrounding the Turkish Cypriot community. In the first chapter, I focused 
upon Turkish Cypriots’ relations with Britain, the Greek Cypriot community of Cyprus, 
Greece, and Turkey to demonstrate the manner in which these relations determined the 
existence of the Turkish Cypriot community. This determination was reflected in the 1960 
constitution which created a carefully balanced state structure, defining and requiring the 
communities to cooperate in their practice of sovereignty.   
 In the second chapter, I focused upon the development of Turkish Cypriots’ relations 
and the ways in which these developments affected the very being of the community. The 
armed struggle of 1963 followed three years of tense constitutional crises and confined the 
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Turkish Cypriot community into isolated life in enclaves. Thus, the year of 1963 marked the 
collapse of the constitutional system and, hence, the loss of sovereign share of power for the 
Turkish Cypriot community. A series of futile negotiations in the aftermath of 1963 
culminated, eventually, in a coup d’état and an external military intervention. These double 
military occasions of 1974 resulted in the geographical separation of the communities 
providing Turkish Cypriots with the relative safety of the northern part of the island and 
renewed opportunities for regaining some form of sovereignty to ensure the existence of 
their community. Consequent to further failures at the negotiation table, in 1983, the 
community unilaterally declared independence. However, this declaration was instantly 
rejected by the United Nations whose Security Council called for its non-recognition.  
 I concluded the case study by focusing upon international isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriot community through prohibitions on direct trade and travel, and non-recognition of 
property rights.  I demonstrated the resultant dependence of the community upon financial 
support from Turkey and highlighted the political vulnerability this dependence engendered. 
I showed that the dire consequences of dependence upon Turkey and unwillingness of Greek 
Cypriots to reach a solution with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts produce a political 
impasse which traps the latter community in an existential crisis. The context of this impasse 
is one in which Turkish Cypriots cannot assert their personality as a distinct community 
under international law and this law, in turn, cannot provide any means to ensure that the 
community fends off these existential challenges. 
 In the third chapter of the thesis, I provided an analysis of the prevalent theories of 
recognition of states under international law to establish the second premise that in 
theoretical terms, too, international law fails to account for recognition as a constitutive 
imperative. This analysis comprised an evaluation of the underlying effects of Vattel’s 
notion of absolute sovereignty upon the constitutive and the declarative theories. I traced the 
development of the notion of absolute sovereignty of states initially through the respective 
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works of Bodin and Hobbes. These authors’ perceptions of the notion rested upon the idea 
of a sovereign whose powers were unmatched by any other person within the realm of 
sovereignty but were externally subjected to rules of God or nature. In other words, Bodin 
and Hobbes respectively argued for what may be termed as absolute internal sovereignty. 
Consequent to these internal accounts of sovereignty, I turned to Grotius’ development of 
the notion. The latter thought of this notion within the external domain of international 
relations among states wherein the overbearing powers of God or nature were much 
diminished. Vattel completed this development by not only arguing that the laws of nature 
did not apply to international relations among states as it did to relations between persons, 
but also that the positive laws of nations were based on absolute sovereignty of states that 
are quite independent of each other. My argument was that Vattel’s approach entailed an 
atomistic understanding of state sovereignty that disregarded the difficulties of perceiving 
states as absolute entities with no external relations.  
 My argument vis-à-vis the question of recognition under international law was that 
Vattel’s problematic approach underlay both the constitutive and the declarative theories 
limiting the scope of each theory to the production of a certain form of subject. I argued that 
Vattel’s effect was manifest in constitutive theorists’ perception of recognition as an act of 
sovereign consent which provided established states with the means to sovereignly decide 
whether to be bound by duties and obligations towards newly emerging entities under 
international law. Constitutive approach does not only generate practical concerns for 
enacting such recognition, but it does also fail to account for recognition as a mutually 
constitutive imperative. The proponents of the declarative theory also commit a similar 
failure by limiting their approach to countering these practical difficulties. The essential 
aspect of the declarative theory’s shortcoming is marked by the idea that states can become 
subjects of international law on an ipso facto basis. Responding to the constitutional 
theorists’ separation of statehood from international personality, such a basis presumes that 
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coming-into-being is an individual affair. This presumption, in turn, reflects the underlying 
effect of Vattel’s idea that states, as absolute sovereignties, can ostensibly be quite 
independent from each other.  
 Therefore, in both theory and practice, international law overlooks the significance 
of one’s relations to its others vis-à-vis the establishment of one’s personality. Insofar as this 
oversight necessitates rethinking the role of recognition, in the fourth chapter, I turned to 
Hegel’s work to meet this requirement. Slavoj Žižek demonstrated the aptness of this turn 
when he commented upon Hegel’s perception of identity: 
How are we to determine [what Hegel calls] identity? If we try to 
seize the thing as it is “in itself,” irrespective of its relationships to 
other things, its specific identity eludes us, we cannot say anything 
about it, the thing coincides with all other things.1077  
To present a theory of recognition that departs from the study of the in-itself, and essentially 
accommodates one’s relations to its others as the constitutive element of one’s personality, 
I focused upon Hegel’s account of consciousness’ transformation into self-consciousness 
through mutual recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit.  This transformation takes place 
as one’s reflection into one’s self by mediating through otherness, a form of mutual 
recognition that creates an intersubjective I, an I that is We and We that is I.   
 In other words, Hegel’s perception of a free and independent subject is established 
through subject’s relation to its other that mutually constitutes both parties as subjects 
capable of such freedom. Hegel’s theory of recognition, thus, introduces an intersubjective 
element into a system of freedom wherein subjects’ connectedness becomes the means that 
ensure each person’s freedom. The question then is whether this theory can be adopted to 
account for international personality whereby the relational element of coming-into-being is 
                                               
1077 Žižek S., Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1993) p.130. [my emphasis] 
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thus accounted for. I referred to three examples in which Hegel’s notion of recognition was 
employed to account for different forms of subjects. Firstly, I considered Axel Honneth’s 
idea of moral subjects which was constructed upon the understanding that relations of 
recognition sustained a uniform level of morality based on persons’ willingness to limit their 
individual liberties in their relations to others. Secondly, I considered Charles Taylor’s 
concept of cultural subjects. This concept was built upon the idea that the honour-oriented 
hierarchical societies of the pre-modern age gave way for the modern age in which equal 
dignity of all human beings are acknowledged. Taylor utilised Hegel’s notion of lord and 
bondsman to demonstrate the failure of such pre-modern societies and emphasised the role 
mutuality of recognition played in achieving such transformation between the ages.  The 
focal point of Taylor’s work was that recognition of cultural identities of groups which 
existed within multicultural societies were essential for each group’s survival. Finally, I 
considered Costas Douzinas’ utilisation of Hegel’s theory of recognition to criticise liberal 
perception of legal subject as monological and abstract. Through Hegel’s notion of self-
consciousness, Douzinas argued that legal subjects, too, came into being through one’s 
relation to an other, that recognition, therefore, played an important part in the constitution 
of persons as subjects of legal rights.    
 Several issues arise with my attempt to extrapolate Hegel’s theory of recognition to 
the constitution of international subjects. The first of these is whether the Hegelian terms 
that indicate the movements of human consciousness, such as, desire, self-certainty, and 
self-consciousness are also applicable to movements of states in their relations as 
international subjects. In Taylor’s perspective, for instance, individuals, and communities 
alike, understand the importance of mutually recognising each other’s esteem. In what way 
would such recognition be interpreted for relations among states? Vattel’s underlying notion 
of absolute sovereignty can be pivotal in our understanding of how a state may desire the 
desire of another state or be willing to enter into a life and death struggle for self-certainty.  
   324
 Beginning with Bodin’s and progressing to Vattel’s accounts, the notion of 
sovereignty is developed from one established internally to one asserted externally. In 
Hegelian terms, this can be interpreted as sovereignty determined initially as in-itself 
whereby a state can be certain of its independence. Later on, the certainty of this self-
knowledge is to be tested as the state has, at some point of its existence, to externally assert 
its sovereignty. Similar to the movements of Hegelian self-consciousness, such externality 
may only be achieved by an encounter with an outsider. In other words, sovereignty can 
only remain in-itself until the moment of the encounter. If this self-certainty is threatened, 
each state will be ready to enter into a life and death struggle to assure itself and the other 
of their independence and absolute detachment. Interpreted through the notion of absolute 
sovereignty, relations among states present similar trends to the moments that lead up to 
Hegel’s theory of recognition. Insofar as the Hegelian human subject needs self-
consciousness to attain the I that is We and We that is I, the state, as the international subject, 
needs the reciprocity from its other to ensure that sovereignty that exists in-itself also equally 
exists for and is mutually accepted by others.  
 Hegel’s theory of recognition provides an apt theoretical framework to account for 
such reciprocity; however, in the Phenomenology, this reciprocity is conditioned by the 
struggle between lordship and bondsman, and the resultant truth of servile consciousness. In 
chapters five and six, I engaged with two challenges that the struggle and its result presented 
for the ad hoc utilisation of recognition. The first related to the teleological reading of the 
effects of lordship and bondsman which suggested that the outcome of Hegel’s theory 
brought an end to history via the attainment of the homogenous and the universal state. This 
challenge pertained to Kojève’s reading of the struggle between master and slave as the 
modus operandi of an history that comes to an end with the reconciliation of the struggle. 
Kojève’s interpretation did not only limit the outcome of recognition to a specific purpose 
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but it also hindered my attempt to deviate from strictly state-centric orientation of the 
prevalent theories of recognition under international law.  
 The second challenge originated from Hegel’s conclusion of the dialectic with the 
notion of servile consciousness and the interpretation that linked this conclusion to the 
prevalence of the notion of death in Hegel’s thought. The point of reference for this 
challenge was again Kojève’s reading wherein the latter argued that the former’s philosophy 
is a philosophy of death. This argument brought to the fore the notion of negation and 
highlighted humans’ consciousness of their mortality as the cornerstone of human reality. 
The question Kojève’s second reading raised was the extent to which one could appropriate 
a theory of recognition to account for the constitution of international subjects if that theory 
culminated in the production of servile consciousnesses with an inclination towards facing 
up to death.   
 I addressed the first challenge in the fifth chapter by relying upon Nancy’s perception 
of negative as restless. This perception derived from Hegel’s theoretical framework of 
recognition a form of subject which is always in flux, is constantly determined by its relation 
to an other — a relation that never has a beginning nor an end. As the embodiment of the 
power of the negative, the very first mediation of the subject takes place as the negation of 
the immediate moments of being and nothingness, and this mediation determines the subject 
as becoming, as that which can only come to be by being with an other, by being in a 
ceaseless relation that constantly shapes the very being of each subject. The idea of subjects 
in constant flux overcomes the possibility that such a restless mediation can come to a 
teleological end in any form of end-of-history reconciliation of the struggle between lord 
and bondsman. 
 I engaged with the second challenge in the sixth chapter. I relied upon Derrida’s 
work to interpret the servile outcome of Hegel’s theory as a restricted economy which 
produced, reproduced and circulated a particular form of subject. In Hegel’s thought, this 
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was a subject that held desire in check and conformed in its labours to the discourse of 
absolute knowledge. Derrida derived the notion of restricted economy from Bataille’s 
criticism of Kojève’s reading. I showed that this criticism focused upon the subterfuge 
prevalent in Hegel’s thought as humans cannot become conscious of death unless they die 
first, and such an act would, in turn, render it impossible to gain consciousness. Insofar as 
subterfuge is necessary to retain the discourse on absolute knowledge, Bataille argued that 
the sovereign aspect of death, the true potential of actual negation, is disregarded by Hegel. 
Bataille’s comparison between the latter’s notion of servile knowledge and the former’s 
perception of sovereignty without any servile limits exposed a blind spot in Hegel’s thought. 
Derrida drew upon this blind spot to interpret Hegelian notion of lordship as imposing a 
restricted economy upon recognition by holding desire in check, by opting for consciousness 
of death, instead of working negation to its radical end — an end which would, in turn, 
reveal the limits of absolute discourse.  
  My references to the Phenomenology, thus, presented a notion of recognition that 
does not readily attain mutuality, and a notion of self-consciousness which is dependent 
upon holding desire in check and labouring upon an object; that is to say, two notions that 
are the outcome of domination, fear, and servile endeavour. Extrapolating Hegel’s notion of 
recognition to states requires understanding whether such trends of domination and servility 
exist in relations among states and what overcoming these trends may entail for statehood 
and international law. My concluding argument is that trends of domination can be identified 
in two modes of relations among states and surpassing these trends is central to rethinking 
recognition vis-à-vis the constitution of international subjects.  
 Firstly, domination pertains to the mode of relation advocated by the constitutive 
theorists. Encompassing a subjective set of criteria for statehood, this form of relation 
permits already established states to dominate new entities by withholding recognition. In 
Oppenheim’s perspective, a newly emerging entity may not be admitted to the Family of 
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Nations without recognition and thus cannot become a subject of international law. In 
Kelsen’s perspective, relative aspect of recognition may render an entity a subject of 
international law for the recognising state and not for the one that does not recognise. In 
other words, established states can subjectively determine the personhood of each emerging 
state retaining the right to be or not to be bound by any obligations towards these entities. 
Such determination would, in turn, amount to one-sided recognition. 
 Another mode of relation is the one between a non-recognised entity and its sponsor 
state. Inherent to this relation is, too, a one-sided recognition as the former entity remains 
heavily dependent upon the latter for economic and military support. I used the case-study 
in chapter two to present the repercussions of such dependence between the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey. The latter professes to recognise the former as an 
independent state however their relation resembles that of the lord and the bondsman; 
Turkey, an independent state, ostensibly recognises the TRNC, a dependent state. In 
Hegelian terms, this is recognition accorded by an essential entity signified by the master. 
In its dependence, the only type of recognition TRNC can offer in return is inessential as 
that of the bondsman. The outcome is that neither of the parties can act as middle term to 
each other, that mutual recognition is impossible as the relation between the non-recognised 
entity and the recognising sponsor state is one of domination, of bondage. However, 
distinguished from Hegel’s servile consciousness, which attains truth of independent 
consciousness via the object upon which it labours, the TRNC lacks the very means to 
achieve such emancipation.     
 One way of surpassing these trends of domination is provided by the proponents of 
declarative theory who dismissed the subjective criteria of statehood. However, central to 
this dismissal was the rejection of recognition as legally constitutive of international 
personality. With such rejection, constitution of the international subject remains an isolated, 
singular affair. One can circumvent such atomism by adopting Nancy’s interpretation of 
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restlessness of negative. This adoption entails understanding statehood as an absolute entity 
that actualises itself. To be able to achieve this realisation, states must be subjects capable 
of movement. This movement can be observed in states’ creation of international law that 
in turn renders states subjects but also determines and safeguards their sovereignty. Such 
sovereignty cannot remain in-itself, it must encompass the mediated moments between 
being and nothingness. As Nancy would have it, the self that emerges from such mediated 
moment of becoming is one that beings with the other, that is constantly determined by its 
relation to its other.   
 Nancy’s interpretation of becoming accentuates the relational element of coming-
into-being, the mutually constitutive and determinative aspect of one’s relation to its other. 
However, this interpretation does not, in itself, provide an alternative means of overcoming 
trends of domination and bondage in two modes of relations I identified above. Nancy’s 
interpretation must, therefore, be supplemented by Derrida’s critique of the restrictive 
economy of recognition for such alternative means. The significance of this critique lies in 
Derrida’s clarification of the effects of lordship, of domination and bondage upon the act of 
recognition as a restricted economy which produces, reproduces and circulates a particular 
form of subject. This is an economy that serves the discourse of absolute knowledge and is 
blind to the underside of this discourse. This service requires lordship to stay alive in the 
face of death, to dominate through subterfuge, to keep the other in bondage wherein desire 
is held in check and servile labour is constant. These elements of lordship, in turn, produce 
a form of subject which conforms to the discourse of absolute knowledge. 
 My argument is that, based on Derrida’s critique, an analogy can be drawn between 
Hegel’s notion of absolute knowledge and Vattel’s notion of absolute sovereignty. This 
analogy will not only help us gain a better understanding of the role of domination identified 
within two modes of relations among states but will also provide theoretical tools to 
circumvent this role. As I pointed out above, domination exists if recognition is one-sided 
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as it would be in Hegel’s idea of lordship and bondsman. Within the context of international 
relations, such one-sidedness prevails if one entity is an already established state and another 
is a newly emerging one that remains dependent upon the former to gain international 
personality. Within these types of relations, the former entity can assert its sovereignty 
against the latter. Such assertion is possible if there is no mutuality or no equality of 
sovereignty among two entities. This is a certain lack that pertains to the discourse of 
absolute sovereignty, to the idea that states can be quite independent from each other and 
therefore are absolutely free to decide whether to be bound by obligations arising from the 
emergence of a new entity. One can, therefore, begin to understand that domination serves 
the discourse of absolute sovereignty whereby a particular form of subject is circulated; this 
is a subject which, in its absoluteness, is closed and complete-in-itself.    
 In theoretical terms, the constitutive camp contributes to the restricted economy of 
international subjects by permitting recognition to be one-sided; and the declarative camp 
contributes to this economy by claiming that a state can become an international subject in-
itself, not requiring any form of outward connection. Overcoming the restrictive economy 
is, therefore, conditional upon transgressing the limits of the discourse of absolute 
sovereignty by insisting on a form of subject that is always in flux and, as such, is 
continuously determined by its relation to its other. It is this insistence that brings to the fore 
what were previously excluded by the discourse of absolute sovereignty, namely, 
constitutive element of intersubjective relations and the fact that even absolute has to relate 
to its underside that is non-absolute. It is the latter relation that sets off the dialectical mode 
of becoming and renders one’s relation to an other essential for coming-into-being. Without 
this relation, the absolutely sovereign state is merely an immediate form of being or 
substance which lacks the ability to act and to realise itself.    
 Dialectical mode of becoming presents a more accurate account of statehood for 
which sovereignty is no longer established by the measure of its misconceived absoluteness 
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but is established through an intersubjective set of relations. A new form of international 
subject is conceived through this account; this is the subject which is always in flux, the 
subject whose constant relations to its others continuously determine and reshape its very 
being, the subject which is not complete-in-itself. International law can account for such a 
subject if the criteria of statehood is supplemented by the criterion of recognition that would 
enable taking into account the imperative force of relations. Without the incorporation of 
this force, international subject is bound to remain closed and complete-in-itself and to 
contribute to the problematic discourse of absolute sovereignty.  
 Direst consequences of failing to take into account constitutive aspects of relations 
are clearly discernible in the case study of the Turkish Cypriot community. This study 
demonstrated the effects of the restricted economy of recognition that culminated in the 
domination of a dependent, non-recognised, and thus purportedly inessential entity. The 
advantage of the consolidation of the criteria of statehood with the imperative force of 
relations for such entities is that the question of international personality may no longer be 
fixed or closed by a once-and-for-all decision of international non-recognition. The question 
will remain open to considerations of ongoing relations and their constitutive or destructive 
effects upon entities.  
 Turkish Cypriots’ struggles to assert any form of sovereignty can be divided into 
three categories: the failure to reunite with the Greek Cypriot community under a reformed 
state structure, the impossibility of compelling Turkey to withdraw its troops, and the 
insurmountable decision of the international community not to recognise an independent 
Turkish Cypriot state. Greek Cypriots’ reluctance and Turkey’s overbearing sponsorship 
respectively determine the fate of the first two categories. The aforementioned advantage of 
a reconceived criteria of statehood for the case of the Turkish Cypriot community is, 
therefore, twofold. Firstly, understanding the fluidity of international personality would 
necessitate reopening the international decision of non-recognition to fresh scrutiny. 
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Secondly, such scrutiny would entail taking into account the existential repercussions of the 
relations that determine the first two categories of Turkish Cypriots’ struggles. Without such 
scrutiny, the question of international personality for the Turkish Cypriot community will 
remain within the confines of the restrictive economy of recognition that traps this 
community in an existentially harmful political impasse.  
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